POLYBIUS

Chapter 1 Introduction

If it had happened that the writers before us who recorded events had left out praise of history itself, perhaps it would have been necessary to urge everyone toward choosing and accepting works of this kind, since no correction for human beings is readier than knowledge of past actions.

But since not just some writers, or to some degree, but virtually all of them have used this theme from beginning to end, saying that learning from history is the truest education and training for political action, and that the clearest—and indeed the only—teacher of how to bear the changes of fortune nobly is the memory of other people's reversals,

it is obvious that no one should think it his duty to repeat what has already been well said by many, and least of all I.

For the extraordinary nature of the events I have chosen to write about is enough in itself to challenge and stir every reader, young and old alike, to engage with this work.

For who is so base or idle that he would not want to know how, and under what kind of constitution, nearly the whole inhabited world was conquered and brought under the single rule of Rome in less than fifty-three years—a thing for which no earlier example can be found?

And again, who is so absorbed in other spectacles or studies that he would think anything more important than gaining this knowledge?

Chapter 2 Importance and Magnitude of the Subject

As for how astonishing and great the subject of my work is, nothing will make it clearer than comparing the most famous powers of earlier times—those on which historians have spent most of their words—with the superiority of Rome.

The powers worthy of such comparison are these. The Persians acquired a great empire and dominion for certain periods; but whenever they dared to go beyond the limits of Asia, they endangered not only their empire but their very survival.

The Lacedaemonians disputed the leadership of Greece for many years, but once they gained it, they held it undisputed for barely twelve years.

The Macedonians ruled in Europe from the regions by the Adriatic as far as the Danube, and that would appear to be only a very small part of the continent just mentioned.

Afterward they added rule over Asia by overthrowing the Persian empire. Yet though they seemed to have become masters of more lands and affairs than anyone before them, they still left the greater part of the inhabited world outside their power.

For they never once even attempted to contest Sicily, Sardinia, or Libya, and, to speak plainly, they did not so much as know the most warlike peoples of western Europe.

The Romans, by contrast, made subject to themselves not some parts, but almost the whole inhabited world, and they left behind a supremacy that past ages cannot match and future ages will not surpass.

From the narrative itself it will be possible to see this more clearly, and likewise to understand how great and how numerous are the benefits that practical history naturally offers to those eager to learn.

Chapter 3 The Starting-point of the History

My work will begin, in point of time, with the 140th Olympiad; and in point of events, with the war among the Greeks called the Social War, first undertaken by Philip, son of Demetrius and father of Perseus, together with the Achaeans against the Aetolians; in Asia, with the war for Coele-Syria, which Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator fought against one another;

and in the regions of Italy and Libya, with the war between Romans and Carthaginians, the one most people call the Hannibalic War. These events follow directly on the final point reached in the history of Aratus of Sicyon.

In the times before this, the affairs of the inhabited world were, so to speak, scattered, because each event differed from the others in its plans, in its results, and in its location.

But from this point onward history becomes, as it were, organic: the affairs of Italy and Libya are interwoven with those of Asia and Greece, and all events are referred to one single end.

That is why I have made this period the starting point of my work.

For after defeating the Carthaginians in the war already mentioned, the Romans judged that they had accomplished the chief and greatest part of the task leading to control of the whole world, and so for the first time they dared to stretch out their hands toward what remained and to cross with an army into Greece and the regions of Asia.

Now if the constitutions that contended for world supremacy had been familiar and well known to us, perhaps I would have had no need to explain before my narrative from what purpose or what power they set out when they undertook enterprises of such scale and kind.

But since most Greeks have no ready knowledge of the earlier strength and achievements of either the Roman or the Carthaginian state, I concluded that it was necessary to compose this book and the next before the history proper,

so that no one, once he has come to the narrative itself, may be at a loss and ask with what plans, what forces, and what resources the Romans embarked on those ventures through which they came to control all the land and sea in our part of the world,

but that from these books and the preliminary account in them it may be clear to readers that they set out on their design with entirely reasonable advantages, and that in carrying it through they reached universal rule and dominion.

Chapter 4 Comprehensive View

The special feature of my work, and the marvelous thing about the age we are dealing with, is this: just as Fortune turned almost all the affairs of the inhabited world in one direction and forced them all to incline toward one and the same goal, so too history must bring before its readers, in a single view, the way Fortune handled events to bring the whole to completion.

Indeed this above all is what drew me on and stirred me to undertake this history, along with the fact that no one in our time has attempted a connected account of general events; otherwise I would have been far less eager for this distinction.

As it is, I see many writers treating particular wars and some of the events accompanying them, but as for the general and collective ordering of events—when and from what starting point it began, and how it reached its end—no one, so far as I know, has even tried to investigate it.

I therefore judged it absolutely necessary not to pass over, or allow to pass unnoticed, this finest and most beneficial display of Fortune's workings.

For although Fortune produces many novelties and is constantly contending in the lives of men, she has never before quite simply accomplished such a feat, or staged such a contest, as in our own time.

And this is not something one can grasp from writers of particular histories, any more than someone could think he understood the shape of the whole world, its arrangement and order, by visiting its most famous cities one by one—or, by Zeus, even by looking at them separately in pictures.

In my judgment, those who think they can gain an adequate view of the whole through partial history are much like people who, after seeing the scattered limbs of some once living and beautiful body, imagine that they have become sufficient eyewitnesses of the creature's power and beauty.

But if someone were at once to put the living thing together again and restore it in full, complete in form and in the grace of its life, and then show it to those same people, I think they would quickly admit that earlier they had fallen far short of the truth and had been little better than dreamers.

For from a part one can gain some notion of the whole, but not exact knowledge or sure understanding.

Therefore particular history must be judged to contribute only a very small part toward experience and confidence regarding the whole.

Only through the interweaving and comparison of all the parts together, through their likenesses and differences, can someone attain a full view and, in so doing, draw from history both its usefulness and its pleasure.

Chapter 5 The Romans in Sicily

I shall take as the starting point of this book the first crossing of the Romans from Italy. This follows directly upon the point where Timaeus left off, and it falls in the 129th Olympiad.

So I must explain how and when they secured their position in Italy, and with what opportunities they afterward set out to cross into Sicily; for that was the first land outside Italy on which they set foot.

I must also state the immediate cause of that crossing in simple terms, so that, in searching for the cause of a cause, the beginning of the whole subject and the understanding of it do not become unstable.

We must take as our starting point one that is agreed upon and recognized by everyone in point of time, and in point of events one that can be considered on its own terms, even if this requires us to go back a little in time and make a summary reminder of the events in between.

For if the starting point is unknown, or even disputed, none of what follows can command acceptance or belief; but once an agreed view about the beginning has been established, then the whole continuous narrative finds acceptance with its hearers.

Chapter 6 Roman Dominion in Italy

At that time it was the nineteenth year after the sea battle at Aegospotami and the sixteenth before the battle at Leuctra,

the year in which the Lacedaemonians ratified the peace called the Peace of Antalcidas with the Persian king; in which Dionysius the Elder, after defeating the Greeks of Italy in the battle by the river Elleporus, was besieging Rhegium; and in which the Gauls, after taking Rome itself by storm, held the city except for the Capitol.

The Romans made a treaty and settlement with these Gauls on terms acceptable to them, and, unexpectedly recovering possession of their fatherland, they then took what was in effect the starting point of their rise and in the years that followed made war on their neighboring peoples.

After mastering all the Latins through courage and success in battle, they next fought the Tyrrhenians, then the Celts, and afterward the Samnites, whose territory bordered Latium to the east and north.

Some time later the Tarentines, because of the outrage they had committed against Roman envoys and the fear this caused them, brought over Pyrrhus—in the year before the Gaulish invasion of the region around Delphi, when some of those Gauls were destroyed and others crossed into Asia.

By this time the Romans had made the Tyrrhenians and Samnites subject to themselves and had already defeated the Celts of Italy in many battles; then for the first time they set out against the remaining parts of Italy, fighting not so much for foreign territory as, for the most part, for lands already their own and rightfully attached to them, since their struggles with the Samnites and Celts had made them true athletes in the labors of war.

They bore this war nobly, and in the end drove both Pyrrhus and his forces out of Italy. After that they again made war on the peoples who had joined him and subdued them.

Thus, in a remarkable way, they gained control of all Italy's inhabitants except the Celts; and after this they undertook to besiege the Romans who were then holding Rhegium.

Chapter 7 Messene and Rhegium

A peculiar and similar misfortune befell both the cities built on either side of the strait, Messene and Rhegium.

Not many years before the time now under discussion, Campanians serving as mercenaries under Agathocles had long had greedy eyes on Messene because of the city's beauty and prosperity, and as soon as they found an opportunity they at once attempted a treacherous seizure.

They entered as friends, took possession of the city, drove some of the citizens out, and slaughtered others.

After this, they took for themselves the wives and children of the dispossessed men, each keeping whatever Fortune had assigned him at the very moment of the lawless deed; then they divided up the rest of the property and the land and held them.

Once they had swiftly and easily become masters of a fine land and city, they at once found imitators of their act.

For the people of Rhegium, when Pyrrhus was crossing into Italy, were alarmed by his invasion and also afraid of the Carthaginians because they controlled the sea, and so they drew from the Romans a garrison to guard and support them.

The troops who entered, four thousand in number, under the command of Decius the Campanian, for a while preserved both the city and their pledged faith.

But in the end, envying the Mamertines and taking them as accomplices, they too betrayed the Rhegians, being captivated both by the favorable position of the city and by the prosperity of the Rhegians in their private fortunes; and, after driving some citizens out and killing others, just as the Campanians had done, they seized the city.

The Romans were distressed by what had happened, but they could do nothing because they were occupied by the wars already mentioned.

Once they were free of these, they shut the men up and besieged Rhegium, as I said above.

When they took it, they killed most of them in the actual assault, since the men defended themselves desperately because they foresaw what was coming; but they captured alive more than three hundred.

These men were sent to Rome, and the consuls brought them into the forum, scourged them all according to Roman custom, and then beheaded them, wanting by the punishment of those offenders, so far as they could, to restore their credit for good faith among their allies.

The territory and city they immediately gave back to the Rhegians.

Chapter 8 The Rise of Hiero II

The Mamertines—for that was the name the Campanians gave themselves after they had taken possession of Messene—so long as they enjoyed the alliance of the Romans who held Rhegium not only remained securely in control of their own city and territory, but also caused no small trouble to the Carthaginians and Syracusans in the neighboring region, and exacted tribute from many parts of Sicily.

But when they were deprived of that support, after the men who held Rhegium had been shut up under siege, they in turn were quickly driven back into their city by the Syracusans, for reasons such as these.

Not long before this, the forces of Syracuse had quarreled with the citizens and, while encamped near Mergane, appointed commanders from among themselves: Artemidorus and Hiero, who afterward became king of Syracuse. He was still very young, but he had a natural gift for royal leadership and practical administration.

When he took over the command and, through certain relatives, made his way into the city and gained control over his political opponents, he handled affairs so mildly and nobly that the Syracusans, though they did not usually approve officers elected by the soldiers, were on this occasion unanimous in ratifying Hiero as their general.

From his very first measures it was immediately clear to those who judged rightly that he was aiming at ambitions greater than the office of general.

Chapter 9 Hiero Defeats the Mamertines

For he saw that whenever the Syracusans sent out their forces and their commanders with them, they themselves at home were always falling into faction and some new political disturbance.

And since he knew that Leptines stood far above the other citizens both in influence and in trustworthiness, and was especially well regarded by the common people, he formed a marriage connection with him, wanting to leave him in the city as something like a reserve support whenever he himself had to go out with the army on campaign.

After marrying the daughter of the man mentioned, and observing that the old mercenaries were disaffected and turbulent, he led out an expedition ostensibly against the foreigners who held Messene.

He encamped opposite them near Centuripa and drew up his line by the river Cyamosorus. The citizen cavalry and infantry he kept with himself at a distance, as though he intended to engage the enemy at another point; but he pushed the mercenaries forward and allowed them all to be destroyed by the foreigners.

At the moment of their rout, he himself safely withdrew with the citizens to Syracuse.

Thus he carried out his purpose with skill and eliminated the whole turbulent and seditious element in the army. After recruiting for himself a sufficient number of mercenaries, he now managed the government in security.

Seeing that the foreigners, emboldened by their previous success, were behaving with daring and recklessness, he thoroughly armed and drilled the citizen forces, led them out, and engaged the enemy on the Mylaean plain near the river called Longanus.

He inflicted a severe rout on them and captured their leaders alive, thereby putting an end to the boldness of the foreigners; and when he came to Syracuse he was hailed as king by all the allies.

Chapter 10 The Mamertines and Rome

The Mamertines, then, first lost the support that came from Rhegium, as I said above, and then, because of the causes just described, suffered complete failure in their own affairs. Some of them fled to the Carthaginians and put themselves and the citadel into their hands;

others sent envoys to the Romans, surrendering the city and asking for help on the ground that they were of the same stock.

The Romans were at a loss for a long time because the irrationality of giving such aid was obvious.

For after having only a little earlier inflicted the severest punishment on their own citizens because they had broken faith with the Rhegians, to seek at once to help the Mamertines, who had done much the same thing not only to the Messenians but also to the Rhegians, seemed an error impossible to defend.

Yet although they were fully aware of this, they also saw that the Carthaginians had made subject to themselves not only many parts of Libya, but also many parts of Iberia,

and that they furthermore held all the islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian seas. They were anxious that, if the Carthaginians also gained control of Sicily,

they would become exceedingly burdensome and formidable neighbors, surrounding them on every side and threatening every part of Italy.

And it was clear that the Carthaginians would quickly bring Sicily under their power if the Mamertines did not get help.

For once Messene had been handed over to them and they had taken possession of it, they were likely in a short time to take Syracuse as well, since they already controlled almost all the rest of Sicily. Foreseeing this, and judging it necessary not to abandon Messene or allow the Carthaginians, as it were, to bridge the crossing into Italy for themselves, the Romans deliberated for a long time.

Chapter 11 Rome Supports the Mamertines

The senate did not finally ratify the decision because of the reasons just given; for the absurdity of helping the Mamertines seemed evenly balanced against the advantages to be gained from that help.

The people, however, worn down by the previous wars and needing every kind of recovery, and hearing the generals point out not only the public advantage of the war but also the obvious and considerable private benefits that each man would gain, decided to send aid.

Once the decree had been ratified by the people, they appointed one of the consuls, Appius Claudius, as commander and sent him out with orders to assist and to cross over to Messene.

The Mamertines, partly by intimidation and partly by trickery, drove out the Carthaginian commander who had already taken possession of the citadel; and they invited Appius in and placed the city in his hands.

The Carthaginians crucified their commander, judging that he had surrendered the citadel both foolishly and cowardly.

They themselves encamped with their naval force near Pelorias, and with their land army near the place called Synes, and pressed the siege of Messene vigorously.

At this time Hiero, thinking the situation well suited for driving the foreigners who held Messene completely out of Sicily, made an agreement with the Carthaginians.

After this he marched out from Syracuse against the city just mentioned, and encamping on the other side near the place called Chalcidian Mount, cut off the men in the city from that exit as well.

The Roman commander Appius crossed the strait by night in a bold passage and came to Messene.

But when he saw the enemy pressing hard from every side and considered that the siege would be both shameful and dangerous for him, since the enemy controlled both land and sea,

he first sent envoys to both parties, wanting to remove the Mamertines from the war altogether.

When neither side paid attention to him, he was at last compelled to hazard a battle and decided to attack the Syracusans first.

So he led his force out and drew it up for battle, and the king of the Syracusans readily came down to join the contest.

After fighting for a long time, Appius prevailed over the enemy and drove them all back as far as their stockade.

Appius then stripped the dead and returned again to Messene, while Hiero, taking a foreboding about the outcome of the larger struggle, withdrew in haste to Syracuse when night came.

Chapter 12 Appius Drives Off the Carthaginians

On the next day, when Appius learned of the withdrawal of the force just mentioned and so became confident, he decided not to delay but to attack the Carthaginians.

He therefore ordered the soldiers to make their preparations on time, and at first light he led them out.

When he engaged the enemy, he killed many of them and forced the rest to flee headlong into the neighboring towns.

Taking advantage of this success and raising the siege, he then marched through the country without fear, ravaging the territory both of the Syracusans and of their allies, since no one disputed his control of the open country; and at last he sat down before Syracuse itself and undertook to besiege it.

Such was the first Roman crossing from Italy with an army, and such were the causes and circumstances in which it took place.

Judging this to be the most fitting beginning for my whole design, I made it the point at which to take my stand, while going back in time so as to leave no difficulty unresolved in explaining the causes.

For I thought it necessary, if we were to follow what is to come and gain a proper general view of the main source of Rome's present supremacy, to see clearly how and when, after suffering disaster in their own fatherland, the Romans began to advance to a better position, and again how and when, after mastering Italy, they turned to enterprises beyond it.

So there is no need to be surprised if later on as well I sometimes go back in time when speaking of the most distinguished states.

For I will do this in order to take beginnings from which it will be possible to see clearly from what conditions, and when and how, each people set out and arrived at the position in which they now stand. That is exactly what I have just done in the case of the Romans.

Chapter 13 The First Punic War; Plan of the First Two Books

Now that I have said enough about these preliminary matters, it is time to turn to my main subject, after briefly and summarily setting out the events covered in the introductory books.

First in order come the events that befell Romans and Carthaginians in the war over Sicily.

Next comes the Libyan War, followed by the affairs in Iberia carried out by Hamilcar and after him by Hasdrubal on behalf of the Carthaginians.

In the same period occurred the Romans' first crossing into Illyria and those parts of Europe, and after the events already mentioned their struggles with the Celts in Italy.

At the same time among the Greeks the war called the Cleomenic War was in progress, and with that war I have made the conclusion of the whole introduction and of the second book.

To enumerate each separate event in detail from all these matters is neither necessary for me nor useful for my audience.

For I do not propose to write their full history; I intend only to mention them in summary as a preparation for the events I am going to narrate.

Accordingly, by touching the main points in order, I will try to join the end of the introduction continuously to the beginning and purpose of my history.

For if the narrative proceeds in this connected way, it will seem reasonable that I touch on matters already narrated by others, and readers eager to learn will, because of such an arrangement, find their approach to what follows easy and intelligible.

I shall, however, try to discuss with a little more care the first war that arose between Rome and Carthage over Sicily.

For it would not be easy to find a war longer than this one, or one involving fuller preparations, more continuous action, more numerous struggles, or greater reversals on both sides.

Moreover, at that period both states still had their institutions in uncorrupted vigor, their fortunes still moderate, and their powers fairly equal.

Therefore anyone who wants a good view of the character and strength of the two constitutions should make the comparison on the basis of this war rather than the ones that followed.

Chapter 14 Philinus and Fabius Pictor

I was prompted to dwell on this war not only by the reasons already given, but also because the two men thought to write about it with the greatest expertise, Philinus and Fabius, have not in my view reported the truth adequately.

I do not think these men lied deliberately, judging from their lives and their principles; rather, they seem to me to have suffered something much like lovers do.

Because of partisan choice and deep attachment, Philinus thinks the Carthaginians did everything wisely, honorably, and bravely, while the Romans did the opposite; Fabius takes exactly the reverse view.

In ordinary life perhaps one would not reject this kind of feeling altogether. A good man ought to love his friends and his country, to hate his friends' enemies with them, and to love the people they love.

But whenever someone takes up the character of history, he must forget all such considerations, and must often speak well of his enemies and crown them with the highest praise when their actions require it, and often rebuke and censure his closest associates with the sharpest reproach when their errors in conduct make that necessary.

For just as a living creature, once deprived of sight, becomes useless as a whole, so if truth is taken away from history, what is left becomes an unprofitable tale.

Therefore one must not hesitate to accuse friends or praise enemies, nor shrink from blaming and at other times commending the same people, since those engaged in public affairs cannot always succeed, nor is it likely that they always fail.

So we must stand apart from the actors themselves and in our written records fit our statements and judgments to the actions themselves.

And that what I have just said is true can be seen from the following.

Chapter 15 Misrepresentations of Philinus and Fabius

The truth of what I have said can be seen from the following examples. Philinus, at the very beginning of his narrative and of his second book, states that the Carthaginians and the Syracusans were jointly besieging Messene, having sat down before it for war.

He says that when the Romans arrived by sea and entered the city, they at once marched out against the Syracusans; that after taking heavy losses they fell back into Messene; and that when they next went out against the Carthaginians, they not only suffered heavy losses but also lost a considerable number of their soldiers taken alive.

Having said this, he then claims that after the engagement Hiero so far lost his head that he not only immediately burned his palisade and tents and fled by night to Syracuse, but also abandoned every one of the forts that had been positioned to hold down Messenian territory.

In the same way, he says, the Carthaginians too, right after the battle, abandoned their palisade, split up among the various towns, and no longer dared even to contest the open country; and that, in consequence, their commanders, seeing that their men had been thoroughly demoralized, resolved not to decide the issue by battle.

The Romans, he goes on, followed them up, and not only ravaged the territory of the Carthaginians and Syracusans, but even sat down before Syracuse itself and set about besieging it.

All of this, as it seems to me, is utterly absurd, and needs no refutation whatsoever.

For the very men whom he first set up as besieging Messene and winning the engagements, he goes on to present as fleeing, withdrawing from the open country, and in the end being besieged and broken in spirit.

And those whom he first put forward as defeated and besieged, he ends by showing as pursuing the enemy, immediately gaining control of the open country, and finally besieging Syracuse.

These statements cannot possibly be reconciled with one another—how could they?—but it must be that either his opening assumptions are false, or else his account of what followed.

In fact, the latter are true: the Carthaginians and Syracusans did withdraw from the open country, and the Romans did press on the heels of the war against Syracuse, and—as he himself says—against Echetla too, which lies in the middle of the territory of the Syracusans and Carthaginians.

It remains, then, that we must admit that the premises and opening assumptions are false, and that, although the Romans were in fact victorious from the outset in the engagements around Messene, they have been reported to us by this writer as defeated.

One could find Philinus to be like this throughout the whole of his work, and Fabius likewise, as will be demonstrated in connection with the events themselves.

Now that I have said what is fitting about this digression, I will return to the events and try, by always adding the next part of the account, to bring my readers in brief compass to a true understanding of the war I have been describing.

Chapter 16 King Hiero and Rome

When news of the successes of Appius and the legions reached Rome from Sicily, the Romans appointed Manius Otacilius and Manius Valerius as consuls and dispatched their entire force, together with both generals, to Sicily.

The Romans have, all told and apart from the allies, four Roman legions, which they enroll each year; each of these consists of four thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry.

When these forces arrived, most of the cities revolted both from the Carthaginians and from the Syracusans, and went over to the Romans.

Hiero, observing the confusion and dismay of the Sicilians, and at the same time the numbers and crushing weight of the Roman legions, reasoned from all this that the prospects of the Romans were brighter than those of the Carthaginians.

Inclining therefore in his calculations toward this side, he sent messages to the consuls, proposing terms of peace and friendship.

The Romans accepted, chiefly on account of supplies.

For since the Carthaginians commanded the sea, they were anxious that they might be cut off on every side from their necessities—warned by the fact that the troops who had crossed earlier had run into severe shortage of provisions.

And so, supposing that Hiero would be of great service to them in this respect, they gladly accepted his friendship.

They made a treaty on these terms: that the king should return his prisoners to the Romans without ransom, and pay them in addition a hundred talents of silver. From then on the Romans treated the Syracusans as friends and allies.

King Hiero, having placed himself under the protection of the Romans and continually supplying them with what their pressing needs required, reigned securely over the Syracusans for the rest of his days, courting honor and reputation among the Greeks.

For of all such men he is thought to have been the most distinguished, and to have enjoyed the fruits of his own sound judgment for the longest time, both in particular affairs and in general.

Chapter 17 The Siege of Agrigentum

When the treaty was brought back to Rome, and the people had accepted and ratified the settlement with Hiero, the Romans decided no longer to send out all their forces, but only two legions.

For they reckoned that the war had been made lighter for them, now that the king had come over to their side, and at the same time they supposed that in this way their forces would be more easily kept supplied with necessities.

The Carthaginians, seeing that Hiero had become their enemy and that the Romans were getting more thoroughly entangled in Sicilian affairs, concluded that they needed a heavier force, one with which they would be able to face the enemy and to hold together their position in Sicily.

So they recruited mercenaries from the country across the sea—many Ligurians and Celts, and still more Iberians than these—and sent them all to Sicily.

Seeing that the city of the Agrigentines was excellently suited for their preparations and was at the same time the most important city in their own province, they gathered into it their supplies and forces, deciding to use this city as their base of operations for the war.

As for the Romans, the generals who had made the treaty with Hiero had withdrawn, and their successors, appointed in their place—Lucius Postumius and Quintus Mamilius—arrived in Sicily with the legions.

Observing the Carthaginian plan and the preparations around Agrigentum, they resolved to take the matter in hand more boldly.

So they set aside the other operations of the war, and bringing their whole army to bear directly against Agrigentum, they pressed upon it; encamping eight stades from the city, they shut the Carthaginians up inside the walls.

Since it was the height of the grain harvest, and the siege was clearly going to be a long one, the soldiers set out to gather corn more eagerly than they should have.

The Carthaginians, seeing the enemy scattered over the countryside, came out and attacked the foragers. Having routed these easily, some of them rushed to plunder the palisade, others against the supporting pickets.

But the difference in their institutions saved the Roman cause then, as it had often done before. For among the Romans the penalty is death for the man who deserts his post and flees outright from the pickets.

And so on this occasion too, although the enemy were many times their number, they stood their ground gallantly; and though they lost many of their own men, they killed still more of the enemy.

Finally, surrounding the enemy just as they were on the very point of tearing apart the palisade, they destroyed some of them, and the rest, pressing upon them and cutting them down, they drove together in flight into the city.

Chapter 18 Relief Comes from Agrigentum

After this it came about that the Carthaginians grew more cautious about making attacks, and the Romans more careful in their foraging.

Since the Carthaginians would no longer come out against them except as far as skirmishing, the Roman generals divided their force into two parts: with one they remained near the temple of Asclepius in front of the city, and with the other they encamped in the quarters of the city that incline toward Heracleia.

The intervals between the two camps, on either side of the city, they fortified. They threw up the inner trench as a protection against those sallying out of the city, and the outer one they ran around as a guard against attacks from outside and against the men and supplies that customarily slip in and make their way into besieged cities.

The spaces between the trenches and the camps they secured with guard posts, fortifying the convenient positions at intervals.

As for provisions and the rest of their supplies, all the other allies gathered them and brought them to Herbesus, and the Romans themselves, hauling and carrying continually from this town—which was not far off—kept up an abundant supply of their necessities.

So for about five months they remained in the same positions, neither side able to gain any decisive advantage over the other beyond what occurred in the skirmishes themselves.

But as the Carthaginians were being squeezed by famine, owing to the multitude of men shut up in the city—for they were no fewer than fifty thousand—Hannibal, the commander appointed over the besieged forces, now hard pressed by the situation, kept sending continual messages to Carthage, making clear their predicament and calling for help.

The authorities in Carthage loaded their ships with the soldiers and elephants they had assembled and sent them off to Sicily, to Hanno, the other general.

He gathered his supplies and forces at Heracleia, and as a first step seized by a stratagem the city of the Herbesians, depriving the enemy's camps of their markets and their supply of necessities.

As a result, the Romans found themselves at once besieging and besieged in their circumstances. For they were brought by the lack of grain and the scarcity of necessities to such a pass that they more than once deliberated about raising the siege.

And in the end they would indeed have done so, had not Hiero, applying every effort and device, kept them supplied with moderate and necessary provisions.

Chapter 19 Fall of Agrigentum

...of supplies. After this, the aforementioned man observed that the Romans were in a weakened condition, both from disease and from shortage of food—since a plague-like situation had set in among them—while he reckoned that his own forces were fit to give battle.

He therefore took the elephants, about fifty in number, together with the whole of the rest of his army, and advanced in haste out of Heracleia. He had given orders to the Numidian cavalry to ride ahead, and, on drawing near to the enemy's stockade, to harass them and try to lure out their cavalry, and then, once the enemy gave chase, to fall back again until they linked up with him.

The Numidians carried out their instructions and engaged one of the two camps, whereupon the Roman cavalry immediately poured out and pressed the Numidians hard with reckless boldness.

The Libyans, in keeping with their orders, gave ground until they joined Hanno's men. Then, wheeling about, they enveloped their pursuers and fell upon them, killed many of them, and chased the rest right up to their stockade.

After this had taken place, Hanno's force encamped facing the Romans, having seized the hill called Torus, at a distance of about ten stades from the enemy.

For two months they remained in these positions, accomplishing nothing decisive beyond daily skirmishing.

But since Hannibal kept signalling with fire-beacons and sending messengers continually out of the city to Hanno, making clear that the populace could not endure the famine and that many men were even deserting to the enemy because of the want of food, the Carthaginian general resolved to risk a battle—and the Romans were no less inclined to it, for the reasons already given.

And so both sides led out their forces into the ground between the camps and engaged one another.

The battle went on for a long time, but in the end the Romans routed the Carthaginian mercenaries who had borne the brunt of the fighting.

When these men fell back upon the elephants and the other ranks stationed behind them, the whole Phoenician army was thrown into confusion.

Once a general rout had set in, most of them were destroyed, though some withdrew to Heracleia; and the Romans took possession of most of the elephants and of all the baggage.

When night came on, the Romans, partly from joy at their successes and partly from exhaustion, kept their watches rather carelessly. Hannibal, having given up the situation as hopeless and judging that he had a favorable opportunity for escape for the reasons already mentioned, set out from the city around midnight with his foreign troops.

Having filled in the trenches with baskets stuffed full of chaff, he led his force away in safety, undetected by the enemy.

When day came, the Romans realized what had happened. They harried the rear guard of Hannibal's column briefly, and after that they all rushed toward the gates.

With no one standing in their way, they burst in and plundered the city, taking control of many captives and of plunder of every kind in great quantity.

Chapter 20 The Romans Build Ships

When the report of what had happened at Agrigentum reached the Roman Senate, they were overjoyed and elated in their thinking, and no longer kept to their original calculations, nor were they content with having saved the Mamertines, nor with the gains that had come from the war itself.

Instead, conceiving the hope that it was altogether possible to drive the Carthaginians out of the island—and that, were this done, their own affairs would make great progress—they applied themselves to these calculations and to the schemes bearing on this objective.

As for their land forces, they saw that matters were proceeding for them according to plan;

for after those who had besieged Agrigentum, the generals appointed in their place, Lucius Valerius and Titus Otacilius, seemed to be handling affairs in Sicily as well as circumstances allowed.

But since the Carthaginians held command of the sea without a fight, the war remained evenly balanced for the Romans;

for in the period that followed, although they now held Agrigentum, many of the inland cities went over to the Romans out of fear of their land forces, while still more of the coastal cities fell away from them, terrified of the Carthaginian fleet.

Seeing, therefore, that the war was increasingly tipping now to one side and now to the other for the reasons stated, and moreover that Italy was repeatedly ravaged by the naval force while Libya remained entirely unharmed, the Romans set their hearts on taking to the sea against the Carthaginians as well.

This is indeed among the chief reasons that prompted me to give a fuller account of the war mentioned above, so that this beginning too should not be unknown—how, when, and for what reasons the Romans first went to sea.

Seeing that the war was dragging on for them, it was then that they first set about building ships—a hundred quinqueremes and twenty triremes.

But since the shipwrights were utterly inexperienced in the construction of quinqueremes—because no one in Italy at that time used such vessels—this part of the undertaking gave them great difficulty.

From this, more than anything, one may grasp the greatness of spirit and the daring of the Roman temper.

For not only did they lack adequate resources, but they had no resources at all and had never given a thought to the sea; yet, taking it into their heads then for the first time, they set to work so boldly that, before they had even made trial of the venture, they at once undertook to fight the Carthaginians at sea—men who from their forefathers held undisputed mastery of the sea.

As evidence for the truth of what I am now saying and for the extraordinary character of their daring, one might cite this: when they first undertook to ferry their forces across to Messene, they not only had no decked warship but no long ship at all, not a single galley.

Rather, they borrowed fifty-oared vessels and triremes from the Tarentines and Locrians, and also from the Eleans and Neapolitans, and on these they boldly carried their men across.

On that occasion, when the Carthaginians put out against them in the strait, one of their decked ships, in its eagerness, pressed too far forward and ran aground, so that it fell into the hands of the Romans; using this ship as a model, they then built their entire fleet on that pattern.

So that, had this not happened, it is plain that through their inexperience they would in the end have been prevented...

Chapter 21 Gn. Cornelius Scipio Asina Surrenders

...from carrying out their plan. Nevertheless, those whose task was the shipbuilding went on with the construction of the vessels, while others gathered the crews and trained them to row on land in the following way:

they seated the men on rowing benches on dry ground, in the same arrangement as the seats aboard the actual ships, and, stationing the boatswain in their midst, accustomed them all to lean back together as they drew their hands toward themselves, and to swing forward again as they thrust their hands out, and to begin and end these movements at the boatswain's commands. Once these preparations had been made,

as soon as the ships were finished they launched them, and after practicing for a short while in real conditions at sea, they sailed along the coast of Italy in accordance with the consul's order.

For Gnaeus Cornelius, who had been put in charge of the Roman naval force, a few days earlier had instructed the ship captains that, as soon as they had fitted out the fleet, they should sail toward the strait; he himself had put to sea with seventeen ships and sailed ahead to Messene, eager to make ready for the fleet the things urgently needed.

While he was there, a proposal came to him concerning the city of the Liparaeans. Embracing the prospect more readily than he should have, he sailed with the aforementioned ships and anchored off the city.

But the Carthaginian general Hannibal, hearing in Panormus what had happened, sent off Boödes, a member of the senate, giving him twenty ships.

Sailing up by night, Boödes blockaded Gnaeus and his men in the harbor. When day came, the crews fled to land, while Gnaeus, panic-stricken and at a loss for what to do, in the end surrendered himself to the enemy.

The Carthaginians, having the enemy's ships and commander in their hands, set off at once to rejoin Hannibal.

Not many days afterward, though the misfortune that had befallen Gnaeus was so vivid and recent, Hannibal himself came within a hair of falling plainly into a similar blunder.

For on hearing that the Roman fleet making its way along the coast of Italy was close at hand, and wishing to get a clear view of the enemy's numbers and their whole formation, he took fifty ships and sailed out.

As he was rounding the headland of Italy he ran into the enemy, who were proceeding on their voyage in good order and formation; he lost most of his ships, and with those that were left escaped against all hope and expectation.

Chapter 22 The Victory of Mylae

After this the Romans drew near to the coasts of Sicily, and when they learned of the disaster that had befallen Gnaeus, they immediately sent word to Gaius Duilius, the commander of the land forces, and waited for him to arrive.

At the same time, hearing that the enemy's fleet was not far off, they set about preparing for a naval battle.

But since their ships were poorly built and hard to maneuver, someone proposed to them, as an aid for the fight, the devices that were afterward called "ravens" (corvi). Their construction was as follows.

A round post stood on the prow, twenty-four feet high and a foot wide in diameter.

At its top this post had a pulley, and around it was fitted a gangway built of cross-planks nailed together, four feet wide and thirty-six feet long.

The opening in the planking was oblong, and the gangway fitted around the post at a point twelve feet along from its near end. Down each of its long sides ran a railing knee-high.

At the far end of the gangway was fastened an iron spike shaped like a pestle, sharpened to a point and fitted with a ring at its top, so that the whole thing looked very much like the machines used for grinding grain.

To this ring a rope was attached. When the ships clashed, the men would hoist up the "ravens" by means of the pulley on the post and drop them onto the deck of the enemy ship—sometimes over the prow, and sometimes, when blows came from the side, swinging the device around to meet them.

Once the "ravens" had bitten into the planks of the decks and lashed the ships together, then, if the vessels lay alongside one another, the men leaped aboard from every quarter; but if they were prow to prow, they made their assault across the "raven" itself, advancing two abreast.

The leading pair shielded their front by holding their shields before them, while those who followed protected the flanks by resting the rims of their shields on the railing.

Having made use of such a preparation, [the Romans watched for the right moment to fight at sea.]

Chapter 23 Operations in Sicily

[Having made these preparations,] they watched for the right moment to fight at sea. As for Gaius Duilius, as soon as he learned of the misfortune that had overtaken the commander of the naval forces, he handed over the land legions to the military tribunes and crossed over himself to join the fleet.

Learning that the enemy was ravaging the territory of Mylae, he sailed against them with his whole fleet.

When the Carthaginians caught sight of him, they put to sea with joy and eagerness, with a hundred and thirty ships, holding the Romans' inexperience in contempt. They all sailed straight at the enemy, prow first, not even thinking the engagement worth drawing up in any order, but as though heading for plunder lying ready for the taking.

Their commander was Hannibal—the same man who had slipped his forces out of the city of Agrigentum by night—sailing in the seven-banked galley that had once belonged to King Pyrrhus.

As they drew near and saw the "ravens" raised aloft on each of the prows, the Carthaginians were for a while at a loss, baffled by the strange construction of the engines. Yet, in utter contempt for their opponents, those sailing in the front rank charged in boldly.

But each time the ships closed and were locked together by the engines, the men crossed at once over the "raven" itself and grappled with the enemy on the decks. Some of the Carthaginians were cut down, while others surrendered, dismayed at what was happening—for the battle had become very much like a fight on land.

So they lost the first thirty ships engaged, crews and all, and with them the commander's ship was captured too; though Hannibal himself, beyond all hope and at great risk, escaped in the ship's boat.

The rest of the Carthaginian force came on as if to charge, but as they drew near and saw what had happened to the ships sailing ahead, they sheered off and dodged the descent of the engines.

Trusting in their speed, they hoped to make their attacks safely by rowing around the enemy, some on the flank and some at the stern.

But the engines swung round in every direction to meet them and dropped down so unfailingly that any ship that came near was bound to be grappled. In the end the Carthaginians gave way and fled, terrified by the novelty of what was happening, having lost fifty ships.

Chapter 24 Further Operations in Sicily

The Romans, having against all expectation made good their hopes at sea, were doubly emboldened in their drive to press the war.

For the moment, then, they put in at Sicily, raised the siege of Segesta, whose people were by now in the last extremity, and on their march back from Segesta took the town of Macella by storm.

After the naval battle, Hamilcar, the Carthaginian commander in charge of the land forces, who was stationed around Panormus, learned that in the Roman camp the allies were quarreling with the Romans over the place of honor in the fighting.

Discovering that these allies were encamped by themselves between Paropus and the Thermae of Himera, he fell upon them suddenly with his whole force while they were striking camp and killed nearly four thousand of them.

After this action Hannibal took the ships that had survived and sailed off to Carthage, and not long afterward crossed from there to Sardinia, having gathered more ships and some of the renowned naval captains.

But not long after, he was hemmed in by the Romans in a certain harbor in Sardinia and lost many of his ships; whereupon he was at once seized by the surviving Carthaginians and crucified.

For the Romans, as soon as they had taken to the sea, set about seizing control of Sardinia as well.

During the following year the Roman armies in Sicily accomplished nothing worth mentioning.

But the next year, after receiving their newly appointed magistrates, Aulus Atilius and Gaius Sulpicius, they set out against Panormus, because the Carthaginian forces were wintering there.

The commanders advanced close to the city with their whole army and drew up for battle. But when the enemy would not come out to meet them, they marched off again, this time against the town of Hippana.

This they took by storm at the first assault, and they also captured Myttistratum, which had withstood the siege for a long time because of the strength of its position.

The city of Camarina, which had revolted from them a little earlier, they now besieged with siege-works, threw down its walls, and occupied. In the same way they took Henna too, and several other small Carthaginian towns.

After these operations they set about besieging the people of Lipara.

Chapter 25 The Battle of Ecnomus

The next year Gaius Atilius, the Roman commander, lay at anchor off Tyndaris, and when he saw the Carthaginian fleet sailing past in disorder, he ordered his own crews to follow the leading ships and set out ahead of the rest himself with ten ships of matching speed.

The Carthaginians, seeing that some of the enemy were still embarking, others just putting out, and the foremost far ahead of the rest, turned and went to meet them.

Surrounding them, they destroyed the rest and very nearly captured the commander's ship, crew and all; but this ship, well manned and fast, escaped the danger against all expectation.

Meanwhile the rest of the Roman ships came sailing up and gradually gathered together. Forming a line abreast, they engaged the enemy, took ten ships with their crews, and sank eight. The remaining Carthaginian ships withdrew to the islands called the Liparae.

As a result of this battle, both sides reckoned that they had fought on equal terms, and so they set about more wholeheartedly building up naval forces and contesting control of the sea.

The land forces in this period did nothing worth recording, but frittered away the time on small, chance engagements.

So, having made the preparations I have described, the Romans put to sea for the coming summer with three hundred and thirty decked warships and put in at Messana.

Setting out from there, they sailed with Sicily on their right, and after rounding Cape Pachynus they crossed over to Ecnomus, because their land army too was in that very district.

The Carthaginians, sailing up with three hundred and fifty decked ships, put in at Lilybaeum, and from there dropped anchor at Heraclea Minoa.

Chapter 26 Preparations for Battle

[There they came to anchor.] Now the Romans' aim was to sail across to Libya and shift the war there, so that the danger for the Carthaginians might concern not Sicily but themselves and their own land.

The Carthaginians took exactly the opposite view: realizing that Libya was easy to invade, and that its whole population would be easily overcome once an enemy had landed, they were unwilling to allow it, but were eager instead to risk everything and fight at sea.

Since the one side was bent on preventing the crossing and the other on forcing it, it was clear that the coming struggle would arise from the rivalry of both.

So the Romans made their preparations to suit both purposes—both for action at sea and for landing in enemy territory.

Accordingly they picked the best men from the land legions and divided the whole force they intended to take aboard into four parts.

Each part had two names: the first was called the "First Legion" and the "First Squadron," and so on in turn for the rest. The fourth had taken on yet a third name besides: they were called "Triarii," following the usage of the land legions.

The total of this whole naval force came to about a hundred and forty thousand men, reckoning each ship as carrying three hundred rowers and a hundred and twenty marines.

The Carthaginians, for their part, made their preparations mostly, indeed almost entirely, with a view to the battle at sea; their numbers, reckoned by the count of their ships, were over a hundred and fifty thousand.

At these figures anyone—not only one who was present and saw it with his own eyes, but even one who merely heard of it—might well be struck with awe at the scale of the contest and at the grandeur and might of both states, judging from the multitude of their men and ships.

The Romans, reasoning that the voyage would be across open sea and that the enemy were fast sailers, tried in every way to make their formation secure and hard to attack.

So they placed first, side by side in the front, the two six-banked galleys on which the commanders Marcus Atilius and Lucius Manlius were sailing.

Behind each of these they stationed ships in single file, one ship to a line—behind the one the first squadron, behind the other the second—setting each successive ship of each squadron at a greater interval from the next. The vessels lay one behind another with their prows angled outward.

Once they had arranged the first and second squadrons simply in a wedge formation, they placed against these, in a single line abreast, the third legion; and with these set in place, the whole formation took the shape of a triangle.

Behind these they stationed the horse-transports, attaching them by tow-lines to the ships of the third squadron.

Behind the transports they placed the fourth squadron, those called the Triarii, extended in a single line so as to overlap at both ends the ships in front of them.

When all had been fitted together in the manner described, the whole formation took the shape of a wedge: the part toward the apex was hollow, the part at the base solid, and the whole was effective and serviceable, and at the same time hard to break apart.

Chapter 27 The Battle of Ecnomus

At the same time the Carthaginian commanders briefly addressed their men, pointing out to them that if they won the sea-battle they would carry on the war over Sicily, but if they were beaten they would be fighting for their own homeland and all that they held dear; and so they ordered them to board the ships.

Since all carried out the order eagerly—because what had been said let them see clearly what lay ahead—they put to sea with confidence and in a manner fit to strike terror.

When the commanders observed the enemy's formation, they arranged their own to match it: three of their four divisions they drew up in a single line, extending the right wing toward the open sea so as to envelop the enemy, and setting all their ships prow-on to the enemy. The fourth division they made the left wing of the whole line,

bending it back at an angle toward the shore.

The Carthaginian right wing was led by Hanno—the man defeated in the battle at Agrigentum—with ships for charging and the fastest quinqueremes for the outflanking movement.

The left was under the charge of Hamilcar, who had fought the sea-battle off Tyndaris; and he, fighting now in the center of the line, employed in the engagement the following stratagem.

When the Romans saw the Carthaginians drawn out in a thin line and launched their charge against the center, the battle began in this way.

The Carthaginian center, by prearranged order, quickly turned to flight so as to break up the Roman formation. These men retreated at full speed, while the Romans followed eagerly behind.

So the first and second squadrons pressed hard upon the fleeing ships, while the third and fourth divisions fell behind—the one because it was towing the horse-transports, and the Triarii because they stayed with them and kept guard over them.

But when the Carthaginians judged that they had drawn the first and second squadrons far enough from the rest, a signal was raised from Hamilcar's ship, and all at once they swung about and engaged their pursuers.

A fierce struggle followed. In speed, the Carthaginians had much the better of it, rowing around the enemy, closing in easily and pulling back swiftly;

but in close, forceful fighting—grappling with the "ravens" any ship that once came near, and fighting under the eyes of both their commanders, who shared in the action in full view of their men—the Romans had hopes no less bright than the Carthaginians.

Such, then, was the course of the fighting in this quarter.

Chapter 28 The Siege of Aspis

Such was the state of affairs [in the center]. At the same time Hanno, commanding the right wing, which had held off at a distance during the first encounter, crossed the open sea and charged the ships of the Triarii, causing them great trouble and difficulty.

Meanwhile the Carthaginians stationed near the shore re-formed from their original position into a line abreast, brought their ships prow-on, and charged the vessels towing the horse-transports. These cast off their tow-lines, grappled with the enemy, and fought it out.

So the whole engagement fell into three parts, and three separate sea-battles were going on at a wide distance from one another;

and since the forces on each side were evenly matched, in keeping with the original disposition, the fighting in each case was hard fought.

Nonetheless the outcome in each battle followed the natural course—as is to be expected when all the contending forces are evenly balanced.

For those who engaged first were the first to be decided: in the end Hamilcar's squadron was overpowered and took to flight.

So while Lucius was busy securing the captured ships, Marcus, seeing the struggle in which the Triarii and the horse-transports were caught up, hurried to their aid with the undamaged ships of the second squadron.

When he had reached and closed with Hanno's division, the Triarii quickly took heart, and although by now they were faring badly, they rallied again to the fight.

The Carthaginians, attacked in front by some and assailed in the rear by others, found themselves in difficulty and—unexpectedly surrounded by the relieving force—gave way and withdrew toward the open sea.

At this same moment Lucius, who was now sailing back and saw the third squadron pinned against the shore by the Carthaginian left wing, and Marcus, who had left the horse-transports and Triarii safe, both hurried to rescue their endangered comrades.

For by now what was happening looked very much like a siege; and these men would plainly all have perished had not the Carthaginians, in fear of the "ravens," merely fenced them in and held them penned against the shore, wary of charging because of the grappling and so keeping their distance.

But the commanders came up swiftly, surrounded the Carthaginians, and captured fifty enemy ships with their crews, while a few escaped by slipping away along the shore.

Such was the course of the fighting in its separate parts; but the outcome of the whole sea-battle went to the Romans.

Of their ships, twenty-four were destroyed, and of the Carthaginians over thirty. Not a single Roman ship fell into enemy hands with its crew, but sixty-four of the Carthaginian ships did.

Chapter 29 The Siege of Aspis

After this the Romans again took on fresh supplies, fitted out the captured ships, and gave the crews the care their success deserved. Then they put to sea and made their voyage toward Libya.

Their leading ships came to land below the headland called Hermaeum, which lies at the mouth of the whole gulf by Carthage and projects out into the open sea toward Sicily. There they waited for the ships sailing up behind them, and when they had gathered the whole fleet together they sailed along the coast until they reached the city called Aspis.

There they landed, hauled the ships ashore, and enclosed them with a trench and palisade. Since the people holding the city would not submit willingly, they began to besiege it.

The Carthaginians who had escaped the danger of the sea battle sailed back as well. Convinced that the enemy, elated by the advantage they had won, would immediately sail against Carthage itself, they stationed their land and naval forces at the points lying in front of the city.

But when they learned that the Romans had disembarked safely and were besieging Aspis, they gave up trying to watch for an attack by sea and instead concentrated their forces and busied themselves with guarding both the city and the countryside.

The Romans, after taking Aspis and leaving a garrison to hold the city and its district, also sent envoys to Rome to report what had happened and to ask what they should do next and how they should handle the situation. After this they broke camp with all their forces in eager haste and set out to ravage the country.

Since no one opposed them, they destroyed many country houses built with exceptional luxury, seized a great quantity of livestock, and carried off to the ships more than twenty thousand people.

Meanwhile messengers arrived from Rome explaining that one of the commanders must remain with an adequate force, while the other was to bring the fleet back to Rome.

So Marcus remained behind with forty ships, fifteen thousand infantry, and five hundred cavalry.

Lucius took the crews and the mass of prisoners aboard, sailed safely along the coast of Sicily, and arrived at Rome.

Chapter 30 Regulus in Africa

The Carthaginians, seeing that the enemy intended to remain in the country for a considerable time, first chose two generals from among themselves, Hasdrubal son of Hanno and Bostar, and then sent to Hamilcar at Heraclea, summoning him to come with all speed.

He took with him five hundred cavalry and five thousand infantry and came to Carthage. Having been appointed a third general, he consulted with Hasdrubal and the others about how they should deal with the present situation.

They decided to come to the aid of the countryside and not to stand by while it was plundered with impunity.

A few days later Marcus advanced, seizing by assault and looting the strongholds that were unwalled, and laying siege to those that were fortified.

When he came to a notable city called Adys, he encamped around it and energetically set about siege works and an assault.

The Carthaginians, eager to relieve the city and judging that they must contest control of the open country, led out their army.

They occupied a hill that stood above the enemy, but it was unsuitable for their own forces, and there they pitched camp.

Though they placed their greatest hopes in their cavalry and elephants, they abandoned the flat ground and shut themselves up in steep and difficult terrain. In doing so, they were about to teach the enemy exactly what ought to be done against them. And that is exactly what happened.

For the Roman commanders, recognizing with practical good sense that the most effective and most formidable part of the enemy's strength had been rendered useless by the ground, did not wait for them to come down into the plain and draw up for battle.

Instead, taking advantage of the opportunity before them, they advanced at daybreak from both sides against the hill.

The Carthaginian cavalry and elephants were therefore completely useless. The mercenaries, however, came out bravely and with great spirit, and at first forced one Roman division to give ground and flee.

But when they pushed too far forward and were surrounded by the troops ascending from the other side, they were routed, and after that the whole army was immediately driven out of the camp.

The elephants and cavalry, as soon as they reached level ground, made their withdrawal safely.

The Romans pursued the infantry only a short distance, then plundered the camp, and after that moved through the whole countryside and sacked the cities without resistance.

They also gained possession of the city called Tunes. Since it was well suited for the operations before them and was conveniently placed both with regard to Carthage itself and the neighboring countryside, they encamped there.

Chapter 31 Distress at Carthage

The Carthaginians, after suffering a setback at sea not long before and now another on land—not because of any cowardice among the rank and file, but because of the incompetence of their leaders—had fallen into difficulties of every kind.

At the same time the nation of the Numidians was attacking them as well, and was doing the country damage no less than the Romans, indeed even greater damage.

As a result, because the people from the countryside fled in fear and crowded into the city, there was complete discouragement and famine: discouragement because of the panic, and famine partly because of the numbers gathered there and partly because they expected a siege.

Marcus, seeing that the Carthaginians had failed both by land and by sea and thinking that he would very soon take the city, but anxious that the commander coming from Rome might arrive first and take the credit for the whole achievement, invited the Carthaginians to negotiate a settlement.

They gladly listened and sent out their leading men. But when they met with him, they were so far from inclining toward any of his proposals that they could hardly bear even to listen to the weight of his demands.

For Marcus, as though he already had complete control of everything, thought that whatever concessions he granted ought to be accepted by them as a favor and an act of generosity.

But the Carthaginians saw that even if they became his captives, nothing harsher could follow than the commands he was now imposing. So they not only came back rejecting the proposals, but were also deeply offended by Marcus's severity.

When the Carthaginian council heard what the Roman general was demanding, although it had almost given up hope of safety, it nevertheless took so manly and noble a stand that it chose to endure anything and to try every action and every opportunity rather than submit to anything dishonorable or unworthy of its past deeds.

Chapter 32 Xanthippus of Sparta

About this time one of the recruiting officers previously sent to Greece sailed into Carthage, bringing a large number of soldiers, among them a certain Xanthippus, a Lacedaemonian, a man trained in the Spartan discipline and possessed of solid experience in warfare.

When he heard about the defeat, how it had happened, and in what way, and when he considered the rest of the Carthaginian resources as well as the number of their cavalry and elephants, he quickly concluded and told his friends that the Carthaginians were being beaten not by the Romans but by themselves, through the inexperience of their commanders.

Because the situation was critical, what Xanthippus said was soon spread among the crowd and among the generals, and the men in authority decided to summon him and test what he could do.

When he appeared before them, he explained to the magistrates why they had now met with defeat, and showed that if they followed his advice and made use of flat ground in marching, encamping, and drawing up for battle, they would easily be able both to secure their own safety and to defeat the enemy.

The generals accepted what he said, were persuaded by him, and immediately entrusted the forces to him.

Even before this, there had already been among the masses an encouraging murmur and hopeful talk based on what Xanthippus was saying.

But once he led the army out before the city, drew it up in proper order, began to maneuver some units in formation, and gave commands according to military rules, he showed such a contrast to the incompetence of the previous generals that the multitude responded with loud cheers and were eager to engage the enemy at once, convinced that so long as Xanthippus led them, they would suffer nothing disastrous.

When the generals saw that the spirits of the masses had been restored so unexpectedly, they addressed them in a way suited to the moment, and after a few days set out with the army.

Their force consisted of twelve thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and nearly a hundred elephants.

Chapter 33 The Defeat of Regulus

The Romans, seeing that the Carthaginians were now making their marches through level country and placing their camps on flat ground, were puzzled and disturbed by this new development, but all the same they were eager to come to close quarters with the enemy.

After advancing, they spent the first day encamped about ten stades from their opponents.

On the next day the Carthaginian leaders were considering what should be done and how they ought to act in the present circumstances.

But the rank and file, full of eagerness for battle, gathered in groups and shouted Xanthippus's name one by one, convinced that he ought to lead them out at once.

The generals, seeing the army's rush of enthusiasm and eagerness, and with Xanthippus also insisting that they must not let the moment pass, ordered the troops to prepare themselves and gave Xanthippus authority to manage affairs as he thought best.

Once he had this power, he brought out the elephants and stationed them in a single line at the front before the whole army. Behind them, at a suitable distance, he placed the Carthaginian phalanx.

Of the mercenaries, he posted some on the right wing, while he placed the most mobile troops together with the cavalry in front of each wing.

When the Romans saw the enemy drawing up for battle, they advanced out readily to meet them.

Alarmed and anticipating the charge of the elephants, they put the light-armed troops in front and behind them stationed the maniples in many successive lines, while they divided the cavalry between the two wings.

By making their whole formation narrower than before but deeper, they had taken reasonable measures against the elephants, but against the cavalry—who greatly outnumbered their own—they had completely misjudged the situation.

When both sides had arranged, both generally and in detail, each part in the positions appropriate to it, they stood in order watching for the moment to attack one another.

Chapter 34 Roman Defeat

As soon as Xanthippus gave the order to the men on the elephants to advance and break up the enemy's line, and to the cavalry on each wing to wheel around and attack the enemy,

then the Roman army too, according to their custom, clashed their weapons together, raised their battle cry, and charged the enemy.

The Roman cavalry on both wings quickly fled, because the Carthaginian cavalry were so much more numerous.

Of the infantry, those posted on the left wing, partly avoiding the elephants' charge and partly despising the mercenaries, attacked the Carthaginian right. After routing them, they pressed on and pursued them as far as the camp rampart.

But among those stationed opposite the elephants, the front ranks, once engaged, were forced back and trampled underfoot by the sheer power of the animals, and perished in heaps where they stood. Still, because of the depth of the formation behind them, the main body remained unbroken for some time.

But when the men in the rear ranks found themselves surrounded on every side by cavalry and were forced to turn and fight them, while those who had forced their way through the elephants to the front, with the beasts now behind them, ran into the Carthaginian phalanx still intact and in good order, they were cut down.

Then, hard pressed from every side, most of the Romans were trampled to death by the overwhelming force of the animals, while the rest were shot down by the mass of cavalry on the very ground of the battle line. Only a very few broke away and tried to flee.

But since the routes of retreat lay over open plain, some of these too were killed by the elephants and cavalry, and perhaps five hundred who fled with the general Marcus were soon overtaken and captured alive together with him.

On the Carthaginian side about eight hundred mercenaries fell, namely those posted opposite the Roman left.

Of the Romans, about two thousand survived—those who, by pursuing the troops mentioned above, had stayed outside the main danger. All the rest perished except the general Marcus and those who fled with him.

The Roman units that escaped made their way with difficulty back to Aspis.

The Carthaginians stripped the dead, took the general along with the prisoners, and returned to the city overjoyed at the turn events had taken.

Chapter 35 Lessons from the Event

At this point a thoughtful observer could rightly note many things that contribute to the correction of human life.

For the need not to trust in Fortune—especially in times of success—was then made perfectly clear to all by what happened to Marcus.

The man who a little earlier had shown no pity or indulgence to the fallen was himself at once led away to beg those very things for his own safety.

And indeed the old saying of Euripides, that one wise plan overcomes many hands, was then confirmed by the facts themselves.

For one man and one mind brought down forces that seemed unconquerable and effective in action, and led back to a better state a government that appeared plainly ruined beyond recovery, along with the utterly disheartened spirits of its armies.

I have mentioned these things for the sake of improving those who read these memoirs.

For there are two ways by which all people may change for the better: through their own misfortunes and through those of others. The lesson drawn from one's own experience is more vivid, but the lesson drawn from other people's is safer.

Therefore one should never deliberately choose the first, since it brings correction only through great suffering and danger, but one should always seek the second, since through it one may perceive the better course without harm.

From this one ought to conclude that the experience gained from practical history is the finest education for real life.

For history alone, without causing us injury, produces true judges of what is better in every situation and circumstance. Let this be enough on these matters.

Chapter 36 Xanthippus Leaves Carthage

The Carthaginians, now that everything had turned out according to their wishes, gave free rein to their overflowing joy, both in thanksgiving offered to the god and in warm congratulations exchanged among themselves.

But Xanthippus, after bringing about so great an advance and so decisive a turn in the affairs of Carthage, sailed away home again not long afterward, having made his decision wisely and shrewdly.

For brilliant and extraordinary achievements breed heavy jealousy and sharp slander; and while native citizens, supported by their kinsmen and their many friends, may be able to fend these off for a long time, foreigners are quickly overcome by one or the other of them and put in danger.

There is also another account given of Xanthippus's departure, which I will try to explain when I come to a more fitting occasion than the present.

The Romans, when news reached them—against all their expectations—of what had happened in Libya, at once set about refitting their fleet and rescuing the men who had survived there.

The Carthaginians, meanwhile, after these events encamped and laid siege to Aspis, eager to get into their hands the men who had escaped from the battle.

But being wholly unable to take the place, owing to the bravery and daring of these men, they finally abandoned the siege.

When word reached them that the Romans were fitting out their fleet and intended once more to make the voyage against Libya, they set to work, repairing some vessels and building others from the keel up.

Quickly manning two hundred ships, they put to sea and kept watch for the enemy's approach.

The Romans, at the beginning of summer, launched three hundred and fifty vessels and, placing the consuls Marcus Aemilius and Servius Fulvius in command, sent them out. Putting to sea, they sailed along Sicily as if heading for Libya.

Falling in with the Carthaginian fleet off Hermaeum, they routed it easily at the first charge and captured a hundred and fourteen ships together with their crews.

Then, taking aboard the young men who had held out in Libya, from Aspis

Chapter 37 The Roman Fleet Wrecked

they sailed back once more toward Sicily. They crossed the strait safely, but on reaching the territory of Camarina they were caught in so great a storm and so great a disaster that one could not even describe it adequately, so far did the catastrophe surpass all bounds.

For out of their three hundred and sixty-four ships, only eighty survived; of the rest, some went down beneath the waves, while others, dashed by the surf against the reefs and headlands, were broken to pieces, filling the shore with corpses and wreckage.

No greater catastrophe at sea, occurring all at once, is even recorded in history. The blame for it must be laid not so much on fortune as on the commanders.

For although the pilots had repeatedly protested against sailing along the outer coast of Sicily, the side facing the Libyan sea, because it was rough and offered no safe anchorage, and because, too, one threatening constellation had not yet set while another was on the point of rising—for they were making the voyage between the rising of Orion

and that of the Dog Star—the commanders heeded none of these warnings and sailed out into the open sea, eager to overawe some of the cities along the coast by the impression of their recent success and so to win them over.

But by chasing small hopes they met with great misfortunes, and only then recognized their own folly.

In general, the Romans rely on force in everything; they think that once they have set themselves a goal they must carry it through at all costs, and that nothing they have once resolved upon can be impossible. Because of this drive they succeed in many things, but in some they fail conspicuously—above all at sea.

On land, where their undertakings are directed against men and the works of men, they usually succeed, because they apply their force against powers comparable to their own, and only rarely fail.

But when they pit themselves against the sea and the surrounding elements and try to fight them by sheer force, they meet with great disasters.

This is what befell them then, and has befallen them many times since, and will continue to befall them, until they correct this rashness and this reliance on force, by which they suppose that every season must be open to them for sailing as well as for marching.

Chapter 38 The Romans Build More Ships

The Carthaginians, learning of the destruction that had overtaken the Roman fleet, and reckoning that they were a match for the enemy on land because of their earlier success, and at sea because of the disaster the Romans had just suffered, turned with greater eagerness to their naval and land preparations.

They immediately dispatched Hasdrubal to Sicily, giving him both the troops already on hand and those that had come from Heracleia, and along with them a hundred and forty elephants.

After sending him off, they fitted out two hundred ships and made all the other preparations for the voyage.

Hasdrubal, having crossed safely to Lilybaeum, set about training his elephants and drilling his forces, and clearly meant to contest control of the open country.

The Romans, when they heard in detail from those who had been brought back from the shipwreck what had happened, took the disaster hard; but unwilling to give in once and for all, they resolved once again to build two hundred and twenty vessels from the keel up.

These were completed within three months—a thing hard even to believe—and the newly appointed magistrates, Aulus Atilius and Gnaeus Cornelius, at once fitted out the fleet and put to sea.

Sailing through the strait, they took on at Messene the ships that had been saved from the shipwreck, and putting in at Panormus in Sicily with three hundred ships—Panormus being the most important city of the Carthaginian province—they set about besieging it.

Throwing up siege-works at two points and making the other preparations, they brought up their engines.

When the tower by the sea easily fell and the soldiers forced their way in there, what is called the New Town was taken by storm; and the so-called Old Town, endangered by this, was quickly surrendered by its inhabitants.

Having made themselves masters of the place, they sailed back to Rome,

Chapter 39 The Carthaginians Prosperous

leaving a garrison in the city. After this, when summer came on, the newly appointed magistrates Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius Sempronius put to sea with the whole fleet, crossed to Sicily, and set out from there for Libya.

Coasting along the country, they made very many landings, but accomplished nothing worth mentioning in any of them, and came to the island of the Lotus-eaters, which is called Mēninx and lies not far from the Lesser Syrtis.

There, through inexperience of the waters, they ran upon some shallows, and when the tide ebbed and their ships settled aground, they fell into utter helplessness.

Nonetheless, after a while the sea unexpectedly flowed back, and by throwing all their heavy cargo overboard they barely managed to lighten the ships.

When this happened, their departure was more like a flight. Reaching Sicily and rounding Lilybaeum, they came to anchor at Panormus.

From there, recklessly making the voyage to Rome across the open sea, they again ran into a storm so great in magnitude that they lost more than a hundred and fifty ships.

The Romans, when this had happened—though they are beyond all others determined in every undertaking—now, because of the scale and number of their misfortunes, were forced by circumstances to give up gathering yet another fleet.

Resting their remaining hopes on their land forces, they sent out the generals Lucius Caecilius and Gaius Furius, along with their legions, to Sicily, and manned only sixty ships to carry supplies to the armies.

As a result of the disasters I have described, the fortunes of the Carthaginians once more rose higher.

For they commanded the sea without fear, now that the Romans had withdrawn from it, while in their land forces they had great hopes.

And they felt this not without reason. For when the report of the battle in Libya had spread—that the elephants had broken up the Roman ranks and destroyed most of their men—

the Romans were so terrified of the elephants that for the two years following the events just described, although they often drew up in battle order against the enemy in the territory of Lilybaeum and often in that of Selinus, within five or six stades of them, they never dared to begin the fight, nor to descend at all onto level ground, for fear of an elephant charge.

During these times they captured by siege only Therma and Lipara, keeping all the while to mountainous and difficult country.

And so the Romans, observing the panic and despondency in their land forces, changed their minds and resolved once more to take to the sea.

Appointing as generals Gaius Atilius and Lucius Manlius, they built fifty vessels and energetically enrolled crews and assembled a fleet.

Chapter 40 Roman Victory at Panormus

Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian commander, seeing that the Romans had lost their nerve in the recent engagements, and learning that one of the generals had gone off to Italy with half the army, while Caecilius was lingering at Panormus with the remaining part of his force, intending to guard the allies' crops just as the harvest was at its height,

took his army from Lilybaeum, set out, and encamped on the borders of the territory of Panormus. But Caecilius,

seeing how overconfident he had become and eager to provoke his rashness, kept his soldiers within the gates.

Emboldened by this, Hasdrubal—convinced that Caecilius did not dare to come out against him—pushed boldly forward with his whole army and marched down through the narrows into the territory of Panormus.

While he was destroying the crops right up to the city, Caecilius held to his intended plan, until he had lured him into crossing the river that lay before the city.

When the Carthaginians had brought their elephants and their force across, Caecilius then began sending out his light-armed troops to harass them, until he had compelled them to deploy their entire army.

Seeing that what he had planned was coming to pass, he stationed some of his nimble troops in front of the wall and the ditch, ordering them, if the elephants came close, to use their missiles freely,

and whenever they were hard pressed, to take refuge in the ditch and then, sallying out from it again, to hurl javelins at whichever of the beasts came near.

He ordered the workmen from the marketplace to carry the missiles and lay them down outside, along the foundation of the wall.

He himself, with his standards, took up his post at the gate lying opposite the enemy's left wing, continually sending more and more men to support the skirmishers.

As the engagement there grew more general, the officers in charge of the elephants, vying with one another for Hasdrubal's favor and wishing the success to be their own doing, all charged the men fighting in the front, easily routed them, and chased them to the ditch.

But when the beasts attacked, wounded by the archers on the wall and pelted with a vigorous, thick shower of javelins and darts by the fresh troops drawn up in front of the ditch,

riddled with missiles and badly wounded, they soon fell into confusion, turned upon their own side, and went charging through them, trampling and destroying the men and throwing their own ranks into disorder and tearing them apart.

Seeing this, Caecilius vigorously led out his force; and falling upon the enemy from the side, against their flank while they were in disorder, with troops that were fresh and in good order, he inflicted a heavy rout upon them, killing many and forcing the rest to flee headlong.

He captured ten elephants together with their Indian drivers, and the rest, whose Indians had thrown themselves off, he rounded up after the battle and got them all into his possession.

By accomplishing this, he was by common agreement held to have been the cause, for the Romans, of their land forces recovering their courage and regaining control of the open country.

Chapter 41 Siege of Lilybaeum

When news of this success reached Rome, the people were overjoyed—not so much because the enemy had been weakened by the loss of their elephants, as because their own men had regained their confidence by mastering the elephants.

For this reason they took heart again, and, in keeping with their original intention, resolved to send out their generals on campaign with a fleet and naval force, eager to bring the war to an end as far as they could.

When the supplies for the expedition had been prepared, the generals sailed for Sicily with two hundred ships. It was the fourteenth year of the war.

Coming to anchor off Lilybaeum, where the land forces had also come to meet them, they set about besieging it, reckoning that if they took this city they could easily transfer the war to Libya.

On this point, more or less, the Carthaginian leaders were of the same mind and reasoned just as the Romans did.

And so, treating everything else as secondary, they set themselves to relieve the city, to take risks, and to endure anything on its behalf, since no other base would be left to them—the Romans now controlling all the rest of Sicily except Drepana.

But so that what I say may not be unclear to those who do not know the region, I will try to bring my readers, in a few words, to an understanding of the favorable situation and position of these places.

Chapter 42 The Topography of Lilybaeum

Sicily as a whole is so situated in relation to Italy and its southern extremity much as the Peloponnese is situated in relation to the rest of Greece and its outermost points,

differing in just this one respect: that the Peloponnese is a peninsula, while Sicily is an island; for in the one case the intervening land can be crossed on foot, in the other only by sea.

The shape of Sicily is a triangle, the vertices of whose angles are formed by promontories.

Of these, the one inclining to the south and stretching out into the Sicilian Sea is called Pachynus;

the one leaning toward the north bounds the western part of the strait and lies about twelve stades from Italy, and is called Pelorias;

the third points toward Libya itself, conveniently situated opposite the promontories that lie out in front of Carthage, at a distance of about a thousand stades; it inclines toward the winter sunset, divides the Libyan from the Sardinian Sea, and is called Lilybaeum.

On this promontory lies a city of the same name as the place, around which the Romans were then forming their siege—exceptionally well fortified with walls, and surrounded by a deep ditch and by lagoons on the seaward side, through which the approach into the harbors requires great experience and familiarity.

The Romans, encamping against the city on both sides, and fencing off the space between their camps with a ditch, palisade, and wall, began to bring up their siege-works against the tower nearest the sea, on the side facing the Libyan main.

Continually building onto what they had already constructed and extending their works, they at last brought down six towers adjoining the one mentioned, and set about battering all the rest at once with rams.

As the siege was pressed with vigor and terrible force, with the towers laboring and crumbling day by day, while the works pushed ever farther into the city,

there was deep dismay and consternation among the besieged—even though, apart from the civilian population, there were in the city as many as ten thousand mercenaries.

Yet their general Himilco left undone nothing that was possible; building counter-walls here and driving counter-mines there, he caused the enemy no small difficulty.

Moreover, every day he went out and attacked the siege-works, trying somehow to set fire to them, and on this account he fought many desperate engagements, both by day and by night, so that sometimes more men fell in such clashes than usually fall in a pitched battle.

Chapter 43 Treason in Lilybaeum

Around this same time, some of the officers who held the highest commands among the mercenaries conferred privately with one another about handing the city over to the Romans. They were convinced that the men under their command would do as they were told, so they slipped out of the city by night to the enemy camp and began negotiating the matter with the Roman general.

But Alexon the Achaean—the same man who in earlier times had saved the people of Agrigentum when the Syracusan mercenaries there were planning to break faith and betray the city—was once again the first to grasp what was afoot, and he reported it to the Carthaginian commander.

The moment the commander heard of it, he summoned the officers who had remained behind. He appealed to them earnestly, promising large gifts and rewards if they would keep faith with him and not join the plot of those who had left the city.

They eagerly accepted his proposal, and he immediately sent them out together with his own men. To deal with the Celts he sent Hannibal—the son of the Hannibal who had died in Sardinia—because of the familiarity he had built up with them during an earlier campaign; and to the rest of the mercenaries he sent Alexon, because of the regard and trust in which they held him.

These men called the troops together, urged them to stay loyal, and on top of that guaranteed the rewards the commander had promised to each of them. In this way they easily persuaded the men to remain at their posts.

As a result, when the officers who had slipped away afterward came openly up to the walls, wanting to make their appeal and say something about the Romans' offer, the men not only refused to pay them any attention but would not even consent to listen. Instead they pelted them with stones and javelins and drove them away from the wall.

So because of these events the Carthaginians came within a hair's breadth of losing everything, betrayed as they were by their own mercenaries.

But Alexon, who earlier through his loyalty had preserved for the people of Agrigentum not only their city and territory but also their laws and freedom, was on this occasion the man responsible for keeping the Carthaginians from total ruin.

Chapter 44 A Fruitless Sortie

The Carthaginians at home knew nothing of all this, but they could work out for themselves what a city under siege would need. So they manned fifty ships with soldiers and gave suitable orders to the officer placed in charge of the operation, Hannibal—son of Hamilcar, a trierarch and the leading friend of Adherbal. They dispatched him in all haste, instructing him not to delay but to seize the right moment and use boldness to relieve the besieged.

He put to sea with ten thousand soldiers and anchored at the islands called the Aegusae, which lie midway between Lilybaeum and Carthage, where he watched for his chance to sail. When he caught a favorable and fresh wind,

he spread all his sails and ran straight before the wind right at the very mouth of the harbor, making the passage with his men fully armed and ready for battle on the decks.

The Romans, partly taken aback by his sudden appearance and partly afraid that the force of the wind might carry them along with the enemy into their opponents' harbor, gave up any attempt to block the relief force as it sailed in. Instead they took up a position out at sea, dumbstruck at the enemy's audacity.

The whole population of the city had gathered on the walls, at once in agony over what would happen and overjoyed at this unexpected ray of hope, and they cheered on the incoming ships with clapping and shouting.

Hannibal, recklessly and with great confidence, ran in and brought his ships safely to anchor in the harbor, disembarking his soldiers without loss.

Yet all those in the city were not so much delighted at the arrival of the relief force—great as the boost was to their hopes and their strength—as they were at the fact that the Romans had not dared to stop the Carthaginians from sailing in.

Chapter 45 Running the Blockade

Himilco, the general in command of the city, saw the eagerness and high spirits of both groups—the men already in the city, because of the arrival of the relief force, and the newcomers, because they had no experience yet of the hardships besetting the place.

Wanting to make use of the enthusiasm of both groups while it was still fresh, for an attack on the siege-works with fire, he called everyone together into an assembly.

He spoke at some length on what the occasion called for and roused them to overwhelming enthusiasm, both by the scale of the rewards promised to those who distinguished themselves individually and by the favors and gifts they would all receive collectively from the Carthaginians.

When they responded as one, shouting that he should not wait but lead them out, he praised them, welcomed their eagerness, and dismissed them for the time being, telling them to rest while there was time and to obey their officers.

Not long afterward he called together their commanders, assigned each of them the positions suited to the attack, made known the watchword and the moment for the assault, and ordered the officers to be at their assigned posts with all their men at the morning watch.

They obeyed, and at first light he led out his force and attacked the works at several points at once.

But because they had foreseen what was coming, the Romans were neither idle nor unprepared; they readily brought help wherever it was needed and fought the enemy hard.

In a short time everyone was at grips with one another, and there was a fierce struggle all around the wall: those from the city numbered no fewer than twenty thousand, and those outside were more numerous still.

And the more the men fought out of formation, mingled together and each following his own impulse, the more brilliant the contest became—for out of so great a multitude, man against man and rank against rank, the rivalry among the fighters became almost a series of single combats.

Even so, the shouting and the press of bodies were at their height right at the works themselves.

For the men posted from the start by both sides for this very purpose—the one group to dislodge those at the works, the other to keep from giving them up—threw themselves into it with such rivalry and zeal, the one straining to drive the enemy off, the other refusing absolutely to yield, that in their determination they ended up dying right where they had first been stationed.

Meanwhile those mixed in among them, carrying torches, tow, and fire, fell upon the engines so boldly and from every side at once that the Romans were brought to the brink of disaster, unable to overcome the enemy's assault.

But the Carthaginian general, seeing many of his men dying in the fight while still unable to take the works—the very object of the attack—ordered his trumpeters to sound the recall.

So the Romans, after coming within an inch of losing all their siege equipment, in the end kept possession of the works and preserved them all safely.

Chapter 46 Hannibal the Rhodian

After this exploit Hannibal sailed out by night with his ships, again escaping the enemy's notice, and made for Drepana to join Adherbal, the Carthaginian commander-in-chief.

Because of the favorable location and the excellence of the harbor at Drepana, the Carthaginians always took great care to keep it well guarded.

This place happens to lie about a hundred and twenty stades from Lilybaeum.

The authorities at Carthage wanted to know how matters stood at Lilybaeum, but they could not find out, since one side was shut up inside and the other was keeping a vigilant watch. Then a man of distinction, called Hannibal the Rhodian, offered to sail into Lilybaeum, see the situation with his own eyes, and report everything in detail.

They were glad to hear his offer, but they did not believe it could be done, since the Roman fleet lay at anchor right at the mouth of the entrance channel.

He fitted out his own ship and put to sea. He crossed to one of the islands lying off Lilybaeum, and the following day, catching a favorable wind at the right moment, around the fourth hour he sailed in—in full view of all the enemy, who were stunned at his audacity.

The next day he immediately set about putting out again.

The Roman general, wanting to keep a more careful watch over the entrance channel, had during the night fitted out his ten fastest ships. He himself took up a position by the harbor and watched what would happen, and so did the whole army.

The ships, on both sides of the channel mouth, drew in as close to the shallows as they possibly could and lay there with oars poised, ready to ram and seize the ship as it tried to sail out.

But the Rhodian made his departure openly and so far outdid the enemy in both daring and speed that he not only sailed out with his ship and crew unscathed—running past the enemy vessels as though they were standing still—

but after sailing a little way ahead he even brought his ship to a halt with oars poised, as if challenging the enemy.

And when none of them dared to put out against him, because of the speed of his rowing, he sailed away, having with a single ship defied the entire enemy fleet.

From then on he did the same thing many times over and proved of great service: he kept the Carthaginians constantly informed of urgent matters, kept up the spirits of the besieged, and dismayed the Romans

Chapter 47 The Rhodian is Captured

by his recklessness. What contributed most to his boldness was that, from experience, he had carefully marked out the entrance by means of the shoals.

For after crossing the open sea and coming into view, he would take his bearings from the Italian side and bring the tower by the sea onto his bow in such a way that it covered all the towers of the city facing toward Libya—and this is the only way it is possible, with a following wind, to aim accurately at the mouth of the entrance channel.

Trusting in the Rhodian's daring, a good many of those who knew the waters likewise grew bold enough to do the same. As a result, the Romans, frustrated by what was happening, set about trying to dam up the mouth of the harbor.

For the most part their attempt accomplished nothing, because of the depth of the sea and because none of the material they dumped in would settle or hold together at all; instead, the swell and the force of the current swept whatever was thrown in aside and scattered it as soon as it began to sink.

But at one spot where there were shoals a mole did, with great effort, take shape. On it a quadrireme that was running out by night ran aground and fell into the enemy's hands—a ship of exceptionally fine construction.

The Romans seized it, fitted it out with a picked crew, and used it to watch for all who tried to sail in, and especially for the Rhodian.

As it happened, he had sailed in by night, and afterward was again putting out openly. But seeing the quadrireme set out alongside him from the start, he recognized the ship and was thrown into confusion.

At first he made a dash to outrun her, but as he was being overtaken by the skill of her crew, in the end he was forced to come about and engage the enemy.

Getting the worst of it in the fight between marines—both because of their numbers and because the men were specially chosen—he fell into the enemy's hands.

The Romans, having captured this finely built ship as well and fitted it out with everything needed for the service, in this way put a stop to those who were boldly running in to Lilybaeum.

Chapter 48 The Roman Siege-Works Burnt

While the besieged were actively building counterworks, they had given up any hope of damaging or destroying the enemy's equipment.

But then a windstorm arose with such violence and force, directed against the very approach-works of the engines, that it shook the galleries loose and lifted by sheer force the towers set out in front of them.

At that moment some of the Greek mercenaries, realizing how suited the circumstances were for destroying the works, put the idea to the general.

He took up the suggestion and quickly got ready everything needed for the job. The young men gathered together and set fire to the works at three points.

Since the structures, owing to their age, were in just the right state to catch fire easily, and since the force of the wind was blowing straight against the towers and engines themselves, the spread of the fire turned out to be vigorous and effective, while the Romans' efforts to relieve and rescue them proved in the end useless and impossible.

So great was the consternation the scene caused among those trying to help that they could neither think clearly nor see what was happening. Blinded by the soot and sparks blown into their faces, and by the sheer volume of smoke, quite a few perished and fell, unable even to get close enough to fight the fire.

And the greater the difficulty the enemy faced for the reasons just given, the greater the advantage to those setting the fires.

For everything that could blind or harm them was blown clean away and driven against the enemy; while whatever they shot or hurled at the rescuers and at the works to destroy them landed accurately—because the men loosing it could see the ground in front of them—and struck hard, since the force of the wind worked together with those throwing.

In the end the destruction was so complete that even the bases of the towers and the timbers of the rams were rendered useless by the fire.

After this, the Romans gave up trying to press the siege by means of works. Instead they dug a ditch and threw a palisade around the whole city, built a wall to protect their own camp as well, and left the outcome to time.

Meanwhile the men in Lilybaeum rebuilt the section of wall that had fallen and now endured the siege with good courage.

Chapter 49 The Roman Fleet Sails for Drepana

When news of these events reached Rome, followed by further reports that most of the fleet's crews had been lost, both at the works and in the conduct of the siege generally,

they hurriedly enrolled sailors, and once they had gathered about ten thousand, sent them off to Sicily.

These men crossed the strait and reached the camp on foot. The Roman general, Publius Claudius, then assembled his military tribunes and said that now was the time to sail against Drepana with the whole fleet.

For Adherbal, the Carthaginian commander stationed there, was unprepared for what was coming: he did not know that the new crews had arrived, and he was convinced that the Roman fleet could not put to sea because of the losses of men suffered during the siege. When they readily agreed,

he at once put on board both the existing crews and those that had recently arrived, and for marines he picked the best volunteers from the whole army—seeing that the voyage was a short one and the prospect of gain plainly at hand.

With these preparations made, he put to sea around midnight, unnoticed by the enemy. At first he sailed in close order, keeping the land on his right.

As soon as it was light and his leading ships came into view off Drepana, Adherbal caught sight of them and was at first thrown off by the unexpected sight.

But quickly collecting himself and grasping that the enemy was attacking, he resolved to attempt anything and endure everything rather than stand by and let his men be shut up in an obvious blockade.

So he at once gathered his crews on the beach and, by proclamation, mustered the mercenaries from the city.

When they had assembled, he set about bringing them, in a few words, to grasp both the hope of victory that lay before them if they dared to fight at sea, and the hardships of a blockade if they hung back out of foreseen danger.

When they readily roused themselves for the sea-battle and shouted at him to lead on and not delay, he praised them, welcomed their eagerness, and ordered them to embark with all speed, to keep their eyes on his ship, and to follow it astern.

Having made these instructions clear, he hurriedly led the way out himself, taking his fleet out close under the very rocks, toward the far side of the harbor away from where the enemy was entering.

Chapter 50 The Roman Fleet Meets Resistance

Publius, the Roman commander, saw that the enemy, contrary to his expectation, were neither giving way nor alarmed at his approach, but were set on fighting a sea-battle.

Some of his own ships were already inside the harbor, others were right at its mouth, and still others were bearing down toward the entrance; so he gave the order for all of them to turn about and sail back out again.

At this, with some of the ships in the harbor and others at the entrance colliding because of the reversal, there arose not only an immense uproar from the men, but the ships, crashing into one another, also broke their oars.

Even so, as each ship ran back out the captains kept forming them up close along the shore and quickly brought their prows to face the enemy.

Publius himself had from the first been sailing astern of the whole fleet, but now, turning aside during the maneuver toward the open sea, he took up his position on the left wing of the entire force.

At the same moment Adherbal, sailing past the left of the enemy [the Romans] with five ships, brought his own ship to a halt facing the enemy on the seaward side;

and at the same time, through his officers, he passed the word to each of the ships coming up behind to do the same as those who joined the line ahead of them.

When they had all formed into a single front, he gave the signal through the agreed tokens and at first advanced in good order, while the Romans stayed close to the land because they were waiting for the ships still running out from the harbor.

As a result, the Romans were at a great disadvantage right up against the shore itself.

Chapter 51 Naval Battle Off Drepana

...joining battle. When the two fleets were close to one another, the signals were raised on each of the flagships and they engaged.

At first the contest was evenly matched, since both sides were using the best of their land troops as marines on board;

but the Carthaginians steadily gained the upper hand, since throughout the whole engagement they held many advantages.

They were far superior in speed, owing to the better construction of their ships and the fitness of their crews, and the lay of the ground greatly helped them, since they had drawn up their line with the open sea behind them.

For whenever any of them were hard pressed by the enemy, they could withdraw safely to the rear, thanks to their speed, into the open water;

and then, wheeling about against the foremost of their pursuers—sometimes circling around them, sometimes striking them broadside as the Roman ships swung clumsily about because of their weight and the inexperience of their crews—they kept ramming again and again and sank many of the vessels.

And whenever one of their allies was in danger, they readily came to the rescue, out of harm's way and in safety, since they made their passage along the sterns of their own ships on the seaward side.

For the Romans the very opposite happened. Those who were hard pressed had no way to retreat to the rear, since they were fighting close to the shore, and any ship that was crowded by the one in front of it either ran onto the shallows and stuck fast in the stern, or was driven against the land and ran aground.

To sail through the gaps in the enemy's line and to appear astern of ships already engaged with others—the most effective maneuver in a sea-battle—was impossible for them, both because of the heaviness of their ships and, still more, because of the inexperience of their crews.

Nor were they able to come to the aid from astern of those who needed it, because they were penned in against the shore and there was not even a little space left for those who wished to help one in distress.

With such difficulty pervading the whole battle—some ships sticking fast on the shallows, others being driven ashore—the Roman commander, seeing what was happening, turned to flight, slipping away from the left wing along the shore, with about thirty ships that happened to be near him.

As for the remaining ships, ninety-three in number, the Carthaginians took possession of them and their crews, except for those men who ran their ships up onto the land and got away.

Chapter 52 Roman Transports for the Camp

The sea-battle having turned out so, Adherbal won high standing among the Carthaginians, as having succeeded through himself and through his own foresight and daring;

while Publius lost his good name among the Romans and was bitterly attacked, as having handled affairs rashly and without judgment, and as having, so far as one man could, brought Rome into no small disasters.

For this reason he was later put on trial and exposed to heavy penalties and grave danger.

The Romans, however, despite these events, in their ambition for the whole cause left undone nothing that was possible, but pressed on with the next steps.

And so, when the time for the elections came round, they appointed consuls and at once sent off one of them, Lucius Junius, to convey supplies of grain to those besieging Lilybaeum, along with the other provisions and stores for the army; and they manned sixty ships as escorts for these.

Junius, arriving at Messana and taking on the ships that met him there from the army and from the rest of Sicily, made his way in haste to Syracuse, with a hundred and twenty warships and his provisions in about eight hundred cargo vessels.

From there he handed over to the quaestors half the cargo ships and some of the warships and sent them off, eager to get the army what it needed.

He himself remained at Syracuse, waiting for those that were lagging behind on the voyage from Messana and taking on additional grain from the allies in the interior.

Chapter 53 Carthalo Attacks the Roman Transports

About this same time Adherbal sent off to Carthage the men captured in the sea-battle and the captured ships,

and gave his colleague Carthalo thirty ships, in addition to the seventy with which he himself had sailed in, and sent him off

with orders to fall suddenly upon the enemy's ships lying at anchor off Lilybaeum, to seize all he could, and to set fire to the rest.

Carthalo obeyed, made his attack just before dawn, and began burning some of the ships and towing others away, so that great confusion arose throughout the Roman camp.

For as the Romans rushed to the rescue of their ships and a shout went up, Himilco, the commander of the garrison at Lilybaeum, grasped what was happening and, seeing it as day was now breaking, sent out the mercenaries from the city against them.

The Romans, with danger pressing in on them from every side, fell into no slight or ordinary confusion.

The Carthaginian admiral, after towing off a few of the vessels and shattering others, then drew off a little way from Lilybaeum, as if making for Heracleia, and lay in wait, intending to block those who were sailing toward the Roman camp.

When his scouts reported that a considerable number of ships of all kinds were bearing down and drawing near, he put out to sea and sailed to meet them, eager to engage because his earlier success had made him contemptuous of the Romans.

In the same way, the light boats accustomed to sail ahead of the squadron reported the enemy's approach to the quaestors who had been sent on in advance from Syracuse.

These men, judging that they were not strong enough for a sea-battle, came to anchor off a small town subject to them—one without a harbor, but with roadsteads and headlands jutting out from the land that conveniently enclosed them.

There they made their landing and, setting up the catapults and stone-throwers from the town, waited for the enemy's attack.

The Carthaginians, on drawing near, at first set about blockading them, supposing that the men, terrified, would withdraw into the little town and leave them to take possession of the ships in safety.

But when this expectation came to nothing—the men on the contrary defending themselves stoutly, and the place presenting many difficulties of every kind—they towed off a few of the provision ships and sailed away to a certain river, where they anchored and watched for the Romans to resume their voyage.

Chapter 54 Shipwreck of the Roman Fleet

The commander left behind at Syracuse, once he had finished what he intended, rounded Pachynus and held his course toward Lilybaeum, knowing nothing of what had happened to those who had sailed ahead.

The Carthaginian admiral, when his scouts again signaled the appearance of the enemy, put out and sailed in haste, wishing to engage them as far as possible from their own ships.

Junius, sighting the Carthaginian fleet and the number of its vessels from a long way off, dared neither to engage nor was he any longer able to escape by flight, since the enemy were close at hand; so he turned aside to a rough and altogether treacherous stretch of coast and came to anchor there,

judging it preferable to suffer whatever he must rather than let his squadron, men and all, fall into the enemy's hands.

The Carthaginian admiral, seeing what he had done, rejected the idea of risking a battle and bringing his ships up to such dangerous ground; instead he seized a certain headland and anchored there between the two enemy squadrons, keeping watch and giving his attention to both.

But when a storm came on and a more general disturbance loomed up from the sea, the Carthaginian pilots, foreseeing what was coming from their knowledge of the locality and of seamanship and predicting the outcome, persuaded Carthalo to flee the storm and round the headland of Pachynus.

He sensibly took their advice, and these men, after great toil and barely getting around the headland, anchored in safety;

but the Roman fleets, with the storm coming on and the coast being utterly without harbors, were so completely destroyed that not even the wreckage proved of any use—both squadrons alike were utterly and unaccountably ruined.

Chapter 55 The Romans Take Mount Eryx

When this had happened, the fortunes of the Carthaginians rose again and their hopes once more grew more favorable;

while the Romans, who had earlier suffered setbacks only up to a point, now withdrew entirely from the sea but kept control of the open country. The Carthaginians were masters of the sea, yet did not wholly give up hope of the land.

After this everyone—both those at Rome and the troops around Lilybaeum—was indignant at the situation as a whole, on account of the disasters described above;

yet they did not abandon their resolve to carry on the siege, but the one side kept up supplies by land without excuse, while the other persisted in the siege as far as they were able.

Junius, brought back to the camp after the shipwreck and deeply distressed, was eager to make some new move and to do what was needed, anxious to recover from the reverse that had occurred.

And so, when even a slight opportunity offered, he seized Eryx by a surprise stroke and made himself master both of the temple of Aphrodite and of the city.

Eryx is a mountain by the sea in Sicily, on the side that faces Italy, between Drepana and Panormus—but closer to and almost adjoining Drepana—and in size it is by far the greatest of the mountains in Sicily except for Aetna.

On its very summit, which is flat, stands the temple of Erycine Aphrodite, which is by common agreement the most distinguished of all the temples in Sicily for its wealth and its general grandeur;

and the city is set just below the summit, with a very long and steep approach on every side.

He posted a garrison on the summit, and likewise watched the approach from Drepana, guarding both points carefully—and still more the line of ascent—convinced that in this way he would securely hold both the city and the whole mountain.

Chapter 56 Hamilcar Barca's Seven Years in Hercte

After this the Carthaginians appointed as their commander Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, and put the affairs of the fleet into his hands.

Taking over the naval forces, he set out to ravage Italy. It was the eighteenth year of the war.

After overrunning the territory of Locris and Bruttium, he sailed off from there and put in with his whole fleet at the region of Panormus, and seized the place called Hercte, which lies between Eryx and Panormus by the sea and is reckoned to surpass other sites by far in suitability for the security and long maintenance of an encampment.

For it is a steep-sided mountain rising to a considerable height above the surrounding country. The perimeter of its upper rim is not less than a hundred stades, and the ground enclosed within it is good for pasture and tillage, well placed to catch the sea-breezes and altogether free of deadly wild beasts.

It is ringed by inaccessible cliffs both on the side toward the sea and on the side stretching toward the interior, while the spaces between these need only slight and minor fortification.

It also has within it a knoll that serves at once as a citadel and as a fine lookout point over the country below.

It commands as well a harbor well situated for the run from Drepana and Lilybaeum to Italy, in which there is an abundant supply of water.

It has in all three approaches, all difficult—two from the land and one from the sea. Encamping here at great hazard, Hamilcar,

though he had no friendly city of his own and clung to no other hope of any kind, but had thrown himself into the very midst of the enemy, nevertheless made trouble for the Romans in struggles and dangers that were neither small nor trivial.

For, first, using this as his base, he ravaged by sea the coast of Italy as far as the territory of Cumae;

and second, on land, when the Romans had encamped opposite him before the city of Panormus at a distance of about five stades, he engaged in many and varied combats on land for nearly three years. About these it is not possible, in writing...

Chapter 57 The Two Sides Evenly Matched

Take the case of two outstanding boxers, men matched in both their natural gifts and their physical conditioning. When they have entered the decisive moment of the contest for the crown and are fighting it out, landing blow upon blow without pause, it is impossible—for the combatants and the spectators alike—to keep a precise account of, or to anticipate, each individual feint and stroke.

Yet from the overall vigor of the men, and from the competitive drive of each, one can form an adequate impression of their skill, their strength, and their courage as well. The same holds for the two generals I am now describing.

The reasons for, and the methods by which, they daily set ambushes and counter-ambushes, attacks and assaults against one another could never be set down in full by a writer who tried to enumerate them; and for an audience the recital would be endless and, into the bargain, the reading of it pointless and unprofitable.

But from a general statement about them and about the outcome of their rivalry, one will arrive at a clearer understanding of the events described.

For nothing was left untried—neither the stratagems that could be learned from history, nor the devices prompted by the moment and the immediate situation, nor the undertakings that called for hazardous and forceful daring.

A decisive engagement, however, could not be brought about, and for several reasons. The forces on both sides were evenly matched; the entrenched camps were alike unapproachable because of their strength; and the distance between the two armies was extremely short.

This last was the chief reason why minor clashes occurred ceaselessly day after day, while nothing decisive was ever accomplished.

For it always turned out that the only men killed in these encounters were those who fell into hand-to-hand fighting; while those who once gave way were at once entirely out of danger, safe behind their own defenses, and could then turn about and renew the fight.

Chapter 58 Hamilcar Besieges the Romans at Eryx

Nevertheless, Fortune, like a good umpire of the games, shifted them by a daring move out of the position just described and the struggle they had been engaged in, and shut them up in a more dangerous contest within a narrower space.

For while the Romans were holding Eryx both at its summit and at its base, as I have said, Hamilcar seized the town of the Erycinians, which lay between the summit and the men encamped at the foot.

The result was that the Romans holding the summit endured a siege and faced danger with reckless courage, while the Carthaginians held out with almost incredible tenacity—with the enemy pressing them on every side, and their supplies brought in only with difficulty, since they clung to the sea at a single point by a single approach.

Here once again both sides used against each other every device and force of siege-craft; they bore every kind of privation and made trial of every assault and battle.

In the end—not, as Fabius claims, because they were exhausted and worn down, but like men untouched and unconquerable—they let the crown stand undecided.

For before either side could overcome the other, though they fought on in this place for two more years, the war came to its decision by another means.

Such, then, was the situation at Eryx and among the land forces. The two states were like high-bred fighting birds battling to their last breath.

Such birds, when through exhaustion they have often lost the use of their wings yet hold on by sheer spirit, keep dealing out blows until at last, by chance closing with each other, they seize one another at a vital moment, and once this happens it falls out that one of the two drops first.

So too the Romans and Carthaginians, worn out by their labors through the unbroken succession of dangers, were utterly past feeling, their strength sapped and their resolve undone—

Chapter 59 The Romans Once More Build a Fleet

—by the long years of taxes and expenses. The Romans were fighting on with the same desperate spirit. For nearly five years now they had entirely withdrawn from operations at sea, both because of their reverses there and because they had become convinced they would decide the war by their land forces alone.

But seeing now that the matter was not going forward as they had reckoned—chiefly because of the daring of the Carthaginian commander—they resolved for a third time to stake their hopes on naval power,

believing that by this plan, if they seized the right moment for the attempt, they could in this way alone bring the war to a successful close. And so in the end they did.

The first time, they had quit the sea, yielding to the blows of fortune; the second time, they had been worsted in the sea-battle off Drepana.

Now they made this third attempt, and by it they were victorious; cutting off the Carthaginian armies around Eryx from their supplies by sea, they brought the whole struggle to its conclusion.

The undertaking was, for the most part, an act of sheer determination. The public treasury held no funds for the purpose; nevertheless, through the patriotism and generosity of the leading men toward the commonwealth, the means were found to carry it through.

According to the resources at their command, men came forward singly, in pairs, or in threes to furnish a fully fitted quinquereme, on the understanding that they would recover the cost if affairs went well.

In this way two hundred quinqueremes were quickly made ready, built on the model of the Rhodian's ship. The Romans then appointed Gaius Lutatius as commander and sent him out at the start of summer.

He appeared unexpectedly off the coasts of Sicily and seized both the harbor at Drepana and the anchorages near Lilybaeum, since the entire Carthaginian fleet had withdrawn home.

He threw up works around the city of Drepana and made his other preparations for the siege; and while he pressed on with this, doing everything in his power,

he also kept watch for the arrival of the Carthaginian fleet, and, mindful of his original purpose—that only through a sea-battle could the whole issue be decided—he let no time be wasted or left idle.

Instead, each day he held practice drills and exercises for the crews suited to his plan, and by attending carefully to the rest of their daily regimen, he turned his sailors, in a very short time, into trained athletes ready for the task before them.

Chapter 60 Battle of the Aegusian Islands

The Carthaginians, when news reached them—contrary to all expectation—that the Romans had put to sea with a fleet and were once again contesting the mastery of the sea, at once fitted out their ships.

Loading them with grain and other provisions, they dispatched the fleet, determined that their forces around Eryx should lack none of the necessities.

They appointed Hanno commander of the naval force. He put out to sea and made landfall at the island called Holy Isle, intent on slipping across to Eryx unobserved by the enemy. There he meant to unload his cargo and lighten his ships, then take on board as marines the suitable men from among the mercenaries, along with Barcas, and only then to engage the enemy.

But Lutatius grasped the arrival of Hanno's force and worked out their intention. Taking the best men from his land army, he sailed to the island of Aegusa, which lies off Lilybaeum.

There he addressed his forces with words fitting the occasion and informed the helmsmen that a sea-battle would take place the next day.

Toward dawn, as day was just breaking, he saw that the wind was bearing down fresh and full astern of the enemy, while for himself the run out against the wind would be difficult, the sea being hollow and rough. At first he was at a loss as to what to do in the circumstances.

But he reasoned that if he risked battle while the storm held, he would be fighting only against Hanno, against the bare naval crews, and against ships still heavily laden;

whereas if he waited for fair weather and held back, letting the enemy cross over and join their land forces, he would be fighting against ships that were nimble and lightened, against the best men of the land armies, and—most formidable of all—against the daring of Hamilcar, than which nothing at that time was more to be feared.

He therefore decided not to let the present opportunity slip; and seeing the enemy's ships running under sail, he put out in haste.

His crews, with their fine physical condition, rode the swell with ease, and he quickly drew up his fleet in a single line, prow facing—

Chapter 61 The Battle of Aegusa

—the enemy. The Carthaginians, seeing that the Romans were blocking their crossing, lowered their masts and, after each ship's company had exhorted one another, closed with their opponents.

Since the state of preparation on each side was the exact opposite of what it had been in the sea-battle off Drepana, the outcome of the fight for each side naturally turned out the opposite as well.

For the Romans had remodeled their shipbuilding and had stripped their vessels of all encumbrances except what was needed for the battle; their crews, well drilled and working together, served them with outstanding effect; and their marines were picked men from the legions, men who would never give ground.

With the Carthaginians the reverse was true. Their ships were laden and so unwieldy for the engagement; their crews were utterly untrained and had been thrown aboard for the emergency; and their marines were newly levied recruits, raw to all hardship and danger.

For because they had never expected the Romans to dispute the sea again, they had grown contemptuous and let their naval forces fall into neglect.

And so, the moment battle was joined, they were worsted at many points of the fighting and quickly gave way. Fifty of their ships were sunk, and seventy captured with their crews.

The rest of the host hoisted their sails and, running before the wind, made off again to Holy Isle, the wind luckily and unexpectedly shifting to serve their need at just the right moment.

The Roman commander, for his part, sailed back to Lilybaeum and busied himself with the army over the disposal of the captured ships and prisoners—a considerable task, for those taken alive in the battle fell little short of ten thousand.

Chapter 62 End of the First Punic War

When the defeat fell upon them unexpectedly, the Carthaginians, as far as their fighting spirit and ambition went, were still ready to carry on the war, but in their reckoning they were at a complete loss.

For they could no longer supply their forces in Sicily, since the enemy controlled the sea; yet to abandon those forces—and so, in a sense, to betray them—would leave them without the men or the leaders to keep fighting.

They therefore quickly sent word to Barcas and entrusted him with the decision over the whole matter. And he indeed acted thoroughly as a good and prudent commander should.

For as long as there was any reasonable hope in the existing circumstances, he left untried nothing that seemed hazardous or daring, but, if any commander ever did, he tested to the full every hope of victory in the war.

But once the situation had turned and no reasonable means was left to save the men under his command, he yielded to circumstances with great good sense and practical judgment, and sent envoys to negotiate a truce and a settlement.

For it is the mark of one and the same commander to be able to see both the moment for victory and, equally, the moment for giving way.

Lutatius readily accepted the overtures, since he was well aware that his own side was worn down and already exhausted by the war; and so it came about that the conflict was brought to an end, on terms drawn up roughly as follows:

"On these conditions there shall be friendship between the Carthaginians and the Romans, provided the Roman people also approve. The Carthaginians shall withdraw from the whole of Sicily, and shall not make war on Hiero, nor bear arms against the Syracusans or against the allies of the Syracusans.

The Carthaginians shall give back to the Romans all prisoners without ransom. The Carthaginians shall pay to the Romans, over twenty years, two thousand two hundred Euboic talents of silver."

Chapter 63 The Longest and Harshest War in History

When these terms were referred back to Rome, the people did not accept the treaty, but sent out ten commissioners to investigate the matter.

On their arrival they made no change in the substance of the terms, but they tightened them somewhat against the Carthaginians.

They cut the time allowed for paying the tribute in half, added a thousand talents to the sum, and further required the Carthaginians to withdraw from all the islands lying between Italy and Sicily.

Such, then, were the terms, and such the conclusion, of the war that arose between the Romans and Carthaginians over Sicily—a war fought continuously for twenty-four years, the longest, the most unbroken, and the greatest war we know of by report.

In it, apart from the other battles and preparations I have described above, the two sides fought against one another at sea once with more than five hundred quinqueremes between them, and a second time with not far short of seven hundred.

In this war the Romans lost, counting those destroyed in shipwrecks, close to seven hundred quinqueremes, and the Carthaginians about five hundred.

So that those who marvel at the sea-battles and fleets of Antigonus, Ptolemy, and Demetrius, had they looked into these events, might well have been astounded at the overwhelming scale of these operations.

And if one cared to weigh the difference in size between quinqueremes and the triremes with which the Persians fought the Greeks, and again the Athenians and Spartans fought one another, one would find that nowhere in all history have such great forces contended at sea.

From this it is clear—as I proposed at the outset—that it was not by chance, as some of the Greeks suppose, nor by accident, but with very good reason that the Romans, having trained themselves in such great affairs, not only set their hands boldly to the rule and dominion of the whole world, but also—

Chapter 64 Why Rome is No Longer a Naval Power

…they achieved their purpose. And here one might naturally be puzzled as to the reason why, now that they have mastered the whole world and possess a superiority many times greater than before, they would be unable either to man so many ships or to put to sea with such great fleets as they once did.

The causes of this puzzle, however, will be clearly understood once we come to the account of their constitution—a subject that we must not treat as a mere aside, nor one to which our listeners should give only idle attention.

For it is a fine thing to contemplate, and one that remains, so to speak, virtually unknown down to the present day, thanks to those who have written about it.

Some of them have simply been ignorant of it, while others have produced an account that is unclear and altogether useless.

Still, in the war just mentioned one would find that the policies of the two states were closely matched—not only in their plans of attack but also in their greatness of spirit, and most of all in their ambition for supremacy.

In the courage of the individual men, however, the Romans were in every respect far the more gallant; while as a commander, the finest of that age in both judgment and daring, we must rank Hamilcar, surnamed Barcas, the natural father of the Hannibal who afterwards made war on the Romans.

Chapter 65 The Sequel of the First Punic War

After this settlement, both states happened to undergo an experience that was peculiar and yet much alike.

For an internal war broke out to receive the Romans—the one against the people called the Faliscans—which they brought to a swift and profitable conclusion, gaining control of their city within a few days.

The Carthaginians, at about the same time, faced a war that was neither small nor to be despised: the one against their foreign mercenaries, the Numidians, and the Libyans who joined them in their revolt.

In the course of it they endured many great terrors, and in the end were in danger not only over their territory but over their own survival and the very soil of their homeland.

It is worth dwelling on this war for several reasons, but, in keeping with my original plan, I shall give an account of it only in summary and briefly.

For the war commonly called the "truceless" war—what its nature and character were—one would best come to understand from what happened then;

and those who employ mercenary forces would see most vividly, from the situation of that time, what they must foresee and guard against well in advance; and besides this, how greatly, and by how much, characters that are mixed and barbarous differ from those reared under education, laws, and civic customs.

But most important of all, one would grasp, from what was done in those days, the causes from which the war between the Romans and Carthaginians in the time of Hannibal arose.

Since the causes of that war are still disputed not only among historians but also among those who took part in it, it is useful to set before students of the subject the truest possible account of them.

Chapter 66 Mischief Brewing Among the Mercenaries

As soon as the aforesaid settlement had been carried out, Barcas brought the forces around Eryx back to Lilybaeum and immediately laid down his command; and Gesco, the commandant of the city, set about transporting the soldiers across into Libya.

Foreseeing what was coming, he prudently embarked them in separate detachments, leaving intervals between each dispatch,

with the aim of giving the Carthaginians time, so that those who had sailed across and been paid the arrears of their wages might get clear of Carthage and reach home before the next group to be ferried over arrived to overtake them.

Gesco, then, holding to this idea, was managing the dispatch in this way.

But the Carthaginians—partly because they were short of funds owing to their recent expenses, and partly because they were convinced that the mercenaries would forgo some portion of the wages owed them if they gathered and received them all together in Carthage—kept the arrivals there in this hope and held them in the city.

When this led to more and more wrongdoing, both by night and by day, the Carthaginians at first grew wary of the crowd and the lack of discipline that was developing, and asked the officers that, until arrangements for their pay rations were ready and the rest had arrived, all the men should withdraw to a certain town called Sicca, each taking a gold piece for his immediate needs.

The men readily agreed to the departure and wished to leave their baggage there, as they had at first, on the grounds that they would soon return for their payment.

But the Carthaginians were anxious that the men, having been away for a long time and longing—some for their children, some also for their wives—might either not set out at all, or, having set out, might turn back again for these reasons, so that in this way wrongdoing in the city would be no less than before.

Foreseeing this, they compelled the men, with much ill feeling and entirely against their will, to take their baggage away with them.

The mercenaries, gathered together at Sicca and having for a long time enjoyed rest and leisure—which is the most ruinous thing for foreign forces and is, one might almost say, the chief and sole cause of mutiny—passed their time without restraint.

And, in their idleness, some of them began to reckon up the wages owed them at an inflated figure, and, totaling it at many times what was actually due, declared that this was what they should demand from the Carthaginians.

And all of them, recalling the promises their generals had made to encourage them in moments of crisis, conceived high hopes and great expectations of the redress that was coming to them…

Chapter 67 The Beginning of the Outbreak

…of the redress they expected. So, as soon as they had all assembled at Sicca, and Hanno—who was then the Carthaginian general in Libya—arrived and, far from fulfilling their hopes and the promises made to them, spoke instead of the weight of the tribute and the general financial straits of the city, and tried to get them to forgo even part of the wages acknowledged to be owed them,

at once dissension and faction arose, and continual gatherings took place, sometimes by nationality, sometimes of them all together.

And since they were neither of one race nor of one tongue, the camp was full of disorder, uproar, and what is called sheer confusion.

For the Carthaginians, always relying on varied mercenary forces, are right in their aim, by making the army up of many races, that the men should not quickly conspire and become disobedient, nor be hard for their commanders to overawe;

but when anger, or slander, or faction has arisen, they utterly fail in instructing, calming, and bringing back to their senses men who have gone astray.

For such forces, once they have fallen into anger and mutual suspicion toward anyone, no longer behave with merely human wickedness, but in the end turn savage like beasts and take on a frenzied disposition.

This is exactly what happened to them on this occasion. For some were Iberians, some Celts, some Ligurians and Balearic Islanders, and not a few were half-Greeks, most of these deserters and slaves; but the largest part of them were Libyans.

So it was impossible to gather them all together into one assembly, or to devise any other means to that end.

How could it be done? It was impossible for the general to know all their languages; and to hold an assembly through many interpreters, saying the same thing four or five times over, was, one might say, even more impossible than the former.

The only course left was to make his requests and appeals through the officers, which is what Hanno kept trying to do at the time.

Yet here too it turned out that the officers either did not grasp what was said, or, having sometimes agreed with the general, reported the opposite to the men—some out of ignorance, some out of malice—so that everything was full of obscurity, mistrust, and confusion.

For on top of everything else, they suspected that the Carthaginians were deliberately not sending them the generals who knew the services they had rendered in Sicily and who had made them their promises, but had dispatched the one man who had been present at none of these dealings.

In the end, then, they rejected Hanno, lost confidence in their individual officers, and, enraged at the Carthaginians, set off for the city; they encamped about a hundred and twenty stades from Carthage at the place called Tunes, being more than twenty thousand in number.

Chapter 68 The Mercenaries Accept an Arbitration

The Carthaginians then saw their own folly before their eyes, when it was no longer of any use.

For they had blundered greatly in massing so large a body of mercenaries in one place while having no hope of military service to fall back on in their own citizen forces;

and, worse still, they had handed over the children, the wives, and along with them the baggage—people whom they might have kept as hostages, thereby deliberating more safely about the situation and finding the mercenaries more compliant to their appeals.

Nonetheless, terrified by the encampment, they endured everything in their eagerness to appease the men's anger;

they sent out abundant supplies of provisions and sold them just as the men wished and at whatever prices they fixed, and they kept dispatching members of the senate as envoys, promising to do whatever the men demanded, so far as it lay in their power.

But there was much being newly devised each day among the mercenaries, since they had taken courage and observed the dismay and panic of the Carthaginians,

and had grown arrogant and convinced, on account of the dangers they had earlier faced in Sicily against the Roman armies, that not only would the Carthaginians never look them in the eye under arms, but that hardly anyone else among men would either.

So, as soon as the Carthaginians had conceded their claims about the wages, they at once pressed further and demanded the value of the horses they had lost.

When this too was granted, they next said they ought to receive the price of the grain ration owed them over a long period, reckoned at the highest value it had reached during the war.

In short, they always kept inventing something new and unheard of, driving the settlement into the realm of the impossible, because there were among them many ill-disposed and seditious men.

Even so, with the Carthaginians promising everything in their power, the men agreed to refer the disputed points to one of the generals who had served in Sicily.

Now toward Hamilcar Barcas, alongside whom they had shared the dangers in Sicily, they were ill-disposed, since they thought it was largely because of him that they were being slighted—because he neither came to them as an envoy nor, as it seemed, had voluntarily laid down his command.

But toward Gesco they were very kindly inclined, since he had been a general in Sicily and had taken every possible care for them in other matters and especially in their transport home. So they referred to him the matter of the…

Chapter 69 Mathōs and Spendius

…disputed points. He came by sea with the money and put in at Tunes; and at first he met with the officers, and afterward gathered the men together by nationality.

In part he rebuked them for what had happened, in part he tried to instruct them about the present situation; but most of all he appealed to them regarding the future, asking them to remain well-disposed toward those who had been their paymasters from the start.

Finally he set about settling the arrears of pay, making the disbursement nationality by nationality.

Now there was a certain Campanian, a slave who had deserted from the Romans, a man of bodily strength and of reckless daring in war, named Spendius.

This man, fearing that his master might come and recover him, and that he would be tortured to death under Roman law, dared to say and do anything in his eagerness to wreck the settlement with the Carthaginians.

Together with him there was also a certain Libyan named Mathōs, who was a free man and one of those who had served, but had stirred up a great deal during the disturbances already described. Dreading that he too would pay the penalty on behalf of all the rest, he came to share the views of Spendius and his circle.

Taking the Libyans aside, he pointed out to them that, once the other races had received their pay and departed to their homelands, the Carthaginians would vent on them the anger felt for those others as well, and would want, through punishing them, to strike terror into everyone in Libya.

The crowd was quickly roused by such arguments, and, seizing on the slight pretext that Gesco was paying the wages but deferring the values of the grain and the horses, they at once rushed together into an assembly.

And while Spendius and Mathōs slandered and accused both Gesco and the Carthaginians, the men listened and gave careful attention to what was said. But if anyone else came forward to give different advice,

they did not even wait to learn whether he had come to oppose or to support Spendius and his party, but at once stoned him to death.

In this way they killed many, both officers and private soldiers, in the course of these gatherings.

And the only word they all understood in common was this—"throw"—because of the constant practice of it. They did this especially when they had gotten drunk after their midday meals and rushed together.

So whenever anyone began to shout "throw," it came so swiftly and from all sides at once that no one who had once stepped forward could escape.

And so, since for this reason no one any longer dared to offer advice, they appointed for themselves…

Chapter 70 Gesco and His Staff Arrested

…as their generals Mathōs and Spendius. Gesco saw the whole disorder and turmoil, but, valuing above all the interest of his country and recognizing that, if these men were driven to savagery, the Carthaginians would clearly be in danger of losing everything,

he persisted and held firm, sometimes taking their leaders in hand, sometimes gathering the men by nationality and appealing to them.

However, the Libyans had not yet received their grain allowances, and, believing that these ought to have been paid to them, they came up insolently; and Gesco, wishing to rebuke their impudence, told them to go and ask their general Mathōs for it.

At this they became so enraged that, without giving any pause at all, they rushed first to plunder the money that lay ready to hand, and then to seize Gesco and the Carthaginians with him.

Mathōs and Spendius, supposing that the war would be kindled most quickly in this way—if the men did something lawless and in breach of the treaty—aided the frenzy of the mob, plundered the baggage of the Carthaginians together with the money, and, having bound Gesco and those with him outrageously, handed them over into custody.

From then on they made open war against the Carthaginians, having formed impious conspiracies contrary to the common customs of mankind.

This, then, was how the war against the foreigners—also called the Libyan war—took its beginning, and of such a kind.

Mathōs and his men, having accomplished what has been described, at once sent envoys to the cities throughout Libya, urging them to assert their freedom and begging them to help and join in their cause.

After this, when nearly all the peoples of Libya readily heeded their call to revolt from the Carthaginians, and eagerly sent supplies and reinforcements, they divided their forces and undertook to lay siege—some to Utica, others to Hippo Zarytus—because these cities refused to…

Chapter 71 Despair at Carthage

There are three things to bear in mind about the Carthaginians. First, the private citizens always supported their own livelihoods from the produce of the land; second, they assembled their public resources and supplies for war from the revenues of Libya; and third, they were accustomed to wage war with foreign mercenary forces.

At this moment they were not only stripped of all these resources at once, against every expectation, but they actually saw each one of the things just mentioned turned against themselves. They sank into utter dejection and despair, since events had fallen out so contrary to their hopes.

For, worn down by the unbroken strain of the war over Sicily, they had hoped that, once the peace settlement was concluded, they would gain some breathing space and a period of welcome stability.

But the opposite befell them: the opening of a still greater and more terrifying war was now upon them.

Previously they had been contesting Sicily with the Romans; now they were about to risk everything for their own survival and for their homeland, taking up a civil war.

On top of this, they had no abundance of weapons, no naval force, and no fleet in good repair, having lost so much in all those sea-battles; nor was there any store of supplies, nor any hope whatsoever of friends or allies coming to their aid from outside.

So it was then that they came to understand clearly how great a difference there is between a foreign war fought across the sea and an internal uprising and upheaval.

And they themselves, more than anyone, had been the cause of such great evils...

Chapter 72 Revolt in the Country

...and of such grievous troubles. For during the previous war, supposing that they had reasonable grounds for it, they had governed the people of Libya with great harshness.

They had taken half of all the other crops, doubled the tribute imposed on the towns from what it had been before, and granted no pardon or consideration whatever to those in difficulty in any of these exactions.

And of their successive generals they admired and honored not those who treated the populace gently and humanely, but those who secured for them the most abundant supplies and provisions, even while dealing most cruelly with the country people—one of whom was Hanno.

So it was that the men needed not even any urging to revolt, but only a single messenger.

And the women, who in earlier times had looked on while their husbands and parents were being led off for the levies, now bound themselves by oath, town by town, to hide none of their possessions; and, stripping off their ornaments, they contributed them without reservation toward the soldiers' pay.

In this way they provided Mathos and Spendius with such ample means that they were able not only to pay off the wages still owed to the mercenaries, as they had promised when inciting the revolt, but also to keep themselves well supplied for the future.

So true it is that those who plan rightly must always look not only to the present, but still more to what lies ahead.

Chapter 73 The Carthaginians Prepare

Nevertheless, even in such a desperate state, the Carthaginians appointed Hanno as their general—because he was thought to have, on an earlier occasion, brought Hecatompylos in Libya under their control—and they began to gather mercenaries and to arm those of their citizens who were of military age.

They also trained and organized the citizen cavalry, and made ready what ships remained to them—triremes, penteconters, and the largest of their light boats.

Meanwhile Mathos, joined by as many as seventy thousand Libyans, divided these forces and kept up the sieges of the people of Utica and of Hippo Zarytus in security, while firmly holding the encampment at Tunes, and so cut the Carthaginians off from the whole of outer Libya.

For Carthage itself lies in a gulf, projecting outward like a peninsula by its situation, surrounded for the most part partly by the sea and partly by a lake.

The isthmus that joins it to Libya is about twenty-five stades wide. On the side of this isthmus that faces the open sea, and at no great distance, lies the city of Utica; on the other side, beside the lake, lies Tunes.

Encamping at both of these points, the mercenaries had now cut the Carthaginians off from the countryside and went on to lay plans against the city itself,

approaching the wall sometimes by day and sometimes by night, and throwing those inside into utter fear and confusion...

Chapter 74 Failures of Hanno

...they struck panic into those within. As for Hanno, he was capable enough when it came to preparations, for he had a natural talent for this side of things;

but once he set out with his army he was a different man, for he made poor use of his opportunities and handled affairs as a whole with inexperience and sluggishness.

Thus, when he first marched to the relief of the besieged at Utica and struck terror into the enemy with the multitude of his beasts—for he had no fewer than a hundred elephants—and then, having gained the beginning of a decisive advantage, he made such bad use of it that he came close to destroying the besieged as well.

For he brought out from the city the catapults, the missiles, and, in short, all the equipment for the siege, and, encamping before the city, undertook to attack the enemy's stockade.

When the beasts forced their way into the enemy's camp, the foe, unable to withstand their weight and the force of their charge, all fled from the encampment.

Many of them died from wounds inflicted by the beasts, while the part that survived took up position on a certain steep, thickly wooded hill, trusting in the natural security of the ground.

But Hanno, used to fighting against Numidians and Libyans—who, once they give way, keep up their flight for two or three days, putting as much distance between themselves and the enemy as they can—supposed that on this occasion too the war was at an end and that he had won a complete victory.

So he neglected his soldiers and the camp as a whole, and went into the city himself to attend to his own comfort.

But the mercenaries who had taken refuge on the hill had been bred up in the daring tactics of Barcas, and were accustomed from their battles in Sicily to retreat at one moment and then, in a sudden reversal, to attack the enemy again, often several times in the same day.

Now, seeing that the general had withdrawn into the city, and that most of the men, because of their victory, had grown careless and were drifting away from the camp,

they formed up together and fell upon the stockade. They killed many of the soldiers and forced the rest to flee in disgrace beneath the city walls and gates,

and they seized all the baggage and all the siege equipment of the besieged, which Hanno, on top of everything else, had brought out from the city and so delivered into the hands of the enemy.

And it was not only on this occasion that he behaved so sluggishly: a few days later, when the enemy had encamped opposite him near a place called Gorza, he had two chances to win in pitched battle and two more by surprise attack—

since the enemy were encamped close beside him—yet he seems to have thrown both of these away rashly and against all reason.

Chapter 75 Hamilcar Barcas Becomes Commander in Chief

For this reason the Carthaginians, seeing that he was mismanaging affairs, once more placed Hamilcar, surnamed Barcas, at the head of things,

and sent him out as general for the war then in progress, giving him seventy elephants, the mercenaries that had been collected, the men who had deserted from the enemy, and along with these the citizen cavalry and infantry—so that the whole force came to about ten thousand men.

At his very first sortie he struck the enemy with dismay by the unexpectedness of his move, broke their spirit, raised the siege of Utica, and showed himself worthy of his earlier deeds and of the people's high expectations.

What he accomplished in this operation was as follows. The hills that bridge the neck of land joining Carthage to Libya are hard to cross, and have only man-made passes leading out to the countryside; and it happened that Mathos had occupied with garrisons all the conveniently placed points along these hills.

In addition, the river called Macaras likewise blocks, at certain points, the route from the city to the countryside, being for the most part impassable because of the volume of its current; and since there was only one bridge over it, Mathos was guarding this crossing securely, having built a town upon it.

The result was that the Carthaginians could not even set foot in the country with an army—indeed, not even private individuals wishing to slip through could easily do so without being detected by the enemy.

With his eye on these difficulties, and testing every plan and every opportunity because of the trouble of getting out, Hamilcar devised the following scheme.

He had observed that at the river's mouth, where it discharges into the sea, the opening became silted up under certain conditions of wind, so that the passage right at the mouth turned shallow and marsh-like. He therefore got everything ready in the camp for the march out, keeping his plan hidden within himself, and waited for this condition to occur.

When the moment presented itself, he set out by night and, unobserved by anyone, brought his force across the place just mentioned by daybreak.

The maneuver came as a complete surprise both to those in the city and to the enemy; and Hamilcar advanced across the plain, making his way toward those...

Chapter 76 Hamilcar Barcas Defeats Spendius

...who were guarding the bridge. When Spendius and his men realized what had happened, they came out into the plain and moved to support one another: those from the town at the bridge numbered no fewer than ten thousand, and those from Utica more than fifteen thousand.

When they came within sight of one another, supposing that they had caught the Carthaginians between them, they eagerly passed the word along, urging each other on, and engaged the enemy.

Hamilcar led his march with the elephants in front, the cavalry and light troops behind them, and the heavy infantry last.

But seeing the enemy bearing down on him too recklessly, he gave the order for all his men to turn about.

Those in the van he ordered to wheel around and retire at speed; while those who had been in the rear from the start he wheeled about and drew up to face the oncoming enemy.

The Libyans and mercenaries, thinking that the Carthaginians had been thrown into panic and were fleeing, broke their formation, pressed in, and joined battle hand to hand with vigor.

But the moment the cavalry, having closed with those drawn up in line, wheeled about and stood firm, and the rest of the army came on, the Libyans, dismayed at this unexpected turn, gave way and at once fled—since they had been pressing the attack carelessly and in scattered order.

In the end, some of them ran into their own men coming up behind, stumbled, and destroyed both themselves and their comrades; but the greater number were trampled down, with the cavalry and the beasts bearing down upon them at close quarters.

So about six thousand of the Libyans and the foreign troops perished, and around two thousand were taken prisoner; the rest escaped, some to the town by the bridge, others to the encampment near Utica.

Having won the advantage in the manner described, Hamilcar followed hard on the enemy's heels. He took the town at the bridge by assault, the enemy there abandoning it and fleeing to Tunes; and, marching through the rest of the country, he brought some towns over to his side and stormed most of the others by force.

He thus instilled a little courage and boldness into the Carthaginians, freeing them to some degree from the despair into which they had fallen.

Chapter 77 Mathos Harasses Hamilcar

Mathos himself, meanwhile, remained at the siege of Hippo Zarytus, but advised Autaritus, the leader of the Gauls, and Spendius to keep close to the enemy,

avoiding the plains because of the great number of cavalry and beasts on the enemy's side, but marching parallel with them along the foothills and joining in attacks whenever some difficulty befell them.

Along with these plans, he also sent word to the Numidians and the Libyans, begging them to come to their aid and not to throw away these opportunities for freedom.

Spendius, taking with him from Tunes about six thousand men in all, drawn from each of the nationalities, advanced, marching along the foothills parallel to the Carthaginians, and bringing with him, besides the men already mentioned, the Gauls under Autaritus, who numbered about two thousand.

For the remaining part of their original body had deserted to the Romans during the encampments around Eryx.

When Hamilcar had encamped in a certain plain enclosed on every side by mountains, it happened that at this very moment the reinforcements from the Numidians and Libyans linked up with Spendius's force.

And so the Carthaginians suddenly found the Libyans encamped in front of them, the Numidians at their rear, and Spendius's men on their flank, which threw them into great difficulty...

Chapter 78 Narávas Joins Hamilcar

...the situation closed in around them and became difficult to escape. At this very time there was a man named Narávas, one of the most distinguished Numidians and full of warlike energy. He had always been well disposed toward the Carthaginians, having an inherited bond of friendship with them, and at this moment he was all the more spurred on by his admiration for Hamilcar the general.

He therefore reckoned that he had a favorable opportunity to make contact with him and form an alliance, and he came to the camp with about a hundred Numidians around him.

Drawing near to the palisade, he boldly waited there, signaling with his hand.

Hamilcar, struck by the boldness of the move, sent forward one of his cavalrymen, and Narávas said that he wished to come and confer with the general.

While the Carthaginian commander was still doubtful and distrustful, Narávas handed over his horse and his lances to the men with him and presented himself, unarmed and full of confidence, in the camp.

The Carthaginians partly marveled at his daring and partly were astonished by it; nonetheless they received him, and they came together to confer.

When he had entered into discussion, he declared that he was well disposed toward all Carthaginians, but that above all he desired to become a friend of Barcas. For this reason, he said, he had now come to ally himself with him and to share honestly in every action and every undertaking.

When Hamilcar heard this, he was so greatly pleased — both by the young man's courage in coming and by his straightforwardness in the interview — that he not only agreed to take him on as a partner in his operations, but also promised on oath to give him his daughter in marriage, provided that Narávas kept faith with Carthage to the end.

Once the agreement had been made, Narávas came bringing the Numidians under his command, who numbered about two thousand,

and Hamilcar, reinforced by this body of troops, drew up his line against the enemy. Spendius and his men, having joined forces with the Libyans and come down into the plain, engaged the Carthaginians.

A hard-fought battle took place, and Hamilcar's side was victorious. The elephants fought well, but Narávas rendered the most conspicuous service of all.

Autaritus and Spendius escaped, but of the rest about ten thousand fell and about four thousand were taken prisoner.

When the success had been completed, Hamilcar granted to those prisoners who were willing the right to serve in his army alongside him, and he equipped them with arms taken from the enemy's spoils.

As for those who were unwilling, he gathered them together and addressed them, saying that up to the present he held them excused for the wrongs they had committed, and that for this reason he permitted them to go their own ways, wherever each of them might choose.

After this he warned them sternly that none of them should bear arms against Carthage, for if any were caught doing so, he would meet with punishment from which there would be no reprieve.

Chapter 79 The Mutineers Resolve to Murder Gesco

At about this same time the mercenaries who were on garrison duty in Sardinia, taking the men of Mathos and Spendius as their model, attacked the Carthaginians on the island.

The garrison commander, Bostarus, who was then with them, they shut up in the citadel together with his own countrymen and put to death.

When the Carthaginians again sent out a general, Hanno, with a force, and these troops too deserted Hanno and went over to the mutineers,

they got the aforesaid Hanno into their hands alive and at once crucified him. After that, devising one extraordinary torture after another, they tortured to death every Carthaginian on the island.

From then on they brought the cities under their control and held the island firmly, until they fell into conflict with the Sardinians and were driven out by them into Italy.

This, then, was how Sardinia was lost to Carthage — an island remarkable for its size, its dense population, and its produce.

But since many writers have already said a great deal about it, I do not think it necessary to repeat what is universally agreed.

Now Mathos and Spendius, and with them Autaritus the Gaul, viewed with suspicion Hamilcar's humane treatment of his prisoners. They feared that, won over by such conduct, the Libyans and the mass of the mercenaries might rush toward the safety thus held out to them. So they began to plan how, by committing some new act of sacrilege, they might once and for all turn the multitude into beasts in their hatred of the Carthaginians.

They decided, therefore, to assemble the rank and file. Once this was done, they brought in a letter-carrier, supposedly sent by their fellow conspirators in Sardinia.

The letter stated plainly that Gesco and all those with him — the men they had treacherously seized at Tunes, as I described above — should be guarded carefully, since certain people in the camp were negotiating with the Carthaginians for their rescue.

Seizing on this pretext, Spendius first urged the men not to trust the leniency that the Carthaginian general had shown toward the prisoners.

For, he said, it was not out of any wish to spare their lives that Hamilcar had decided to deal with the captives in this way; rather, he was eager, by releasing them, to get us into his power, so that he might punish not just some of us but all of us at once, once we had trusted him.

In addition, he advised them to take care that, by letting Gesco and his men go, they did not earn the contempt of their enemies and do grave harm to their own cause — by allowing such a man and so capable a general to escape, one who was likely to become their most formidable enemy.

While he was still saying this, another letter-carrier arrived, supposedly sent by the men at Tunes...

Chapter 80 The Murder of Gesco

...bringing a message similar to the one from Sardinia. Following up on this, Autaritus the Gaul declared that there was only one path to safety for their cause: to give up entirely every hope that rested on the Carthaginians.

As long as anyone clung to the prospect of the Carthaginians' kindness, he said, that man could not become a genuine ally to them.

He therefore demanded that they trust these messengers, listen to these men, and give their attention to those who consistently brought reports of the most hateful and bitter kind against the Carthaginians; and he urged them to regard anyone who spoke to the contrary as traitors and enemies.

Having said this, he advised that they should torture and put to death Gesco and the men seized along with him, as well as the Carthaginians who had been captured afterward.

He was the most effective speaker in their councils, because many could understand his speech.

For, having long served as a soldier, he knew how to speak Phoenician, and most of the men had come to be at home with this language because of the great length of the previous campaign.

And so, when the multitude praised him with one accord, he withdrew in high favor.

Many men then came forward from each of the various peoples, all at once, wishing to plead at least against the torture, because of the kindnesses Gesco had done them. But nothing of what they said could be understood, since many were speaking at the same time, each in his own language.

When at last it became clear that they were pleading against the punishment, and one of those seated cried out, "Stone them!" they all at once stoned to death the men who had come forward.

These men, mangled as though by wild beasts, were carried off by their relatives.

Then Spendius and his followers took Gesco and his companions, about seven hundred in number, and led them out of the palisade. Bringing them a short distance in front of the camp, they first cut off their hands,

beginning with Gesco — the very man whom, a short time before, they had singled out from among all the Carthaginians, proclaiming him their benefactor and entrusting to him the settlement of their disputes.

After they had cut off their hands, they mutilated the wretched men further; and having maimed them and broken their legs as well, they threw them, still alive, into a pit.

Chapter 81 Atrocities of the Mutineers

When this calamity was reported to them, the Carthaginians could do nothing. In their grief and anguish at the disaster, they sent envoys to Hamilcar and to the other general, Hanno, begging them to come to their aid and to avenge those who had suffered.

To the perpetrators of the sacrilege they sent heralds to ask for the recovery of the dead bodies.

But the mutineers neither gave them up nor allowed it; they warned those present to send them no further herald or envoy, declaring that anyone who came would suffer the same punishment that Gesco had just undergone.

And for the future they passed a resolution, and exhorted one another to keep it: that any Carthaginian they caught they would torture and kill, and any of Carthage's allies they would send back to Carthage with his hands cut off. And this they continued to carry out scrupulously.

Looking at all this, one would not hesitate to say that it is not only the bodies of men — and certain ulcers and tumors that grow in them — that become so inflamed and utterly beyond cure, but, far more so, their souls as well.

For with ulcers, if you apply treatment, they are sometimes irritated by the very treatment and spread the faster; but if, on the other hand, you leave them alone, by their own nature they keep destroying the surrounding flesh and do not stop until they have consumed what lies beneath.

In much the same way, such gangrenous and festering growths often fasten upon men's souls, so that no creature becomes more impious or more savage than man.

Toward such men, if you offer any pardon and kindness, they take what happens to be a plot and a trick, and they grow more distrustful and more hostile toward those who treat them kindly.

But if you retaliate, then, vying with them in fury, there is no forbidden or dreadful act they will not undertake, counting such audacity a fine thing — until in the end, brutalized, they pass out of human nature altogether.

The chief and largest cause of such a disposition we must reckon to be wicked customs and a bad upbringing from childhood; but there are several contributing causes as well, and the greatest of these is the persistent arrogance and greed of those in command.

This was exactly what was happening at that time, both with the body of mercenaries as a whole and, still more, with their leaders.

Chapter 82 Revolt of Hippo Zarytus and Utica

Hamilcar, hard pressed by the desperate fury of the enemy, summoned Hanno to join him, convinced that once the two armies were combined he would more quickly bring the whole affair to an end.

Of the enemy he overpowered, some he destroyed in hand-to-hand combat, while those who were brought to him alive he threw to the elephants — seeing this as the one solution, if he could utterly wipe out his foes.

But just when the Carthaginians seemed to have brighter hopes regarding the war, a complete and unexpected reversal of their fortunes came over them.

For the two generals, having joined forces, fell into such a quarrel with each other that they not only let slip their chances against the enemy but, through their rivalry with one another, even handed the enemy many opportunities against themselves.

When the Carthaginians realized this, they ordered one of the generals to leave and the other to remain — whichever one the troops should choose.

At the same time, the supplies being brought to them from the place they call the Emporia, on which they had pinned their greatest hopes for food and other necessities, happened to be completely destroyed at sea by a storm.

And the affairs of Sardinia, as I said above, had been lost to them — an island that had always rendered them great service in their times of crisis.

But the greatest blow of all was the revolt of the cities of Hippo Zarytus and Utica. These were the only cities in all Libya that had not only borne the present war nobly, but had also gallantly endured the times of Agathocles and the invasion of the Romans — in short, had never once adopted any policy hostile to Carthage.

But now, quite apart from their irrational revolt to the Libyans, they immediately showed by their defection the greatest friendship and loyalty toward them, while toward the Carthaginians they conceived an implacable anger and hatred.

For they killed the men who had come from Carthage to help them — about five hundred — along with their commander, and threw them all down from the wall; they handed the city over to the Libyans; and they would not even permit the Carthaginians to bury their unfortunate dead, though they asked to do so.

While these things were happening, Mathos and Spendius, emboldened by these events, undertook to lay siege to Carthage itself.

Barcas, meanwhile, took on the general Hannibal — for the citizens had sent this man out to the army after the troops decided that Hanno must withdraw, in accordance with the authority the Carthaginians had granted them regarding the quarrels that had arisen between the generals.

And so Hamilcar, with Hannibal and Narávas, advanced through the country, cutting off the supply lines of Mathos and Spendius — in this and in everything else receiving the greatest service from Narávas the Numidian.

Such, then, was the situation of the forces in the field...

Chapter 83 Hippo and Utica Join the Rebels

...this was their state. The Carthaginians, hemmed in on every side, were compelled to fall back on their hopes from the cities allied with them.

Now Hiero, throughout the present war, had always shown great zeal in everything they asked of him,

and at this point he was even more eager, convinced that it was in his own interest — both for his sovereignty in Sicily and for his friendship with Rome — that the Carthaginians should survive, so that the dominant power should not be left entirely free to accomplish its purpose without resistance. His reasoning was thoroughly shrewd and sensible.

For one should never overlook such matters, nor help anyone build up so great a power that it becomes impossible even to dispute with him over rights that are universally acknowledged.

The Romans, too, observing the terms of justice laid down in their treaty, fell short in no point of goodwill.

At the outset, indeed, a dispute had arisen between the two sides, for the following sort of reasons.

The Carthaginians had been bringing in to themselves those who sailed from Italy to Libya carrying supplies to the enemy, and when nearly five hundred of these men had been collected in custody, the Romans were angered.

After that, however, they sent an embassy and recovered all the men by negotiation, and were so well satisfied that they at once gave back to the Carthaginians, in return, the prisoners still remaining in their hands from the war over Sicily.

From that time on they responded readily and generously to each request made of them.

For this reason they permitted their merchants to export to the Carthaginians whatever was urgently needed, while they forbade exports to the enemy.

And later, when the mercenaries in Sardinia — at the time they revolted from Carthage — tried to draw the Romans onto the island, they did not respond; and when the people of Utica offered to put themselves under Roman control, they did not accept them, keeping faith with the terms of the treaty.

The Carthaginians, then, receiving the support of the friends mentioned above, held out against the...

Chapter 84 Hamilcar's Tactical Superiority

...siege. But Mathos and Spendius found themselves no less besieged than besieging.

For Hamilcar reduced them to such a shortage of provisions that in the end they were forced to break off the siege.

After some time they gathered the best of the mercenaries and the Libyans — in all about fifty thousand, among whom was Zarzas the Libyan with the men under his command — and set out once more to maneuver against Hamilcar in the open country and keep watch on him.

They kept away from the level ground, terrified of the elephants and of Narávas's cavalry, but they tried to seize the hill country and the narrow passes in advance.

In these operations it turned out that, in daring and in their plans of attack, they fell in no way short of their opponents, but because of their inexperience they were often worsted.

It was then, it seems, that one could see in actual fact how great a difference there is between methodical experience and the skill of a general on the one hand, and inexperience and mere unreasoning, soldierly routine on the other.

For in many of the smaller engagements he cut them off and hemmed them in, like a skilled draughts-player, and destroyed them without a fight;

and in the larger, decisive encounters he killed many by luring them into ambushes they never suspected, and threw others into panic by appearing suddenly and unexpectedly, sometimes by day and sometimes by night. All those he took alive he threw to the elephants.

Finally, having camped against them unexpectedly in ground unsuited to their needs but well suited to his own strength, he brought them to such a pass that — neither daring to risk a battle nor able to flee, because they were hemmed in on every side by trench and palisade — they were at last driven by famine to eat one another.

So the divine power was bringing upon them a fitting recompense for their impiety and lawlessness toward their neighbors.

For they did not dare to come out to battle, since defeat was certain and punishment plain for any who were captured; and as for terms, they did not even think to make mention of them, conscious of what they had done.

Still clinging always to the hope of relief from Tunes, because of the promises of their leaders, they endured to do anything, even against themselves.

Chapter 85 Hamilcar Captures Spendius

When they had impiously consumed their prisoners by using them for food, and had then likewise consumed the bodies of their slaves, and still no relief came from Tunes,

the maltreatment in store for the leaders now became unmistakable, given the desperate fury rising among the rank and file. So Autaritus, Zarzas, Spendius, and their companions decided to put themselves into the hands of the enemy and to open negotiations with Hamilcar about a settlement.

They therefore sent a herald, obtained safe-conduct for an embassy, and came to the Carthaginians, ten men in all.

With them Hamilcar concluded an agreement on these terms: the Carthaginians might pick out any ten of the enemy they wished, and would release the rest, each man keeping a single tunic.

As soon as the terms were settled, Hamilcar declared that, in accordance with the agreement, he chose the men then present. In this way the Carthaginians gained possession of Autaritus, Spendius, and the other most prominent leaders.

When the Libyans learned that their leaders had been seized, they assumed they had been betrayed—since they did not know the terms of the agreement—and on that account rushed to arms.

Hamilcar then surrounded them with his elephants and the rest of his force and destroyed them all, more than forty thousand men, near the place called the Saw, which, it turns out, owes its name to the resemblance of its shape to that tool.

Chapter 86 Mathōs Captures Hannibal

By accomplishing what has just been described, Hamilcar once again gave the Carthaginians great hope of a better outcome, though they had already despaired of survival. He himself, together with Naravas and Hannibal, went about the countryside and the cities.

As the Libyans came over and shifted their allegiance to them on account of the recent success, they brought most of the cities under their control and then advanced on Tunes and set about besieging Mathōs and his forces.

On the side facing Carthage, Hannibal pitched his camp; on the opposite side, Hamilcar.

After this they brought Spendius and the other captives up to the walls and crucified them in full view.

But Mathōs and his men, observing that Hannibal was behaving carelessly and over-confidently, attacked his palisade, killed many of the Carthaginians, drove them all out of the camp, seized the entire baggage train, and took the general Hannibal alive.

They brought him at once to Spendius's cross, and after torturing him cruelly, they took Spendius down, fastened Hannibal up alive in his place, and slaughtered around Spendius's body thirty of the most prominent Carthaginians,

Fortune, as if on purpose, giving each side in turn, by way of contrast, the occasion to outdo the other in vengeance.

Barcas was late in realizing that an attack had been made by the men from the town, because of the distance between the camps; and even once he did realize it, he could not bring help in time because of the rough ground that lay between.

He therefore broke camp from Tunes, marched on to the river Macaras, and encamped near the mouth of the river by the sea.

Chapter 87 Final Defeat of the Mutineers

This unexpected reversal once more left the Carthaginians dejected and despondent; for just as they were regaining their spirits, their hopes collapsed again in an instant.

Even so, they did not give up doing what they could for their own survival.

And so they appointed thirty members of the senate, and along with them Hanno—the general who had earlier withdrawn and was now brought back into command—and, arming all the remaining men of military age, they sent these off to Barcas as though making their last throw of the dice,

charging the members of the senate emphatically to settle, by any means possible, the dispute between the generals that had arisen earlier, and to force them to act in concert, in view of the present state of affairs.

The envoys put forward many and varied arguments, and once they had brought the generals face to face, Hanno and Barcas were compelled to give way and to be persuaded by what was said.

From then on they acted in concert, of one mind, and everything went according to the Carthaginians' wishes,

so that Mathōs and his men, finding themselves at a disadvantage in the engagements that took place piecemeal—for they fought many around the town called Leptis and some of the other cities—finally pressed to decide the issue by a pitched battle, the Carthaginians being eager for this course as well.

Both sides, therefore, having set their minds on this, summoned all their allies to the conflict and gathered the garrisons from the cities, intending to stake everything on the outcome.

When each side had its preparations ready for the attempt, they drew up in line and joined battle by mutual agreement.

The victory went to the Carthaginians: most of the Libyans were destroyed in the battle itself, while the rest fled together to a certain town and surrendered themselves not long afterward; and Mathōs fell into his enemies' hands alive.

Chapter 88 Aftereffects in Hippo, Utica, and Sardinia

After the battle, the other parts of Libya immediately submitted to the Carthaginians;

but the cities of the Hippacritae and the Uticans held out, having no opening for a settlement, since their initial undertakings had left them no room for mercy or pardon.

So true is it that, even in wrongdoing of this kind, there is a great difference made by moderation and by deliberately avoiding any irreparable act.

Nevertheless, by encamping against them—Hanno against the one, Barcas against the other—they quickly forced them to make terms and agreements satisfactory to the Carthaginians.

The Libyan War, then, after bringing the Carthaginians into such straits, had an outcome such that the Carthaginians not only regained control of Libya but also took fitting vengeance on those responsible for the revolt;

for at the very end, the young men led a triumphal procession through the city and inflicted every kind of torment upon Mathōs and his followers.

For three years and about four months the mercenaries waged this war against the Carthaginians—a war that, of all those we know of by report, far surpassed the rest in cruelty and lawlessness.

About this time the Romans, invited by the mercenaries who had deserted to them from Sardinia, set about sailing against that island. When the Carthaginians took offense at this,

on the ground that sovereignty over Sardinia belonged rather to them, and prepared to proceed against those who had made the island revolt from them,

the Romans seized on this as a pretext and voted for war against the Carthaginians, alleging that their preparations were directed not against the Sardinians but against themselves.

The Carthaginians, having against all expectation just escaped the war described above, and being in every way ill-disposed at that moment to take up their hostility toward the Romans again,

yielded to the circumstances and not only withdrew from Sardinia but also paid the Romans an additional twelve hundred talents on condition that they not have to take on the war for the present. So this was how these things came about.

Chapter 1 Recapitulation of Book 1

In the book before this one I set out clearly when the Romans, having consolidated their position in Italy, began to take a hand in affairs beyond it; and after that, how they crossed over into Sicily, and for what reasons they undertook the war against the Carthaginians over that island.

After that I told when they first began to assemble naval forces, and what happened to each side over the course of the war down to its conclusion—the outcome of which was that the Carthaginians withdrew from the whole of Sicily, while the Romans gained control of the entire island except for the districts under Hiero's command.

Following on from this, I set about describing how the mercenaries, in revolt against the Carthaginians, kindled what is called the Libyan War; how far the atrocities committed during it went; and what course these extraordinary events ran until their end and the triumph of Carthage.

Now I shall try to make plain what came next, touching on each matter in summary fashion, in keeping with the plan I laid out from the start.

For as soon as the Carthaginians had settled affairs in Libya, they at once raised an army and dispatched Hamilcar to the regions of Iberia.

He took over the troops, together with his son Hannibal—then nine years old—and crossing by the Pillars of Heracles, set about recovering Carthaginian fortunes in Iberia.

He spent about nine years in those parts, and after subjecting many of the Iberians to Carthage, some by war and some by persuasion, he ended his life in a way worthy of his earlier achievements.

For while drawn up in battle against the most warlike peoples, those with the greatest power, and while exposing himself with daring and reckless courage at the critical moment of danger, he met a valiant death.

The Carthaginians handed over the command to Hasdrubal, who was his son-in-law and the commander of his fleet.

Chapter 2 Situation in Illyria

It was at this same period that the Romans set about making their first crossing, with an army, into Illyria and these parts of Europe. This is not to be looked at as a minor matter,

but must be studied with close attention by anyone who genuinely wishes to grasp both the purpose of my work and the growth and consolidation of Roman power.

They decided to make the crossing for reasons of the following kind.

Agron, king of the Illyrians, was the son of Pleuratus, and he possessed the most powerful land and naval forces of any king who had reigned in Illyria before him.

Bribed with money by Demetrius, the father of Philip, he had promised to help the Medionians, who were being besieged by the Aetolians.

For the Aetolians, being quite unable to persuade the Medionians to join their own league, had resolved to take them by force.

So they marched out with their whole army, encamped around the city, and laid siege to it without a break, bringing every kind of force and siege engine against it.

But when the time for the annual elections drew near, and a new general had to be chosen, and the besieged were already in a bad way and seemed likely to surrender any day, the general then in office made a proposal to the Aetolians. He argued

that, since it was he who had taken on the hardships and dangers of the siege, it was only fair that, once they captured the place, he should be allowed both the management of the spoils and the privilege of inscribing his name on the dedicated arms.

But some objected to what he said—above all those who were standing for the office—and urged the assembly not to settle the matter in advance, but to leave it open, so that fortune might bestow this crown on whomever it chose.

In the end the Aetolians decided that whoever was appointed general and captured the city should share with his predecessor both the management

Chapter 3 The Illyrians Relieve Medion

of the spoils and the inscribing of the arms. This had been resolved, and on the very next day the election and the transfer of office were due to take place, as is the custom among the Aetolians, when during the night a hundred boats sailed up to the territory of Medion, to the places nearest the city, carrying five thousand Illyrians.

They put in to shore, and when day came they made their landing swiftly and unobserved, and forming up in the order customary among them, advanced in companies against the Aetolian camp.

When the Aetolians realized what was happening, they were taken aback by the unexpectedness and the boldness of the Illyrians; yet, having long been full of self-importance and confident in their own strength, they remained reasonably steady.

So they drew up the bulk of their hoplites and cavalry on the level ground in front of their camp, while with a portion of their cavalry and their light troops they moved to seize in advance the high ground in front of the palisade, which was conveniently placed for defense.

But the Illyrians, charging the light troops at the first rush, drove them back by the sheer mass and weight of their formation, and forced the cavalry stationed with them to fall back on the heavy infantry.

Then, charging down from the high ground against the troops drawn up on the plain, they quickly routed them, especially as the Medionians joined the attack on the Aetolians by sallying out from the city at the same time.

They killed many of them and took even more prisoners, and they captured all their arms and baggage.

So the Illyrians, having carried out their king's orders and brought the baggage and the rest of the plunder down to their boats, at once put to sea, setting

Chapter 4 Death of Agron of Illyria

their course for home. The Medionians, having won an unexpected deliverance, gathered in assembly and deliberated on their affairs in general and, in particular, on the inscribing of the arms.

They resolved to make the inscription a joint one, naming both the man who had held the office of Aetolian general and those who were standing for it for the coming year, in accordance with the Aetolians' own decree—

as though Fortune were deliberately demonstrating her power to the rest of mankind through what had happened to these men.

For the very things the Medionians had expected to suffer at the hands of their enemies any moment now, she gave them the power to inflict on those same enemies, all in a very short space of time.

And the Aetolians, by the unexpected disaster they met with, taught everyone never to treat the future as though it had already happened, nor to count confidently on outcomes that may still turn out otherwise, but to allow a share to the unexpected—being human in every situation, but most of all in matters of war.

As for King Agron: when the boats had sailed back and he had heard from his officers the details of the engagement, he was overjoyed at the thought of having beaten the Aetolians, those men of the highest spirit. He gave himself over to bouts of drinking and other such revelry, and fell ill with pleurisy, from which within a few days he died.

His wife Teuta took over the kingdom and conducted the detailed administration of affairs through trusted friends.

But she relied on a woman's reasoning, looking only at the recent stroke of good fortune and taking no thought for anything beyond it. First, she gave permission to those sailing on their own account to plunder any ships they fell in with;

second, she gathered a fleet and a force no smaller than the previous one, and sent it out, declaring every coast fair game to its commanders.

Chapter 5 Queen Teuta's Pirates

Those who were sent out made their first attack on Elis and Messenia, for the Illyrians were always raiding these regions.

Because of the length of their coastline, and because the cities that held power in them lay inland, relief against the Illyrians' landings was always very slow and a long time in coming. As a result, the Illyrians overran and pillaged these regions whenever they liked, without fear.

On this occasion, however, when they reached Phoenice in Epirus, they put in for supplies.

There they fell in with some Gauls—about eight hundred in number—who were serving as mercenaries with the Epirotes and were stationed in Phoenice. They discussed the betrayal of the city with them, and when these Gauls agreed to the plan, they disembarked and at the first assault made themselves masters of the city and everyone in it, with the Gauls inside working with them.

When the Epirotes learned what had happened, they hurried to the rescue with a full levy. On reaching Phoenice, they encamped with the river that flows past the city in front of them, and for safety's sake tore up the planks of the bridge over it.

But when word reached them that Scerdilaidas was approaching by land with five thousand Illyrians through the pass near Antigoneia, they detached part of their force and sent it off to guard Antigoneia; meanwhile they passed the rest of their time carelessly, indulging without restraint in the produce of the countryside, and grew slack about their guard duty and outposts.

The Illyrians, perceiving both the division of their forces and their general carelessness, marched out by night, laid planks on the bridge, crossed the river safely, took up a strong position, and stayed there for the rest of the night.

When day came, and both sides drew up in front of the city, the Epirotes were beaten: many of them fell, still more were captured, and the rest escaped in the direction of the Atintanes.

Chapter 6 The Aetolians and Achaeans Support the Epirotes

The Epirotes, then, having met with such misfortunes and lost all the hopes they had placed in themselves, sent envoys to the Aetolians and to the Achaean League, begging with suppliant pleas for help.

These took pity on their plight and consented, and afterwards came to their aid, arriving at Helicranum.

The men who had seized Phoenice, having first joined up with Scerdilaidas and advanced to the place, encamped opposite the relief force, wishing to give battle.

But they found themselves hampered by the difficult terrain; and at the same time a letter arrived from Teuta, in which she said they ought to return home as quickly as possible, because some of the Illyrians had defected to the Dardani.

So, after ravaging Epirus, they made a truce with the Epirotes.

Under its terms they restored to them the free persons and the city for a ransom, but loaded the slaves and the rest of the spoils onto their boats; then some of them sailed away, while the troops under Scerdilaidas withdrew again by land through the pass near Antigoneia.

In doing so they instilled no small or ordinary alarm and fear in the Greeks who lived along the coasts.

For each of these peoples, seeing the most strongly fortified and most powerful city in Epirus so unexpectedly enslaved, no longer felt anxiety, as in earlier times, merely for their property in the countryside, but now for themselves and their cities.

The Epirotes, however, having been saved beyond all expectation, were so far from trying to take revenge on those who had wronged them, or to show gratitude to those who had helped them, that on the contrary they sent envoys to Teuta and made an alliance with the Illyrians, together with the Acarnanians,

under which they cooperated with the Illyrians in the period that followed, while working against the Achaeans and the Aetolians.

By these actions they showed themselves to have behaved senselessly toward their benefactors at that time, and to have planned foolishly from the start in regard to their own affairs.

Chapter 7 A Band of Gallic Mercenaries

For that men, being human, should fall unexpectedly into some calamity is the fault not of the sufferers but of Fortune and of those who do the wrong;

but that they should plunge themselves into the gravest disasters thoughtlessly and with their eyes open is, by common admission, the fault of the victims themselves.

That is why those who stumble through Fortune are met with pity, forgiveness, and assistance, whereas those who fail through their own bad judgment are followed by reproach and censure from sensible people.

And this is just what the Epirotes would rightly have met with from the Greeks at that time.

For, in the first place, who—mindful of the general reputation of the Gauls—would not have been wary of entrusting to them a prosperous city that offered so many openings for treachery?

And second, who would not have been on his guard against the known character of that particular band? For in the beginning they had been driven out of their own country, when their fellow countrymen banded together against them because they had betrayed their own friends and kinsmen;

then, having been taken in by the Carthaginians because the latter were hard pressed by war, they were brought into Agrigentum to garrison it—being at that time more than three thousand strong—and, when a dispute arose between the soldiers and their generals over pay, they at once set about plundering the city of the Agrigentines.

After that, when the Carthaginians once more brought them into Eryx for the same purpose, while the Romans were besieging the city, they attempted to betray both the city and those besieged in it along with them;

and when this attempt failed, they deserted to the enemy, by whom they were again trusted—and then plundered the temple of Aphrodite of Eryx.

For this reason the Romans, having clearly recognized their impiety, made it their first priority, as soon as they had ended the war with the Carthaginians, to disarm them, put them aboard ships, and banish them from the whole of Italy.

These were the men the Epirotes made guardians of their democracy and their laws, and into whose hands they entrusted their most prosperous city. How, then, could they not reasonably be seen as the authors of their own misfortunes?

So much, then, for the folly of the Epirotes, and for the principle that sensible people should never bring in a garrison stronger than themselves—especially one of barbarians.

Chapter 8 Queen Teuta and Rome

This much I judged worth recording. Now the Illyrians had, even in earlier times, persistently preyed upon ships sailing from Italy.

During the period when they were operating around Phoenice, a good number of them broke away from the main fleet and fell upon many of the Italian merchants: some they merely robbed, others they slaughtered, and not a few of those they captured they carried off alive.

The Romans had until then turned a deaf ear to those who lodged complaints against the Illyrians; but now, when still more people came before the Senate on the matter, they appointed envoys to go to Illyria and look into the grievances described—Gaius and Lucius Coruncanius.

When the galleys returned to Teuta from Epirus, she was struck by the sheer quantity and the beauty of the spoils they brought back—for Phoenice was at that time by far the most prosperous of the cities of Epirus—and so she was doubly emboldened to press on with her depredations against the Greeks.

For the moment, however, she held back because of disturbances at home; but once she had quickly settled affairs with the Illyrians who had revolted, she laid siege to Issa, since it alone still refused to submit to her.

It was at this very time that the Roman envoys arrived. Granted an audience, they set out the wrongs that had been done to their citizens.

Throughout the entire discussion Teuta listened to them in an arrogant and thoroughly overbearing manner.

When they had finished speaking, she replied that, as a matter of public policy, she would try to see to it that no wrong was done to the Romans by the Illyrians; but that, as a private matter, it was not lawful for the kings of Illyria to bar the Illyrians from the profits to be had at sea.

The younger of the envoys, offended at this answer, spoke out with a frankness that was fitting in itself but in no way suited to the moment. For he said:

"Romans, Teuta, have a most excellent custom of using the state to punish private wrongs and to come to the aid of those who have been wronged.

We shall therefore endeavor, God willing, to compel you—and that soon and emphatically—to reform the royal practices of Illyria."

Receiving this frankness with a woman's temper and without reflection, she was so enraged at what had been said that, disregarding the rights established among all mankind, she sent men after the envoys as they sailed away with orders to kill the one who had spoken so frankly.

When news of this reached Rome, the Romans were incensed at the woman's lawless act and at once set about their preparations, enrolling legions and assembling a fleet.

Chapter 9 Teuta Sends Out Another Fleet

When the sailing season came round, Teuta fitted out more galleys than before and sent them off once again toward the regions of Greece.

Some of them made their crossing by the open sea straight for Corcyra, while a portion put in at the harbor of Epidamnus—ostensibly to take on water and provisions, but in reality to make an attempt on the city by treachery.

The Epidamnians received them without suspicion and carelessly, and the Illyrians went in wearing nothing but their loincloths, as though to fetch water, but with daggers hidden in the water-jars. In this way they cut down the men guarding the gate and quickly seized the gatehouse.

When, according to plan, reinforcements arrived in force from the ships, they let these men in and easily held most of the walls.

The people of the city, though caught unprepared by the surprise, came to the rescue with spirit and fought it out, so that in the end the Illyrians, after holding their ground for a long while, were driven out of the city.

So on this occasion the Epidamnians, through their negligence, came near to losing their homeland, but through their courage came off unharmed and the wiser for the future.

The Illyrian commanders then put to sea in haste, joined the squadron that had sailed ahead, and made land at Corcyra. There they made a terrifying landing and set about besieging the city.

At this turn of events the Corcyraeans, hard-pressed and despairing of their whole situation, sent envoys to the Achaeans and the Aetolians—and along with them the Apollonians and Epidamnians did the same—begging them to come to their aid quickly and not to stand by while they were driven from their homes by the Illyrians.

The Achaeans and Aetolians, having heard the envoys and granted their plea, jointly manned the ten decked ships of the Achaeans, and within a few days had them fitted out and sailed for Corcyra,

Chapter 10 Illyrian Victories

hoping to break the siege. But the Illyrians, having taken on seven decked ships supplied by the Acarnanians under the terms of their alliance, put out to meet them and engaged the Achaean vessels off the islands called Paxi.

Now the Acarnanians, and the Achaean ships posted opposite them, kept the fight even and came through the clashes unscathed, apart from wounds among the men themselves.

The Illyrians, however, lashed their own galleys together in groups of four and so closed with the enemy. They paid no regard to their own vessels but threw them in broadside and so worked to assist the enemy's ramming charges.

And when the enemy ships, having rammed and become locked in by the impact, were for the moment in difficulty—with the lashed-together galleys hanging on around their rams—the Illyrians then leapt onto the decks of the Achaean ships and overpowered them by sheer weight of numbers.

In this way they captured four four-banked ships, and sank one five-banked ship with all hands aboard—the ship on which Margos of Caryneia was sailing, a man who had served the common government of the Achaeans with complete integrity right up to his death.

Those who were fighting the Acarnanians, seeing the advantage the Illyrians had gained and trusting in their own swiftness, ran before the wind and made their withdrawal home in safety.

The Illyrian host, emboldened by their success, now pressed the siege with ease and full confidence.

The Corcyraeans, despairing of their whole situation after what had happened, held out under the siege only a little while longer and then came to terms with the Illyrians, accepting a garrison and, with the garrison, Demetrius of Pharos.

Once this had been arranged, the Illyrian commanders immediately put to sea; and, putting in at Epidamnus, set about besieging that city once again.

Chapter 11 Corcyra Submits To the Romans

At this same period, of the men holding the consulships, Gnaeus Fulvius set sail from Rome with two hundred ships, while Aulus Postumius set out with the land forces.

Gnaeus's first intention was to sail to Corcyra, supposing that he would still find the outcome of the siege undecided.

Although he came too late for that, he nevertheless sailed on to the island, wishing both to learn clearly what had happened concerning the city and to test the proposals being conveyed by Demetrius.

For Demetrius, being under suspicion and in fear of Teuta, was sending messages to the Romans, offering to hand over the city and to surrender the other affairs of which he was in charge.

The Corcyraeans, delighted at the arrival of the Romans, surrendered the Illyrian garrison with Demetrius's approval, and of their own accord, on being invited, gave themselves over wholeheartedly into the protection of Rome—judging this to be their one safeguard for the future against the lawlessness of the Illyrians.

The Romans, having received the Corcyraeans into their friendship, sailed for Apollonia, taking Demetrius as their guide for the remaining operations.

At the same time Postumius was ferrying his land forces across from Brundisium—some twenty thousand foot and about two thousand horse.

As soon as both forces had converged together upon Apollonia, and the Apollonians too had welcomed them and given themselves into Roman trust, they at once put to sea again on hearing that Epidamnus was under siege.

The Illyrians, learning of the Romans' approach, broke up the siege in complete disorder and fled.

The Romans, taking the Epidamnians too under their protection, advanced into the interior of Illyria, subduing the Ardiaei as they went.

When many envoys came to meet them—among them those from the Parthini, offering an unconditional surrender—they received these into their friendship; and likewise those who came from the Atintanes. They then advanced toward Issa, since that city too was being besieged by the Illyrians.

On reaching it and breaking the siege, they received the Issaeans as well into their protection.

In the course of their voyage along the coast they also stormed certain Illyrian cities; and at one of these, Nutria, they lost not only many soldiers but also some of the military tribunes and the quaestor.

They likewise captured twenty galleys that were carrying off the plunder from the countryside.

Of those besieging Issa, the men from Pharos were left unharmed for Demetrius's sake, while all the rest scattered and fled to Arbo.

Teuta herself, with a very few companions, escaped to Rhizon, a little town well fortified for strength, set back from the sea and lying right on the river Rhizon.

Having accomplished this, and having placed most of the Illyrians under Demetrius and invested him with great power, the Romans withdrew to Epidamnus with their fleet and their land army.

Chapter 12 Teuta Agrees to Pay Tribute to Rome

Gnaeus Fulvius, then, sailed back to Rome with the greater part of both the naval and the land forces.

Postumius stayed behind with forty ships, raised a legion from the surrounding cities, and wintered there, keeping watch over the Ardiaei and the other peoples who had given themselves into Roman trust.

About the spring season Teuta sent envoys to the Romans and concluded a treaty, in which she agreed to pay the tribute that had been imposed, to withdraw from all Illyria except for a few places, and—the crucial point, which most concerned the Greeks—not to sail beyond Lissus with more than two galleys, and those unarmed.

Once these terms had been settled, Postumius afterward dispatched envoys to the Aetolians and to the Achaean nation. On their arrival, they first explained the grounds for the war and for the crossing, then went through in order what had been accomplished and read out the treaty they had made with the Illyrians.

Having met with a fitting courtesy from each of the two nations, they then sailed back to Corcyra, having freed the Greeks from a considerable fear by means of the aforesaid treaty.

For it so happened that the Illyrians were at that time the common enemies not of some peoples only, but of all alike.

Such, then, was the first crossing of the Romans with an army into Illyria and these parts of Europe, along with their first involvement, by way of an embassy, in the affairs of Greece—and these were the causes that brought it about.

From this beginning the Romans straightaway sent yet other envoys to the Corinthians and to the Athenians; and it was then that the Corinthians first admitted the Romans to take part in the Isthmian Games.

Chapter 13 Jealousy At Rome of Hasdrubal In Spain

During this same period—for it was at this point that we broke off our account of affairs in Iberia—Hasdrubal was administering his command with prudence and practical skill, and was making great headway overall. In particular, by founding the town called Carthage by some and New Town by others, he contributed greatly to the interests of the Carthaginians,

and this above all because of the favorable position of the site, both for affairs in Iberia and for those in Libya. Of this place I shall, when I find a more suitable occasion, point out its location and the use it can serve for each of the two regions I have mentioned.

When the Romans saw this power now growing greater and more formidable, they were spurred to interest themselves in affairs in Iberia.

Finding that in the preceding period they had let themselves doze off and had allowed the Carthaginians to build up a great force, they tried to make up the lost ground as best they could.

For the moment, however, they did not venture either to dictate terms to the Carthaginians or to go to war with them, because the fear of the Celts was hanging over their own affairs and they were all but daily expecting their attack.

So, having soothed and conciliated Hasdrubal, they then decided to take on the Celts and bring matters to a decision against them; for they reckoned that, with such men poised on their flank, they would never be able—not merely to hold sway over the rest of Italy—but even to live in safety in their own homeland.

Accordingly, as soon as they had sent envoys to Hasdrubal and made a treaty with him—in which they passed over the rest of Iberia in silence, but stipulated that the Carthaginians were not to cross the river called the Ebro for the purpose of war—they at once launched their war against the Celts in

Chapter 14 Cisalpine Gaul

Italy. Concerning these Celts, it seems to me useful to give an account in summary form, so as to keep intact the proper purpose of my introductory survey in accordance with my original design, and to go back in time to the beginning—to the point at which the people just mentioned first occupied the country.

For I consider the history of these matters not only worth knowing and remembering, but absolutely essential, in order to learn what men and what places Hannibal afterward relied upon when he set himself to break the power of Rome.

First I must speak about the country—what sort it is and how it lies in relation to the rest of Italy. For in this way it will be easier to grasp the distinctive features of the events as well, once the peculiarities of the localities and of the land have been sketched out.

Italy as a whole is triangular in shape. One of its sides, the one inclined toward the east, is bounded by the Ionian strait and, continuous with it, by the Adriatic gulf; the side facing south and west is bounded by the Sicilian and Tyrrhenian seas.

These two sides, meeting one another, form the apex of the triangle—the promontory of Italy that juts out toward the south, which is called Cocynthus and divides the Ionian strait from the Sicilian sea.

The remaining side, which stretches along the north and the interior, is bounded throughout by the foothills of the Alps. This range takes its beginning from Massalia and the region above the Sardinian sea, and runs on continuously as far as the head of the whole Adriatic, falling short only by a little where it stops before reaching it.

Along this foothill range—which we must think of as, so to speak, the base of the triangle—there lie, to the south of it, plains that are the most northerly of all Italy, the very ones now under discussion, surpassing in fertility and extent any in Europe that have come within the scope of my history.

The overall shape, and that of the line enclosing these plains, is likewise triangular. The apex of this figure is formed by the meeting of the mountains called the Apennines and the Alpine range, not far from the Sardinian sea and above Massalia.

As for its sides: along the northern one, as I said above, the Alps themselves extend for two thousand two hundred stades,

while along the southern one the Apennines extend for three thousand six hundred.

The seaboard of the Adriatic gulf serves as the base of the whole figure: the length of this base, from the city of Sena to the head of the gulf, is more than two thousand five hundred stades,

so that the entire perimeter of the plains just described comes to little short of …

Chapter 15 Grain Production in Cisalpine Gaul

...of the ten thousand stades. As for the fertility of the land, it is not even easy to put into words. Grain is so abundant in these regions that in our own day the Sicilian medimnus of wheat has often gone for four obols, of barley for two, and the metretes of wine for the same price as the barley.

There is, moreover, an utterly overwhelming abundance of panic-grass and millet among them. And as for the quantity of acorns produced by the oak woods scattered at intervals across the plains, one may best judge it from this:

although a very great number of pigs are slaughtered in Italy, both for private households and for the provisioning of the armies, by far the fullest supply of them comes from these plains.

As to the cheapness and plenty of the various articles of food in detail, one could grasp it most precisely in this way:

travellers passing through the country take their lodging at the inns, and do not haggle over the individual provisions, but simply ask how much the host charges per person.

Now for the most part the innkeepers take in their guests—on the understanding that everything needful is provided—for half an as, which is the fourth part of an obol; and only rarely do they exceed this.

As for the numbers of the men, the size and beauty of their bodies, and beyond that their boldness in war, all this will be plain to learn from the events of their history themselves.

On each of the two flanks of the Alps—the one inclining toward the river Rhone, the other toward the plains already mentioned—the hilly, fertile regions are inhabited: those facing the Rhone and the north by Gauls called Transalpine, and those facing the plains by the Taurisci and the Agones and several other barbarian peoples.

The Transalpine are so named not from a difference of race but from a difference of location: for "trans," translated, means "beyond"; and so they call those who live on the far side of the Alps the Transalpine.

The peaks, both because of their ruggedness and because of the great depth of the [snow]...

Chapter 16 Rivers and Mountains in Northern Italy

...of the snow that lies there always, [the peaks] are utterly uninhabitable. The Apennine, from its beginning above Massalia and its junction with the Alps, is inhabited by the Ligurians—both the flank of it inclining toward the Tyrrhenian Sea and the flank toward the plains—

along the sea as far as the city of Pisa, which lies first in Etruria toward the west, and inland as far as the territory of the Arretini.

Next come the Etruscans; and continuous with these, on both slopes of the mountains just mentioned, dwell the Umbrians.

After that the Apennine, keeping a distance of about five hundred stades from the Adriatic Sea, leaves the plains behind, bending off to the right, and running through the middle of the rest of Italy stretches down to the Sicilian Sea.

The remaining flat part of that flank runs down to the sea and the city of Sena.

The river Padus—celebrated by the poets as the Eridanus—has its sources in the Alps, toward the apex rather of the figure just described, and descends into the plains, making its course toward the south.

But when it reaches the level country, it turns aside with its stream toward the east and flows through the plains; it makes its outlet by two mouths into the region of the Adriatic, and the larger part of the plain country is cut off by it toward the Alps and the head of the Adriatic.

It carries a volume of water inferior to none of the rivers in Italy, because all the streams that flow down toward the plains from the Alps and the Apennine mountains fall into it from every side.

It runs with its greatest and most beautiful flow around the rising of the Dog Star, swollen by the mass of snows melting on the mountains just mentioned.

From the sea it is navigable upstream, by the mouth called Olana, for nearly two thousand stades.

For at first, from its sources, it has a single channel, but it divides into two parts at the place called Trigaboli; of these, the one mouth is named the Padoa, the other the Olana.

On the latter lies a harbour that offers anchorage as safe as any on the Adriatic to those who put in there. Among the local people the river is called the Bodencus.

As for the other tales told about this river among the Greeks—I mean the stories of Phaethon and his fall, and the tears of the poplars, and the black-clad people living along the river, who, they say, still to this day wear such garments out of mourning for Phaethon—

and indeed all such tragic material of this sort—we shall pass over for the present, because a detailed treatment of such matters does not really suit the character of this introductory survey.

But when a fitting occasion comes, we shall give them the notice they deserve, especially in view of Timaeus's ignorance about the regions just described.

Chapter 17 Gallic Settlements in the Valley of the Po

...except that these plains were in ancient times occupied by the Etruscans, at the same period as the so-called Phlegraean plains around Capua and Nola—plains which, just because they lay in many people's way and so became known, have won a great reputation for fertility.

For this reason those who record the dominions of the Etruscans should not direct their account to the land now held by them, but to the plains just mentioned and to the resources they drew from these places.

The Celts, mingling with them because they lay alongside one another, and casting envious eyes on the beauty of the country, on a slight pretext unexpectedly attacked with a great army, drove the Etruscans out of the country around the Padus, and took possession of the plains themselves.

So the first districts, those lying toward the eastern part of the Padus, the Laevi and the Lebecii settled; after these the Insubres, who were the greatest of their peoples; and next to these, along the river, the Cenomani.

The districts already adjoining the Adriatic were held by another, very ancient people: they are called the Veneti, differing little from the Celts in customs and dress, but using a different language.

About them the tragic poets have made much talk and dealt out much marvel-mongering.

The districts beyond the Padus, around the Apennine, were settled first by the Anares, and after them by the Boii; next to these, toward the Adriatic, the Lingones; and the last, on the sea, the Senones.

These, then, were the most notable of the peoples that took possession of the regions just described.

They lived in unwalled villages, without any other furnishings of life.

For because they slept on beds of straw, ate meat, and practiced nothing besides war and farming, they led simple lives, with no other science or craft known among them at all.

Each man's property consisted of livestock and gold, since these alone could, whatever the circumstances, be readily carried about everywhere and moved according to their own wishes.

They set the greatest store by their bands of companions, because among them the most feared and most powerful man was the one who was reckoned to have the most attendants and followers in his train.

Chapter 18 Early Conflicts between Gauls and Romans

In the beginning, then, they not only mastered the territory, but also made many of the neighbouring peoples their subjects, having overawed them by their daring.

Some time later, having defeated the Romans and those drawn up in battle alongside them, and pursuing the fugitives, they occupied Rome itself, except for the Capitol, three days after the battle.

But when a diversion arose—the Veneti invading their country—they then made terms with the Romans, handed back the city, and returned home.

After this they were caught up in internal wars; and some of those who lived in the Alps kept making raids and often gathered against them, comparing their own situation with the prosperity that had come to the others.

During this period the Romans recovered their own strength and once more set in order their affairs with the Latins.

When the Celts came again to Alba with a great army, in the thirtieth year after the capture of the city, the Romans did not then dare to lead out their armies against them, because—the assault having come unexpectedly—they were caught off guard and had no time to assemble the mustered forces of their allies.

But again, on a further expedition twelve years later, when the Celts were advancing with a great army, the Romans, having learned of it beforehand and gathered their allies, went out to meet them with great eagerness, hastening to engage and to risk all in a decisive battle.

But the Gauls, dismayed at their approach and falling into discord among themselves, when night came on made their withdrawal homeward in something very like a flight.

After this alarm they kept quiet for thirteen years; and after that, seeing the power of the Romans growing, they made...

Chapter 19 Gallic Wars

...[peace] and a treaty. Having kept firmly to it for thirty years, when a fresh movement arose among the Transalpine Gauls, the [Cisalpine Gauls], fearing that a heavy war might be stirred up against them, turned the onslaught of the would-be invaders away from themselves by giving gifts and pleading their kinship, but incited them against the Romans and joined in the campaign themselves.

On this campaign they made their attack through Etruria, with the Etruscans joining forces with them, and after gathering a great quantity of plunder they returned safely from the Roman province.

But when they reached home and fell into strife over the greedy division of what they had taken, they destroyed the greater part both of the booty and of their own force.

This is the customary thing for the Gauls to do whenever they have seized something of their neighbours', and it comes about especially because of their senseless bouts of drunkenness and overeating.

After this, again in the fourth year, the Samnites and the Gauls came to an agreement together and drew up against the Romans in the territory of the Camertini, and destroyed many of them in the engagement.

On this occasion the Romans, stung to rivalry by the setback they had suffered, marched out a few days later and, engaging with all their armies in the territory of the Sentinates against the aforesaid enemy, killed most of them and forced the rest to flee headlong, each to his own land.

When ten years had again passed, the Gauls arrived with a great army to besiege the city of the Arretini.

The Romans came to the rescue and, engaging before the city, were defeated. In this battle Lucius the commander was killed, and they appointed Manius Curius in his place.

When he had sent envoys into Gaul concerning the prisoners, the Gauls broke the truce and killed the envoys.

When the Romans, in their anger, marched against them at once, the Gauls called the Senones met them and joined battle.

The Romans, prevailing over them in a pitched battle, killed most of them and drove out the rest, and became masters of all the country.

Into it they sent the first colony of Gaul, the city called Sena, named after the Gauls who had formerly inhabited it,

about which we explained a little earlier, saying that it lies on the Adriatic at the edge of the plains around the Padus.

Chapter 20 The Boii Attack the Romans and Lose

The Boii, seeing the Senones driven out, and fearing for themselves and their land that they might suffer the same fate, marched out in full force, having summoned the Etruscans.

Mustering near the lake called Vadimon, they drew up against the Romans.

In this battle most of the Etruscans were cut down, and only very few of the Boii escaped.

Nevertheless, in the very next year the same peoples came to an agreement once more, and, arming even those of their young men who had only just reached manhood, drew up against the Romans.

Utterly defeated in the battle, they barely brought themselves to yield, and by sending envoys to ask for a truce and a settlement they made a treaty with the Romans.

These events happened to fall in the third year before Pyrrhus's crossing into Italy, and the fifth before the destruction of the Gauls at Delphi.

For at this period fortune set, as it were, a kind of plague of war upon all the Gauls.

From the struggles just described two excellent advantages fell to the Romans: for, having grown accustomed to being cut down by the Gauls, they could neither see nor expect anything more dreadful than what had already been done to them;

and so, having become perfect athletes in the works of war, they faced Pyrrhus,

and, having crushed the daring of the Gauls at the right moment, thereafter fought without distraction—first against Pyrrhus for Italy, and after that against the Carthaginians for the supremacy over Sicily.

Chapter 21 War with Insubres and Boii and Gaesatae

After the defeats just described, the Gauls kept quiet for forty-five years, maintaining peace with the Romans.

But when those who had been eyewitnesses of those terrors had passed out of life with the passage of time, and a younger generation had come up—full of unreasoning passion, and with no experience or sight of any evil or any reverse—

they began once again to disturb the established order—as naturally tends to happen—being roused to anger against the Romans on trifling pretexts and calling in the Gauls from the Alps.

At first these designs were carried on apart from the common people, by the leaders themselves, in secret.

And so, when the Transalpine Gauls arrived as far as Ariminum with an armed force, the masses of the Boii grew suspicious and fell into discord both against their own leaders and against the newcomers; they put to death their own kings, Atis and Galatus, and cut one another to pieces in pitched battles.

It was then that the Romans too, alarmed at the invasion, went out with an army; but on learning of the self-inflicted destruction of the Gauls, they withdrew home again.

In the fifth year after this alarm, when Marcus Lepidus was consul, the Romans parcelled out among their citizens the territory in Gaul called Picene, from which they had defeated and expelled the Gauls called the Senones,

Gaius Flaminius having introduced this demagogic measure and policy—which indeed we must say became for the Romans, so to speak, the first cause of the people's turn for the worse, and also the cause of the war that afterward arose for them against the aforesaid Gauls.

For many of the Gauls slipped into that undertaking, and especially the Boii, because their lands bordered on Roman territory, having come to believe that the Romans were now making war on them no longer for leadership and dominion, but for their total uprooting and destruction.

Chapter 22 Several Gallic Tribes Join Forces

Accordingly the greatest of the tribes—those of the Insubres and the Boii—at once came to an agreement and sent messengers to the Gauls living about the Alps and along the river Rhône, who are called Gaesatae because they serve for pay; for this is what the word properly means.

To their kings, Concolitanus and Aneroestes, they offered on the spot a large sum of gold, and for the future they pointed out the greatness of Rome's prosperity and the abundance of goods that would be theirs if they prevailed; and in this way they urged them on and incited them to the campaign against the Romans.

They persuaded them easily, since along with the arguments already mentioned they gave pledges of their own alliance and reminded them of the exploit of their own ancestors—

in which those men, when they took the field, not only defeated the Romans in battle but, after the battle, seized Rome itself by direct assault;

and having become masters of all it contained and having held the city itself for seven months, they at last handed it back willingly and as an act of grace, returning home with their gains unbroken and unharmed.

When the leaders among them heard this, they were so roused to the expedition that never before had more men, or more renowned, or more warlike, gone out from these regions of Gaul.

During this same period the Romans, partly from what they heard and partly from guessing at what was to come, fell into continual fears and disturbances to such a degree

that at one time they were enrolling legions and laying in supplies of grain and provisions, and at another were even leading their forces out to the frontiers, as though the enemy were already in their land—though the Celts had not yet stirred from their own country.

This movement also did not least help the Carthaginians toward securing their affairs in Iberia.

For the Romans, as has been said by us before, judging these matters the more pressing because they lay right at their side, were forced to overlook affairs in Iberia, being eager first to put matters with the Celts on a good footing.

Therefore, having secured their position with the Carthaginians through the agreements with Hasdrubal, which we have just described, they set about with one accord at this time to deal with the enemy in Italy, considering it to their advantage to settle matters decisively with them.

Chapter 23 The Roman Forces

The Gaesatae Gauls, having assembled a costly and heavily armed force, came across the Alps to the river Padus in the eighth year after the distribution of the land.

Now the people of the Insubres and the Boii stood nobly by their original designs, but the Veneti and the Cenomani, after the Romans had sent envoys, chose to ally themselves with the Romans.

On this account the kings of the Celts were compelled to leave behind part of their force to guard their country against the threat from these tribes.

They themselves set out confidently with the whole army, making their march toward Etruria, with about fifty thousand foot and about twenty thousand horse and chariots.

As soon as the Romans heard that the Celts had crossed the Alps, they sent out the consul Lucius Aemilius with a force toward Ariminum to watch for the enemy's advance by that route, and one of the praetors into Etruria.

For the other of the consuls, Gaius Atilius, happened to have already gone out to Sardinia with his legions.

All those in Rome were terrified, supposing that a great and fearful danger was bearing down on them. And they felt this naturally, since the old fear of the Gauls still sat deep in their souls.

So, with this thought in mind, they partly gathered and partly enrolled legions, and ordered those of the allies who were ready to stand prepared.

In general they directed their subjects to submit registers of those of military age, eager to learn the total number of the force available to them.

And of grain, missiles, and the other equipment for war they made such great provision as no one could remember before.

Everything was supplied to them readily and from every quarter.

For the inhabitants of Italy, struck with terror at the Gauls' advance, no longer thought of themselves as allies of the Romans, nor that the war was about Roman supremacy, but each people reckoned that the danger was being brought against themselves and their own city and territory. They therefore obeyed the orders readily.

Chapter 24 Forces Available to the Romans

In order that it may become clear, from the facts themselves, how great were the undertakings that Hannibal dared to attack, and against how mighty a power he recklessly set his eyes—yet succeeded in his purpose so far as to involve the Romans in the greatest disasters—

I must state the preparation and the size of the force available to them at that time.

With the consuls there had marched out four Roman legions, each having five thousand two hundred foot and three hundred horse.

The allies with each of the two consuls were, together, thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse.

Of the Sabines and Etruscans who came to Rome's aid for that occasion there were about four thousand horse and more than fifty thousand foot.

These they gathered and posted in advance toward Etruria, appointing a praetor as their commander.

The Umbrians and Sarsinatae who inhabit the Apennines were assembled to the number of twenty thousand, and with these were twenty thousand Veneti and Cenomani. These they stationed on the frontiers of Gaul,

so that by invading the territory of the Boii they might in turn draw off the tribes that had marched out. These, then, were the armies posted to guard the country.

In Rome itself there remained, held ready against the chances of war and serving as a reserve, twenty thousand foot of the Romans themselves and with them one thousand five hundred horse, and of the allies thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse.

Registers had been submitted of: the Latins, eighty thousand foot and five thousand horse; the Samnites, seventy thousand foot and with them seven thousand horse;

and likewise of the Iapygians and Messapians together, fifty thousand foot and sixteen thousand horse;

of the Lucanians, thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse; of the Marsi, Marrucini, Ferentani, and also Vestini, twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse.

Moreover, in Sicily and Tarentum two legions were held in reserve, each of about four thousand two hundred foot and two hundred horse.

The total number of Romans and Campanians enrolled was about two hundred and fifty thousand foot, and of horse, in addition to twenty thousand there were a further three thousand.

So that the grand total of the forces stationed in advance to defend Rome was more than one hundred and fifty thousand foot,

and about six thousand horse; while the whole multitude of those able to bear arms, both the Romans themselves and the allies, was over seven hundred thousand foot and up to seventy thousand horse.

Against these Hannibal invaded Italy with fewer than twenty thousand men. But on these matters the narrative that follows will make it possible to understand them more clearly.

Chapter 25 Defeat of the Romans Near Faesulae

The Celts, having descended into Etruria, advanced through the country, plundering it fearlessly; and since no one opposed them, they finally pushed on against Rome itself.

When they were already near a city called Clusium, three days' march from Rome, news was brought that the Roman forces stationed in Etruria were following close on their rear and were catching up with them.

On hearing this, they turned back to meet them, eager to engage.

When the two armies had drawn near each other, already about sunset, both then encamped at a moderate distance apart and bivouacked.

When night came on, the Celts lit fires and left their cavalry behind, instructing them that at daybreak, once they had become visible to the enemy, they should withdraw along the same track.

They themselves made a secret withdrawal toward the city of Faesulae and took up position there, intending both to wait for their own cavalry and to harass the enemy's advance by surprise.

When day came, the Romans, seeing the cavalry alone and supposing the Celts had fled, eagerly pursued the cavalry along the line of their withdrawal.

As they drew near the enemy, the Celts rose up and fell upon them, and at the outset the struggle on both sides was fierce.

In the end, as the Celts had the upper hand in daring and in numbers, it came about that no fewer than six thousand of the Romans were killed and the rest fled; most of these withdrew to a certain strong position and stayed there.

The Celts at first set about besieging them; but being in a wretched state from the night's march and their hardship and exhaustion, they turned to rest and recovery, leaving a guard of their own cavalry around the hill,

intending on the following day to besiege those who had taken refuge there, unless they should surrender of their own accord.

Chapter 26 Aemilius Deters the Gauls

At this time Lucius Aemilius, who was posted in the regions along the Adriatic, having heard that the Celts had invaded by way of Etruria and were drawing near to Rome, came to the rescue in all haste, arriving fortunately at the critical moment.

When he had encamped close to the enemy, those who had taken refuge on the hill, seeing his fires and grasping what had happened, quickly recovered their courage and sent some of their men, unarmed, by night through the woods to report to the general what had occurred.

He, having heard them out and seeing that no other course of deliberation was left to him in the present circumstances, ordered the tribunes to lead out the infantry at daybreak, while he himself took the cavalry and led the way for the force, making his march toward the aforementioned hill.

The leaders of the Gauls, observing the fires during the night and reckoning that the enemy was at hand, held a council.

At it King Aneroestes put forward the view that, since they had become masters of so much booty—for the quantity of captives and cattle, and also of the baggage they had, was, it seems, beyond reckoning—

they ought therefore no longer to take risks nor stake everything, but should withdraw home in safety; and once they had disposed of all this and made themselves unencumbered, they should then, if it seemed good, attack the Romans' state again in full force.

Having resolved to deal with the present situation according to Aneroestes' opinion, they took this decision in the night, broke camp before daylight, and advanced along the coast through the country of the Etruscans.

Lucius, taking up from the hill the surviving part of the army together with his own forces, judged that it was in no way to his advantage to risk a pitched battle, but rather to watch for favorable times and places as he followed, in case he might somewhere be able to harm the enemy or strip away part of the booty.

Chapter 27 Atilius Meets the Gauls

At this same time the consul Gaius Atilius, having sailed down from Sardinia with his legions to Pisae, was advancing with his force toward Rome, making his march toward the enemy from the opposite direction.

When the Celts were already near Telamon in Etruria, their foragers fell in with the advance party from Gaius's force and were captured;

and on being questioned they made clear to the general what had taken place and reported the presence of both armies, indicating that the Celts were very close at hand and that behind them came the forces of Lucius.

He, partly surprised at this news and partly becoming hopeful at the thought that the Celts had been caught in the middle on the march, ordered the tribunes to draw up the legions and advance at a walk to the front, as far as the ground would allow a frontal advance.

He himself, having opportunely spotted a hill lying above the road, beneath which the Celts had to march, took his cavalry and pressed on, eager to seize the crest first and to be the first to open the action, convinced that in this way he would win for himself the greatest share of the credit for the outcome.

The Celts at first, unaware of the presence of Atilius's force and supposing from what was happening that Aemilius's cavalry had marched around during the night and were seizing the positions ahead of them, immediately sent out their own cavalry and some of the light troops to contest the ground about the hill.

But on quickly learning of Gaius's presence from one of the prisoners who had been brought in, they hastily drew up their infantry, forming them up to face both ways at once—both to the rear and to the front;

for they knew that one army was following them, while they expected to meet another head-on, judging both from the reports reaching them and from what was

Chapter 28 The Gauls Defeated On Their Way Home

happening at that very moment. Aemilius's men, who had heard of the legions' landing at Pisae but did not yet expect them to be drawing near, now recognized clearly, from the struggle around the hill, that their own forces had come quite close.

Therefore they at once sent out the cavalry to help those fighting it out on the hill, while they themselves, arranging the infantry in the customary order, advanced against the enemy.

The Celts stationed the so-called Gaesatae from the Alps facing the rear, where they expected Aemilius's men, and behind these the Insubres;

and facing the front they posted the Taurisci and the Boii who dwell on this side of the Padus, in the position opposite to the others, looking toward the advance of Gaius's legions.

Their wagons and chariots they placed outside each wing, and the booty they collected onto one of the neighboring hills, setting a guard around it.

With the Celtic army thus made double-fronted, the formation proved to be not only striking in appearance but also effective.

Now the Insubres and Boii drew up wearing their trousers and their light cloaks;

but the Gaesatae, out of love of glory and bravado, threw these off and took their stand at the front of the force naked, with nothing but their weapons, supposing they would thus be most effective, since some of the ground was overgrown with brambles that would catch on clothing and hamper the use of their weapons.

At first the action at the hill itself was the whole of the fighting, plainly visible to all, since so great a number of cavalry from each army had fallen in together in confused combat.

In this engagement it happened that the consul Gaius, fighting recklessly in hand-to-hand combat, lost his life, and his head was carried off to the kings of the Celts; while the Roman cavalry, after struggling stoutly, finally prevailed over both the position and the enemy.

After this, when the infantry forces were now close upon one another, the event that took place was remarkable and astonishing—not only to those present at that very moment, but also to those able afterward to bring it before their own eyes from the accounts of it.

Chapter 29 A Peculiar and Surprising Battle

This was the way the engagement unfolded. In the first place, since the battle was made up of three separate forces, it is clear that the spectacle, as well as the actual fighting of the troops drawn up in this fashion, must have looked strange and out of the ordinary.

In the second place, one might well be uncertain — both now and at the time, for anyone present at the very moment — whether the Celts held the most perilous position of all, with the enemy pressing in on them from both directions at once,

or, on the contrary, the most advantageous one: fighting against both forces simultaneously, yet securing their own safety from either side by means of the men at their backs, and, most important of all, having every avenue of retreat to the rear cut off, along with any hope of survival should they give way. For this is precisely the special quality of a formation that faces two ways.

Such, indeed, is the advantage of a double-fronted line of battle.

As for the Romans, on the one hand they were emboldened by having caught the enemy in the middle and surrounded them on every side; on the other hand they were unnerved by the splendor and the din of the Celtic army.

For the number of horn-blowers and trumpeters was beyond counting, and when, along with these, the whole army joined in raising its war cry together, the clamor that arose was so great and of such a character that not only the trumpets and the men, but even the surrounding country, seemed to echo back and to be giving off a voice of its own.

Terrifying too were the appearance and the gestures of the naked warriors who stood in the front line, men in the very prime of their strength and conspicuous for their fine physique.

And all those who held the foremost companies were adorned with gold torques and armlets.

At the sight of all this the Romans were on the one hand dismayed, but on the other, drawn on by the hope of profit, they were spurred on twice as keenly toward the

Chapter 30 Great Slaughter of the Gauls

danger. But as soon as the javelin-throwers advanced in front of the Roman legions, in keeping with their custom, and let fly with vigorous and densely massed volleys of missiles, the Celts in the rear ranks found their cloaks and trousers of great use to them;

but for the naked men standing in front, the outcome turned out contrary to their expectation, and what happened caused them great difficulty and helplessness.

For since the Gallic shield could not cover the whole man, the more the bodies were exposed and the larger they were, the more readily the missiles found their mark.

In the end, unable to ward off the men hurling the javelins because of the distance, and overwhelmed by the multitude of falling missiles, they were utterly distressed and at a loss in their situation. Some of them, out of rage and recklessness, flung themselves blindly upon the enemy and, giving themselves up willingly, perished; others, drawing back step by step toward their own friends and plainly showing their cowardice, threw the men behind them into disorder.

In this way the spirit of the Gaesatae was broken down by the javelin-throwers.

But the main body of the Insubres, Boii, and Taurisci — once the Romans had taken back their own javelin-throwers and the companies charged at them — clashed with the enemy and put up a stubborn hand-to-hand fight.

For though they were being cut down, they held firm in spirit on equal terms, inferior only in this one respect — both as a whole and man for man — namely in the construction of their weapons.

The Roman shields, that is, offered far greater protection, and their swords were far more effective in action, while the Gallic sword could only deliver a downward cut.

And when the Roman cavalry charged in from higher ground against the flank, riding down from the hill and pressing the attack vigorously, then the Celtic infantry were cut to pieces right where they stood in their line, while their cavalry took to flight.

Chapter 31 Aemilius Returns Victorious

About forty thousand of the Celts were killed, and no fewer than ten thousand taken prisoner, among them one of their kings, Concolitanus.

The other king, Aneroestes, fled with a few men to a certain place and there laid hands on himself and on his close companions.

The Roman general gathered the spoils and sent them to Rome, and restored the plunder to its rightful owners.

Then, taking up his legions and marching along the very edge of Liguria, he invaded the territory of the Boii. After satisfying the legions' appetite for plunder, within a few days he returned with his forces to Rome.

He adorned the Capitol with the standards and the torques — a torque being the gold collar that the Gauls wear around their necks —

while the rest of the spoils and the captives he used for his own entry into the city and for the decoration of his triumph.

So this, the most formidable Celtic onslaught, was destroyed in this manner — an invasion that had hung over all the Italians, and especially the Romans, as a great and fearful danger.

Emboldened by this success, the Romans came to hope that they would be able to drive the Celts out of the regions around the Padus altogether. They therefore sent out both of the consuls appointed for the following year, Quintus Fulvius and Titus Manlius, together with their forces and large-scale preparations, against the Celts.

These consuls, by terrifying the Boii in a sudden assault, forced them to put themselves under Rome's protection; but for the remainder of the campaign,

with extraordinary rainstorms setting in, and on top of that an outbreak of plague befalling them,

Chapter 32 Victory Over the Insubres

they accomplished nothing in the end. After these men, Publius Furius and Gaius Flaminius were appointed and once again invaded Celtic territory, marching through the country of the Anares, who happen to live not far from Massalia.

Having won this people over to friendship, they crossed into the land of the Insubres at the confluence of the rivers Adua and Padus.

After suffering some losses both during the crossing and around their camp, they stayed put for the moment; but afterward they made a truce and withdrew from the region by agreement.

Then, after marching around for several days and crossing the river Clusius, they came into the country of the Cenomani, and taking these people along as allies, they invaded once more — descending from the Alpine regions into the plains of the Insubres — and laid waste the land and plundered their settlements.

The chiefs of the Insubres, seeing that the Romans' purpose was unshakable, decided to put their fortune to the test and to risk a full, decisive battle against them.

So they gathered all their available forces in one place, took down the golden standards known as "the immovables" from the temple of Athena, made the rest of their preparations as needed, and then, with confidence and in formidable array, encamped opposite the enemy, numbering some fifty thousand men.

The Romans, on the one hand, seeing that they were far outnumbered by their opponents, wished to make use of the forces of the Celts allied with them;

but on the other hand, reflecting on Gallic faithlessness and on the fact that they were about to fight against men of the same race as these auxiliaries, they were wary of sharing such a moment and such an undertaking with men of that sort.

In the end, then, they themselves remained on their own side of the river, while the Celts who were with them they sent across to the far bank, and then tore up the bridges over the stream —

at once securing themselves against those allies, and at the same time leaving themselves only one hope of survival, namely in victory, since the aforementioned river lay impassable at their backs.

Having done this, they were ready to risk the battle.

Chapter 33 Tactics Against the Gauls

The Romans are thought to have handled this battle intelligently, for the military tribunes showed how the fighting ought to be conducted, both collectively and by each man individually.

For they had observed from earlier engagements that the whole Gallic race is most fearsome in its first charge, in its fury, so long as that fury is still fresh;

and that their swords, by their construction, as has been said before, have only one effective downward stroke — the first — but after that they immediately lose their edge, bending both lengthwise and crosswise so badly that, unless the men are given time to straighten them by setting them against the ground with the foot, their second blow is utterly useless.

So the tribunes distributed the spears of the triarii, who stood in reserve behind, to the men in the front companies, and ordered them to use their swords only after switching weapons; and they engaged the Celts in pitched battle, facing them head-on.

As soon as the Gauls made their swords useless by their first downward strokes against the spears, the Romans closed to hand-to-hand range and rendered the Celts helpless, robbing them of their slashing style of fighting — which is peculiar to Gallic warfare — since their sword has no point for thrusting at all.

The Romans, by contrast, used their swords not for cutting but for thrusting, holding them straight, since the point on them is effective; and striking at the chests and faces and landing blow upon blow, they killed the greater part of those drawn up against them, thanks to the foresight of the tribunes.

For the consul Flaminius is thought not to have made good use of the engagement described above. By forming his line right along the very brow of the river, he ruined what is distinctive about Roman tactics, leaving no room for the companies to fall back step by step.

For if the men had been pressed back even slightly from their ground during the battle, they would have had to throw themselves into the river, all because of their commander's blunder.

Nevertheless, by their own valor they won a decisive victory, as I have said, and after taking abundant plunder and no small amount of spoils, they returned to Rome.

Chapter 34 Capture of Mediolanum and End of the War

In the following year, when the Celts sent an embassy seeking peace and promising to do anything, the newly appointed consuls Marcus Claudius and Gnaeus Cornelius pressed hard that no peace be granted them.

The Celts, having failed in this and resolving to put their last hopes to the test, once more set about hiring about thirty thousand of the Gaesatae Gauls who live around the Rhone. Having taken these into service, they kept them at the ready and awaited the enemy's attack.

The Roman generals, when the season came, took up their forces and led them into the country of the Insubres.

Arriving there and encamping around the city of Acerrae, which lies between the Padus and the Alpine mountains, they laid siege to it.

The Insubres, unable to bring relief because the favorable positions had already been seized, but eager to break the siege of Acerrae, sent a portion of their force across the Padus into the country of the Anares and laid siege to the place called Clastidium. When news of what was happening reached the generals,

Marcus Claudius took the cavalry and some of the infantry and hurried off, eager to relieve the besieged.

The Celts, learning of the enemy's arrival, raised the siege, came out to meet them, and drew up for battle.

When the Romans, with the cavalry alone, boldly charged them in a sudden assault, they held out at first; but afterward, with the enemy surrounding them both at the rear and on the flank, they were hard-pressed in the fighting and were finally routed by the cavalry alone.

Many of them fell into the river and were destroyed by the current, while the greater number were cut down by the enemy.

The Romans also captured Acerrae, full of grain, after the Gauls withdrew to Mediolanum, which is the principal stronghold of the Insubres' territory.

Gnaeus followed close on their heels and made a sudden assault on Mediolanum; at first the Gauls kept quiet,

but when he started back again toward Acerrae, they sallied out, boldly fell upon his rearguard, killed many men, and even forced a part of his force to flee,

until Gnaeus called back the men from the vanguard and urged them to stand and engage the enemy.

The Romans, obeying their general, fought stoutly against those pressing on them.

The Celts, on account of their present success, held their ground confidently for a while, but before long they were routed and fled to the foothills. Gnaeus pursued them, ravaged the countryside, and

Chapter 35 Character of the Gauls

took Mediolanum by storm. When this happened, the chiefs of the Insubres, despairing of any hope of safety, surrendered everything they had to the Romans.

Such, then, was the outcome of the war against the Celts. In terms of the desperate fury and daring of the men who fought it, and further in terms of the battles and the number of those killed and engaged in them, it was inferior to none recorded in history;

but in terms of strategic planning and the lack of judgment in the conduct of its individual stages, it was utterly contemptible — because not the greater part, but absolutely everything the Gauls did was governed by passion rather than by reason.

Having observed for myself how these people were driven out of the plains around the Padus not long afterward — except for a few localities lying right at the foot of the Alps — I decided that I ought not to leave unrecorded either their original invasion, or their subsequent actions, or their final expulsion,

believing it proper to the work of history to bring such episodes of Fortune into memory and to hand them down to those who come after,

so that our descendants may not be utterly ignorant of these things and thus be terrified by the sudden and unexpected attacks of the barbarians, but rather, bearing in mind to some degree how short-lived and how easily broken the barbarian host is, may withstand their onslaught — those who face danger with judgment — and may exhaust all their own resources before yielding any of what is essential.

For I believe that those who recorded for us, and handed down to memory, the Persians' invasion of Greece and the Gauls' invasion of Delphi contributed in no small way — indeed greatly — to the struggles waged for the common freedom of the Greeks.

For no one, dismayed by an abundance of supplies or arms or men, would abandon his last hope — that of fighting to the end for his own land and homeland — if he kept before his eyes the astonishing nature of what happened then, and remembered how many myriads of men, what daring, and how vast the preparations were that the resolve and power of those who faced danger with judgment and calculation brought to nothing.

And since the dread of the Gauls has dismayed the Greeks repeatedly, not only in ancient times but even down to our own day,

I was all the more moved to give an account of these matters — summary in form, yet reaching back to the beginning.

Chapter 36 Hasdrubal Dies and Hannibal Succeeds Him

Now Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian general — for it was from his affairs that we digressed in our narrative — died after governing the affairs of Iberia for eight years. He was treacherously murdered at night in his own quarters by a certain man of Celtic stock, in revenge for private wrongs.

He had brought about no small but a great advance in the fortunes of Carthage, not so much through his military exploits as through his dealings with the native princes.

The Carthaginians then conferred the command in Iberia on Hannibal, despite his youth, on account of the shrewdness and daring that his conduct had already begun to display.

As soon as he took up the command, it was clear from his designs that he intended to make war on Rome — and this in fact he soon did, after waiting only a very short time.

From this period onward, then, relations between the Carthaginians and the Romans were marked by mutual suspicion and friction.

For the Carthaginians were plotting, eager to take their revenge for their losses around Sicily, while the Romans were distrustful, observing what the Carthaginians were planning.

From all this it was clear to anyone who judged the situation correctly that the two peoples would be at war with each other before long.

Chapter 37 Greece At This Time

At the same period the Achaeans and King Philip, together with their other allies, were embarking on the war against the Aetolians known as the Social War.

Now, having carried our account of the affairs of Sicily and Libya, and of what followed, continuously through the preliminary portion of the work down to the beginning of the Social War and of the second war between Rome and Carthage — the one most people call the Hannibalic War — and since from the outset it was my declared intention to make this period the starting point of my own composition,

it would be fitting to set those matters aside and turn to events in Greece, so that, having brought my preliminary survey from every quarter to the same level and the same point in time, I may then at last begin the demonstrative history proper.

For I have not undertaken, as my predecessors did, to record particular sets of events — Greek history, say, or Persian — but rather the events in all the known parts of the world at once, because the times we live in have contributed something distinctive toward this aspect of my plan, of which I shall give a clearer account elsewhere.

It would therefore be proper, even before the main construction of the work, to touch briefly on the most prominent and best-known nations and regions of the inhabited world.

Now as for the affairs of Asia and Egypt, it will be enough to begin our account of them from the period just mentioned, since the earlier history of those countries has been published by many writers and is familiar to everyone, and since in our own day nothing so unusual or unexpected has befallen them at the hands of fortune as to require any reference back to their past.

But as for the Achaean nation and the royal house of Macedonia, it will be appropriate to go back briefly in time — since the latter has now been utterly extinguished,

while in the case of the Achaeans, as I said above, there has occurred in our own time an extraordinary growth and a coming-together in unity.

For although many men in past times had set out to bring the Peloponnesians together for their common advantage, and not one had succeeded — because each was exerting himself not for the freedom of all but for his own personal power —

yet in our own day this enterprise has reached such progress and completion that there is among them not merely an alliance and friendly partnership in their affairs, but they also use the same laws, weights, measures, and currency, and in addition the same magistrates, councillors,

and judges. In general, the only respect in which the whole Peloponnese falls short of being a single city is that its inhabitants are not enclosed within one and the same wall; in all other respects, both collectively and city by city, their institutions are nearly identical.

Chapter 38 Origin of the Name "Achaean"

First, it is worth learning how and in what way the name of the Achaeans came to prevail over all the Peloponnesians.

For those who from the beginning bore this name as their ancestral title are not distinguished by any greater extent of territory and cities, nor by greater wealth, nor by the valor of their men.

The Arcadian people, and likewise the Laconian, far surpass them in numbers of men and in extent of land; and indeed neither of these would ever consent to yield the first place in courage to any of the Greeks.

How then, and for what reason, are these peoples and the rest of the Peloponnesians now content to share both the constitution and the name of the Achaeans?

It would clearly be quite inappropriate to call it the work of chance — that is a feeble answer; rather, one must seek a cause, for without a cause nothing, whether it seems to follow reason or to defy it, can be brought about. The cause, in my opinion, is something like this.

Nowhere could one find a system and a principle of equality before the law, of free speech, and in a word of genuine democracy, more pure than that which exists among the Achaeans.

This constitution found some of the Peloponnesians willing converts of their own accord, and won over many by persuasion and argument; and those whom it constrained at the right moment it presently brought, even so, to acquiesce in it.

For since it reserved no special advantage for the original members, but granted equal rights to all newcomers alike, it swiftly attained its purpose, using the two most powerful aids: equality and humane treatment.

This, then, must be regarded as the originating and contributing cause of the Peloponnesians' coming to share one purpose and establishing the prosperity they now enjoy.

This principle and this distinctive character of their constitution, as just described, had existed among the Achaeans in earlier times as well.

This could be shown by many other proofs, but for the present it will suffice, for the sake of confidence, to bring forward one or two pieces of evidence.

Chapter 39 The First Achaean League

At the time when, in the regions of Italy then called Magna Graecia, the meeting-houses of the Pythagoreans were burned down,

there followed, as was natural, a complete upheaval of the political order, since the leading men of each city had thus been destroyed in so unexpected a fashion;

and the Greek cities in those parts came to be filled with slaughter, factional strife, and confusion of every kind.

At that time, when embassies came from most parts of Greece to try to settle these disorders, the cities turned to the Achaeans and to their good faith for deliverance from the evils that beset them.

And it was not only on this occasion that they showed their approval of the Achaean way; some time later they set out wholeheartedly to become imitators of their constitution.

For the people of Croton, Sybaris, and Caulonia, after inviting one another and reaching a common understanding, first established a shared temple and precinct of Zeus Homarios, in which they held their meetings and deliberations, and then, adopting the customs and laws of the Achaeans, undertook to use them and to govern their state accordingly. But under the pressure of the despotic power of Dionysius of Syracuse,

and likewise of the domination of the neighboring barbarians, they were hindered, and abandoned these arrangements — not willingly, but under compulsion.

Later, when the Lacedaemonians had suffered their unexpected defeat at the battle of Leuctra, and the Thebans had unexpectedly laid claim to the leadership of Greece, there was great uncertainty among all the Greeks, and especially among the two peoples just named, since the one would not admit it had been beaten, and the other did not believe it had won.

Nevertheless, in their dispute the Thebans and the Lacedaemonians entrusted the points at issue to the Achaeans alone of all the Greeks — not with any regard to their power,

for at that time they had perhaps the smallest power of any people in Greece, but chiefly out of regard for their good faith and their general integrity. For that was, by common consent, the reputation everyone then held of them.

At that period, then, these qualities of principle existed among them only in bare form; but no achievement or notable action tending to the growth of their own power came about,

because they were unable to produce a leader worthy of their principles. Whenever someone gave promise of it, he was overshadowed and held back, at one time by the dominance of the Lacedaemonians, at another, still more, by

Chapter 40 Unification of the Peloponnese

that of the Macedonians. But when at last, in due time, the nation found leaders of sufficient worth, it quickly made its own power manifest by accomplishing that most glorious of works — the concord of the Peloponnesians.

As the originator and prime mover of the whole undertaking we must reckon Aratus of Sicyon; as the champion who carried the work through to completion, Philopoemen of Megalopolis; and as the man who secured its lasting permanence for a time, Lycortas and those who shared his policy.

What each of these men did, and how, and at what times, I shall try to make clear, always giving my attention to it in the manner appropriate to the narrative.

As for the measures carried out by Aratus, I shall mention them in summary both now and again later on, because he himself composed thoroughly truthful and lucid memoirs of his own deeds;

but for the others I shall give a more detailed and discriminating account. I suppose the easiest course for me, and the one that will make the subject easiest for my readers to follow, will be to take my starting point from the period when, the Achaean nation having been broken up city by city by the kings of Macedon, a new beginning was made and the cities once more drew together toward one another.

From that time the nation, growing continuously, advanced to the state of completion in which it stood in our own day, about which I have just spoken in some detail.

Chapter 41 The Second League

It was the 124th Olympiad when the people of Patrae and Dyme first began to act in concert,

the period in which Ptolemy son of Lagus, Lysimachus, and also Seleucus and Ptolemy Ceraunus departed this life — for all these died around the Olympiad just mentioned.

Now in the times before this, the situation of the aforesaid nation was roughly as follows.

They had been ruled by kings ever since Tisamenus, who was the son of Orestes and who, having been expelled from Sparta on the return of the Heraclidae, took possession of the regions around Achaea;

from him they were ruled by kings of the same line in unbroken succession down to Ogyges. After that, becoming dissatisfied with the sons of Ogyges because they ruled them not constitutionally but despotically, they changed their government into a democracy.

Thereafter, throughout the following times down to the supremacy of Alexander and Philip, their fortunes varied with circumstances, now one way, now another; but their common government, as we have said, they tried to maintain as a democracy.

This league consisted of twelve cities, which still survive today, except for Olenus and for Helice, which was swallowed up by the sea before the events at Leuctra.

These cities are: Patrae, Dyme, Pharae, Tritaea, Leontium, Aegium, Aegeira, Pellene, Bura, and Caryneia.

But in the period after the time of Alexander and before the Olympiad just mentioned, they fell into such discord and ill condition — chiefly through the agency of the kings of Macedon — that all the cities became separated from one another and pursued interests opposed to each other.

As a result, some of them came to have garrisons imposed on them by Demetrius and Cassander, and afterwards by Antigonus Gonatas, while others fell under the rule of tyrants; for this last king seems to have planted more absolute rulers among the Greeks than anyone else.

But around the 124th Olympiad, as I said above, they changed their minds and began once again to act in concert. This was at the time of Pyrrhus's crossing into Italy.

The first to form the union were the peoples of Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, and Pharae; and for this reason there happens to be no monument recording the federation of these cities.

After this, in about the fifth year, the people of Aegium expelled their garrison and joined the federation; next to them the people of Bura, after killing their tyrant.

At the same time the people of Caryneia were restored to it. For Iseas, then tyrant of Caryneia, seeing that the garrison had been driven out of Aegium and that the despot in Bura had been destroyed by Margos and the Achaeans, and seeing himself on the point of being attacked from every side,

laid down his power and, after receiving guarantees from the Achaeans for his safety, attached his city to the Achaean confederation.

Chapter 42 Policy of the Achaean League

For what reason, then, did I go back to these times? First, so that it might become clear how, at what periods, and which of the original Achaeans were the first to undertake again the formation of the present league;

and second, so that their guiding policy might be confirmed not merely by my own assertion but by the facts themselves — namely, that the Achaeans always held to one and the same principle.

In accordance with this principle, holding out the equality before the law and the freedom of speech that prevailed among them, and continually making war on and crushing those who, whether on their own account or with the help of the kings, were enslaving their respective homelands, they accomplished this work in this manner and with this aim — partly by their own efforts, partly with the help of their allies.

For indeed whatever was achieved toward this end through those allies in later times must be credited to the deliberate policy of the Achaeans.

For though they took part in many enterprises with others, and in very many and very fine ones with the Romans, they never at any time sought from their successes any private advantage for themselves;

rather, in exchange for all the zeal they offered their allies, they bargained for nothing but the freedom of each people and the common concord of the Peloponnesians.

But it will be possible to grasp these things more clearly from the actual record of their deeds.

Chapter 43 Margos, the First Sole Strategus

For the first twenty-five years, the cities I have named governed themselves jointly, choosing in rotation a common secretary and two generals.

After this they decided instead to appoint a single man and to entrust him with authority over the whole confederacy. The first to receive this honor was Margos of Caryneia.

In the fourth year after this man held the office, Aratus of Sicyon—then only twenty years old, having freed his native city from tyranny through his own courage and daring—brought it into the Achaean union, for from the very start he had been an enthusiast for their political ideals.

Then, in the eighth year after that, having been elected general for the second time, he laid a secret plot against the Acrocorinth, which Antigonus held, and seized it. By gaining control of it he relieved the inhabitants of the Peloponnese of a great fear, and by liberating the Corinthians he brought them into the Achaean union.

During the same term of office he also won over the city of Megara and attached it to the Achaeans.

These events took place in the year before the defeat of the Carthaginians, the defeat that made them withdraw entirely from Sicily and submit, for the first time, to paying tribute to Rome.

Having advanced his design so greatly in so short a time, Aratus thereafter continued as leader of the Achaean nation, directing all his plans and actions toward a single goal:

namely, to expel the Macedonians from the Peloponnese, to abolish the autocracies, and to secure for each people the common freedom their ancestors had enjoyed.

So long as Antigonus Gonatas lived, then, Aratus persisted in opposing both that king's meddling and the rapacity of the Aetolians,

handling each matter with practical skill—even though the two of them had advanced so far in injustice and reckless daring that they made a formal compact with each other for

Chapter 44 The Death of Demetrius

the dismemberment of the Achaean nation. But when Antigonus died, the Achaeans came to terms and made an alliance with the Aetolians, who joined them honorably in the war against Demetrius; and so, for the time being, the estrangement and ill will were set aside, and a sense of partnership and friendship grew up between them.

When Demetrius, after a reign of only ten years, died at about the time of the Romans' first crossing into Illyria, events flowed favorably toward the Achaeans' original design.

For the autocrats in the Peloponnese fell into despair: Demetrius, who had been, as it were, their patron and paymaster, was dead; and Aratus was pressing hard upon them, insisting that they ought to lay down their tyrannies, holding out great gifts and honors to those who complied, while threatening those who resisted with still greater terrors and dangers at the hands of the Achaeans.

So they were driven to comply—to give up their tyrannies, to set their own native cities free, and to join the Achaean union.

Now Lydiades of Megalopolis, while Demetrius was still alive, had on his own initiative—shrewdly and prudently foreseeing what was to come—laid down his tyranny and joined the national confederacy.

And Aristomachus, tyrant of Argos, Xenon, tyrant of Hermione, and Cleonymus, tyrant of Phlius, now likewise gave up their autocracies and shared in the Achaean democracy.

Chapter 45 The Aetolians Envy the Achaeans

But as the nation grew and prospered all the more on this account, the Aetolians, prompted by their innate injustice and greed, grew envious—and, even more, hoped to carve up the cities among themselves, just as before they had divided the cities of Acarnania with Alexander and had schemed to divide those of the Achaeans with Antigonus Gonatas.

So now, buoyed up by similar hopes, they had the audacity to make common cause and join hands at once with both Antigonus—who at that time was head of the Macedonians, acting as guardian of the boy Philip—and Cleomenes, king of the Lacedaemonians.

For they saw that Antigonus held secure control of Macedonia, and that he was an acknowledged and open enemy of the Achaeans because of their plot that had captured the Acrocorinth.

They reckoned that if they brought in the Lacedaemonians as additional partners in the scheme and pushed them first into hostility against the nation, they could easily crush the Achaeans by attacking them at the right moment and surrounding them with war on every side.

And in all likelihood they would quickly have accomplished this, had they not overlooked the most crucial point in their plan: they failed to reckon that in their designs they would have Aratus as an opponent—a man capable of meeting every emergency.

And so, when they set out to meddle and to launch unjust attacks, far from achieving any of their aims, they did the opposite: they actually strengthened Aratus, then the leader, and the nation itself, since he skillfully drew them off and wrecked their plans.

How the whole affair was managed will become clear from what I am about to relate.

Chapter 46 The Intrigues of the Aetolians

For Aratus observed that the Aetolians were ashamed to take up war against the Achaeans openly, since the favors the Achaeans had done them in the Demetrian War were still very fresh,

but that they were conspiring with the Lacedaemonians and envied the Achaeans so deeply that, when Cleomenes had treacherously seized from them Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenus—cities that were not only Aetolian allies but at that time actually members of their own league—they were not the least indignant about it, but even confirmed his takeover;

and whereas in the past, out of greed, they had treated any pretext as sufficient grounds for going to war against people who had done them no wrong, now Aratus saw them willingly letting their treaties be violated and deliberately giving up their greatest cities for one purpose only—to see Cleomenes become a formidable adversary to the Achaeans.

Seeing all this, Aratus—and likewise all the leaders of the Achaean state—decided that they should not initiate war against anyone, but should resist the designs of the Lacedaemonians.

At first, then, they held to this view; but as time went on, when they saw Cleomenes boldly building the fort called the Athenaeum in the territory of Megalopolis and openly revealing himself as their bitter enemy,

then at last they convened the Achaeans and resolved, together with the council, to take up open hostility against the Lacedaemonians.

This, then, was how the war called the Cleomenic War began, and at about these

Chapter 47 The Cleomenic War

times. At first the Achaeans set out to face the Lacedaemonians with their own forces, partly because they thought it most honorable not to obtain their safety through others, but to preserve their cities and territory by themselves,

and partly because they wished to maintain their friendship with Ptolemy, on account of the benefits he had bestowed earlier, and not to appear to be reaching out to others for help.

But when the war had gone on for some time, and Cleomenes had abolished his country's ancestral constitution and converted its lawful kingship into a tyranny, and was waging the war with energy and reckless daring,

Aratus, foreseeing what was to come and fearing the desperate audacity of the Aetolians, decided that he must spoil their plan well in advance.

He saw that Antigonus was a man of action and intelligence who laid claim to a reputation for trustworthiness, while he knew perfectly well that kings by nature regard no one as either an ally or an enemy, but always measure their hatreds and friendships by the calculus of self-interest.

So he resolved to open communication with that king and to join hands with him, pointing out to him the outcome that his present circumstances would bring.

To do this openly, however, he judged inexpedient for several reasons. For one thing, it would prepare Cleomenes and the Aetolians as adversaries to the scheme;

for another, it would dishearten the mass of the Achaeans, since by taking refuge with their enemies he would seem to have utterly given up his hopes in them—which was the very last impression he wanted to create.

For this reason, holding to such a purpose, he planned to manage the matter in secret.

As a result, contrary to his own real intentions, he was often forced to say and do things in public through which, by presenting the opposite impression, he meant to conceal his actual management of affairs.

For this reason he did not even record some of these things in his memoirs.

Chapter 48 Aratus Involves Megalopolis

Aratus knew that the people of Megalopolis were suffering badly in the war, because, lying next to Sparta, they had to bear the brunt of the fighting ahead of the others, yet were not receiving the proper support from the Achaeans, since the Achaeans too were hard-pressed and crippled by their circumstances.

He also knew clearly that they were favorably disposed toward the Macedonian royal house because of the benefits they had received in the time of Philip, son of Amyntas.

So he understood that, once hard-pressed by Cleomenes, they would quickly take refuge with Antigonus and the hopes that Macedonia offered.

Accordingly, he confided his whole plan in secret to Nicophanes and Cercidas of Megalopolis, who were his family's hereditary guest-friends and well suited to the undertaking.

Through them he easily prompted the Megalopolitans to send an embassy to the Achaeans and urge them to appeal to Antigonus for help.

So the Megalopolitans appointed Nicophanes and Cercidas themselves as envoys to the Achaeans, and from there straight on to Antigonus, should the nation agree.

The Achaeans gave the Megalopolitans permission to send the embassy.

Nicophanes and his colleagues hastened to meet the king, and concerning their own city they spoke only of the essentials, briefly and in summary; but most of what they said, following Aratus's instructions, concerned

Chapter 49 The Message to Antigonus Doson from Aratus

the broader situation, in accordance with his directions. These were: to point out what the collaboration between the Aetolians and Cleomenes amounted to and where it was heading, and to make clear that the Achaeans themselves had primarily to be on their guard, but next—and even more so—Antigonus.

For one thing, it was plain to everyone that the Achaeans could not withstand a war from both sides at once; and for another, that if the Aetolians and Cleomenes prevailed over the Achaeans, they would not rest content nor stop at the present situation—and this was even easier for a sensible man to see than the first point.

For the greed of the Aetolians would never be content to be confined within the boundaries of the Peloponnese—nor even within those of Greece;

and the ambition of Cleomenes, his whole design, was for the present aimed at the rule of the Peloponnese, but once he gained that, he would at once reach for the leadership of all the Greeks.

And that leadership he could not attain without first overthrowing the Macedonian empire.

They therefore asked him to consider, looking ahead to the future, which course better served his own interests: to fight Cleomenes in the Peloponnese for the leadership of Greece alongside the Achaeans and Boeotians, or to abandon the greatest nation and stake the Macedonian empire on a battle in Thessaly against the Aetolians and Boeotians—and the Achaeans and Lacedaemonians as well.

If, then, the Aetolians—out of regard for the goodwill the Achaeans had shown them in the time of Demetrius—were to pretend to keep quiet, as they were doing even now, the Achaeans, they said, would wage war against Cleomenes on their own; and if fortune lent its support, they would have no need of anyone to help them. But if fortune turned against them,

and the Aetolians joined in the attack, they urged him to keep an eye on developments, so that he might not let the right moment slip, but might come to the aid of the Peloponnesians while they could still be saved.

As for good faith and the repayment of his kindness, they thought he need not trouble himself: once the service was rendered, they pledged that Aratus would himself find guarantees satisfactory to both parties.

Likewise, they said, he would himself indicate the right moment for the help to be given.

Chapter 50 Antigonus Doson Will Help the League

When Antigonus heard these arguments, he judged that Aratus was laying out the situation honestly and practically, and he attended carefully to the next steps. He also wrote to the people of Megalopolis,

promising to send help, provided that the Achaeans, too, were willing that this should happen.

When Nicophanes and Cercidas returned home, delivered the king's letters, and made clear the rest of his goodwill and his eagerness for the cause,

the Megalopolitans were elated and were keen to go to the assembly of the Achaeans and urge them to win Antigonus over and to place the conduct of affairs in his hands without delay.

Aratus, having heard privately from Nicophanes about the disposition the king held both toward the Achaeans and toward himself, was overjoyed that his scheme had not been undertaken in vain, and that he had not found Antigonus, as the Aetolians had hoped, utterly estranged from him.

He also considered it very much to his advantage that the Megalopolitans were eager to bring the matter to Antigonus through the agency of the Achaeans. For above all,

as I said earlier, his goal was to avoid needing the assistance at all; but if it should become unavoidable to fall back on it, he wanted the invitation to come not through himself alone, but still more from all the Achaeans together.

For he was anxious that, should the king come, defeat Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians in the war, and then adopt some less favorable policy toward their common constitution, he himself might by general agreement bear the blame for whatever followed—

since Antigonus would be thought to be acting justly, on account of the wrong previously done by Aratus himself against the house of Macedon in the matter of the Acrocorinth.

Therefore, as soon as the Megalopolitans came before the common council, displayed the letters to the Achaeans, made clear the king's full goodwill, and on top of this asked them to secure Antigonus's alliance as quickly as possible—and as the assembly too was of the same inclination—

Aratus came forward, welcomed the king's eagerness and praised the disposition of the majority, but then in a lengthy speech urged them above all to try to preserve their cities and their territory by their own efforts: for nothing, he said, was more honorable or more advantageous than this;

and only if fortune turned against them in this effort, he said, should they—after first exhausting every hope that lay within themselves—then

Chapter 51 The Achaeans Must Appeal to Antigonus

fall back on the assistance of their friends. The assembly signified its approval, and it was resolved to hold to their present course and to carry through the current war by their own efforts.

But Ptolemy, despairing of the league, set about subsidizing Cleomenes instead—wishing to set him up against Antigonus, because he had greater hopes that the Lacedaemonians, rather than the Achaeans, could hold in check the designs of the Macedonian kings.

The Achaeans, meanwhile, were first worsted at Lycaeum, when they clashed with Cleomenes on the march; secondly they were defeated in a pitched battle at the place called Ladocea in the territory of Megalopolis, where Lydiadas also fell; and a third time they were utterly broken in the territory of Dyme, near the place called Hecatombaeum, where they had risked their whole levy.

At that point, when affairs no longer allowed any respite, their circumstances forced them to take refuge unanimously with Antigonus.

At that juncture Aratus sent his son as envoy to Antigonus and confirmed the terms regarding the assistance.

But the greatest difficulty and embarrassment they faced was this: the king did not seem likely to help unless he recovered the Acrocorinth and took the city of the Corinthians as a base of operations for the current war; while the Achaeans, for their part, could not bring themselves to hand the Corinthians over to the Macedonians against their will.

For this reason the deliberation was at first postponed,

Chapter 52 Antigonus Doson at the Isthmus

so that the question of the guarantees might be examined. Cleomenes, meanwhile, having struck terror with the successes already described, now made his way fearlessly through the cities, winning some by persuasion and over others holding the threat of force. In this manner he took over Caphyae,

Pellene, Pheneus, Argos, Phlius, Cleonae, Epidaurus, Hermione, Troezen, and last of all Corinth; and he personally laid siege to the city of the Sicyonians. But in doing so he in fact relieved the Achaeans of their gravest problem.

For when the Corinthians ordered Aratus, who held the office of Strategus, and the Achaeans to leave the city, and sent messages to Cleomenes inviting him in, they handed the Achaeans a starting point and a reasonable pretext.

Aratus seized on it: since the Achaeans then held the place, he offered the Acrocorinth to Antigonus. By this he dissolved the standing grievance against the royal house, furnished a sufficient pledge of partnership for the future, and—what was decisive—provided Antigonus a base of operations for the war against the Lacedaemonians.

When Cleomenes learned that the Achaeans were coming to terms with Antigonus, he broke camp from Sicyon and encamped near the Isthmus, fencing off with palisade and trench the ground between the Acrocorinth and the mountains called the Onean range, by now firmly embracing in his hopes the whole dominion of the Peloponnese.

Antigonus had long been ready, waiting to see what would happen in line with the proposals of Aratus.

At that point, reckoning from the reports reaching him that Cleomenes with his army was on the very point of entering Thessaly, he sent word to Aratus and the Achaeans about the terms agreed upon, and came with his forces through Euboea to the Isthmus.

For the Aetolians, among their other measures and also at this time wishing to prevent Antigonus from bringing aid, had forbidden him to march with an army south of Thermopylae, declaring that otherwise they would oppose his passage by force of arms.

So Antigonus and Cleomenes lay encamped opposite each other, the one striving to enter

Chapter 53 Cleomenes Returns to Sparta after the Achaeans Take Argos

the Peloponnese, Cleomenes determined to bar Antigonus's way in. The Achaeans, although they had suffered no small reverses in the war as a whole, nevertheless did not abandon their resolve or give up the hopes that lay in their own efforts.

Rather, the moment that Aristotle of Argos rose in revolt against the Cleomenists, they came to his aid, broke into the city with Timoxenus the Strategus, and seized the city of the Argives.

This indeed must be reckoned the chief cause of the recovery of their fortunes. For this was what checked the momentum of Cleomenes and beforehand broke the spirit of his troops, as became clear from the events themselves.

For although he held more advantageous positions, enjoyed more lavish supplies than Antigonus, and was driven on by greater daring and ambition,

nevertheless, as soon as the news fell upon him that the city of the Argives had been taken by the Achaeans, he was immediately uprooted: abandoning the advantages just described, he made his withdrawal more like a flight, fearing that the enemy might surround him on every side.

He fell back upon Argos and for a while contested the city; but afterward, when the Achaeans resisted nobly and the Argives, out of remorse, fought him off with great zeal, he failed in this attempt as well, and marching by way of Mantinea returned thus to

Chapter 54 Antigonus Doson Appointed Generalissimo

Sparta. Antigonus, having entered the Peloponnese safely, took over the Acrocorinth, and without staying any time held to his purpose and arrived at Argos.

After praising the Argives and settling affairs in the city, he again set off without delay, directing his march toward Arcadia.

He expelled the garrisons from the strongholds that had been built up by Cleomenes throughout the territory of Aegys and Belmina, handed those forts over to the Megalopolitans, and then came to the assembly of the Achaeans at Aegium.

There he gave an account of his own actions, conferred about future plans, and was further appointed commander of all the allies.

After this he spent some time in winter quarters in the region of Sicyon and Corinth. When the spring season came on, he took up his forces and advanced.

Completing the march to the city of the Tegeans on the third day, and being joined there by the Achaeans as well, he encamped around it and began to besiege it.

As the Macedonians pressed both the rest of the siege and the digging of mines vigorously, the Tegeans quickly despaired of safety and surrendered.

Antigonus, having secured affairs in the city, kept on without a break to the next stages of his plan and pressed on at speed into Laconia.

Drawing near to Cleomenes, who was posted in front of his own territory, he tested him and engaged in some skirmishing.

But when word came to him through his scouts that the soldiers from Orchomenus had marched out to reinforce Cleomenes, he at once broke camp and hurried off.

He took Orchomenus by storm at the first assault; then, encamping around the city of the Mantineans, he besieged it.

When the Macedonians had quickly terrified this city too and reduced it to submission, he broke camp and advanced along the road toward Heraea and Telphusa.

Having taken over these cities as well, their inhabitants coming over to him voluntarily, and with winter now closing in, he came to Aegium for the assembly of the Achaeans.

He dismissed all the Macedonians home for the winter, while he himself conferred with the Achaeans and deliberated jointly with them about the present situation.

Chapter 55 Capture of Megalopolis

About this time Cleomenes observed that the forces had been disbanded, that Antigonus with his mercenaries was lingering at Aegium, three days' march distant from Megalopolis,

and that this city was hard to guard because of its size and the thinness of its population, and was at that moment being watched all the more carelessly because of Antigonus's presence in the country. Most important of all, he knew that the greater part of its men of military age had perished in the battle at Lycaeum and afterward in the battle at Ladocea.

So, getting the help of some Messenian exiles who happened to be staying in Megalopolis, he slipped in by night through their agency, undetected, inside the walls.

When day broke, he came within a little of not merely being driven out but of risking total disaster, on account of the courage of the Megalopolitans.

This was just what had happened to him three months earlier, when he had broken in by the part of the city called the Colaeum.

On this occasion, however, by the size of his force and by seizing the favorable positions in advance, he accomplished his design, and in the end, driving out the Megalopolitans, he took possession of the city.

Having made himself master of it, he destroyed it so bitterly and so malignantly that no one could even hope it might ever be resettled.

He did this, it seems to me, because among the Megalopolitans and the Stymphalians alone, throughout the vicissitudes of those times, he had never been able to procure either a partisan and accomplice in his own designs, or a traitor.

For as to the Clitorians, their love of freedom and their nobility were disgraced by the baseness of a single man, Thearces—whom the Clitorians, with good reason, deny was born among them, asserting that he was a changeling foisted in from Orchomenus, the son of one of the foreign garrison soldiers there.

Chapter 56 The Credibility of Phylarchus

Now, since among those who have written about the same period as Aratus, Phylarchus is, in some quarters, held worthy of acceptance—though on many points he holds opposing views and writes the contrary of Aratus—

it would be useful, or rather necessary for us, since we have chosen to follow Aratus concerning the Cleomenic affairs, not to leave this matter unexamined, lest we allow falsehood in written works to carry weight equal to the truth.

In general, then, this writer has throughout his whole work said much at random and as chance dictated.

But while it is perhaps not necessary to censure him on the other matters at present, or to scrutinize them closely, those of his statements that bear on the period I am now writing about—that is, the affairs of the Cleomenic war—on these it is necessary for us to give a precise account.

These will be quite sufficient to enable us to understand his whole purpose and ability in his work.

Wishing, then, to set forth the cruelty of Antigonus and the Macedonians, and along with theirs that of Aratus and the Achaeans, he says that the Mantineans, when they fell into their hands, met with great misfortunes, and that the most ancient and greatest city of Arcadia struggled with such great calamities as to move all the Greeks to amazement and tears.

And in his eagerness to call forth the pity of his readers and to make them feel for what he describes, he brings in women clinging together, hair flung loose, breasts bared, and besides these the tears and laments of men and women being led off into captivity together with their children and aged parents. And he does this throughout his whole history,

always trying in each instance to set the horrors before our eyes.

Now let the ignoble and womanish character of his approach be passed over; let us examine instead what is proper to history and at the same time useful.

A historian, then, must not try to astonish his readers by sensational writing, nor seek out the speeches that might have been delivered, nor reckon up the circumstances that might attend his subject—as the writers of tragedy do—but must record above all only what was actually done and said, even if it happens to be quite ordinary.

For the aim of history and of tragedy is not the same, but the opposite. In the latter the object is to astound and beguile the hearers for the moment by the most plausible words; in the former it is, through true deeds and words, to instruct and convince for all time those who love learning.

In the one, what governs is plausibility, even if it be false, because the object is the deception of the spectators; in the other it is the truth, because the object is the benefit of those who love learning.

Apart from this, he relates most of his catastrophes without setting out the cause and manner of what happened—without which it is impossible reasonably to feel pity or properly to feel anger at anything that occurs.

For who among men does not think it a dreadful thing that free men should be struck? Yet, nonetheless, if a man suffers this because he began with unjust violence, he is judged to have suffered justly; whereas if the same thing is done for correction and instruction, those who strike free men are thought worthy even of honor and gratitude.

And again, the killing of fellow citizens he treats as the gravest impiety, deserving the heaviest penalties—and yet plainly the man who kills a thief or an adulterer goes unpunished, while the man who kills a traitor or a tyrant receives honor and precedence among all.

So in every case the final judgment about such things rests not in the deeds themselves, but in the causes and purposes of those who act, and in the differences between them.

Chapter 57 The Treatment of Mantinea

The people of Mantinea, then, had at the outset abandoned their membership in the Achaean confederacy and of their own free will handed themselves and their homeland over to the Aetolians, and after that to Cleomenes.

Having committed themselves to this course and become participants in the Lacedaemonian polity, in the fourth year before the arrival of Antigonus they were taken by storm by the Achaeans, when Aratus carried off a stroke against their city.

On that occasion they were so far from suffering any harsh treatment for the offense just described that what happened actually became famous, because of the suddenness with which both sides reversed their attitude toward one another.

For the moment he secured the city, Aratus at once ordered the men under his command that no one was to touch anything belonging to another.

Next, gathering the Mantineans together, he urged them to take heart and to remain in possession of their own property; for their safety would be guaranteed if they continued as citizens within the Achaean confederacy.

To the Mantineans this prospect appeared so unsuspected and unexpected that they all instantly swung over to the opposite frame of mind.

The very men against whom they had been fighting a little while before—men through whom they had watched many of their kinsmen perish and not a few of their own people fall to grievous wounds—these they now brought into their own houses and made sharers of their hearths along with their families, leaving out nothing of mutual goodwill.

And they had good reason to act so. For I do not know whether any men ever encountered more reasonable enemies, or whether any ever came through what seemed the greatest of calamities with less harm than the Mantineans did, thanks to the humanity of Aratus and the Achaeans toward them.

Chapter 58 The Mantineans Turn Over their City to the Lacedaemonians

But afterward, foreseeing the factional strife within their own community and the schemes of the Aetolians and Lacedaemonians, they sent envoys to the Achaeans and requested that a protective garrison be provided for them.

The Achaeans agreed and selected by lot three hundred men from their own number. Those on whom the lot fell set out, leaving behind their own cities and livelihoods, and took up residence in Mantinea, guarding the freedom and at the same time the security of its people.

Along with these they also sent out two hundred mercenaries, who together with the Achaeans helped maintain the established order there.

Not long afterward, however, the Mantineans fell into civil strife, drew in the Lacedaemonians, handed over the city to them, and slaughtered the men stationed among them by the Achaeans—a graver and more dreadful breach of faith than one could easily describe.

For even granted that they had decided to renounce altogether their gratitude and friendship toward the confederacy, they surely ought at least to have spared the men just mentioned and allowed every one of them to depart under a truce.

This much, after all, it is customary to grant even to enemies, by the common laws of mankind.

But they, in order to give Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians a sufficient pledge of their commitment to the present design, transgressed the common rights of mankind and deliberately carried out the most monstrous act of impiety.

For to become the murderers and avengers of men who had earlier taken them by storm yet released them unharmed, and who at that very moment were guarding their freedom and security—how great an indignation does this deserve?

What would these men have to suffer before they would be thought to have paid a fitting penalty? Perhaps one might say: to be sold into slavery along with their wives and children, once they had been overcome in war.

But this is a fate that, by the laws of war, awaits even those who have committed no act of impiety at all. So they deserved to meet with some more thorough and heavier punishment;

and therefore, even if they had suffered what Phylarchus says, it would not have been natural for pity toward them to follow from the Greeks. Rather, praise and approval would have been due to those who carried out the punishment of their impiety.

Yet, although nothing worse befell the Mantineans in their downfall than the plundering of their goods and the selling of the free into slavery, this writer, for the sake of sensationalism, not only introduced an outright falsehood,

but a falsehood that is implausible as well; and through the excess of his ignorance he could not even take account of what lay right beside it—namely, how these same men, who at the very same period took Tegea by storm, did nothing of the kind there.

And yet, if the cruelty of the perpetrators had been the cause, it would have been natural for the people of Tegea too to suffer the same fate as those who had fallen under their power at the same time.

But if the difference in treatment concerned the Mantineans alone, it is obvious that the cause of the anger directed at them must also have been something distinctive.

Chapter 59 Execution of Aristomachus

Again, Phylarchus says that Aristomachus of Argos—a man from a most distinguished family, who had himself been tyrant of the Argives and was descended from tyrants—after falling into the hands of Antigonus and the Achaeans, was led off to Cenchreae and tortured to death, having suffered the most unjust and dreadful treatment of any man alive.

In this episode too the writer keeps to his characteristic manner and invents certain cries supposedly heard through the night as the man was being racked, reaching the people living nearby; of whom some, he says, were appalled at the impiety, others incredulous, others outraged at what was happening, and all came running to the house.

As for this sort of sensationalism, let it pass; enough has been said about it.

For my own part, even if Aristomachus had committed no other crime against the Achaeans, I judge that, by reason of the way he chose to live and his lawless treatment of his own country, he deserved the heaviest punishment.

And although the writer, wishing to magnify the man's reputation and to dispose his audience to share more deeply in his indignation at what Aristomachus suffered, says that he was not only a tyrant himself but also descended from tyrants—

no one could easily bring a graver or more biting accusation than this. For the very word carries with it the most impious connotation and embraces every injustice and lawlessness found among men.

And if Aristomachus did endure the most terrible tortures, as this man claims, even so he did not pay an adequate penalty for a single day—

the day on which, after Aratus had broken into the city with the Achaeans and undergone great struggles and dangers for the freedom of the Argives, and had in the end been driven out because none of those inside who had arranged to support him stirred, out of fear of the tyrant—

Aristomachus, using this as a pretext and excuse, on the ground that certain men had been complicit in the Achaeans' entry, tortured and slaughtered the eighty foremost citizens, who had done no wrong, in front of their own relatives.

I pass over the crimes committed throughout the whole of his life and

Chapter 60 Crimes of Aristomachus

those of his ancestors, for that would be a long story. And so one should not regard it as a terrible thing if he met with some such fate himself; far more terrible would it have been if he had died scot-free without experiencing any of this.

Nor should any lawlessness be charged against Antigonus or Aratus because they took a tyrant captive in war, tortured him, and put him to death—a man for killing and punishing whom, even in time of peace, praise and honor would have followed from all who reason rightly.

And when, on top of the crimes already mentioned, he also betrayed the Achaeans, what did he deserve to suffer?

He had laid down his tyranny only a short time before, hemmed in by circumstances on account of the death of Demetrius, and had unexpectedly obtained his safety, protected by the mildness and generosity of the Achaeans;

for they not only made him exempt from punishment for the crimes committed during his tyranny, but even admitted him into their commonwealth and clothed him with the highest honor, appointing him their leader and general.

Yet he forgot the favors just described in an instant: as soon as his hopes for the future were a little raised by Cleomenes, he tore both his native city and his own allegiance away from the Achaeans at the most critical moment and attached them to the enemy.

Such a man, once he had been taken captive, ought not to have died being tortured at night in Cenchreae, as Phylarchus says, but rather to have been led around the Peloponnese and made an example of under punishment, and so to have departed from life.

And yet, for all that he was such a man, he met with no harsh treatment except being drowned in the sea by those stationed at Cenchreae.

Chapter 61 The Loyalty of the Megalopolitans

Besides this, he recounted the misfortunes of the Mantineans with exaggeration and dramatic effect, evidently supposing that it is the duty of historians to call attention to lawless deeds;

yet of the nobility of the Megalopolitans, which they displayed at the very same period, he made not even the slightest mention—

as though it were more proper to history to enumerate the offenses of the wicked than to mark out the fine and just things that men do, or as though readers of such records were less improved by serious and admirable deeds than by lawless and despicable ones.

How Cleomenes took the city, and how, having kept it intact, he at once sent letter-carriers to the Megalopolitans in Messene, inviting them to recover their homeland undamaged and to share in his own cause—this he did relate to us, wishing to display the magnanimity and moderation of Cleomenes toward his enemies.

And further, how the Megalopolitans, while the letter was being read aloud, would not let it be read to the end and nearly stoned the letter-carriers—this much he made clear. But the natural sequel, the very thing proper to history, he left out:

the praise and the honorable record of their admirable resolve.

And yet it lay ready at hand. For if we count as good men those who endure war on behalf of friends and allies merely by their words and votes, while to those who go so far as to take upon themselves the devastation of their land and a siege we award not only praise but also gratitude and the greatest rewards,

what estimate must we form of the Megalopolitans? Surely the most honorable and the highest?

First they surrendered their land to Cleomenes; then again they suffered utter ruin for their homeland because of their loyalty to the Achaeans;

and finally, when an unhoped-for and unexpected opportunity was given them to recover it undamaged, they chose instead to lose their land, the tombs of their ancestors, their temples, their homeland, their possessions—everything, in a word, that men hold most necessary—rather than betray their faith to their allies.

What nobler deed has ever been done, or could be done? To what could a historian better draw the attention of his audience? By what deed could he more strongly urge men toward keeping faith and toward genuine and lasting partnership? Yet of none of this did Phylarchus make any mention,

being blind, as it seems to me, to the finest things and those most fitting for a historian to treat.

Chapter 62 The Wealth of Megalopolis

Furthermore, in what follows he says that from the spoils of Megalopolis six thousand talents fell to the Lacedaemonians, of which two thousand were given to Cleomenes according to custom.

Here, in the first place, who would not be amazed at his inexperience and his ignorance of the common understanding of the resources and power of Greek affairs—a knowledge that historians above all ought to possess?

For I am not even speaking of those earlier times in which the resources of the Peloponnesians had been utterly ruined, both by the kings in Macedonia and, still more, by the unbroken succession of their wars against one another;

but in our own day, in which everyone, speaking with one and the same voice, is thought to be enjoying the greatest prosperity, nevertheless from the whole Peloponnese, from its movable property alone—leaving slaves out of account—it would be impossible to gather so great a sum of money.

That I make this claim now not at random but on solid reasoning is clear from the following.

For who has not read concerning the Athenians that at the time when, together with the Thebans, they entered upon the war against the Lacedaemonians and sent out ten thousand soldiers and manned a hundred triremes,

they then decided to base their war contributions on a property assessment and had the entire territory of Attica valued, along with the houses, and likewise the rest of their property—yet the whole valuation of their wealth fell short of six thousand talents by two hundred and fifty?

From this, what I have just said about the Peloponnesians will appear not unreasonable.

And at that period, from Megalopolis itself, not even the most extravagant estimate would dare to claim that more than three hundred talents were obtained,

seeing that it is agreed that most of the bodies, both free and slave, managed to escape to Messene. And the strongest proof of what has been said is this:

the Mantineans, who were second to none of the Arcadians in either power or wealth, as this very writer says, and who were captured through siege and surrender, so that no one could escape and nothing could easily be smuggled away,

nevertheless yielded as their entire spoil, captives included, only three hundred talents at this same period.

Chapter 63 Cleomenes Invades Argolis

But who would not marvel still more at what comes next? For in his account he states that about ten days before the battle the ambassador from Ptolemy came to Cleomenes announcing that Ptolemy refused to continue supplying funds and urged him to make terms with Antigonus.

And he says that, on hearing this, Cleomenes decided he must stake everything on a throw as quickly as possible, before his forces learned what had happened, since he had no hope in his own resources of being able to pay his troops.

But if he had at that very time become master of six thousand talents, he could have outdone Ptolemy himself in supplies;

and as for war against Antigonus, if he had been master of only three hundred talents, he would have been more than able to hold out safely and wear the war down.

To declare at once that all of Cleomenes' hopes rested on Ptolemy because of the supplies, and at the same time to assert that he had become master of so vast a sum at the very same period—how is this not a sign of the greatest absurdity and, moreover, of want of reflection?

Many other things of this kind have been set down by the writer, both for the present period and throughout his whole work; but concerning these I think that what has now been said is sufficient for my original purpose.

Chapter 64 Cleomenes Invades Argos

After the capture of Megalopolis, Antigonus wintered in the city of the Argives. As soon as the spring season set in, Cleomenes assembled his army, gave them the encouragement the moment called for, marched the troops out, and invaded the territory of the Argives.

To most observers this seemed a reckless and audacious move, given the strength of the fortified positions guarding the approaches; but to those who reasoned correctly it was both safe and shrewd.

For he could see that Antigonus had disbanded his forces, and so he knew clearly two things: first, that he would make his incursion without danger; and second, that as the countryside was ravaged right up to the walls, the Argives, watching what was happening, were bound to grow indignant and blame Antigonus.

If, then, it turned out that Antigonus could not endure the abuse of the crowds and came out to risk a battle with the forces he had on hand, it was plain from a reasonable calculation that Cleomenes would win easily.

But if Antigonus held to his strategy and stayed quiet, Cleomenes reckoned he could withdraw home safely, having struck fear into his opponents and instilled confidence in his own troops. And that is exactly what happened.

As the land was being plundered, the crowds gathered and railed at Antigonus. But he, acting very much like a true commander and king, set nothing above acting according to sound reason, and kept his calm.

And Cleomenes, in keeping with his original plan, having ravaged the country, struck fear into his opponents, and made his own forces confident in the face of the coming danger, returned home in safety.

Chapter 65 Battle of Sellasia

When summer set in, and the Macedonian and Achaean troops had reassembled from their winter quarters, Antigonus took up his army and advanced with his allies into Laconia.

He had ten thousand Macedonians for the phalanx, three thousand peltasts, three hundred cavalry, a thousand Agrianians along with these, an equal number of Gauls, and in all three thousand mercenary infantry and three hundred mercenary cavalry.

There were also picked Achaean troops—three thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry—and a thousand Megalopolitans equipped in the Macedonian fashion, commanded by Cercidas of Megalopolis; and among the allies, two thousand Boeotian infantry,

two hundred Boeotian cavalry, a thousand Epirote infantry and fifty cavalry, the same numbers from Acarnania, and sixteen hundred Illyrians, under the command of Demetrius of Pharos.

The entire force thus came to about twenty-eight thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry.

Cleomenes, anticipating the attack, had secured the other passes into the country with garrisons, trenches, and felled trees.

He himself, with his army, was encamped at the place called Sellasia, his whole force amounting to about twenty thousand men, having judged from reasonable calculation that the enemy would make their incursion by that route—which is just what came to pass.

Two hills lie right at the entrance of the pass, one called Evas and the other Olympus,

with the road between them, running alongside the river Oenus, leading to Sparta. Cleomenes threw a trench and palisade across the front of both hills. On Evas he posted the perioeci and the allies, placing his brother Eucleidas in command of them, while he himself held Olympus with the Lacedaemonians and the mercenaries.

On the level ground beside the river, on either side of the road, he stationed the cavalry together with a portion of the mercenaries.

When Antigonus arrived and surveyed both the strength of the ground and the way Cleomenes had so skillfully occupied the advantageous points with every appropriate part of his army—so that the whole layout of the encampment resembled the defensive front of good armored fighters—

for nothing had been left undone for either attack or defense; rather, it was at once an effective battle line and a position hard to approach—

he therefore gave up any attempt to test it and engage at the first onset.

Chapter 66 The Two Armies Line Up

He gave up the idea of a rash attack, and instead pitched camp a short distance away, covering his front with the river called Gorgylus. There he remained for some days, studying both the peculiarities of the ground and the differences between the two armies,

while at the same time making some show of intended maneuvers to draw out the enemy's plans.

But since he could never catch any point off guard or unarmed—because Cleomenes was always ready to counter every move—

he abandoned that approach, and at last both sides agreed to settle the matter by battle: for Fortune had brought together in these two men commanders highly gifted and well matched.

Against the troops on Evas, then, the king drew up the bronze-shielded Macedonians and the Illyrians, arranged in alternating companies, placing Alexander, son of Acmetus, and Demetrius of Pharos in command.

Behind these he set the Acarnanians and the Epirotes, and behind them stood two thousand Achaeans, taking up position as a reserve.

His cavalry, around the river Oenus, he stationed opposite the enemy's horse, giving them Alexander as commander and flanking them with a thousand Achaean infantry and an equal number of Megalopolitans.

He himself, with the mercenaries and the Macedonians, resolved to make his attack along Olympus against the troops with Cleomenes.

So he placed the mercenaries in front and stationed behind them a double phalanx of Macedonians, one line close behind the other; he did this because of the narrowness of the ground.

The signal arranged for the Illyrians to begin their assault on the hill was the moment they should see a linen flag raised from the direction of Olympus—for these men had been positioned during the night along the river Gorgylus, right at the foot of the hill—

and likewise for the Megalopolitans and the cavalry, when a scarlet flag was raised by the king.

Chapter 67 Battle Begins

When the moment for action came, the signal was given to the Illyrians, and those responsible passed the word to do what was required; at once they all revealed themselves and began the assault on the hill.

But the light-armed troops who had been posted from the start with Cleomenes's cavalry, seeing that the Achaean companies were left exposed in their rear, fell upon them from behind and brought into the gravest danger the men who were forcing their way up toward the hill—

since Eucleidas's men were bearing down on them from the higher ground in front, while the mercenaries pressed on their rear and laid into them vigorously. At this moment Philopoemen of Megalopolis grasped what was happening,

and, foreseeing what would come of it, first tried to point out the looming result to the officers in command.

When no one paid him any heed—because he had never yet held a command and was still quite young—he rallied his own fellow citizens and charged the enemy boldly.

When this happened, the mercenaries who were pressing the rear of the men climbing the hill quickly heard the shouting, saw the cavalry locked in combat, abandoned the troops in front of them, and ran back to their original posts to help their own cavalry.

Once this happened, the body of Illyrians, Macedonians, and the others advancing with them, now free of harassment, surged eagerly and confidently against their opponents.

From this it later became clear that Philopoemen was responsible for the success against Eucleidas.

Chapter 68 Skill and Gallantry of Philopoemen

This is why, they say, Antigonus afterward tested Alexander, the commander of the cavalry, by asking him why he had begun the engagement before the signal was given.

When Alexander denied it, saying that some young man from Megalopolis had taken the initiative against his own wishes, Antigonus replied that the young man had acted like a good commander by seizing the moment, while Alexander, though a commander, had behaved like any ordinary youngster.

In any case, when Eucleidas's men saw the companies advancing, they failed to make use of the advantages of the ground.

What they should have done was meet the enemy and fall upon them well in advance, throwing their massed ranks into confusion and breaking them up, and then fall back step by step, steadily withdrawing in safety to the higher ground above.

For in that way, having spoiled and disrupted the special character of the enemy's equipment and formation beforehand, they would easily have routed them, thanks to the natural advantage of the terrain.

But they did none of this; instead, as though victory were already theirs for the taking, they did the very opposite.

For they stayed in their original position on the heights, intent on catching the enemy as high up as possible so that their flight would be all the longer over steep and broken ground.

What happened, naturally, was the reverse: by leaving themselves no room for retreat, and by letting the companies come up fresh and still in close order, they fell into such difficulty that they had to fight it out on the very crest of the hill against men forcing their way up.

Then, as soon as they were pushed back even a step by the weight of the enemy's armor and formation, the Illyrians immediately gained their footing, while Eucleidas's men were driven back, having left themselves no ground for retreat or maneuver.

As a result they were quickly turned and forced into a disastrous flight, since the ground over which they had to withdraw was for a long stretch steep and hard to cross.

Chapter 69 Defeat of Cleomenes

At the same time the cavalry engagement was reaching its climax, with all the Achaean cavalry—and Philopoemen above all—fighting outstandingly, since the whole struggle was for their own freedom.

In the course of this, Philopoemen's horse was struck a fatal blow and fell, and as he fought on foot he received a severe wound through both thighs.

Meanwhile the two kings, over on Olympus, at first carried on the fighting with their light-armed troops and mercenaries, of which each side had about five thousand.

These engaged sometimes in detachments, sometimes in their full bodies, and the fighting on both sides proved exceptional, as both the kings and their armies watched the battle in full view of one another.

They competed with each other man against man and unit against unit in displays of courage.

But when Cleomenes saw that his brother's troops had fled and that the cavalry on the level ground were on the verge of giving way, he grew alarmed that he might be attacked from every side and was forced to tear down his front fortifications and lead out his whole force in line along one side of the camp.

The light-armed troops of both sides were recalled from the ground between by the trumpet, and the phalanxes, raising their war cry together and leveling their pikes, charged one another.

A fierce struggle followed: at one moment the Macedonians fell back step by step, hard pressed by the courage of the Laconians, at another the Lacedaemonians were thrust back by the sheer weight of the Macedonian formation.

At last Antigonus's men locked their pikes together and, employing the special feature of the double phalanx, drove in with force and pushed the Lacedaemonians out of their entrenchments.

The rest of the army fled headlong, cut down as they went; but Cleomenes, with a few cavalry about him, withdrew safely to Sparta with them.

When night came on he went down to Gythium, where the means for a sea voyage had long since been prepared against just such an outcome, and sailed off with his friends to Alexandria.

Chapter 70 End of the Introductory Period

Antigonus, having taken Sparta at the first assault, treated the Lacedaemonians in everything else with magnanimity and kindness; and after restoring their ancestral constitution, within a few days he marched out of the city with his forces, on receiving word that the Illyrians had invaded Macedonia and were ravaging the country.

So it is that Fortune always tends to decide the greatest matters contrary to expectation.

For on this occasion too, if Cleomenes had only put off the engagement by a very few days, or had withdrawn from the battle into the city and held out against the situation even for a short while, he would have kept his throne.

As it was, Antigonus reached Tegea, restored their ancestral constitution there as well, and on the second day went on from there to Argos, arriving just in time for the festival of the Nemean games.

There, having received every honor that pertains to undying fame and glory, both from the Achaean League as a body and from each of the cities individually, he hurried off in haste to Macedonia.

He caught the Illyrians still in the country, met them in a pitched battle, and won the day; but having thrown himself so passionately into encouraging and shouting to his men during the engagement, he brought on a hemorrhage and some such condition, and not long afterward died of illness,

having held out fine hopes of himself to all the Greeks, not only for his service in the field but still more for his whole character and nobility.

He left the kingdom of Macedonia to Philip, son of Demetrius.

Chapter 71 Conclusion of Book 2

Why have I dwelt at such length on the war just described?

Because these times join directly onto the events I am about to relate, and it seemed useful—indeed necessary, in keeping with my original plan—to make plainly clear to everyone the state of affairs that then existed concerning the Macedonians and the Greeks.

About the same period, Ptolemy too died of illness, and Ptolemy surnamed Philopator succeeded to the kingdom.

There died as well Seleucus, son of the Seleucus who bore the surnames Callinicus and Pogon; and Antiochus, his brother, succeeded to the kingdom in Syria.

For something very similar happened to these men as had happened to the first to hold these realms after the death of Alexander—I mean Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus.

Those men all died around the 124th Olympiad, as I noted above, and these around the 139th.

Now that I have worked through the introduction and preliminary foundation of the whole history—through which it has been shown when, how, and for what reasons the Romans, after gaining mastery over Italy, first began to lay hands on affairs beyond it and first dared to dispute the sea with the Carthaginians,

and at the same time have set out the condition then existing among the Greeks and Macedonians, and likewise among the Carthaginians—

it would now be fitting, having arrived at these times in accordance with my original plan—the times in which the Greeks were about to enter upon the Social War, the Romans upon the Hannibalic War, and the kings in Asia upon the war for Coele-Syria—

to mark off this book in line both with the outline of the events already recounted and with the deaths of the rulers who had managed affairs up to that point.

Chapter 1 Summary of the Work

In the first book of my whole composition—which is the third counting backward from the present one—I made clear that I would take as the starting points of my work the Social War, the Hannibalic War, and, alongside these, the war over Coele-Syria.

In that same book I also explained the reasons why, going back in time to the period before these events, I composed the books that precede this one.

Now, after a few preliminary remarks about my own undertaking, I shall attempt to give a demonstrated account of the wars mentioned above, of the causes from which they arose, and of the reasons why they grew to such proportions.

Since the whole subject I have set my hand to write about is in fact a single action and a single spectacle—namely, how, when, and why all the known parts of the inhabited world fell under the dominion of Rome—

and since this event has a recognizable beginning, a fixed span of time, and an acknowledged conclusion, I think it useful to give in summary form a preliminary account of the greatest of its parts, all those that lie between the beginning and the end.

For I believe that in this way I shall best furnish to those eager to learn an adequate grasp of the whole design.

The mind takes in much when it moves from the whole toward knowledge of the particulars, and much again when it moves from the particulars toward understanding of the whole; and since I judge that the best comprehension and view comes from combining both, I shall make my preliminary outline of my own work follow accordingly.

I have already set out the general impression of my subject and its overall scope.

As for the particular events that occurred within it, the starting points are the wars mentioned above; the culmination and conclusion is the overthrow of the kingdom in Macedonia; and the time between the beginning and the end is fifty-three years.

Within this span are contained deeds so many and so great that no previous age has embraced their equal in an equal interval of time.

Beginning my account of these from the hundred and fortieth Olympiad, I shall make my approach to the exposition in the following manner.

Chapter 2 Plan: Causes of Wars

I shall make my approach to the narrative as follows. First, having pointed out the causes from which the previously mentioned war between the Carthaginians and the Romans—the one called the Hannibalic War—arose,

I shall tell how the Carthaginians invaded Italy, broke up the dominion of Rome there, and brought the Romans into great fear for themselves and for the very soil of their homeland, while they themselves conceived great and unexpected hopes, expecting even to take Rome itself by assault.

Next, I shall try to make clear how, during the same period, Philip of Macedon—after fighting his war with the Aetolians to its end and afterward settling affairs among the Greeks—set out to share these same hopes with the Carthaginians,

how Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator first disputed and finally went to war with each other over Coele-Syria,

and how the Rhodians and Prusias took up war against the Byzantines and forced them to stop levying tolls on those sailing into the Pontus.

Pausing my account at this point, I shall put together a discussion of the Roman constitution, in which I shall show in due sequence that the distinctive character of their political system contributed enormously to their success—not only in winning back their dominion over the Italians and Sicilians, and in further acquiring the rule over the Iberians and the Celts, but finally also, after they had defeated the Carthaginians in war, in coming to conceive the idea of universal empire.

Together with this, by way of digression, I shall describe the fall of the dynasty of Hiero of Syracuse.

To these I shall append the disturbances in Egypt: how, after King Ptolemy departed this life, Antiochus and Philip agreed together to divide up the realm of the child he had left behind, and began their treacherous dealings and laid their hands on it—Philip on the regions around the Aegean, Caria, and Samos, and Antiochus on Coele-Syria and Phoenicia.

Chapter 3 Plan: Events in Greece

After this, having summarized the operations of the Romans and Carthaginians in Iberia, Libya, and Sicily, I shall, along with the shift in events, move my narrative entirely to the regions of Greece.

Having recounted the naval battles of Attalus and the Rhodians against Philip, and also the war between Rome and Philip—how it was conducted, by whom, and what end it had—

I shall join to this in unbroken sequence the account of the resentment of the Aetolians, in the course of which they drew in Antiochus from Asia and kindled the war against the Achaeans and the Romans.

After explaining its causes and the crossing of Antiochus into Europe, I shall make clear, first, how he was driven out of Greece; second, how, after being defeated, he withdrew from all the territory on this side of the Taurus;

and third, how the Romans, after crushing the insolence of the Galatians, secured for themselves undisputed mastery over Asia and freed those dwelling on this side of the Taurus from their fear of the barbarians and from the lawlessness of the Galatians.

After this, having set before the reader's eyes the misfortunes of the Aetolians and the Cephallenians, I shall take up the wars that Eumenes waged against Prusias and the Galatians, and likewise the one waged together with Ariarathes against Pharnaces.

Following these, after recalling the concord and resettlement of the Peloponnesians, and also the growth of the Rhodian state, I shall draw together my whole narrative and the events within it,

and finally relate the campaign of Antiochus, called Epiphanes, against Egypt, the Persian War, and the overthrow of the kingdom in Macedonia.

Through all of this it will at the same time be observed how the Romans, by their handling of each situation, made the whole inhabited world subject to themselves.

Chapter 4 Extension of the First Plan of the Work

Now, if it were possible to form an adequate judgment about which men and political systems are blameworthy and which, on the contrary, praiseworthy simply on the basis of their successes or their failures, then I ought to stop here and bring both my narrative and my work to a close with the last events I have mentioned, in keeping with my original intention.

For the fifty-three years came to their end at this point, and the growth and advance of Roman power had reached completion;

and besides, it seemed an accepted fact, forced upon everyone, that from then on all that remained was to listen to the Romans and to obey their commands.

But since judgments based purely on the contests themselves are not conclusive, whether about the victors or about the defeated,

because to many what seemed the greatest of successes has, when not used as it should be, brought the greatest disasters, while not a few who have met the most shattering reverses, when they bore them nobly, have often turned them to their advantage—

I ought therefore to add to the events already described an account of the policy of the victors: what it was afterward, and how they presided over the whole; and also the reactions and judgments of the others—how many and what kind there were concerning the leading power; and besides these I must set out the impulses and ambitions that prevailed and held sway among each people, both in their private lives and in their public affairs.

For it is clear that from these things it will become evident to people now living whether the rule of Rome is to be avoided or, on the contrary, to be welcomed, and to later generations whether their empire is to be considered praiseworthy and enviable or blameworthy.

It is precisely in this part that the usefulness of my history, both for the present and for the future, will chiefly lie.

For it must not be supposed that the end of a course of action—either for those who direct affairs or for those who pronounce judgment on them—is simply to conquer and bring everyone under one's own power.

No one with any sense makes war on his neighbors merely for the sake of defeating those who oppose him, nor sails the seas merely to make the crossing, nor takes up skills and crafts merely for the sake of the knowledge itself.

Everyone does everything for the sake of the resulting pleasure, honor, or advantage that comes from his actions.

Therefore the crowning achievement of this work will be to learn the condition of each people: what it was after everything had been subdued and had fallen under Roman authority, down to the disturbance and upheaval that arose again afterward.

Because of the magnitude of the events involved, the unexpected character of what happened, and—most of all—because I was not only an eyewitness to most of it but in some cases a participant and in others the very director, I was led to begin, as it were, a new work.

Chapter 5 The True Theory of Historical Causes

—as if making this the beginning of a fresh narrative to write. The upheaval I have spoken of was that in which the Romans waged war against the Celtiberians and the Vaccaei, and the Carthaginians against Massinissa, king of the Libyans;

while in Asia Attalus and Prusias made war on each other, and Ariarathes, king of the Cappadocians, having been driven from his throne by Orophernes through the agency of King Demetrius, recovered his ancestral kingdom again with the help of Attalus.

Demetrius, son of Seleucus, after holding the throne of Syria for twelve years, was robbed at once of his life and his rule when the other kings combined against him.

The Romans, too, restored to their own country those Greeks who had been accused in connection with the Persian War, having acquitted them of the charge brought against them.

Not long afterward these same Romans laid their hands on the Carthaginians, intending first to compel them to relocate, and then, for reasons to be stated in what follows, to root them out altogether.

Corresponding to these events—as the Macedonians broke away from their friendship with Rome and the Lacedaemonians from their membership in the Achaean confederation—the common calamity of all Greece had at once its beginning and its end.

Such, then, is the design of my work.

But it still has need of Fortune, that the circumstances of my life may run together to bring my purpose to completion.

For I am persuaded that, even if some human fate should befall me, this theme will not be left idle, nor will it lack men worthy of it; rather, because of its excellence, many will pledge themselves to it and be eager to bring it to completion.

Now that I have gone through the most notable events in summary—wishing to give my readers a conception of the whole history both in general and in its parts—it is time, keeping my purpose in mind, to lead the account back to the beginning of my subject.

Chapter 6 Causes of the Second Punic War

Some of those who have written accounts of the deeds of Hannibal, wishing to point out to us the causes from which the aforementioned war between the Romans and the Carthaginians arose, name as the first the siege of Saguntum by the Carthaginians,

and as the second their crossing, in violation of the treaties, of the river called by the local inhabitants the Iber.

For my part, I would say that these were the beginnings of the war, but I would by no means concede that they were its causes. Far from it—

unless one is also going to say that Alexander's crossing into Asia was the cause of the war against the Persians, and that Antiochus' landing at Demetrias was the cause of his war with the Romans: neither of which is either probable or true.

For who could suppose these to be causes, when Alexander earlier, and Philip while still alive, had done and prepared a great deal for the war against the Persians, and likewise the Aetolians had done much before the arrival of Antiochus for the war against the Romans?

But such notions belong to men who have not grasped how a beginning differs from a cause and a pretext, and how far apart they stand—that causes and pretexts come first of all, while the beginning is the last of the things mentioned.

I, however, declare that the beginnings of anything are the first attempts and actions to carry out what has already been decided, while the causes are the things that precede the decisions and judgments. By this I mean the conceptions, the dispositions, and the reasonings about these matters, and the considerations through which we come to decide on something and to set it as our purpose.

What I have said is made clear by what follows.

For what the true causes were, and from what source the war against the Persians sprang, is easy even for an ordinary person to discern.

The first was the return march of the Greeks under Xenophon from the upper satrapies, in the course of which, as they passed through the whole of Asia—hostile though it was—no one dared to stand and face them in the open;

the second was the crossing of Agesilaus, king of the Lacedaemonians, into Asia, in which he found nothing worthy or capable of opposing his designs, and was forced to return midway, without accomplishing his aim, because of the disturbances in Greece.

From these things Philip perceived and reckoned up the cowardice and laziness of the Persians, as well as his own excellence and that of the Macedonians in matters of war; and setting before his eyes, too, the magnitude and splendor of the prizes that would come from the war,

while at the same time securing the acknowledged goodwill of the Greeks, he at once made use of the pretext that he was eager to avenge the lawless treatment the Greeks had suffered from the Persians, conceived an eagerness for the enterprise, resolved to make war, and began preparing everything toward this end.

Accordingly, the first set of circumstances mentioned should be regarded as the causes of the war against the Persians, the second as the pretext, and the beginning as—

Chapter 7 Fabius Pictor on the Cause of the Punic War

—Alexander's crossing into Asia. And so too, in the case of the war between Antiochus and the Romans, it is clear that the cause must be considered the resentment of the Aetolians.

For they, believing that they had been slighted by the Romans in many respects regarding the outcome of the war with Philip—as I said above—not only drew in Antiochus, but undertook to do and suffer anything because of the anger that had arisen in them out of the events of that time.

The pretext should be considered the liberation of the Greeks, which they went about proclaiming from city to city in company with Antiochus, without reason and falsely; and the beginning of the war was the landing of Antiochus at Demetrias.

I have made this rather extended distinction about these matters not for the sake of censuring the historians in question, but for the sake of correcting the understanding of those eager to learn.

For what use is a physician to the sick who does not know the causes of the body's disorders? And what use is a man of affairs who cannot reason out how and why and from what source each of these matters took its origin?

For it is no more likely that the one will ever properly arrange treatments for the body than that the man of affairs will be able to handle any situation that arises as he should, without knowledge of the things just mentioned.

Therefore there is nothing we ought to be more on the watch for and to seek out than the causes of each event that occurs, since the greatest matters often grow out of trifling ones, and it is easiest of all to remedy anything in its first impulses and conceptions.

Chapter 8 The Credibility of Fabius Pictor

Fabius, the Roman historian, claims that the cause of the war with Hannibal was, alongside the wrong done to the Saguntines, the greed and lust for power of Hasdrubal.

For Hasdrubal, he says, had built up great personal authority in the regions of Iberia, and afterward came to Libya with the intention of abolishing the laws and transforming the Carthaginian government into a monarchy.

But the leading men of the state foresaw his design, joined together against him, and resisted him.

Hasdrubal, suspecting their hostility, withdrew from Libya and from then on managed affairs in Iberia entirely according to his own judgment, paying no attention to the Carthaginian senate.

Hannibal, who from boyhood had shared and admired Hasdrubal's outlook, and who then succeeded to the command in Iberia, conducted affairs in the same manner as Hasdrubal.

And so, in this present case too, he launched this war against the Romans on his own authority, contrary to the will of the Carthaginians;

for none of the men of standing in Carthage approved of what Hannibal had done against the city of the Saguntines.

After saying this, Fabius goes on to claim that, following the capture of the aforementioned city, the Romans came forward and demanded that the Carthaginians either hand Hannibal over to them or take on the war.

Now, suppose someone were to ask this historian: what occasion could have suited the Carthaginians better, and what course could have been more just or more advantageous than this one—seeing that, as he himself says, they had been displeased from the very beginning with Hannibal's actions?

What better than to yield then to the Romans' demands, hand over the man responsible for the wrongs, and so reasonably rid themselves, through others' hands, of the common enemy of the state, while securing safety for their territory and warding off the threatened war—all by merely passing a decree? What answer could Fabius give to this? Clearly none.

For so far were the Carthaginians from doing any of the things just described that they fought continuously for seventeen years in accordance with Hannibal's policy, and did not lay down the war until, having exhausted every hope, they came at last to the danger that threatened their homeland and the lives of all in it.

Chapter 9 First Cause of the Second Punic War

For what reason, then, have I brought up Fabius and what he has written?

Not out of any worry that his account is so plausible it might win belief among some readers—for the absurdity of his claims can be seen on its own, even without any explanation from me, by those who come across it—

but rather for the sake of warning those who take up his books, so that they may look not to the author's reputation but to the facts.

For there are some who do not fix their attention on what is said but on the man who says it, and who, bearing in mind that the writer lived through those times and was a member of the Roman senate, at once assume that everything he says is to be trusted.

My own view is that we should not, on the one hand, take the historian's authority lightly, but neither should we treat it as conclusive; rather, readers should base their judgments for the most part on the facts themselves.

But to return to the war between the Romans and the Carthaginians—for it was from this point that we made our digression—we must consider its first cause to have been the resentment of Hamilcar, surnamed Barcas, the natural father of Hannibal.

For that man's spirit had not been broken by the war over Sicily, since he believed that he himself had kept intact the forces at Eryx, where he was stationed, with their fighting spirit undiminished, and that it was only because of the Carthaginians' defeat in the naval battle that he had yielded to circumstances and made the treaty. He therefore held fast to his anger, always watching for a chance to strike.

Now, had the upheaval over the mercenaries not broken out among the Carthaginians, he would at once have sought another pretext and begun preparations for action, so far as it lay in his power.

But he was forestalled by the civil disturbances, and in these...

Chapter 10 Second Cause of the War

...he was occupied, taken up with those events. When the Romans, after the Carthaginians had put down the aforementioned disturbance, declared war on them, the Carthaginians at first were ready to face any extremity, supposing they would prevail on the justice of their cause, as we have explained concerning these matters in the earlier books—

without which it would be impossible to follow properly either what is now being said or what we shall say hereafter.

But since the Romans would not give way, the Carthaginians yielded to the circumstances, and though deeply aggrieved, being unable to do anything, they withdrew from Sardinia and agreed to pay another twelve hundred talents on top of the earlier sum, on condition of not having to take on the war at that time.

This, then, must be reckoned the second—and the most important—cause of the war that later broke out.

For Hamilcar, adding to his own private resentment the anger of his fellow citizens over these matters, as soon as he had subdued the rebellious mercenaries and secured his country's safety, immediately set his energies on affairs in Iberia, eager to use it as a base of preparation for the war against the Romans. This too must be counted a cause—the third—

I mean the prosperous course of Carthaginian affairs in Iberia. For it was by relying on the strength gained there that they confidently entered upon the aforementioned war.

That Hamilcar contributed most to bringing about the second war—even though he died ten years before its outbreak—one could find many proofs; but what follows will be just about...

Chapter 11 Hannibal's Oath

...enough to establish the point. For at the time when Hannibal, after being defeated by the Romans, finally left his homeland and was staying at the court of Antiochus, the Romans, now observing the scheming of the Aetolians, sent envoys to Antiochus, wishing not to be left in the dark about the king's intentions.

These envoys, seeing that Antiochus was inclined toward the Aetolians and eager to make war on the Romans, courted Hannibal, intent on bringing him under suspicion with Antiochus.

And this is just what happened. As time went on, and the king grew ever more suspicious of Hannibal, an occasion arose to bring out into open discussion the estrangement that had been quietly festering between them.

In the course of this, Hannibal offered several explanations, but at last, finding his arguments unavailing, he came out with the following.

He said that at the time when his father was about to set out on his expedition into Iberia with his forces, he himself was nine years old, and that as his father was sacrificing to Zeus he stood beside the altar.

When the omens proved favorable, his father poured the libation to the gods and performed the customary rites, then bade the others present at the sacrifice withdraw a little, and calling Hannibal to him, asked him kindly whether he wished to set out with him on the campaign.

When the boy eagerly assented and even begged, as children will, to be taken along, his father took him by the right hand, led him up to the altar, and bade him lay his hand on the sacrificial victims and swear that he would never be a friend to the Romans.

Knowing this clearly, then, Hannibal urged Antiochus that, so long as he was planning anything hostile against the Romans, he should take heart and trust him, considering that he had in Hannibal a most genuine ally;

but that if ever Antiochus should make a settlement or friendship with them, then he need wait for no slander, but should distrust Hannibal and be on his guard against him—

Chapter 12 Statesmen Must Pay Attention to Motives

—for there was nothing Hannibal would not do against the Romans, if it lay in his power. Antiochus, hearing this and judging that it had been spoken with real feeling and sincerity, set aside all the suspicion he had held before.

As for the hostility of Hamilcar and his whole purpose, this must be regarded as undeniable evidence, as the facts themselves also made plain.

For he prepared such enemies of the Romans in Hasdrubal, his daughter's husband, and in his own natural son Hannibal, that no greater degree of hatred could be left to imagine.

Hasdrubal, dying before his time, did not make his purpose evident to everyone; but circumstances gave Hannibal abundant opportunity to display, all too fully, the hatred of Rome he had inherited from his father.

For this reason, those placed in charge of public affairs ought to attend to nothing more than discerning the true intentions of those who lay aside their enmities or form friendships—whether they are making their agreements as a concession to circumstances or because their spirit has truly been defeated—

so that they may be constantly on guard against the former, regarding them as men lying in wait for an opportunity, while trusting the latter as genuine subjects or friends and giving them, without hesitation, whatever orders the occasion may require.

These, then, are to be considered the causes of the war with Hannibal. As for the beginnings, which I am about to relate...

Chapter 13 Hannibal Succeeds to Command in Spain

...The Carthaginians had taken hard their defeat over Sicily, but their anger was intensified still further, as I said above, by the affair of Sardinia and by the size of the sum of money imposed on them at the end.

For this reason, as soon as they had brought most of Iberia under their control, they were ready to seize on anything that offered a chance against the Romans.

So when the death of Hasdrubal occurred—the man to whom they had entrusted affairs in Iberia after the death of Hamilcar—they at first waited to see which way the armies would lean.

But when news came from the camps that the forces had with one accord chosen Hannibal as their commander, the Carthaginians at once convened the popular assembly and by a unanimous vote ratified the army's choice.

As soon as Hannibal had taken over the command, he set out at once to subdue the tribe of the Olcades; and arriving before Althaea, their most important city, he made camp.

After this, by means of vigorous and terrifying assaults, he quickly took the city. When this happened, the rest of the tribe, struck with terror, surrendered themselves to the Carthaginians.

Having exacted money from the cities and gained control of large funds, he came to New Carthage to winter.

Treating those under him generously—paying part of the wages owed to the men serving with him and promising the rest—he instilled in his forces great goodwill and high hopes...

Chapter 14 Hannibal Attacks the Vaccaei

...for the future. In the following summer he set out again, this time against the Vaccaei. He took Helmantica (Salmantica) by storm at the first assault, but Arbucala—because of the city's size, its large population, and the bravery of its inhabitants—he captured by force only after a laborious siege.

After this, on his march back, he unexpectedly found himself in the gravest danger, when the Carpesii—who are just about the strongest tribe in those regions—rushed upon him.

Their neighbors gathered together with them as well, stirred up chiefly by the exiles of the Olcades, but further inflamed by those who had escaped from Helmantica.

Had the Carthaginians been forced to risk a pitched battle against these foes, they would beyond question have been defeated.

As it was, Hannibal acted with skill and good sense: he wheeled about and withdrew, placing the river called the Tagus as a barrier in front of him, and arranged the engagement around the crossing of the river, using as his allies both the river itself and the elephants he had, about forty in number. As a result, the whole affair turned out, against expectation, just as he had reasoned it would.

For when the barbarians attempted to force a crossing of the river at several points, the greater part of them were destroyed at the places where they emerged, as the elephants moved along the bank and caught those coming out of the water one after another;

and many were killed in the river itself by the cavalry, since the horses were better able to hold their ground against the current, and the horsemen had the advantage of higher ground in fighting against the foot soldiers.

Finally, Hannibal's men crossed over to the other side in their turn, fell upon the barbarians, and routed more than a hundred thousand of them.

After their defeat, no one south of the river Iber any longer dared readily to look him in the face—except the Saguntines.

From this city Hannibal tried his best to keep his distance, wishing to give the Romans no acknowledged pretext for war until he had securely brought everything else under his control, in keeping with the instructions and counsels of his father Hamilcar.

Chapter 15 Hannibal Defies the Romans

The Saguntines kept sending embassies to Rome, partly because they were anxious for themselves and could see what was coming, and partly because they wanted the Romans to be aware of the steady success the Carthaginians were having in their Iberian affairs.

For a long while the Romans paid no attention to them, but at this point they dispatched envoys to investigate the situation.

At about the same time Hannibal, having subdued the peoples he had set out to subdue, came back with his forces to winter at New Carthage, which was in a sense the showpiece and royal seat of the Carthaginians in the regions of Iberia.

There he found the embassy from Rome, granted it an audience, and heard out what it had to say about the present circumstances.

The Romans, for their part, solemnly warned him to keep his hands off the Saguntines—since they were under Roman protection—and not to cross the river Ebro, in keeping with the agreement made in Hasdrubal's time.

But Hannibal—being young, full of warlike energy, successful in his ventures, and long since driven by his hatred of Rome—

answered the envoys by posing as the protector of the Saguntines. He charged the Romans with having, a short time before, when civil strife broke out in the city, taken on the role of arbitrators and unjustly put some of the leading men to death; he said the Carthaginians would not stand by while the Saguntines were treated treacherously like this, for it was Carthage's ancestral policy to overlook no one who was being wronged.

At the same time he sent word to Carthage asking what he should do, on the grounds that the Saguntines, trusting in their alliance with Rome, were committing injustices against some of the peoples subject to Carthage.

In short, he was thoroughly governed by unreason and violent passion. For this reason he did not make use of the genuine grounds for complaint, but took refuge in irrational pretexts—just as men typically do when, because of the impulses already lodged in them, they lose all regard for what is right.

How much better it would have been for him to take the view that the Romans ought to give back Sardinia to the Carthaginians, along with the tribute they had imposed at the same time—both of which the Romans had unjustly seized earlier when they took advantage of Carthage's difficulties—and that, failing that, he would go to war.

Instead, by saying nothing of the real, existing grievance and fabricating a non-existent one concerning the Saguntines, he gave the impression of starting the war not only without reason but, still worse, unjustly.

As for the Roman envoys, since they now clearly understood that war was inevitable, they sailed off to Carthage, intending to lodge the same protest there as well.

They expected, however, that they would be fighting the war not in Italy but in Iberia, and that they would use the city of Saguntum as their base of operations.

Chapter 16 War in Illyria

For this reason, the Senate, in adapting its plans to this situation, decided to secure its interests in Illyria, foreseeing that the war would be a major and protracted one, fought far from home.

For it so happened that at this time Demetrius of Pharos had forgotten the benefits he had previously received from the Romans, and—having come to despise them, first because of the threat surrounding them from the Gauls and then because of the threat from the Carthaginians—

placing all his hopes in the royal house of Macedonia (because he had fought alongside Antigonus and shared in the campaigns against Cleomenes), was plundering and subjugating the cities of Illyria that were subject to Rome, and had sailed beyond Lissus with fifty galleys, in violation of the treaty, and had ravaged many of the Cyclades islands.

In view of this, and seeing that the royal house of Macedonia was flourishing, the Romans were eager to secure their interests east of Italy, convinced that they had ample time to set right the folly of the Illyrians and to censure and punish the ingratitude and recklessness of Demetrius.

But they were mistaken in their calculations, for Hannibal forestalled them by taking the city of Saguntum.

And as a result it came about that the war was fought not in Iberia but right at Rome's doorstep and throughout the whole of Italy.

Nonetheless, with these considerations in mind, the Romans, just before the summer season, sent out Lucius Aemilius with an army to conduct operations in Illyria, in the first year of the one hundred and fortieth Olympiad.

Chapter 17 Hannibal Takes Saguntum

Hannibal, breaking camp with his army, advanced from New Carthage and marched on Saguntum.

This city lies on a spur of the mountain range that runs down toward the sea, where the borders of Iberia and Celtiberia meet, and it stands about seven stades from the sea.

Its inhabitants farm a territory that produces every kind of crop and is superior in quality to any in all of Iberia.

It was here that Hannibal pitched camp and set about the siege in earnest, foreseeing many advantages that would come from taking the city by storm.

In the first place, he reckoned he would deprive the Romans of their hope of basing the war in Iberia. Second, he was convinced that by terrifying everyone he would make the peoples already under his command more obedient, and the still-independent Iberians more cautious.

But the most important thing was that, leaving no enemy behind him, he could safely make his advance forward.

Apart from these considerations, he reckoned that he himself would gain plentiful supplies for his enterprises, that he would inspire eagerness in his forces through the profit each man stood to gain, and that he would win the goodwill of the Carthaginians at home through the spoils that would be sent to them.

With such calculations in mind, he pressed the siege vigorously, at times making himself an example to the troops by personally taking part in the labor of the works, and at other times encouraging the men and recklessly exposing himself to danger.

After enduring every kind of hardship and care, he finally took the city by storm in eight months.

Having become master of a great quantity of money, captives, and goods, he set aside the money for his own undertakings, in keeping with his original plan; the captives he distributed among his fellow soldiers according to each man's merit; and the goods he sent off at once, in their entirety, to the Carthaginians.

In doing this he was not disappointed in his calculations, nor did he fail of his original purpose. Rather, he made his soldiers keener to face danger, kept the Carthaginians ready to do whatever he asked, and afterward, thanks to the supplies he had laid in, accomplished many useful things himself.

Chapter 18 Demetrius Fortifies Dimale

At about this same time, as soon as Demetrius learned of the Romans' intentions, he immediately threw a strong garrison into Dimale, with appropriate supplies, while in the other cities he put to death those who opposed his policies and placed power in the hands of his own friends.

He then picked out six thousand of the most able-bodied men from his subjects and stationed them in Pharos.

When the Roman commander arrived in Illyria with his forces and saw that the enemy were confident in the strength of Dimale and in their preparations—and moreover believed the place to be impregnable—he decided to attack it first, wishing to strike terror into the enemy.

After addressing the various officers in turn and bringing up siege works at several points, he began the siege.

He took the place by storm in seven days, and at once crushed the spirit of all his opponents.

As a result, envoys immediately came from all the cities, surrendering themselves and placing themselves under the protection of Rome.

He accepted each on suitable terms and then sailed to Pharos against Demetrius himself.

Learning that the city was strongly fortified, that a large body of exceptional troops had been gathered into it, and that it was furthermore well stocked with supplies and other equipment, he began to suspect that the siege might prove difficult and drawn out.

So, foreseeing all this, he resorted on the spot to the following sort of stratagem.

Making his approach to the island by night with his whole army, he landed the greater part of his force at some wooded, low-lying places,

while at daybreak he sailed openly with twenty ships toward the harbor nearest the city.

When Demetrius and his men caught sight of the ships and, despising their small number, rushed out of the city to the harbor to prevent the landing.

Chapter 19 Illyrian War Successfully Finished

[The Illyrians rushed out] to prevent the enemy's landing. As soon as battle was joined and the fighting grew fierce, more and more men kept coming out of the city in support, until at last the whole force had poured out into the engagement.

At that point the Romans who had disembarked during the night joined the battle, having made their way through unobserved ground.

Seizing a strong hill between the city and the harbor, they cut off from the city those who had sallied out.

When Demetrius and his men realized what had happened, they gave up trying to stop those landing; rallying themselves and exhorting one another, they set off, having decided to risk a pitched battle against the troops on the hill.

The Romans, seeing the Illyrians' attack coming on vigorously and in good order, charged their companies into them with terrifying force.

At the same time, the men who had made the landing from the ships, seeing what was happening, pressed in from behind; and attacking from every side, they created no small confusion and disorder among the Illyrians.

So, with some of them in difficulty to their front and others to their rear, in the end Demetrius and his men were routed. Some of them fled toward the city, but most scattered across the island by trackless ways.

Demetrius, who kept galleys ready for whatever might happen, lying at anchor at certain deserted spots, made his escape to these. Boarding them when night came on, he sailed away and, against all expectation, made his way to King Philip, with whom he spent the rest of his life—

a man who possessed daring and boldness, but daring of an irrational and utterly undiscerning kind.

And so it came about that his death matched the character of his whole life.

For when, with Philip's approval, he undertook to seize the city of the Messenians, he was killed in a rash and reckless manner at the very moment of the attempt—matters about which I will give the details when I come to that period.

The Roman commander Aemilius, after taking Pharos at once by assault and razing it, gained control of the rest of Illyria, settled everything according to his own plans, and then, as the summer was now drawing to a close, returned to Rome, where he celebrated his entry with a triumph and amid universal acclaim.

For he was thought to have handled the affair not only skillfully but, still more, with manly courage.

Chapter 20 Rome's Reaction to the Fall of Saguntum

As for the Romans, when the news of the capture of Saguntum had already reached them, they certainly did not, by Zeus, then hold a debate about whether to go to war—as some historians claim, even setting down the speeches supposedly delivered on both sides—which is the most absurd thing imaginable.

For how could it be that the Romans, who a year earlier had declared war on the Carthaginians should they so much as set foot on Saguntine territory, would now, after the city itself had been taken by storm, gather to deliberate whether or not to go to war?

And how, and in what manner, can these writers, while introducing the astonishing detail of the gloom of the Senate, at the same time claim that the fathers brought their sons of twelve and older into the Senate House, and that these boys, though present at the deliberations, did not divulge any of the secrets even to their closest relatives?

None of this is either plausible or true in the slightest—unless, by Zeus, on top of everything else, Fortune granted the Romans this gift too: to have good sense the moment they were born.

About such writings as those of Chaereas and Sosilus there is no need to say anything more, for in my view they have the rank and value not of history but of barber-shop and street-corner gossip.

When the disaster that had befallen the Saguntines was reported to them, the Romans at once chose envoys and sent them in haste to Carthage,

presenting them with two options, one of which seemed, if the Carthaginians accepted it, to bring both disgrace and harm, while the other meant the beginning of great troubles and dangers.

For they either ordered that the general Hannibal and the councilors with him be handed over to the Romans, or they declared war.

When the Romans arrived, came before the Senate, and made these demands clear, the Carthaginians found the choice being put to them hard to bear.

Nonetheless, they put forward the ablest man among them and began to plead their case.

Chapter 21 Romans Demand Surrender of Hannibal

[The Carthaginians began] to argue their case. As for the agreement made with Hasdrubal, they passed over it in silence, on the grounds that it had never been made, and that even if it had, it was not binding on them, since it had been concluded without their authorization.

On this point they used a precedent drawn from the Romans themselves: they said that the treaty made by Lutatius during the war over Sicily, after it had already been agreed to by Lutatius, was later annulled by the Roman people on the grounds that it had been made without their authorization.

Throughout their argument they pressed and leaned hard on the final treaty, the one concluded in the war over Sicily.

In it, they said, there was no clause in writing concerning Iberia, but it was expressly laid down that the allies of each party should enjoy security from both.

They pointed out that the Saguntines were not at that time allies of Rome, and to prove this they read out the treaty aloud several times.

The Romans, however, refused outright to engage in legal argument, declaring that while the city of the Saguntines remained intact, the matter admitted of legal pleading and it was possible to settle the disputed points by discussion;

but now that the city had been treacherously destroyed, either the guilty parties had to be surrendered to them—whereby it would be clear to all that the Carthaginians had had no share in the wrongdoing, but that the deed had been done without their authorization—

or, if they were unwilling to do this and admitted that they shared in the wrongdoing, they had to take on the war as well. So the two sides argued in these rather general terms.

But it seems necessary to me not to leave this matter unexamined, so that neither those whose duty and concern it is to know the precise truth of these things may stray from the truth in deliberations of the utmost importance,

nor those who study these matters out of love of learning may go astray, misled along with the errors and partisan ambitions of the historians; but rather that there may be some agreed-upon survey of the rights that existed between the Romans and the Carthaginians toward one another, from the beginning down to our own times.

Chapter 22 Treaties between Rome and Carthage

The first treaty between Rome and Carthage was concluded in the consulship of Lucius Junius Brutus and Marcus Horatius, the first consuls appointed after the abolition of the monarchy—the same men under whom the temple of Jupiter on the Capitol was consecrated.

This was twenty-eight years before Xerxes crossed over into Greece.

I have translated the treaty and set it down below as accurately as I possibly could. For so great is the difference between the Roman language of today and that of antiquity that even the most learned men can scarcely make out certain points, and only after careful study.

The terms of the treaty run roughly as follows: "On these conditions there shall be friendship between the Romans and the allies of the Romans, and the Carthaginians and the allies of the Carthaginians:

The Romans and their allies shall not sail beyond the Fair Promontory, unless they are forced to by storm

or by enemies. If anyone is driven beyond it by necessity, he shall not be permitted to buy or take anything except what is needed for the repair of his ship or for

[7;8]

sacrifices, and within five days he must depart. Those who come to trade shall pay no duty,

except for the fee to the herald or the clerk. Whatever is sold in their presence shall be guaranteed to the seller by the public faith—that is, whatever is sold either in Libya or in Sardinia.

If any Roman comes to the part of Sicily that the Carthaginians govern, he shall have rights equal in all respects

to the Carthaginians. The Carthaginians shall do no wrong to the people of Ardea, Antium, Laurentum, Circeii, or Tarracina, nor to any other of the Latins

who are subject to Rome. From those cities that are not subject to Rome they shall keep their hands; and if they take one,

they shall hand it back to the Romans undamaged. They shall build no fortress in Latium. If they enter the territory in arms, they shall not spend a night within that territory."

Chapter 23 Division of Territory

The Fair Promontory is the headland lying just in front of Carthage itself, toward the north.

The Carthaginians hold that the Romans must under no circumstances sail in warships beyond this point toward the south, because—as it seems to me—they did not want them to become acquainted either with the region around Byzacium or with that around the Lesser Syrtis, the places they call Emporia, on account of the richness of the land.

But if anyone is driven there by force of storm or of enemies and needs some of the necessities for sacrifices or for the repair of his ship, they allow him to take these and nothing beyond them, and those who have put in to anchor must of necessity depart within five days.

To Carthage, and to all the part of Libya lying on the near side of the Fair Promontory, and to Sardinia and to the part of Sicily the Carthaginians govern, the Romans are permitted to sail for trade, and the Carthaginians guarantee by the public faith that justice will be secured.

From the terms of this treaty it is clear that they speak of Sardinia and Libya as their own exclusive possessions; but in the case of Sicily they expressly stipulate the opposite, making the treaty apply only to those parts of Sicily that fall under Carthaginian dominion.

Likewise the Romans make the treaty concerning Latium alone, and make no mention of the rest of Italy, because it did not fall under their authority.

Chapter 24 Treaties Between Rome and Carthage

After these, they made a further treaty, in which the Carthaginians included the Tyrians and the people of Utica as well.

To the Fair Promontory they added Mastia of Tarseium, beyond which they hold that the Romans must neither raid nor found a city.

Its terms run roughly as follows: "On these conditions there shall be friendship between the Romans and the allies of the Romans, and the Carthaginians, the Tyrians, and the people of Utica and their

allies. Beyond the Fair Promontory and Mastia of Tarseium the Romans shall not raid,

nor trade, nor found a city. If the Carthaginians take some city in Latium that is not subject to the Romans, they may keep the goods and the men,

but shall give back the city. If any of the Carthaginians capture men belonging to a people with whom the Romans have a peace in writing, but who are not subject to the Romans, they shall not bring them into the harbors of the Romans; and if such a captive is brought in and a Roman lays a hand on him,

he shall be set free. The Romans shall do likewise.

If a Roman takes water or provisions from any land the Carthaginians govern, he shall not, while supplied with these provisions, do wrong to any

with whom the Carthaginians are at peace and friendship.

A Carthaginian shall do likewise. If one does otherwise, he shall not take redress on his own authority; and if anyone does so,

the wrong shall be treated as a public offense. In Sardinia and Libya no Roman shall trade or found a city—*** unless only to take on provisions

or to refit a ship. If a storm drives him in, he shall depart within five days. In the part of Sicily the Carthaginians govern, and in Carthage, a Roman may do and sell everything that is permitted

to a citizen. A Carthaginian shall do likewise in Rome."

Once again in this treaty they tighten their hold on Libya and Sardinia, claiming them as their own and shutting off every landing-place to the Romans;

but in the case of Sicily they specify the opposite, with respect to the part subject to them.

So too the Romans, in regard to Latium, hold that the Carthaginians must do no wrong to the people of Ardea, Antium, Circeii, or Tarracina. These are the cities that enclose, along the sea, the Latin territory with which the treaty is concerned.

Chapter 25 The Third Treaty

Furthermore, the Romans concluded yet another treaty, the last of them, at the time of Pyrrhus's crossing, before the Carthaginians had embarked on the war over Sicily.

In it they preserve all the other provisions in accordance with the existing agreements, but the following clauses are added to them.

"If they make a written alliance with Pyrrhus, both parties shall make it on such terms that they remain free to come to each other's aid in the territory of whichever is at war.

Whichever of the two has need of the assistance, the Carthaginians shall furnish the ships both for the voyage out and for the return, but each side shall provide the pay for its own men.

The Carthaginians shall also aid the Romans by sea, if there is need; but no one shall compel the crews to disembark against their will."

The oath that had to be sworn was as follows.

In the case of the first treaties, the Carthaginians swore by the gods of their ancestors and the Romans by Jupiter the Stone, in accordance with a certain ancient custom; but in the case of these later treaties, by Mars and Enyalius.

The swearing by Jupiter the Stone went like this: the man taking the oath over the treaty takes a stone in his hand, and once he has sworn in the name of the public faith, he says these words:

"If I keep my oath, may good things be mine; but if I think or do otherwise, then, while all others are kept safe in their own homelands, under their own laws, in possession of their own livelihoods, their sacred things, and their tombs, may I alone be cast out, just as this stone is now."

And having said this, he throws the stone from his hand.

Chapter 26 Treaties Between Rome and Carthage

Since such treaties exist, and are still preserved even now, engraved on bronze tablets beside the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus in the treasury of the aediles,

who would not reasonably feel astonishment at the historian Philinus? Not because he was ignorant of these documents—that is no wonder, since even in our own day the oldest men among both the Romans and the Carthaginians, and those reputed to take the greatest interest in public affairs, were unaware of them—

but rather, how or on what grounds did he have the boldness to write the very opposite of these facts: namely, that there existed treaties between the Romans and the Carthaginians by which the Romans were bound to keep away from the whole of Sicily

and the Carthaginians from the whole of Italy, and that the Romans violated the treaties and their oaths when they made their first crossing into Sicily—when in fact no such written document was ever drawn up or ever existed at all.

For he states this in his second book in explicit terms. I mentioned these matters in the introductory part of my own work, but I deferred treating them in detail until the present occasion, because a good many people too have been led away from the truth in this matter by trusting Philinus's account.

Nevertheless, if anyone finds fault with the Romans on this point regarding the crossing into Sicily—because they took the Mamertines into their friendship at all, and then, when these men asked for it, came to their aid, men who had broken faith not only with the city of the Messenians but also with that of the Rhegians—he might with reason appear to be displeased.

But if anyone supposes that they made the crossing in violation of their oaths and treaties, he is plainly mistaken.

Chapter 27 The Fourth Treaty

When the war over Sicily had been brought to an end, then, they made another treaty, in which the essential points of the written terms were these:

"The Carthaginians shall withdraw from the whole of Sicily and from all the islands

lying between Italy and Sicily. Security shall be guaranteed by each side to the allies of the other.

Neither side shall impose any orders, nor erect any public buildings, nor recruit mercenaries, nor take into alliance the allies of the other, within the other's domains.

The Carthaginians shall pay out two thousand two hundred talents within ten years, and shall hand over a thousand at once.

The Carthaginians shall return all their prisoners to the Romans without ransom."

After this, again,

when the Libyan (Mercenary) war had ended, the Romans, having declared war on the Carthaginians to the point of a formal decree, made additional terms of the following kind:

"The Carthaginians shall withdraw from Sardinia and pay an additional twelve hundred talents," as we stated above.

In addition to the foregoing, the last of the agreements were the ones concluded with Hasdrubal in Iberia, to the effect that "the Carthaginians shall not cross the river Ebro

with arms." These were the legal obligations between the Romans and the Carthaginians from the beginning down to the times of Hannibal.

Chapter 28 No Reasonable Pretext for Rome to Claim Sardinia

Just as, then, we find that the Romans' crossing into Sicily was not made in violation of their oaths, so too, in the case of the second war—the one in connection with which they made the treaty concerning Sardinia—one could find neither a reasonable pretext nor a just cause,

but rather it is generally agreed that the Carthaginians, contrary to all justice, were forced by their circumstances to withdraw from Sardinia and to pay out the sum of money mentioned above.

For the charge brought by the Romans on this matter—that the Carthaginians had wronged Roman seafarers during the Libyan war—had already been settled at the time when, after recovering from the Carthaginians all those who had been carried off, the Romans in return, as a favor, gave back without ransom the prisoners they held.

I have set out these matters in detail in the book before this one.

Since this is how things stand, it remains to examine and determine carefully, concerning the war of Hannibal's time, to which of the two parties the responsibility for it is to be assigned.

Chapter 29 The Roman Case For War

I have now set out what the Carthaginians said on that occasion; next I will give the arguments put forward by the Romans. They did not in fact make use of these at the time, because of their anger at the destruction of Saguntum, but the arguments were voiced often and by many men among them.

First, they said that the agreement made with Hasdrubal could not be set aside, as the Carthaginians presumed to claim it could. For it did not include the clause—

—that the treaty of Lutatius had included, namely that "these terms shall be binding only if the Roman people also approve them." Instead, Hasdrubal made the agreement on his own full authority, and in it stood the provision that "the Carthaginians shall not cross the river Iber for the purpose of war."

Furthermore, in the treaty concerning Sicily there was a written clause—as the Carthaginians themselves admit—that "the allies of each party shall enjoy security from the other." This did not apply only to those who were allies at that time, as the Carthaginians construed it.

For if it had, there would have been an added clause either forbidding each side to take on additional allies beyond those they already had, or excluding from these terms any allies acquired later.

But since neither of these was written in, it was plain that all the allies of both parties—both those existing at the time and those to be taken on afterward—were always to enjoy security from both sides.

And this surely seems entirely reasonable. For they were hardly going to make a treaty that stripped them of their own freedom to take on, as occasions arose, any who might prove to be suitable friends and allies;

nor, having taken such people under their protection, would they then stand by and watch them be wronged by anyone.

Rather, the gist of what both parties had in mind in the treaty was this: with regard to the allies that both sides already had, each would keep its hands off them and in no way receive any of the other's allies into its own alliance;

and with regard to those who would be taken on later, the point was precisely the same—that neither side should recruit mercenaries or levy contributions in the other's provinces and allied territories, and that all should enjoy security from both sides.

Chapter 30 Both Sides Are in the Wrong

Given that this was the situation, it was also a matter of agreement that the Saguntines had placed themselves under Roman protection many years before the time of Hannibal.

The clearest proof of this—and one acknowledged even by the Carthaginians themselves—was that when the Saguntines fell into civil strife among themselves, they entrusted the matter not to the Carthaginians, although these were close at hand and were already active in Iberia, but to the Romans, and through them they set their political affairs right.

Therefore, if one regards the destruction of Saguntum as the cause of the war, it must be granted that the Carthaginians began the war unjustly—both in light of the treaty of Lutatius, under which the allies of each party were to have security from the other, and in light of the treaty of Hasdrubal, under which the Carthaginians were not to cross the river Iber for the purpose of war.

But if one regards the seizure of Sardinia and the money exacted along with it as the cause, then it must be fully admitted that the Carthaginians had good reason for waging the Hannibalian war: for having yielded to circumstance at the time, they took the opportunity, when circumstance favored them, to defend themselves against those who had injured them.

Chapter 31 The Value of Such Discussions

Some who consider such matters without discernment might perhaps say that there is no real need for us to go into such precise detail about arguments of this kind.

For my part, if anyone supposed himself to be self-sufficient in the face of every circumstance, I would say that knowledge of the past, while a fine thing, is perhaps not essential.

But since no human being would dare to make such a claim about either his private or his public affairs—because even if he is prosperous in the present, no one of sound mind can reasonably guarantee anything about the future on the basis of the present—then for these reasons I say that knowledge of the past is not only a fine thing,

but all the more essential.

For how could a man—whether wronged himself or with his country being wronged—find helpers and allies, or, if he were eager to gain something and take the initiative, rouse others to join him in his undertakings?

And how, if he were content with the present state of affairs, could he rightly spur on those who would secure his policy and preserve the established order, if he knew nothing from the record of what each party had done in the past?

For with an eye always to the present, everyone adapts and plays a part, saying and doing such things that each man's true purpose is hard to discern, and in many cases the truth is heavily obscured.

But the deeds of the past, which are tested by the facts themselves, truly reveal the choices and judgments of each person, and show us among whom we have gratitude, kindness, and aid to expect, and among whom the opposite.

From this record one can often find, in many situations, the man who will show pity, the man who will share our indignation, and the man who will see justice done.

These things offer the greatest help, both to communities and to individuals, in human life.

This is why neither those who write history nor those who read it should concern themselves so much with the bare narrative of the events themselves as with what preceded, accompanied, and followed them.

For if you take away from history the why, the how, and the purpose for which something was done, and whether its outcome was reasonable, what is left of it becomes a mere display rather than a lesson;

and though it gives pleasure for the moment, it is of no use whatever for the future.

Chapter 32 This History is Not Difficult to Understand

We must regard those who suppose that my work is hard to acquire and hard to read through, on account of the number and bulk of its books, as simply mistaken.

For how much easier is it both to obtain and to read through forty books—woven together, as it were, on a single thread—and to follow clearly the events in Italy, Sicily, and Libya from the time of Pyrrhus down to the capture of Carthage,

and those in the rest of the world, in unbroken sequence from the flight of Cleomenes the Spartan down to the engagement between the Achaeans and the Romans at the Isthmus—how much easier than to read or to acquire the separate compositions of those who write only of particular events?

For, quite apart from the fact that such works are many times more numerous than my own treatise, it is impossible for their readers to grasp anything from them with any certainty: first, because most of these writers do not give the same account of the same events,

and next, because they leave out the events that run parallel to one another in time—events which, when set side by side and viewed and compared together, lead each to a quite different verdict than they receive under piecemeal treatment—while of the most decisive matters these writers cannot even take hold at all.

For we maintain that by far the most essential parts of history are the consequences that follow upon actions, the circumstances that accompany them, and above all the matter of their causes.

Thus we observe that the war with Antiochus took its origin from the war with Philip, the war with Philip from the war with Hannibal, and the war with Hannibal from the war over Sicily; and that the many and varied developments that lay between these wars all converged upon one and the same end.

Now all of this can be recognized and learned from those who write universal history, but it cannot be learned from those who write of the wars themselves in isolation—the Persian War, say, or the war with Philip—

unless a man, by reading the accounts of the pitched battles that those writers give, imagines that he has thereby gained a clear understanding of the whole conduct and design of the war.

But that is not so at all. Rather, by as much as understanding surpasses mere hearing, by so much, I hold, does my history surpass the compositions that treat only of particular events.

Chapter 33 Hannibal's Preparations

As for the Roman envoys—for it was at this point that we broke off into our digression—when they had heard out the case of the Carthaginians, they said nothing further,

except that the eldest of them, pointing to the fold of his toga before the council, declared that there in it he carried both war and peace for them, and that he would shake out and leave behind whichever of the two they should bid him.

The king of the Carthaginians told him to shake out whichever of the two seemed good to the Romans.

And when the Roman said that he would shake out war, many of those in the council cried out together that they accepted it. On these terms the envoys and the council parted.

Hannibal, meanwhile, while wintering at New Carthage, first dismissed the Iberians to their own cities, wishing them to be ready and eager for what was to come.

Secondly, he gave instructions to his brother Hasdrubal as to how he should manage the government and dominion over Iberia, and conduct the preparations against the Romans, in case he himself should be away somewhere.

Thirdly, he took thought beforehand for the security of affairs in Libya.

Reasoning with great experience and prudence, he transferred soldiers from Libya into Iberia and from Iberia into Libya, binding fast the loyalty of each group toward the other through this arrangement.

Those who crossed over into Libya were the Thersitae, the Mastiani,

and besides these the Oretes (an Iberian people) and the Olcades—altogether from these nations twelve hundred cavalry and thirteen thousand eight hundred and fifty infantry, and in addition eight hundred and seventy Balearic men,

whom they properly call slingers, and from this very function the people themselves and their island take their shared name.

Of the troops just mentioned, he stationed the greater part in Metagonia in Libya, and some in Carthage itself.

From the cities of the people called the Metagonians he sent another four thousand infantry to Carthage, who served at once as hostages and as a body of reinforcement.

In Iberia he left with his brother Hasdrubal fifty quinqueremes, two quadriremes, and five triremes—of these, thirty-two of the quinqueremes were furnished with crews, and all five of the triremes.

There were also cavalry: four hundred and fifty Libyophoenicians and Libyans, three hundred Lergetes, and eighteen hundred Numidians of the Masylii, Masaesylii, Maccoei, and Maurusii who dwell along the Ocean;

and infantry: eleven thousand eight hundred and fifty Libyans, three hundred Ligurians, five hundred Balearic Islanders, and twenty-one elephants.

No one should be surprised at the precision of this enumeration—if I have used a precision concerning Hannibal's operations in Iberia such as a man would scarcely employ even of matters he had managed himself in detail—nor should anyone condemn me beforehand for behaving like those historians who lie plausibly.

For I myself found this record set down on a bronze tablet at Lacinium, drawn up by Hannibal during the period when he was operating in the regions of Italy, and I judged it to be entirely trustworthy, at least for such matters; and therefore I chose to follow this record.

Chapter 34 Hannibal Contacts the Celts

Hannibal, having taken every precaution for the security of affairs both in Libya and in Iberia, now waited expectantly for the messengers being sent to him from the Celts.

For he had clearly informed himself of the excellence of the land at the foot of the Alps and around the river Padus, of the multitude of those who inhabited it, and further of the men's daring in war,

and—most important of all—of the hostility they bore toward the Romans from the earlier war, which I described in the book before this one, so that those who read might be able to follow what is now about to be told.

He therefore clung to this hope and promised everything, sending careful messages to the chieftains of the Celts, both those on the near side of the Alps and those dwelling in the Alps themselves,

since he believed that he could establish the war against the Romans within Italy only if he could pass through the difficult country that lay before him, reach the regions just mentioned, and make use of the Celts as helpers and allies for the undertaking he had in view.

When the messengers arrived and reported the willingness and expectation of the Celts, and declared that the crossing of the Alpine mountains, though very toilsome and difficult, was nevertheless not impossible, he gathered his forces from their winter quarters at the approach of spring.

Since the news from Carthage had also just reached him, his spirit was raised, and, trusting in the goodwill of his fellow citizens, he now openly summoned his forces to the war against the Romans.

He set before them how the Romans had ventured to demand his own surrender and that of all the commanders of the army, and he pointed out the excellence of the country to which they were going, and the goodwill and alliance of the Celts.

When the troops eagerly rallied to his side, he praised them, named a fixed day on which he would make the departure, and for the moment dismissed the assembly.

Chapter 35 Hannibal Crosses the Pyrenees

Having carried out the measures described during the winter quarters, and having provided sufficient security for affairs both in Libya and in Iberia, when the appointed day came he set out, with about ninety thousand infantry and around twelve thousand cavalry.

Crossing the river Iber, he subdued the nation of the Ilurgetes and the Bargusii, and also the Aerenosii and the Andosini, as far as the place called the Pyrenees.

When he had brought all of them under his control and taken some cities by storm—quickly and beyond expectation, but only after many great struggles and heavy loss of men—

he left Hanno as governor over all the country on the near side of the river, and as master over the Bargusii in particular; for he distrusted these people most of all, on account of their goodwill toward the Romans.

He also assigned to Hanno a portion of the forces he had: ten thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry, and he left with him the baggage of those who were setting out with himself.

He sent home an equal number to the troops just mentioned, wishing both to leave these men well disposed toward him and to hold out to the rest a hope of returning home—both to the Iberians serving in his own army and, no less, to those remaining at home—so that all might set out eagerly should there ever be need of reinforcement from them.

Taking up the rest of his army, lightly equipped—fifty thousand infantry and close to nine thousand cavalry—he led them through the mountains called the Pyrenees toward the crossing of the river called the Rhone,

having a force not so much large as serviceable and exceptionally well trained from the continuous fighting in Iberia.

Chapter 36 Geography of Hannibal's March

So that my account may not become entirely obscure through ignorance of the localities involved, I ought to state from where Hannibal set out, through which regions—and how many of them—he passed, and into which parts of Italy he came down.

But I should not merely cite the bare names of the places, rivers, and cities, as some historians do, supposing that this alone is enough in every case to produce knowledge and clarity.

In my view, where places are already familiar, the listing of their names contributes something—and indeed a great deal—toward recollection; but where they are unknown, reciting their names has in the end no more force than meaningless, jangling noises.

For when the mind has nothing to fasten upon and cannot fit what is said onto anything familiar, the narrative becomes ungraspable and dead.

We must therefore point out a method by which it will be possible, in speaking of unknown places, to lead our listeners to some degree toward genuine and recognizable ideas.

The first and most important means of knowledge,

and one moreover that is common to all people, is the division and ordering of the heaven that surrounds us, by which all of us who are worth anything at all recognize east, west, south, and north.

The second is that, by assigning the regions of the earth to each of these distinctions and always carrying in our minds whatever is mentioned onto one of the directions named above, we arrive at familiar and customary notions about things unknown and

Chapter 37 Three Geographic Divisions of the World

unseen. Now that these matters have been laid down concerning the earth as a whole, it follows that we should divide up the inhabited world that is ours by the same principle and bring it to our listeners' attention.

This world is divided into three parts with three names: one part of it they call Asia, the second Libya, and the third Europe.

The boundaries that separate these are the river Don, the Nile, and the strait at the Pillars of Heracles.

Asia, then, happens to lie between the Nile and the Don, and falls within that span of the surrounding heaven that lies between the summer sunrise (northeast) and the south.

Libya lies between the Nile and the Pillars of Heracles, and falls within the southern portion of the heaven and, continuously, within the region of the winter sunset (southwest), as far as the equinoctial setting point, which falls at the Pillars of Heracles.

These two regions, then, viewed in broad terms, occupy the southern zone of our sea, running from east toward west.

Europe lies opposite both of them, facing toward the north, and stretches continuously from east to west.

Its largest and deepest portion lies directly beneath the north, between the river Don and the Narbo—a river not far to the west of Marseilles and of the mouths of the Rhone, through which the aforesaid river empties into the Sardinian Sea.

From the Narbo and the surrounding country the Celts dwell, as far as the mountains called the Pyrenees, which extend without a break from our sea to the outer sea.

The remaining part of Europe, from those mountains onward—the part adjoining the west and the Pillars of Heracles—is enclosed by our sea and the outer sea; and the portion stretching along our sea as far as the Pillars of Heracles is called Iberia,

while the portion lying along the outer sea, which is called the Great Sea, has no common name, because it has only recently been explored. It is inhabited entirely by barbarous and populous peoples, about whom I will give a detailed

Chapter 38 Unknown Areas in the North and the South

account later on. Just as, in the case of Asia and Libya, where they border on each other in the region of Ethiopia, no one down to our own day can say with certainty whether the land toward the south is one continuous mainland or is bounded by the sea,

so too the country that runs up toward the north between the Don and the Narbo remains unknown to us until now—unless, by some later inquiry, we investigate it.

And anyone who says or writes anything about these regions otherwise must be regarded as ignorant and as spinning fables.

Let this much, then, be said by me so that my narrative may not be wholly unintelligible to those unacquainted with the localities, but so that, at least in terms of the broad distinctions, they may grasp something and refer what is said to some point in their minds, judging from the surrounding heaven.

For just as, in the matter of sight, we are accustomed always to turn our faces toward whatever is being pointed out to us, so too with the mind we must constantly direct and incline our thoughts toward the places

Chapter 39 The Length of Hannibal's March

...demonstrating these points in the course of my account. But I will set these matters aside and turn back to the continuous thread of the narrative before me.

At this time the Carthaginians were masters of all those parts of Libya that face the inner sea, from the Altars of Philaenus, which lie along the Great Syrtis, as far as the Pillars of Heracles.

This stretch of coastline is more than sixteen thousand stades in length.

Having crossed the strait at the Pillars of Heracles, they had likewise gained control of all Iberia as far as the headland on our sea where the Pyrenees range comes to an end—the mountains that form the boundary between the Iberians and the Celts.

This place is about eight thousand stades distant from the mouth at the Pillars of Heracles.

For the distance from the Pillars to New Town happens to be three thousand stades—this was the base from which Hannibal launched his expedition into Italy (some people call New Town "New Carthage")—and from there to the river Iber it is two thousand six hundred stades;

from that river again to Emporium is one thousand six hundred, and from the city of Emporium to *** is about six hundred,

and from there on to the crossing of the Rhone is about one thousand six hundred. (These distances have now been carefully measured out and marked by the Romans in segments of eight stades.)

From the crossing of the Rhone, for those marching alongside the river itself toward its sources up to the start of the ascent into the Alps that leads into Italy, it is one thousand four hundred stades.

What remains are the passes over the Alps themselves, about one thousand two hundred stades; once he had crossed these, he would arrive in the plains around the Padus in Italy.

So that the whole distance he had to traverse from New Town was about nine thousand stades.

Of this territory he had by now covered nearly half in terms of sheer distance, but in terms of difficulty the greater part of the march still lay ahead of him.

Chapter 40 Gauls Attack the Military Colonies

Hannibal, then, set about forcing the passes over the Pyrenees, full of fear of the Celts because of the strength of the terrain.

The Romans, meanwhile, at this same period had heard from the envoys they had sent to Carthage both the decisions reached and the words that had been spoken; and when news fell upon them, sooner than they expected, that Hannibal had crossed the river Iber with his army, they resolved to send Publius Cornelius with legions into Iberia, and Tiberius Sempronius into Libya.

While these commanders were busy with the enrolment of their legions and the rest of their preparations, the people pressed on to bring to completion the work of the colonies which they had earlier resolved to send out into Gaul.

They fortified the towns vigorously, and ordered the settlers to be on the spot within thirty days, their number amounting to six thousand for each of the two cities;

one of these they founded on the near side of the river Padus, naming it Placentia, and the other on the far side, calling it Cremona.

These colonies had just been settled when the Gauls called the Boii—who had long been lying in wait, as it were, to throw off their friendship with the Romans, but had until then lacked an opportunity—

now grew excited and, trusting in the presence of the Carthaginians on the strength of the reports passing among them, revolted from the Romans, abandoning the hostages they had given when they came out of the earlier war, which I described in the previous book.

They appealed to the Insubres and, joining forces in keeping with their long-standing anger, overran the land that had been parcelled out by the Romans; pursuing the fleeing colonists, they shut them up in Mutina, a Roman colony, and laid siege to it.

Among those they trapped inside were three distinguished men who had been sent out to divide up the land: one of these was Gaius Lutatius, who had held the consulship, and the other two had held the praetorship (the office of the six axes).

When these men thought it necessary to come to a parley with them, the Boii agreed. But when the men came out, the Boii violated the truce and seized them, hoping by their means to recover their own hostages.

Lucius Manlius, who was a praetor stationed in the area with an army, heard what had happened and hurried to the rescue.

The Boii, learning of his approach, prepared ambushes in some woods, and as soon as he had entered the wooded ground they fell upon him from all sides at once and killed many of the Romans.

The survivors at first rushed to flee, but once they reached open ground they pulled themselves together to such a degree that they managed, with difficulty, to make an orderly withdrawal. The Boii, however, followed close behind and shut these men too up in the village called Tannes.

When news reached Rome that the fourth legion was surrounded by the Boii and being besieged with full force, they hastily dispatched the legions that had been assigned to Publius to the relief of these men, putting a praetor in command of them, and they instructed Publius to gather and enrol other legions from among the allies.

Chapter 41 The Consuls Set Out to Iberia and Libya

Such, then, was the state of Celtic affairs from the beginning down to the arrival of Hannibal, and they had reached the outcome that I have described both earlier and now.

The Roman commanders, having made ready everything for their own undertakings, set sail at the start of the season for the operations before them—Publius to Iberia with sixty ships, and Tiberius Sempronius to Libya with a hundred and sixty quinqueremes.

With these he set out to wage war so formidably and made such preparations at Lilybaeum—mustering everyone from every quarter—as though he meant to lay siege to Carthage itself the moment he landed.

Publius, sailing along the Ligurian coast, came on the fifth day from Pisae to the region around Massalia,

and, anchoring off the first mouth of the Rhone, the one called the Massaliote mouth,

he began disembarking his forces. He had heard that Hannibal was already crossing the Pyrenees, but he was convinced that he was still far off, both because of the difficulty of the terrain and because of the multitude of Celts lying between them.

Hannibal, however, contrary to expectation, partly winning over the Celts with money and partly forcing his way through them, arrived with his forces at the crossing of the Rhone, keeping the Sardinian Sea on his right.

When it was made clear to Publius that the enemy were at hand, he partly disbelieved it because of the speed of their arrival and partly wished to learn the precise truth; so while he himself let his troops recover from the voyage and deliberated with the tribunes about which ground to use and how to engage the enemy,

he sent out three hundred of his most courageous cavalry, attaching to them as both guides and supporting fighters some Celts who happened to be serving as mercenaries with the Massaliotes.

Chapter 42 The Passage of the Rhone

Hannibal, on reaching the region of the river, at once set about making the crossing where the stream runs in a single channel, his camp being about four days' march from the sea.

Making friends in every way with the people living along the river, he bought up from them all their dugout boats and small craft, which were plentiful in number because many of those dwelling beside the Rhone engage in seaborne trade.

He also obtained from them suitable timber for the construction of dugouts, so that within two days a countless number of transport boats was produced, each man eager not to depend on his neighbour but to hold in his own hands his hopes of getting across.

At this time a host of barbarians had gathered on the far bank in order to prevent the Carthaginians from crossing.

Looking at them, Hannibal reasoned from the present circumstances that it was impossible either to force a crossing with so many enemies posted opposite, or to wait where he was, for fear of being attacked by the enemy from every side;

so when the third night came on he sent off a part of his force, providing them with local guides and placing over them all Hanno, the son of Bomilcar the king.

These men marched up against the current along the river for two hundred stades, and when they reached a certain place where the river happened to divide around an island-like piece of ground, they halted there.

From the woodland close at hand, by fastening some pieces of timber together and lashing others, they constructed in a short time many rafts, sufficient for their immediate need; on these they crossed over safely, with no one to stop them.

Seizing a strong position, they stayed there that day to rest from their recent hardships, while at the same time making preparations for the task to come, according to their orders.

Hannibal, for his part, was doing much the same with the forces left behind with him.

The greatest difficulty he faced was getting the elephants across; these numbered thirty-seven.

Chapter 43 Hannibal's Troops Begin to Cross

When the fifth night had come, the detachment that had crossed earlier set out from the far bank at dawn and advanced along the river itself against the barbarians on the opposite side.

Hannibal, meanwhile, with his soldiers ready, was poised to begin the crossing. He had loaded the larger boats with the shield-bearing cavalry and the dugout canoes with the most agile of his infantry.

The larger boats took up position upstream and against the current, while the lighter craft were stationed below them, so that, with the larger boats absorbing most of the force of the stream, the passage across the channel would be safer for the canoes.

They planned to tow the horses swimming behind the sterns of the boats, with one man on each side of the stern steering three or four at once by their lead-ropes, so that a sufficient number of horses could be ferried across together with the very first crossing.

The barbarians, watching the enemy's maneuver, poured out of their stockade in disorder and scattered groups, convinced that they would easily prevent the Carthaginians from landing.

But as soon as Hannibal saw that his own men on the far side were now drawing near—they had signaled their arrival with smoke, as had been arranged—he gave the order for everyone to embark at once, and for those manning the craft to push hard against the current.

This was done quickly, and the men in the boats raced one another with loud shouts, struggling against the force of the river.

The two armies stood drawn up along the banks of the river on either side: Hannibal's own men sharing in the struggle and following its course with shouts, while the barbarians facing them chanted their war cries and dared them to the fight. The whole scene was astonishing and charged with suspense.

At this moment, when the barbarians had abandoned their tents, the Carthaginians from the far side fell upon them suddenly and unexpectedly. Some of them set fire to the encampment, while the greater number rushed against those who were guarding the crossing.

The barbarians, finding the situation utterly unexpected, split: some hurried to the tents to defend them, while others fought back and grappled with the attackers.

Hannibal, with events falling out just as he had planned, immediately formed up the first men as they landed, rallied them with encouragement, and engaged the barbarians.

The Celts, both because of their disorder and because of the unexpected turn of events, were quickly routed and broke into flight.

Chapter 44 Hannibal Addresses His Men

The Carthaginian commander, having now mastered both the crossing and his opponents, at once turned to ferrying over the men still left on the far bank.

When he had brought all his forces across in a short time, he made camp for that night beside the river itself.

The next day, hearing that the Roman fleet had anchored off the mouths of the river, he picked out five hundred Numidian cavalry and sent them off to discover where the enemy were, how many they numbered, and what they were doing.

At the same time he also detailed suitable men to handle the crossing of the elephants.

Then he himself gathered his forces and brought forward the chieftains in Magilus's company—for these had come to him from the plains around the Padus (Po)—and through an interpreter explained to the troops the decisions these men had reached.

Of what was said, the strongest grounds for confidence among the rank and file were, first, the plain fact of the presence of these envoys, who were urging them on and pledging to share in the war against Rome;

second, the trustworthiness of their promise that they would guide the army through such country that, without lacking any of their necessities, they would make their march into Italy both swiftly and safely;

and besides this, the richness and the vast size of the land they were going to reach, and furthermore the eagerness of the men alongside whom they were about to wage their battles against the Roman forces.

So, having spoken to this effect, the Celts withdrew.

After them Hannibal himself came forward and first reminded the troops of their past achievements: in these, he said, though they had undertaken many bold actions and dangers, they had failed in none, so long as they had followed his judgment and counsel.

Next he urged them to be of good courage, seeing that the greatest part of their task had been accomplished, since they had now mastered the crossing of the river and had seen with their own eyes the goodwill and eagerness of their allies.

For this reason he told them not to trouble themselves about the details, as those were his concern, but to obey his commands and so prove themselves brave men, worthy of their past deeds.

When the men responded with approval and showed great drive and enthusiasm, he praised them, prayed to the gods on behalf of them all, and dismissed them, ordering them to look after themselves and to make their preparations with all speed, since the march would begin the next day.

Chapter 45 Skirmish between Reconnoitring Parties

When the assembly had broken up, the Numidians who had been sent ahead to reconnoiter returned, having lost most of their number, while the rest had fled headlong.

For not far from their own camp they had collided with the Roman cavalry that Publius had dispatched on the same errand, and both sides showed such fierce determination in the clash that of the Romans and Celts about a hundred and forty horsemen were killed, and of the Numidians more than two hundred.

After this, the Romans, having pressed close to the Carthaginian stockade in their pursuit and reconnoitered it, turned back and hurried away to report the enemy's presence to their commander; and when they reached their own camp, they delivered their report.

Publius at once loaded his baggage onto the ships, set out with his whole army, and advanced along the river, eager to engage the enemy.

Hannibal, on the day following the assembly, stationed all his cavalry at first light facing toward the sea, holding them in reserve, and moved his infantry force out of the stockade onto the march.

He himself waited behind for the elephants and the men who had been left with them.

Chapter 46 The Crossing of the Elephants

The way the animals were ferried across was roughly this. They built a number of rafts, sturdily put together, and lashed two of these firmly to one another, then anchored both against the ground at the point where the river was to be entered. Together the two had a width of about fifty feet.

To these they joined still others on the outer side and fitted them on, extending the structure of the joined platform out into the channel.

The side facing the current they secured with cables run to the land, fastening them to the trees growing along the bank, so that the whole work would hold together and not be pushed downstream by the river.

When they had made the entire projecting platform about two hundred feet long, they then attached to the outermost rafts two others that had been built especially large. These were bound tightly to the platform's end but connected to the rest only by ties that could be easily cut through. To these last rafts they also fastened several towlines,

with which the boats, towing them, were meant to keep them from being carried off downstream, and instead, holding them by force against the current, were to bring them along and ferry the animals across on them.

After this they heaped a great deal of earth onto all the rafts, piling it on until they had made the surface match, level and the same color as the road that led over dry land to the crossing.

The animals were trained to obey their Indian handlers right up to the water's edge, but would no longer dare in any way to step into the water. So they led them across over the bank of earth, putting two females in front, with the animals following them obediently.

Once the elephants had been brought onto the outermost rafts, the men cut through the ties by which these were attached to the rest, hauled in the towlines with the boats, and quickly pulled both the animals and the rafts beneath them away from the earthen ramp.

When this happened, the beasts, thrown into a panic, at first turned about and rushed in every direction; but, hemmed in on all sides by the current, they grew too frightened to act and were forced to stay where they were.

And it was in just this way, by always attaching a fresh pair of rafts, that most of the animals were carried across.

A few, however, in the middle of the crossing flung themselves into the river out of fear. Of these, all the Indians happened to perish, but the elephants were saved.

For thanks to the strength and length of their trunks, they raised them above the water and breathed through them, while at the same time blowing out everything that got in, and so held out, making most of their way upright along the river bottom.

Chapter 47 Previous Histories of this March either False or Inconsistent

Once the animals had been ferried over, Hannibal took up the elephants and the cavalry and advanced with them as a rearguard along the river, away from the sea and toward the east, making his march as though heading for the interior of Europe.

The Rhone has its sources above the head of the Adriatic Gulf, inclining toward the west, in the parts of the Alps that slope toward the north; it flows toward the winter sunset, and empties into the Sardinian Sea.

It runs for a long way through a valley, to the north of which dwell the Ardyan Celts, while the entire southern side of it is bounded by the foothills of the Alps that incline toward the north. As for the plains around the Po,

about which I have already spoken at some length, the ridges of the aforementioned mountains separate them from the valley of the Rhone; these ridges take their beginning at Massalia and run as far as the head of the whole Adriatic.

It was these that Hannibal then crossed over, passing from the region of the Rhone into Italy.

Some of those who have written about this crossing, in their wish to astonish their readers with marvelous tales about the places mentioned, fall without realizing it into two errors that are more foreign than anything else to all sound history: for they are driven both to tell falsehoods and to write things that contradict themselves.

For on the one hand they bring Hannibal on stage as an inimitable general, both in daring and in foresight, while at the same time they demonstrate to us, by their own account, that he was utterly devoid of judgment;

and on the other hand, being unable to find any resolution or way out of their falsehood, they bring gods and the sons of gods into what is supposed to be factual history.

For having laid it down that the strongholds and ruggedness of the Alpine mountains were such that not only horses and armies, and with them elephants, but not even lightly armed infantry could easily get through; and likewise having sketched the wilderness of those regions as so complete that, unless some god or hero had met Hannibal's men and shown them the roads, they would all have been at a total loss and perished — on both these counts they manifestly fall into the two errors mentioned above.

Chapter 48 Absurd Premises of Other Historians

[They fall into both of these errors.] For, in the first place, what general could be shown to be more devoid of judgment than Hannibal, what commander more inept,

if, leading forces so large and resting his greatest hopes of overall success on them, he knew, as these writers claim, neither the roads nor the country, neither where he was going at all nor against whom,

and, to crown it, not even whether what he was attempting was generally possible?

What men who have utterly failed and are at their wits' end in every way will not bring themselves to do — namely, to plunge into unscouted country with an army — this the writers attribute to Hannibal, who held the greatest hopes for his cause entirely unimpaired.

Likewise their account of the desolation, and further of the ruggedness and difficulty of the terrain, makes their falsehood plain.

For they failed to inquire into the fact that the Celts living along the Rhone, not once nor twice before Hannibal's arrival — and not in the distant past but quite recently — had crossed the Alps with great armies, drawn up against the Romans and fought alongside the Celts inhabiting the plains around the Po, as I have shown in the earlier parts of this work;

and besides this, they did not know that a very large tribe of people happens to live in the Alps themselves. Instead, ignorant of every one of the things I have mentioned, they claim that some hero appeared and pointed out the roads to them.

By this they naturally fall into the same case as the writers of tragedy. For with all of those, the denouements of their dramas require a god and a stage machine, because they take their initial premises to be false and irrational;

and so historians too must suffer and do the same — bringing on heroes and gods to appear — once they have set up beginnings that are implausible and false. For how is it possible to set a reasonable ending upon irrational beginnings?

Hannibal, at any rate, did not act as these men write; on the contrary, he handled his designs in these matters with great practical sense.

For he had clearly investigated both the fertility of the land into which he intended to descend and the hostility of its peoples toward the Romans, and for the difficult ground that lay between he employed local guides and leaders who were going to share in the same hopes as himself.

I speak about these things with confidence because I have inquired into the events from men who were themselves present at the time, and have surveyed the country and used the Alpine route myself, for the sake of knowledge and of seeing it firsthand.

Chapter 49 Scipio Is Too Late To Stop Hannibal

Nevertheless, Publius, the Roman general, arriving at the river crossing three days after the Carthaginians had broken camp, and finding that the enemy had already set out, was as thoroughly astonished as could be,

since he had been convinced that they would never dare to make their march into Italy by this route, because of the numbers and the faithlessness of the barbarians inhabiting those regions.

But seeing that they had in fact dared it, he hurried back to his ships, and on arriving began to embark his forces.

He sent his brother off to handle affairs in Iberia, while he himself turned back and made the voyage to Italy, eager to outpace the enemy by going through Etruria to the crossing of the Alps.

Hannibal, meanwhile, after marching four days in succession from the crossing, came to the place called the Island, a populous and grain-bearing district that takes its name from the very circumstance of its situation.

For where the Rhone runs along one side and the river called the Isère along the other, flowing past on each flank, they bring its shape to a point at the place where they converge with each other.

It is similar in size and shape to what is called the Delta in Egypt, except that in the Delta the sea joins together its one side and the mouths of the rivers, whereas here that side is closed off by mountains hard to approach, hard to enter, and, one might almost say, inaccessible.

On reaching this district, he found in it two brothers quarreling over the kingship and encamped against each other with their armies.

When the elder courted him and called on him to join in helping him secure the throne, he agreed, since the advantage this would bring him for the present was almost obvious.

And so, by joining the attack and helping to drive out the other brother, he gained much assistance from the victor.

For this man not only supplied the army lavishly with grain and the other provisions, but also exchanged all their old and worn-out weapons and renewed the equipment of the whole force at an opportune moment;

and further, by furnishing most of the men with clothing and, on top of that, with footwear, he provided great practical benefit for the crossings of the mountains.

But most important of all, since the Carthaginians were apprehensive about the march through the territory of the Gauls called Allobroges, he brought up the rear with his own force and secured them a safe passage until they drew near to the crossing of the Alps.

Chapter 50 Hannibal Harassed By the Natives

After marching for ten days along the river, covering some eight hundred stades, Hannibal began the climb up toward the Alps, and it was now that he fell into the gravest dangers.

For as long as the army was on level ground, all the local chieftains of the Allobroges held back from attacking, partly out of fear of the cavalry and partly because of the barbarians who were escorting the column. But once the escort had withdrawn to their own country,

and Hannibal's forces began to push forward into the difficult terrain, the Allobrogian chieftains then mustered a sizable body of men and seized in advance the strategic positions through which Hannibal's troops were compelled to make their ascent.

Now if they had kept their plan hidden, they would have utterly destroyed the Carthaginian army. As it was, since they were spotted, they did indeed do serious harm to Hannibal's men, but they suffered no less themselves.

For once the Carthaginian general realized that the natives had occupied the advantageous positions ahead of him, he encamped at the foot of the pass and waited there,

and he sent ahead some of the Gauls who were serving as his guides to scout out the enemy's intentions and their whole plan.

When these men had carried out their orders, the general learned that during the day the enemy kept careful watch and held the positions in force, but at night they withdrew to a nearby town. Adapting himself to this state of affairs, he devised the following scheme.

He took up his army and advanced openly, and on coming near the difficult ground he encamped not far from the enemy. When night fell, he ordered the watch-fires to be lit and left the greater part of his army where it was; then, taking the men best suited for the task and equipping them lightly, he passed through the narrow defiles during the night and occupied the positions the enemy had seized earlier, the barbarians having withdrawn to the town as was their custom.

Chapter 51 The Gauls Attack the Baggage Train

When this had happened and day broke, the barbarians saw what had occurred and at first gave up their attempt.

But afterward, watching the great mass of pack animals and the cavalry struggling to wind their way slowly through the difficult ground, they were drawn by the opportunity to fasten onto the column.

When they did so and the barbarians attacked at many points, the Carthaginians suffered heavy losses—not so much from the enemy as from the terrain itself, and above all among the horses and pack animals.

For the approach was not only narrow and rough but also flanked by sheer drops, so that at every disturbance or panic many of the pack animals were sent tumbling over the cliffs along with their loads.

It was the wounded horses most of all that caused this kind of chaos. Some of them, panicked by their wounds, would collide head-on with the pack animals, while others, charging forward, shoved aside everything in their path on the narrow ground, and so they created enormous confusion.

Watching all this, and reckoning that even those who survived the present danger could not be saved if the baggage train were destroyed, Hannibal took the men who had seized the heights during the night and rushed down to help those who had gone ahead on the march.

In doing so, since Hannibal was charging from higher ground, many of the enemy were killed—but no fewer of his own men perished as well,

for the uproar along the column was now mounting on both sides because of the shouting and the clash described above.

But once he had killed most of the Allobroges and routed the rest, forcing them to flee back to their own land, the remaining mass of pack animals and horses then made its way through the difficult ground, slowly and with great hardship.

Hannibal himself rallied as many men as he could after the engagement and assaulted the town from which the enemy had launched their attack.

Finding it nearly deserted, since everyone had been lured out after plunder, he took control of the town. From this he gained many things useful both for the moment and for the future.

For the immediate present he recovered a quantity of horses and pack animals along with the men captured with them, and for the future he secured a supply of grain and livestock enough for two or three days.

But the most important result was the fear he instilled in the tribes that came next, so that none of those living near the passes would readily dare to attack him.

Chapter 52 Treachery of the Gauls

For the time being, then, he made his camp on the spot, stayed for one day, and then set out again.

Over the following days he led the army on in safety for a while; but by the fourth day he once more found himself in great danger.

For the people living along his route, having conspired together with treacherous intent, came out to meet him carrying branches and garlands—which among nearly all the natives is a token of friendship, just as the herald's staff is among the Greeks.

Wary of trusting such assurances, Hannibal carefully questioned them about their intentions and their whole purpose.

They claimed to be well aware both of the town's capture and of the destruction of those who had tried to do him wrong, and they made clear that this was precisely why they had come: they wished neither to inflict nor to suffer any harm, and they even promised to hand over hostages from among themselves.

For a long time Hannibal remained cautious and distrustful of what they said. But reasoning that if he accepted their offer he might perhaps make these new arrivals more cautious and more peaceable, whereas if he refused he would have them as open enemies, he assented to their proposal and pretended to enter into friendship with them.

When the barbarians had handed over the hostages, supplied cattle in abundance, and altogether put themselves into his hands without reserve, Hannibal's men came to trust them to a certain extent—so much so that they even used them as guides for the difficult ground that lay ahead. But after these guides had led the way for two days,

the people just mentioned gathered their forces, followed close behind, and attacked, [seizing] a certain gorge that was hard to pass and ringed with cliffs

Chapter 53 The White Rock

While they were crossing, there came a moment when Hannibal's entire force would have been completely destroyed, had he not still been wary to some degree and, foreseeing what lay ahead, kept the baggage train and the cavalry in the vanguard and the heavy infantry in the rear.

Because these troops were posted as a rearguard, the damage that occurred was less severe, for they absorbed the onslaught of the barbarians.

Even so, despite this precaution, a great number of men, pack animals, and horses were destroyed.

For since the high ground was held by the enemy, the barbarians moved along the slopes parallel to the column, rolling rocks down on some and striking others at close range with stones, and so threw them into utter confusion and peril,

to such a degree that Hannibal was forced to spend the night with half his force beside a certain fortified white rock, cut off from the horses and the pack animals, standing guard over them, until through the course of the whole night these were at last drawn out of the ravine with great difficulty.

The next day, once the enemy had withdrawn, he rejoined the cavalry and the pack animals and pushed on toward the highest passes of the Alps. He no longer ran into any large concentrated body of the barbarians, but was harassed by them piecemeal and from place to place.

Some of them, attacking from the rear and others from the front whenever the opportunity arose, would carry off part of the baggage. His elephants were of the greatest service to him in this:

for at whatever point in the march these animals happened to be, the enemy did not dare to approach that part of the line, terrified by the strange sight of the creatures.

On the ninth day he reached the summit of the pass, encamped there, and remained for two days, wishing both to rest the survivors and to wait for the stragglers to catch up.

During this time it happened that many of the horses that had bolted in panic and many of the pack animals that had thrown off their loads unexpectedly came back, having followed the tracks of the army, and rejoined the column.

Chapter 54 The Descent Into Italy

...and rejoined the camp. By now, since the setting of the Pleiades was drawing near, the snow was already gathering on the peaks; and seeing his men in low spirits, both because of the hardship they had already endured and because of what they still expected to face,

Hannibal tried to gather and encourage them, having one single resource for the purpose: the clear sight of Italy. For Italy lies so close beneath the mountains just mentioned that, when both are viewed together, the Alps appear to stand like a citadel over the whole of Italy.

Therefore, by pointing out to them the plains around the Po, and by reminding them in general of the goodwill of the Gauls who inhabited them, and at the same time indicating the location of Rome itself, he succeeded to some extent in restoring the men's confidence.

The next day he broke camp and began the descent. In the course of it he no longer encountered any enemy, except those who did damage by stealth, but because of the terrain and the snow he lost a number of men not much smaller than those he had lost on the ascent.

For since the descent was narrow and steep, and the snow made it impossible for each man to see where he was stepping, anyone who strayed from the path or slipped was carried over the cliffs.

Still, they endured this hardship, being by now accustomed to such troubles.

But when they came to a place that neither the elephants nor the pack animals could get past because of its narrowness—where the cliff face had fallen away for nearly a stade and a half, having been broken before but having now collapsed even more freshly—there once again the men fell into despair and confusion.

At first the Carthaginian general attempted to go around the difficult ground; but when fresh snow fell and made this route also impossible to travel,

Chapter 55 Snow

he abandoned the attempt. For what was happening was peculiar and out of the ordinary. The new snow of that year had just fallen on top of the old snow, which had remained from the previous winter; the fresh snow was easy to cut through, both because it was recent and soft and because it had not yet gained any depth.

But once they had trodden through this and stepped onto the snow underneath, which had hardened, they no longer cut through it; instead they slid on the surface, both feet skidding at once, just as happens on level ground to people walking through mud.

And what followed from this was still more difficult.

For the men, being unable to break through the lower snow, whenever they fell and tried to brace themselves on their knees or hands in order to get up, only slid all the more, with every support giving way at once, since the ground sloped steeply downward.

The pack animals, on the other hand, when they fell, did break through the lower snow as they struggled to rise; but once they had broken through, they remained stuck there with their loads, as if frozen in place, both because of the weight and because of the firmness of the old snow underneath.

So, giving up this hope, he encamped on the ridge, clearing away the snow on it, and then set the men to work and, with great toil, built up a road along the cliff face.

For the pack animals and the horses he made a passage wide enough in a single day. He therefore led these across at once and, encamping at the spots that were already below the snow line, sent them off to pasture;

while he brought up the Numidians in relays to work on the road, and only after three days of painful labor did he get the elephants across. These were in a wretched state from hunger,

for the highest parts of the Alps and the areas reaching up toward the passes are entirely without trees and completely bare, because the snow lies there continuously in both summer and winter, whereas the parts about halfway down the slopes, on both sides, are wooded, bear trees, and are altogether habitable.

Chapter 56 Hannibal Reaches the Plains

Hannibal then gathered his whole force together and continued the descent, and on the third day after passing the cliffs just described he reached the level country.

He had lost many of his soldiers to the enemy and at the river crossings during the march as a whole, and many more to the cliffs and difficult terrain in the Alps—not only men, but still greater numbers of horses and pack animals.

In the end, having made the entire march from New Carthage in five months, and the crossing of the Alps in fifteen days, he boldly descended into the plains around the Po and the territory of the Insubres,

with the surviving portion of his army: twelve thousand Libyan infantry, about eight thousand Iberian infantry, and cavalry numbering altogether not more than six thousand, as he himself sets out on the inscribed column concerning his numbers at Lacinium.

At the same time, as I stated above, Publius, having left his forces to his brother Gnaeus and urged him to hold fast to affairs in Iberia and to wage war vigorously against Hasdrubal, sailed back himself with a few men to Pisae.

He then marched through Etruria, took over from the praetors the legions that were stationed there and campaigning against the Boii, and arrived at the plains around the Po; pitching his camp, he kept watch on the enemy, eager to engage them in battle.

Chapter 57 The Limits of History

Now that we have brought both the narrative and the commanders of both sides, along with the war itself, into Italy, I wish, before the battles begin, to discuss briefly a few matters that bear on my work.

For some readers will perhaps ask why, having devoted so much discussion to the regions of Libya and Iberia, I have said nothing further about the strait at the Pillars of Heracles, or about the outer sea and its distinctive features,

nor indeed about the British Isles and the production of tin there, nor about the silver and gold mines of Iberia itself—subjects on which the historians, disputing with one another, expend a great deal of discussion.

Now, I passed these over not because I think this branch of inquiry foreign to history, but, in the first place, because I did not wish to keep breaking up the narrative at every turn, nor to lead those eager to listen away from the practical subject before us;

and, in the second place, because I judged it best not to treat these matters in a scattered way or as a mere by-the-way digression, but to set aside a place and an occasion of their own for this subject and, as far as I am able, to give a truthful account of them there.

For this reason no one should be surprised if, in what follows as well, when I come to regions of this kind, I pass over this subject for the reasons already stated.

But if there are those who absolutely insist on hearing about such matters region by region and part by part, they are perhaps unaware that they are doing much the same as greedy dinner guests.

For those guests, by sampling everything set before them, neither truly enjoy any of the dishes at the moment nor draw from them any wholesome digestion and nourishment for the future, but quite the opposite;

and those who do the same with their reading likewise fail to attain, as they should, either genuine pleasure in the present or benefit for the future.

Chapter 58 Necessity of Refuting Past Errors

That this department, if any in history, also requires discussion and a more accurate correction is plain from many considerations, but above all from the following.

For since nearly all writers—or at any rate the great majority—have attempted to set out the peculiar characteristics and positions of the regions at the far edges of the world we inhabit, yet in many points most of them have gone badly wrong,

it is by no means proper to pass this over; rather, something must be said to them, not as a by-the-way or scattered remark, but with careful attention—and it must be said not by way of censure or rebuke,

but rather with praise and with a correction of their ignorance, recognizing that they too, had they had access to our own times, would have brought many of their statements to correction and revision.

For in earlier times one could find very few Greeks who undertook to investigate the matters of these remote regions, because the attempt was impossible.

For the dangers by sea were then many and hard to reckon, and those by land many times greater still.

But even if someone did reach the ends of the inhabited world, whether by necessity or by choice, even so he did not accomplish his purpose.

For it was difficult to become an eyewitness of more than a few of these places, since some had grown wholly barbarous and others were uninhabited; and it was harder still to learn and understand by conversation anything about what one had seen, because of the strangeness of the language.

And even if someone did gain such understanding, it was harder still than any of these things for one who had seen the places to handle the matter with restraint—to scorn marvel-mongering and sensationalism for his own glory, to value the truth above all, and to report to us nothing of what lies outside it.

Chapter 59 Recent Advances in Geography

Since, then, a true account of the matters just mentioned was, in former times at least, not merely difficult but very nearly impossible, it is not right to censure the historians if they omitted something or made mistakes;

rather, it is just to praise and admire them for whatever knowledge they did gain and for the way they advanced our experience of these matters in such an age.

But in our own day, the regions of Asia have become accessible through the empire of Alexander, and the remaining regions through the supremacy of the Romans, so that nearly all of them can now be reached by sea and by land;

and since men of action, released from their ambitions in military and political affairs, have through these means gained many great opportunities for investigation and for the pursuit of knowledge about the matters just mentioned,

it would only be fitting that we should have both better and truer knowledge concerning what was formerly unknown. This is what I myself will also try to do,

taking a fitting place in my work for this subject, and I will wish to inform those eager to learn more fully about the matters just mentioned;

for it was largely for this purpose that I undertook the dangers [and the hardships] that befell me in my wanderings through Libya and Iberia, and also Gaul and the sea that lies beyond these countries and borders upon them,

in order that, by correcting the ignorance of those who came before, I might make these parts of the inhabited world too familiar to the Greeks.

But now, returning from this digression to the narrative, I will try to set out the pitched battles that took place in Italy between the Romans and the Carthaginians.

Chapter 60 Hannibal Attacks the Taurini

I have already given an account of the size of the army with which Hannibal invaded Italy.

After completing the invasion, he encamped at the very base of the Alps and at first set about restoring his forces.

For his entire army had not only been terribly worn down by the climbs and descents, and still more by the rough ground along the passes, but it was also in a wretched condition from the scarcity of provisions and from the lack of any care for the men's bodies.

Many had given themselves up entirely, broken by the want and by the unrelenting hardships. It had been impossible to carry an ample supply of food for so many tens of thousands across such terrain, and even what they did bring along was for the most part lost when the pack animals perished.

Thus, when he set out from the crossing of the Rhône he had some thirty-eight thousand infantry and more than eight thousand cavalry, and he lost nearly half of his force in the passes, as I stated above.

Even those who survived had become almost like wild beasts, in both their appearance and their general condition, because of the relentless hardships I have described.

Hannibal therefore took great care over their treatment and worked to restore both the spirits and the bodies of his men, and likewise of his horses.

After this, once his army had recovered its strength, he found that the Taurini, who happen to live near the foot of the mountains, were at odds with the Insubres and distrustful of the Carthaginians.

At first he invited them into friendship and alliance; but when they would not listen, he laid siege to their strongest city and stormed it within three days.

By slaughtering those who had resisted him, he instilled such fear in the neighbouring barbarian tribes that they all came over to him at once, surrendering themselves into his trust.

As for the rest of the Celts inhabiting the plains, they were eager to make common cause with the Carthaginians, in keeping with their original intention.

But since the Roman legions had by now advanced past most of them and cut them off, they kept quiet; and some were even compelled to serve alongside the Romans.

Seeing this, Hannibal decided not to delay but to push forward and to do something that would give heart to those who wished to share in the same hopes as himself.

Chapter 61 Approach of Scipio

While he was set on this purpose, Hannibal heard that Publius had already crossed the Padus with his forces and was close at hand. At first he refused to believe the reports,

reflecting that only a few days earlier he had left Publius behind near the crossing of the Rhône, and reckoning that the voyage from Massalia to Tyrrhenia was long and difficult to make.

Besides this, he had learned that the route from the Tyrrhenian Sea through Italy up to the Alps was a long one and hard for an army to traverse.

But as more and more men reported it, each with greater certainty, he was astonished and amazed at the consul's whole plan and the way he had carried it out.

Publius felt much the same. At first he had not even expected that Hannibal would attempt the march through the Alps with an army of foreign peoples; and even if he did dare it, he supposed the man would clearly be destroyed. So, while he was occupied with such thoughts,

when he learned that Hannibal had come through safely and was already besieging some towns in Italy, he was amazed at the man's audacity and reckless daring.

The people at Rome experienced just the same feelings about the news that reached them.

For the last report about the Carthaginians—that they had taken Saguntum—had only just ceased to be the talk of the city, and they had only just adopted measures in response to it: they had sent off one of the consuls to Libya to besiege Carthage itself, and the other to Iberia to wage war against Hannibal there. Then word arrived that Hannibal was present in Italy with his army and was already besieging some of its towns.

Since what was happening seemed to them incredible, they were thrown into immediate confusion and sent dispatches to Tiberius at Lilybaeum, informing him of the enemy's arrival and judging that he must abandon his current operations and come in all haste to aid their own affairs.

Tiberius at once assembled the crews of the fleet and sent them off, with orders to make the voyage home; and through the military tribunes he put the land forces under oath, fixing a day by which all of them were to be present at Ariminum for the night.

This is a city lying on the Adriatic, at the southern edge of the plains around the Padus.

With this upheaval breaking out on every side, and with events befalling everyone contrary to expectation, there was in every quarter no small anxiety about what was to come.

Chapter 62 Gallic Prisoners

At this time, as Hannibal and Publius were now drawing near to one another, each set about exhorting his own troops, presenting whatever suited the present circumstances.

Hannibal undertook to deliver his encouragement in the following way.

He gathered the men together and brought forward some young captives whom he had taken while they were harassing his march in the difficult country around the Alps.

He had treated these men harshly, preparing them for what he now intended: they wore heavy chains, were wasted by hunger, and their bodies were ruined by the lashes they had received.

Seating these prisoners in the middle, he set out before them suits of Gallic armour, of the kind in which their kings are accustomed to deck themselves when they are about to fight in single combat; and in addition he placed horses there and brought in costly cloaks.

Then he asked the young men which of them were willing to fight one another in single combat, on the terms that the victor would take the prizes set before them, while the loser would be released from his present miseries by death.

When they all cried out together that they wished to fight, he ordered them to draw lots, and commanded the two on whom the lot fell to arm themselves and fight each other.

The moment the young men heard this, they lifted up their hands and prayed to the gods, each eager that he himself might be one of those chosen by lot.

And when the result of the lottery was announced, those who had been picked were overjoyed, while the rest felt the opposite.

When the combat took place, the captives who were left behind counted the dead man no less fortunate than the victor, since the one had been released from many great miseries, while they themselves were still left to endure them.

The same view was held by most of the Carthaginians as well: for as they watched, by way of comparison, the wretchedness of those who were being led off still alive, they pitied these men, while the one who had died they accounted

Chapter 63 Harangues of Hannibal and Scipio

altogether fortunate. Having by these means worked the desired disposition into the spirits of his troops, Hannibal

then came forward himself and declared that this was why he had brought in the captives: so that, seeing vividly in the misfortunes of others what was at stake, his men might make better plans regarding their own situation.

For Fortune, he said, had confined them to a struggle and a moment very like that of the captives, and had set before them prizes very like those just offered.

They must either conquer, or die, or fall alive into the hands of their enemies. The prize for victory was not horses and cloaks, but to become the most fortunate of all men, having mastered the prosperity of Rome.

If they should fall while fighting—battling to their last breath for the noblest of hopes—they would exchange this life in the press of combat without ever tasting any misery;

but for those who were beaten, and who out of a craving to stay alive chose to flee, or by some other means clung to life, every misery and every misfortune would be their portion.

For not one of them, he said, could be so unreasoning or so dull that, remembering the length of the road he had travelled from his homeland, remembering the multitude of enemies that lay between, and knowing the size of the rivers he had crossed, he could ever hope to reach his own country by running away.

Therefore he thought that, with such a hope cut off entirely, they ought to take the very same view of their own situation that they had just now taken of the misfortunes of others.

For just as, in the case of those captives, everyone counted both the victor and the dead man fortunate while pitying the survivors, so, he thought, they ought to judge their own case, and all of them go into the contest meaning above all to win, but, if that should not be possible, to die.

The hope of living on in defeat he urged them not to entertain in their minds in any way whatever.

For if they adopted this reasoning and this resolve, then both victory and survival would clearly follow for them.

For all those who, whether by deliberate choice or by necessity, have adopted such a resolve have never been cheated of mastery over their opponents.

And when it also happens that the enemy hold the opposite hope—as is now the case with the Romans, so that for most of them safety plainly lies in flight, with their homeland near at hand—then it is clear that the daring of men who have abandoned all hope would prove irresistible.

Since the mass of the men accepted both the example and the words, and took on the drive and resolve that the speaker had striven to produce, Hannibal then praised them and dismissed them; and on the next day he ordered them to break camp at first light.

Chapter 64 Scipio Crosses the Ticinus

Around the same days Publius, having now crossed the river Padus and having decided to advance still farther by crossing the Ticinus, ordered the men skilled in such work to build a bridge over the latter river, while he gathered the rest of his forces together and addressed them.

Most of what he said concerned the prestige of their homeland and the achievements of their ancestors, but the part bearing on the present moment ran as follows.

He told them that, even though they had as yet gained no actual experience of the enemy, the mere fact that they knew they were about to face Carthaginians in battle should make their hope of victory beyond all dispute.

And in general he said it would be an outrageous and absurd thing if the Carthaginians dared to look the Romans in the eye—men who had often been beaten by them, who had paid them heavy tribute over and over, and who for so many years now had been all but their slaves.

"And when, quite apart from all this, we have already had some experience of these very men now before us—namely that they do not dare to face us head-on—what conclusion should those who reason correctly draw about what is to come?

What is more, their cavalry, when it clashed with our horsemen at the river Rhone, came off badly: they lost many of their own men and fled in disgrace all the way back to their own camp.

And their general together with his whole army, the moment they learned that our soldiers were near, made a retreat that was little better than a flight, and out of fear, against their own intentions, resorted to the march over the Alps.

Hannibal is here now, he said, having destroyed the greater part of his army, while what remains is feeble and unfit for service because of the hardships they have suffered; likewise he has lost the greater part of his horses and rendered the rest useless owing to the length and difficulty of the journey.

By all this he tried to show that they had only to make their appearance before the enemy.

Above all he urged them to take heart by looking to his own presence among them: for he would never have left his fleet and his campaign in Iberia, the task he had been sent to carry out, and come here in such haste, had he not seen very clearly, on rational grounds, that this action was both necessary for his country and certain to bring victory.

Since all the men, both from their trust in the speaker and from the truth of what he said, were eager for the battle, he welcomed their enthusiasm and dismissed them, urging them in addition to be ready for whatever order should be passed along.

Chapter 65 Cavalry Engagement on the Ticinus

On the very next day both sides advanced along the river on the side toward the Alps, the Romans keeping the stream on their left and the Carthaginians on their right.

On the second day, learning through their foraging parties that they were close to one another, they encamped where they were and stayed there for the time being.

On the following day both sides took all their cavalry—and Publius also the javelin-throwers from among his infantry—and advanced across the plain, eager to scout out each other's forces.

As soon as they drew near and saw the dust rising up, they at once began to form up for battle.

Publius, placing his javelin-throwers and the Gallic cavalry that accompanied them in front, and stationing the rest in a line abreast, advanced at a walking pace.

Hannibal, drawing up his bridled cavalry and all the steadier part of his horse facing the front, went to meet the enemy, while he held the Numidian cavalry ready on each wing for an encircling movement.

Since both the commanders and the horsemen on each side were keen for the contest, the first clash turned out to be such that the javelin-throwers did not even manage to let fly their first missile, but reeled back and fled at once through the gaps to the rear of their own squadrons, panicked by the charge and terrified of being trampled by the cavalry bearing down on them.

Those who met one another face to face kept the contest evenly balanced for a long time;

for it was at once a cavalry battle and an infantry battle, because of the number of men who dismounted in the very midst of the fighting.

But when the Numidians had encircled them and fallen on them from behind, the foot javelin-throwers, who at first had escaped the cavalry clash, were now trampled down by the mass and the onslaught of the Numidians;

while those who from the start had been fighting the Carthaginians face to face—having lost many of their own men, but having destroyed still more of the Carthaginians—now, attacked from the rear by the Numidians, were put to flight: most of them scattered, but some rallied around their commander.

Chapter 66 Scipio Crosses the Po

Publius then broke camp and advanced across the plains toward the bridge over the Padus, in haste to get his legions across first.

For seeing that the ground was level, that the enemy was superior in cavalry, and that he himself was weighed down by his wound, he judged it necessary to bring his forces back to safety.

Hannibal for a while supposed that they would risk a battle with their infantry too; but when he saw that they had moved out of their camp, he followed as far as the first river and the bridge over it.

Finding that most of the planks had been torn up, but that the men guarding the bridge were still left behind near the river, he took these prisoner—about six hundred of them in number.

Then, hearing that the rest had already gotten a long way ahead, he turned about again in the opposite direction and made his march along the river, hurrying to reach a point on the Padus where it could easily be bridged.

On the second day he halted and bridged the crossing with river boats, and assigned to Hasdrubal the task of bringing the main body across, while he himself crossed at once and dealt with the envoys who had arrived from the neighboring districts.

For as soon as he had gained the advantage, all the neighboring Celts hastened, in keeping with their original intention, to become his friends, to supply him, and to join the Carthaginians on campaign.

After receiving those who had come in a friendly manner and bringing his forces over from the far side, he advanced along the river, taking the opposite direction to his earlier march: for he now made his way downstream, eager to come to grips with the enemy.

Publius, having crossed the Padus and encamped near the city of Placentia, which was a Roman colony, attended at once to himself and the other wounded, and at the same time, considering that he had brought his forces into a safe position, kept quiet.

Hannibal, arriving on the second day after his crossing near the enemy, on the third day drew up his army in full view of his opponents.

But when no one came out against him, he pitched camp, leaving an interval of about fifty stades between the two armies.

Chapter 67 The Gauls Join Hannibal

The Celts who were serving alongside the Romans, seeing that the Carthaginians' prospects were the more promising of the two, made an agreement among themselves and watched for the right moment to strike, each remaining meanwhile in his own tent.

After the men in the camp had eaten their supper and gone to sleep, the Celts let most of the night pass, and then, around the time of the morning watch, they armed themselves and fell upon the Romans encamped nearest to them.

They killed many of them and wounded a good number more; and in the end, after cutting off the heads of the dead, they withdrew to the Carthaginians, numbering about two thousand infantry and a little under two hundred cavalry.

Hannibal welcomed their arrival warmly. He at once encouraged them, promised each of them suitable rewards, and sent them off to their own cities to report to their fellow citizens what they had done and to urge them to join his alliance.

For he knew that, once they learned of the act of treachery committed against the Romans by their own countrymen, they would all be compelled to throw in their lot with him.

At the same time the Boii also arrived and handed over to him the three men whom the Romans had sent out to distribute the land—men whom they had seized at the very start of the war by breaking the truce, as I have already described above.

Hannibal welcomed their goodwill and gave pledges of friendship and alliance to those who had come; but he returned the men to them, instructing them to keep them safe, so that through them they might recover their own hostages, in keeping with their original purpose.

Publius, indignant at the treachery that had occurred, reasoned that since the Celts had long been hostile toward the Romans, the defection of these men would cause all the surrounding Gauls to go over to the Carthaginians; and so he decided that he must guard against what was coming.

For this reason, when night fell, he broke camp toward dawn and set out toward the river Trebia and the hills adjoining it, trusting in the strength of the terrain

Chapter 68 Tiberius Sempronius Joins Scipio

and in the support of the allies who lived nearby. When Hannibal learned that they had broken camp, he immediately sent out the Numidian cavalry, and shortly afterward the rest, while he himself followed close behind with his main army.

The Numidians, finding the camp deserted, set it on fire.

This proved a great benefit to the Romans; for if the Numidians had instead pressed on at their heels and overtaken the baggage train, many of the Romans would have been cut down by the cavalry on the open plains.

As it was, however, most of them managed to cross the river Trebia first; of those left behind in the rearguard, some were killed and others taken alive by the Carthaginians.

Publius, then, having crossed the river just mentioned, made camp on the first line of hills,

and after surrounding his position with a ditch and a palisade, he waited for Tiberius and the forces with him, while attending carefully to his own recovery, eager to be able to take part in the coming engagement.

Hannibal pitched his camp about forty stades away from the enemy.

The mass of the Celts who inhabited the plains, having committed themselves to the Carthaginians' hopes, supplied the army abundantly with provisions and were ready to share in every undertaking and danger alongside Hannibal.

The people in Rome, when news of the cavalry engagement reached them, were taken aback that the outcome had run contrary to their expectations; yet they were not at a loss for excuses to convince themselves that what had happened was not a defeat.

Some blamed the rashness of the general, others the deliberate treachery of the Celts, which they inferred from the latter's recent defection.

In general, since their infantry legions remained intact, they reckoned their hopes for the overall outcome were likewise intact.

And so, when Tiberius and the legions with him arrived and were marching through Rome, the people imagined that the mere sight of them would decide the battle.

When the soldiers had gathered at Ariminum in accordance with their oath, the general took them up and led them forward, hurrying to join Publius's forces.

Having effected the junction and pitched camp beside them with his own troops, he let his men recover their strength—for they had marched on foot continuously for forty days from Lilybaeum to Ariminum—while he made every preparation as if for battle,

and he himself conferred carefully with Publius, inquiring into what had already taken place and deliberating together about the present situation.

Chapter 69 A Skirmish Near the Trebia

Around this same time Hannibal, by an act of treachery, gained control of the town of Clastidium, which was surrendered to him by the man from Brundisium to whom the Romans had entrusted it.

Having become master of the garrison and the stores of grain, he used the grain for his immediate needs, but took the men he had captured along with him unharmed,

wishing to give a demonstration of his own policy, so that those caught up by the circumstances need not be afraid or despair of obtaining safety from him.

He honored the traitor lavishly, eager to entice those holding positions of authority over toward the Carthaginians' prospects.

After this, observing that certain Celts who lived between the Padus and the river Trebia had made a friendship with him while at the same time sending messages to the Romans—convinced that in this way they would secure their safety from both sides—

he sent out two thousand infantry and about a thousand cavalry, both Celts and Numidians, with orders to overrun their territory.

When these men had carried out their orders and gathered a great deal of plunder, the Celts immediately came to the Roman camp begging for help.

Tiberius, who had long been looking for an opportunity to act, now seized on this as a pretext and sent out the greater part of his cavalry, together with about a thousand javelin-throwers from his infantry.

When these troops quickly came up with the enemy across the Trebia and fought them for the plunder, the Celts and Numidians were put to flight and withdrew toward their own camp.

But the troops on guard in front of the Carthaginian camp quickly grasped what was happening and brought up reserves from there to help the hard-pressed men; whereupon the Romans in turn were routed and withdrew back to their own camp.

Tiberius, seeing what was happening, sent out all his cavalry and javelin-throwers. When this happened, the Celts again gave way and retreated to the safety of their own position.

The Carthaginian general, being unprepared to risk a decisive engagement and believing that one should never bring on a full-scale battle without a settled plan or on the strength of any chance opening—which, it must be said, is the mark of a good commander—

checked his own men as they drew near the camp and forced them to halt and turn about, but prevented them from pursuing and engaging the enemy, recalling them through his aides and trumpeters. The Romans, after waiting a short time, withdrew,

having lost only a few of their own men while destroying a greater number of the Carthaginians.

Chapter 70 Tiberius Sempronius Plans to Attack

Tiberius, elated and overjoyed at this success, was keen to decide the whole issue as quickly as possible.

Now it lay within his power to act on his own judgment in the present circumstances, since Publius was ill; nevertheless, wishing to secure his colleague's opinion as well, he discussed the matter with him.

Publius, however, held the opposite view about the present situation.

For he reckoned that their legions would become better after wintering under arms; that the faithlessness of the Celts would not remain loyal once the Carthaginians were inactive and forced to keep quiet, but would instead make some fresh move against them again;

and besides, that once he himself had recovered from his wound, he hoped to be able to render real service to their common cause.

Reasoning along these lines, he urged Tiberius to remain with things as they stood.

Tiberius knew that each of these points was being stated truly and properly; but driven by ambition and an unreasonable confidence in the situation, he was eager to decide the whole matter himself—before Publius could be present at the battle and before the incoming consuls could take over the command; for the time for that was now at hand.

For this reason, choosing not the moment that the circumstances called for but his own, he was plainly bound to fall short of what was needed.

Hannibal, holding much the same view as Publius about the present situation, was for the opposite reason eager to engage the enemy: first, he wished to make use of the Celts' fighting spirit while it was still fresh;

second, to engage the Roman legions while they were still untrained and newly recruited; third, to fight while Publius was still unable to take the field; and, most important of all, to be doing something and not let the time slip away to no purpose.

For when a general has brought his army into foreign territory and is attempting bold undertakings, this is the one means of safety: continually to keep the hopes of his allies fresh.

Hannibal, then, knowing the attack that was to come

Chapter 71 Hannibal Prepares An Ambush

These were the matters that occupied Tiberius. Hannibal, meanwhile, had long since noticed a stretch of ground between the two camps that was flat and bare of trees, yet well suited for an ambush, because a watercourse ran through it with a raised bank along its edge, and along that bank grew a continuous thicket of thorns and brambles. There he set about laying a trap for the enemy.

He was confident the scheme would easily escape notice. For the Romans were suspicious of wooded ground, since the Celts always set their ambushes in such places, but they felt no distrust of level and open country—

not realizing that, both for staying concealed and for keeping the men in ambush from coming to any harm, open ground is in fact better suited than woodland. The reason is that those lying in wait can see everything that is going on from a long way off, while in most such places there is cover enough to hide behind.

A chance watercourse with a low bank, or sometimes reeds, ferns, and a kind of thorn-scrub, can conceal not only infantry but at times even cavalry, provided one takes the modest precaution of laying the conspicuous parts of the armor flat against the ground and tucking the helmets in under the shields.

In any case, the Carthaginian general, after conferring with his brother Mago and with his council about the coming engagement, found them all in agreement with his plans.

So, as soon as the army had taken its evening meal, he called for his brother Mago—a young man, but full of dash and trained in warfare from boyhood—and assigned to him a hundred horsemen and an equal number of foot soldiers.

While it was still daylight, he had picked out the most robust men from the whole army and ordered them, after their supper, to report to his tent.

There he encouraged them and roused in them the spirit the occasion demanded, and instructed each man to choose ten of the bravest soldiers from his own unit and bring them to a certain spot in the camp that had already been designated.

When they had carried out his orders, he sent these men—a thousand cavalry and as many infantry—off by night to the place of ambush, supplying them with guides, and gave his brother his instructions about the timing of the attack.

At first light he himself assembled the Numidian cavalry, who were outstanding for their stamina, encouraged them, and—promising rewards to those who fought well—ordered them to ride up to the enemy's rampart, then quickly cross the river and skirmish so as to provoke the enemy into action. His aim was to catch his opponents before they had breakfasted and while they were still unprepared for what lay ahead.

He then gathered the rest of his officers, urged them likewise toward the coming battle, and ordered them all to breakfast and to see to their weapons and horses.

Chapter 72 Preparations for Battle

As soon as Tiberius saw the Numidian cavalry approaching, he immediately sent out his own cavalry on their own, with orders to engage and close with the enemy.

Next he sent out the foot javelineers, about six thousand of them, and he also set the rest of his army in motion from the camp, as though the whole issue were going to be decided at first sight. He was emboldened both by his superior numbers and by his cavalry's success the day before.

It was now around the winter solstice, and the day was snowy and bitterly cold; and since nearly all the men and horses had marched out without breakfast, at the start the troops were carried along by their dash and eagerness.

But when it came to crossing the river Trebia, which had risen because of the rain that had fallen during the night on the high ground above the camps, the infantry could barely get across, immersed up to their chests.

As a result the army was in distress from the cold and from hunger, all the more as the day wore on.

The Carthaginians, by contrast, had eaten and drunk in their tents, had got their horses ready, and were all rubbing themselves down with oil and arming around their fires.

Hannibal, watching for his moment, as soon as he saw that the Romans had crossed the river, threw out his spearmen and Balearic slingers—some eight thousand of them—as a covering force and led out his army.

Advancing about eight stades in front of his camp, he drew up his infantry, about twenty thousand in number—Iberians, Celts, and Libyans—in a single straight line,

and dividing his cavalry, he stationed them on either wing—more than ten thousand, counting his Celtic allies—while he split the elephants and posted them in front of both wings.

Tiberius at this same moment was recalling his cavalry, since he saw they could make no headway against the enemy. For the Numidians would fall back easily and in scattered fashion, then wheel about and press the attack again boldly and recklessly—this being the characteristic feature of Numidian fighting.

His infantry he drew up in the formation customary among the Romans: about sixteen thousand citizens and twenty thousand allies.

For with them a full army for major operations consists of that many men, whenever circumstances bring both consuls together at once.

After this, placing his cavalry—about four thousand—on either wing, he advanced against the enemy in imposing style, in good order

Chapter 73 The Battle of the Trebia

and at a steady, deliberate pace. When the two sides were now close to one another, the light-armed troops posted in front of each army closed with each other.

When this happened, the Romans were at a disadvantage in many respects, while for the Carthaginians the engagement turned out greatly in their favor,

since the Roman foot javelineers had been under hard strain since dawn, had spent most of their missiles in the clash with the Numidians, and found the missiles they had left useless from being soaked through by the persistent damp.

Much the same was happening with their cavalry and with the army as a whole.

With the Carthaginians the situation was the very opposite: drawn up fresh and in their prime, they were always ready and eager for whatever was needed.

And so, as soon as the light troops who had fought the opening skirmish had been received back through the gaps in the line, and the heavy-armed troops on both sides had clashed, the Carthaginian cavalry at once began pressing the enemy hard from both wings, since they far outnumbered them and were superior in the freshness of both men and horses, owing to the unworn condition I mentioned, in which they had set out.

As the Roman cavalry gave way and the wings of the phalanx were left exposed, the Carthaginian spearmen and the mass of Numidians, sweeping past their own front ranks and falling upon the Roman flanks, did them great damage and prevented them from fighting the troops facing them.

But the heavy-armed troops on both sides, who held the front and center positions of the whole line, kept up a close, hand-to-hand fight for a long time, evenly matched,

Chapter 74 The Romans Retreat to Placentia

making the contest a fierce one. It was at this point that the Numidians lying in ambush rose up and suddenly fell on the rear of the troops fighting in the center, throwing the Roman forces into great confusion and difficulty.

In the end both of Tiberius's wings, pressed in front by the elephants and all around—on their flanks—by the light-armed troops, were routed and driven, as the pursuit went on, toward the river that lay behind them.

After this, of the Romans stationed in the center of the action, those positioned in the rear were destroyed and suffered terribly under the attack of the men from the ambush,

while those in the foremost ranks, forced to fight on, overpowered the Celts and a portion of the Libyans, killed many of them, and cut their way through the Carthaginian line.

Seeing that their own wings had been driven off the field, they gave up any thought of going to their aid or of returning to their own camp—wary of the enemy's superior numbers of cavalry, and hindered by the river and by the driving, swirling downpour beating down on their heads.

So, keeping their ranks, they withdrew in a body and in safety to Placentia, numbering no fewer than ten thousand.

Of the rest, the greater part perished near the river at the hands of the elephants and the cavalry,

while those of the infantry who escaped, and most of the cavalry, made their withdrawal toward the body of men just mentioned and were brought back together with them to Placentia.

The Carthaginian army pursued the enemy as far as the river but, unable to advance any farther because of the storm, returned again to its camp.

They were all overjoyed at the battle, feeling they had won a complete success; for it turned out that few of the Iberians and Libyans had fallen, and that the heaviest losses had been among the Celts.

But from the rain and the snow that followed, they were so badly affected that the elephants died—all but one—and many of the men and horses perished as well from the cold.

Chapter 75 Better Success in Spain

Tiberius, well aware of what had happened but wishing as far as possible to hide the disaster from the people in Rome, sent messengers to report that a battle had been fought but that the storm had robbed them of the victory.

For the moment the Romans believed the reports that reached them; but before long they learned that the Carthaginians were holding their own camp and that all the Celts had gone over to friendship with them,

while their own men had abandoned their camp, had withdrawn from the field, had all gathered together into the cities, and were being supplied with necessities by sea up the river Padus. They then understood all too clearly what had really happened in the battle.

And so, since the affair had come upon them as a complete surprise, they devoted themselves with special energy to their remaining preparations and to guarding the regions that lay exposed, sending legions to Sardinia and Sicily, and garrisons to Tarentum and to other places of strategic value; they also fitted out sixty quinqueremes.

Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius Flaminius, who happened to be the consuls newly installed at that time, were assembling the allies and enrolling their own legions.

They also forwarded supplies, some to Ariminum and some to Etruria, with the intention of taking the field from those positions.

They sent too to Hiero asking for help, and he dispatched to them five hundred Cretans and a thousand peltasts. In short, they were vigorously making every kind of preparation on every front.

For the Romans are at their most formidable, both collectively and as individuals, when they are gripped by genuine fear.

Chapter 76 Gnaeus Scipio in Spain

About this same time Gnaeus Cornelius, who had been left by his brother Publius in command of the naval forces (as I mentioned earlier), set sail from the mouths of the Rhone and put in with his whole fleet on the Iberian coast at the region called Emporium.

Starting from there he made a series of landings: those of the coastal inhabitants who would not submit, as far as the river Iber, he besieged, while those who came over to him he treated kindly, taking every possible care for their welfare.

Having secured the coastal peoples who had joined him, he advanced with his whole army, marching into the interior,

for by now he had also gathered a large allied contingent of Iberians. As he went forward he won some cities over and subdued others.

When the Carthaginians—those whom Hanno had been left in charge of in that district—encamped against him near a city called Cissa, Gnaeus engaged them in a pitched battle, defeated them, and gained a great quantity of property, since the whole baggage of the forces that had set out for Italy had been left behind with them.

He made allies and friends of all the peoples north of the river Iber, and took prisoner both Hanno, the Carthaginian general, and Andobales, the leader of the Iberians.

This Andobales was ruler of the inland regions and had always been exceptionally well disposed toward the Carthaginians.

Hasdrubal quickly grasped what had happened and came to the rescue, crossing the river Iber.

Learning that the men from the Roman fleet had been left behind and were carrying on carelessly and overconfidently because of the success of the land forces,

he took from his own army about eight thousand infantry and around a thousand cavalry, caught the men from the ships scattered about the countryside, killed many of them, and forced the rest to flee to their vessels.

He then withdrew, recrossed the river Iber, and set about preparing and garrisoning the regions south of the river, taking up his winter quarters at New Carthage.

Gnaeus, having rejoined his fleet and punished those responsible for the disaster according to their own customs, then brought his land and sea forces together in one place and took up his winter quarters at Tarraco.

By dividing the spoils fairly among his soldiers, he won great goodwill from them and made them eager for what lay ahead.

Chapter 77 Hannibal's Treatment of Roman Prisoners

Such was the state of affairs in Iberia. As the spring season set in, Gaius Flaminius took up his forces and advanced through Etruria, pitching camp before the city of the Arretines,

while Gnaeus Servilius went in the opposite direction, toward Ariminum, to watch there for the enemy's invasion.

Hannibal, wintering in Celtic territory, kept the Romans among the prisoners from the battle under guard, giving them only modest rations,

but their allies he at first treated with every kindness; and afterward he gathered them together and addressed them, declaring that he had not come to make war on them but on the Romans on their behalf. Therefore, he said, if they were sensible, they should

hold fast to friendship with him.

For he had come, first, to win back freedom for the peoples of Italy, and likewise to help each of them recover the cities and territory they had lost to the Romans.

With these words he released them all without ransom to their own homes, wishing in this way both to draw the inhabitants of Italy to his side and to alienate them from their goodwill toward Rome, and to stir up those who felt they had suffered any loss of cities or harbors under Roman rule.

Chapter 78 Hannibal Marches Southward

During his time in winter quarters he also employed a certain stratagem that was thoroughly Phoenician in character.

Because he was anxious about the unreliability of the Celts and about possible plots against his life—the alliance between himself and them being so recently formed—he had a set of false hairpieces made, each one suited to the appearance natural to a different age of life.

These he wore constantly, changing them from one to another, and in the same way he kept changing his clothing as well, always to match whichever wig he was wearing.

By this means he was hard to recognize, not only for those who caught sight of him suddenly, but even for those who were on familiar terms with him.

He observed, however, that the Celts were resentful at the war dragging on in their own territory, and that they were eager and on edge to push into enemy land—ostensibly out of anger toward the Romans, but mostly for the sake of plunder. He therefore decided to break camp as quickly as possible and to satisfy the army's impulses.

And so, as soon as the season began to change, he made inquiries of those reputed to have the best knowledge of the country. He found that the other routes for invading enemy territory were long and obvious to the enemy, whereas the one leading through the marshes into Etruria, though difficult, was short and would catch Flaminius and his men completely off guard.

Since he was always by temperament drawn to this kind of approach, he resolved to make his march by this route.

But when word spread through the camp that the general intended to lead them through some marshes, every man grew wary of the march, fearful of pits and

Chapter 79 Hannibal Goes Through the Marsh

the swampy stretches of the terrain. But Hannibal had carefully reconnoitered the ground along the route, learning which parts were shallow and firm. He broke camp and placed the Libyans and Iberians—all the more serviceable part of his force—in the vanguard, mixing the baggage train in among them so that they would have ample supplies for the immediate present.

As for the longer term, he gave no thought at all to the whole baggage train, reasoning that once he reached enemy country, if he were defeated he would have no further need of supplies, and if he held the open field he would have no shortage of provisions.

Behind the troops just mentioned he set the Celts, and behind all of them the cavalry.

He left his brother Mago in charge of the rearguard, both for general reasons and especially because of the softness and aversion to hardship of the Celts, so that if they should suffer and try to turn back, Mago could stop them with the cavalry and lay hands on them.

Now the Iberians and Libyans, marching through the marshes while these were still untrampled, got through with only moderate hardship, since they were all hardy by nature and accustomed to such ordeals.

But the Celts advanced only with difficulty, since the marshes were now churned up and trodden into deep mire, and they endured the suffering painfully and miserably, being wholly unused to that kind of distress.

Yet they were prevented from slipping back to the rear by the cavalry stationed behind them.

All of them suffered, especially from sleeplessness, as they marched continuously through water for four days and three nights on end; but the Celts in particular labored and perished more than the rest.

Most of his pack animals slipped in the mud, fell, and died, providing a single service to the men in their fall:

for the soldiers sat on the carcasses and, piling the baggage in heaps, kept themselves above the water, and in this way snatched a little sleep during a short part of the night.

Not a few of the horses, too, lost their hoofs through the relentless march across the mud.

Hannibal himself barely came through, riding with great hardship on the one elephant that survived, in severe pain from a violent attack of ophthalmia that had struck him—through which he ultimately lost the sight of one eye, since the circumstances allowed him no time to halt or apply treatment, the situation making it impossible.

Chapter 80 Flaminius in Hannibal's Way

Having crossed the marshy terrain in this unexpected fashion, and finding Flaminius in Etruria encamped before the city of Arretium, Hannibal for the moment pitched camp there beside the marshes,

wishing to rest his army and to make a thorough study of the enemy and of the terrain that lay ahead.

He learned that the country in front of him was rich in plunder, and that Flaminius was a consummate rabble-rouser and demagogue but had no natural aptitude for the genuine conduct of military affairs, and on top of this was overconfident in his own resources.

He therefore calculated that if he marched past their camp and descended into the territory beyond, Flaminius—partly anxious about the jeers of the crowd, unable to bear watching the land being ravaged, and partly stung by personal feeling—would readily come along, following him into any region, eager to win the success on his own and not to wait for the arrival of his colleague, who held equal authority.

From all this he reckoned that Flaminius would hand him many openings for an attack.

Chapter 81 A General Must Know his Enemy's Character

He reasoned all this out with intelligence and practical sense. For it would not be wrong to say that anyone who supposes there is any more decisive element of generalship than knowing the purpose and character of the opposing commander is ignorant and deluded.

Just as in contests between individuals or between ranks the man who means to win must observe carefully how he can reach his goal and what part of his opponent appears exposed or insufficiently armored,

so too those in command of whole armies must look not for where some part of the body is unguarded, but for where some vulnerable point in the mind of the enemy commander shows itself.

For many men, through laziness and sheer idleness, utterly throw away not only the affairs of the state but their own private lives as well;

many, through their craving for wine, cannot even fall asleep without a stupefying bout of drunkenness;

and some, through their lust for sexual pleasure and their obsession with it, have not only brought ruin on cities and lives but have even forfeited their own existence in disgrace.

And indeed, cowardice and slackness bring reproach on the individuals who have them privately, but when they reside in a supreme commander they become a public matter and the greatest of calamities.

For such a commander not only renders his subordinates ineffective, but often brings the gravest dangers upon those who have placed their trust in him.

Recklessness, too, and audacity and irrational temper, and likewise vainglory and conceit, are easy prey for the enemy but most perilous for one's friends. For a man of that sort is an easy mark for every plot, ambush, and deception.

So if a man can discern the failings of those around him, and approach his adversaries precisely at the point and by the means through which the enemy's leader is most vulnerable, he would very quickly master the whole campaign. For just as, if you remove the helmsman from a ship,

the entire vessel with all its crew falls into the hands of the enemy, in the same way, if a man outmaneuvers the commander of an army through his designs and calculations, he often gains possession of the opposing force, men and all.

It was precisely by foreseeing and reasoning out these things about the enemy commander that Hannibal, on this occasion, did not fail in his design.

Chapter 82 Flaminius Enticed Out

For as soon as Hannibal broke camp from the region around Faesulae and, passing a little beyond the Roman encampment, made his raid into the country that lay ahead,

Flaminius at once became agitated and full of fury, imagining that he was being treated with contempt by the enemy.

Then, as the country was being plundered and the smoke rising everywhere signaled its devastation, he grew indignant, regarding what was happening as outrageous.

And so, when some advised that he should not rashly pursue or close with the enemy, but should be on his guard and beware of their large body of cavalry, and above all should wait for the other consul and engage in battle only when all the armies were combined together,

he not only paid no attention to what they said but could not even tolerate those who offered such advice.

He urged them rather to consider what the people back home were likely to say if the country were being ravaged almost up to the very walls of Rome while they sat encamped in Etruria behind the enemy.

Finally, with these words, he broke camp and advanced with his army, giving no thought to time or place, intent only on engaging the enemy, as though victory were already plainly theirs.

For he had instilled in the crowds such confident expectation that those who tagged along outside the ranks for the sake of booty—carrying chains and fetters and all such equipment—were more numerous than those bearing arms.

Hannibal, for his part, was at the same time advancing forward through Etruria toward Rome, keeping on his left the city called Cortona and its hills, and on his right the lake called Thrasymene.

As he advanced he set fire to the country and laid it waste, wishing to provoke the fury of his opponents. And when he saw that Flaminius was already drawing near,

and had observed ground naturally suited to his purpose,

Chapter 83 Hannibal Takes a Position in the Valley

he set about preparing for battle. Along the route there was a level defile, which on its two long sides had high, continuous hills, while at its short ends it was closed: on the side facing him by a steep, hard-to-climb height set across the way, and at the rear by the lake, which left only an extremely narrow passage into the valley along the foot of the hills.

Passing through the valley along the lake, Hannibal seized for himself the hill that faced the line of march, and encamped on it with the Iberians and Libyans.

The Balearic slingers and spearmen he led around by the vanguard and posted in concealment beneath the hills lying to the right of the valley, deploying them in a long extended line.

The cavalry and the Celts he likewise led around in a circuit under the hills on the left and stretched them out in a continuous line, so that the outermost of them were right at the entrance—the one running between the lake and the foot of the hills into the place described.

So Hannibal, having made these preparations during the night and having ringed the valley with his ambushes, kept quiet.

Flaminius followed close behind, eager to close with the enemy.

He had pitched camp the day before right beside the lake at a very late hour, and when day broke afterward he immediately, at dawn, led his vanguard along the lake into the valley below, intending to engage the enemy.

Chapter 84 The Disaster At the Thrasymene Lake

The day being exceptionally foggy, Hannibal—once the greater part of the marching column had entered the valley and the enemy's vanguard was already drawing close to him—gave the signals and sent word to the men in the ambushes, and launched his attack on the enemy from every side at once.

Flaminius and his men, taken aback by this sudden appearance, and with visibility poor because of the conditions in the air, and with the enemy bearing down and falling upon them from higher ground at many points, found that the Roman company-commanders and tribunes were not only unable to bring help wherever it was needed, but could not even grasp what was happening.

For they were being struck simultaneously—some in front, some from the rear, some on the flanks.

As a result, most of them were cut down still in their order of march, unable to defend themselves, as if they had been handed over to slaughter by the poor judgment of their commander.

For while they were still debating what to do, they were being destroyed before they realized it.

At that very moment some of the Celts fell upon Flaminius himself—who was at a loss and in utter distress over the whole situation—and killed him.

So of the Romans in the valley nearly fifteen thousand fell, unable either to give way to the circumstances or to do anything at all, but holding to this above all else, in keeping with their training: not to flee or abandon their ranks.

Those, however, who were caught on the march in the narrows between the lake and the foot of the hills were destroyed shamefully, and still more wretchedly.

For as they were forced back into the lake, some, in their frenzy of mind, plunged in to swim with their armor on and were drowned, while the great mass advanced into the lake as far as they could and stayed there with only their heads above the water.

When the cavalry rode in and destruction was plainly before them, they raised their hands and begged to be taken alive, uttering every kind of plea; but in the end they were killed, some by the enemy, and some at their own urging by their comrades.

About six thousand of those in the valley, having beaten the enemy directly in front of them, were unable to come to the aid of their own side or to get around behind their opponents, because they could see nothing of what was happening—though they could have rendered great service to the overall outcome.

Always pressing forward, they kept advancing, convinced they would fall in with some of the enemy, until without realizing it they emerged onto the higher ground. When they reached the heights,

and the fog had by now lifted, they understood the disaster that had occurred. No longer able to do anything—since the enemy now had the upper hand in the whole battle and already held all the ground—they closed ranks and withdrew to a certain Etrurian village.

After the battle, Maharbal was sent by the general with the Iberians and the spearmen and encamped around the village; and with manifold difficulties closing in on them, they laid down their arms and surrendered under a truce, on the understanding that their lives would be spared.

Such, then, was the course of the entire engagement that took place in Etruria between the Romans and the Carthaginians.

Chapter 85 Roman Reaction

So that affair was brought to its conclusion. Hannibal, once the men who had surrendered under terms had been brought back to him, along with the rest of the prisoners as well, gathered them all together — more than fifteen thousand of them.

He began by making clear that Maharbal had no authority to grant the men who had surrendered their safety without his own consent. After this he delivered an indictment against the Romans.

When he had finished with that, he distributed all the captives who were Romans among the units of his army to be held under guard, but he released all the allies, without ransom, to return to their own homes,

repeating the same declaration he had made before: that he had come to wage war not against the Italians but against the Romans, on behalf of the freedom of the Italians.

He then let his own forces recover their strength, and he buried the most distinguished of the dead from his own army, about thirty in number; for in all about fifteen hundred had fallen, most of whom were Celts.

Having done this, he began to deliberate with his brother and his friends about where and how he ought to press his advance, since he was now confident about the whole campaign.

When news of the disaster that had occurred reached Rome, the leaders of the state were unable to disguise or play down what had happened, because of the sheer scale of the calamity, and they were forced to tell the people what had taken place, calling the citizens together into an assembly.

And so, the moment the magistrate announced to the crowds from the Rostra, "We have lost a great battle," such a panic broke out that, to those who had been present on both occasions, the event then seemed far greater than at the actual moment of the battle itself.

And this was natural enough. For having had no experience, for many years, either of the word or of the fact of an acknowledged defeat, they bore the reversal with no moderation and no composure.

The Senate, however, did not do so: it held to the reasoning that the situation demanded, and deliberated about the future — how, and what, each group ought to do.

Chapter 86 A Second Disaster in Etruria

At the time of the battle, Gnaeus Servilius, the consul stationed forward in the region of Ariminum —

this lies on the side of Italy facing the Adriatic, where the plains of Gaul join the rest of Italy, not far from where the mouths of the Po empty into the sea —

having heard that Hannibal had invaded Etruria and was encamped opposite Flaminius, intended to join all his own legions to him. But, unable to do so because of the weight of his army, he hurriedly sent Gaius Centenius ahead with four thousand cavalry, wishing them to arrive in advance of his own coming, should circumstances require it.

Hannibal, when the enemy's relief force was reported to him after the battle, sent out Maharbal with the spearmen and a portion of the cavalry.

These troops fell upon Gaius's men and, in the very first engagement, destroyed nearly half of them, and after driving the rest together onto a certain hill, on the following day took them all prisoner.

In Rome, with the report of the battle now three days old, and the suffering throughout the city at that very moment, so to speak, at its most inflamed, when this further reversal also came on top of it, not only the populace but the Senate itself was thrown into dismay.

For this reason they set aside the annual conduct of public business and the election of magistrates, and undertook to deliberate more seriously about the present situation, judging that affairs and the surrounding circumstances called for a commander with absolute authority.

Hannibal, now thoroughly confident about the whole campaign, decided against approaching Rome for the present, and instead advanced through the countryside, plundering it without resistance, making his march toward the Adriatic.

Passing through the country called Umbria and that of Picenum, he reached the Adriatic region on the tenth day,

having taken so much plunder that the army could neither drive nor carry off the spoils, and having killed a great many people along the way;

for, just as in the storming of cities, on this occasion too an order had been given to kill any grown men who fell into their hands. This he did because of the

Chapter 87 Quintus Fabius Maximus

innate hatred toward the Romans that was rooted in him. During this period, encamping beside the Adriatic in a country surpassingly rich in every kind of produce, he took great pains over the recovery and care of his men, and no less of his horses.

For since their winter quarters in the region of Gaul had been spent in the open, and what with the cold and the lack of oil for grooming, and on top of that the subsequent march and hardship through the marshes, nearly all the horses, and likewise the men, had developed what is called scurvy and a wretched condition of that sort.

So, having gained control of a prosperous country, he put the horses back into good condition, and restored the bodies and the spirits of his soldiers. He also re-equipped the Libyans in the Roman fashion with select weapons, since he had become master of so much captured gear.

At this time he also sent men by sea to report to Carthage about what had happened; for this was the first time he had reached the sea since he made his invasion into Italy.

On hearing this, the Carthaginians rejoiced greatly, and gave much energy and forethought to supporting in every possible way both their cause in Italy and their cause in Iberia.

The Romans appointed as dictator Quintus Fabius, a man outstanding in judgment and of fine natural endowment. Indeed, even down to our own day the members of this household are called the Maximi — that is, "the Greatest" — on account of that man's successes and achievements.

The dictator differs from the consuls in this respect: each of the consuls is attended by twelve axes,

but this officer by twenty-four; and whereas the consuls in many matters require the Senate's cooperation to carry out their plans, this man is a commander with absolute power, upon whose appointment all the magistracies in Rome are immediately dissolved, except the tribunes of the people.

We shall, however, give a more precise account of these matters elsewhere. Together with the dictator they appointed Marcus Minucius as master of the horse. This officer is placed under the commander-in-chief, but becomes, as it were, his deputy in the holder's absences on other business.

Chapter 88 Hannibal Marches Through Iapygia

Hannibal, shifting his camp from place to place over short distances, lingered in the region along the Adriatic. Because he had a great supply of old wine, he washed down his horses with it and so cured them of their poor condition and their mange.

In much the same way he restored his men, healing the wounded and bringing the rest into good physical shape and a keen readiness for the tasks ahead.

Then, after passing through and laying waste the territories of Praetutia and Hadria, and further those of the Marrucini and the Frentani, he set out and made his march into Iapygia.

This region is divided under three names—its peoples being called Daunii, Peucetii, and Messapii—and the first district he invaded was Daunia.

Beginning there from Luceria, which is a Roman colony, he plundered the countryside.

After this he encamped near the place called Vibo, overran the territory of Arpi, and ravaged all of Daunia without opposition.

At this same time Fabius, after his appointment, sacrificed to the gods and then set out together with his master of the horse and the four legions that had been enrolled for the occasion.

Joining the forces that had come to his aid from Ariminum near Narnia, he relieved Gnaeus, the existing commander, of the land command and sent him off under escort to Rome, with instructions that, should the Carthaginians make any movement by sea, he should always come to the rescue as circumstances required.

Fabius himself, with his master of the horse, took over the forces and encamped facing the Carthaginians near the place called Aecae, keeping about fifty stades from the enemy.

Chapter 89 Fabius Defers Battle

Hannibal, realizing that Fabius had arrived and wishing to strike fear into his opponents by an immediate assault, led out his army, drew close to the Roman entrenchment, and formed up for battle. But after waiting for some time, with no one coming out against him, he again withdrew to his own camp.

For Fabius had resolved neither to expose himself to risk nor to stake everything on a battle, but to make the safety of those under his command his first and foremost aim; and he held firmly to this decision.

At the outset he was despised for it and gave occasion for talk that he had turned coward and was terrified of the danger. But in time he compelled everyone to admit and agree that no one could possibly have handled the circumstances then prevailing with greater sense or prudence.

And events soon bore witness in favor of his reasoning—and reasonably so.

For it happened that the enemy's forces had been continuously trained in warfare from their earliest years; that they had as their leader a man brought up among them and schooled from boyhood in operations in the field;

that they had won many battles in Iberia, and had twice in succession beaten the Romans and their allies; and, most important of all, that having given up everything else, they had one single hope of survival—in victory.

With the Roman army the very opposite of all this was the case.

For this reason Fabius was unable to commit to a decisive engagement, since his inferiority was plain to see. Instead, falling back in his calculations upon his own advantages, he kept to these and conducted the war by their means.

And the Romans' advantages were inexhaustible resources

Chapter 90 Hannibal Enters Campania

and an abundance of manpower. And so, in the period that followed, he kept maneuvering alongside the enemy, and by his experience he would seize beforehand all the favorable positions.

Since he had ample supplies at his back, he never let his soldiers go out foraging or get separated from the camp at all, but kept them always concentrated and massed together, watching for the right places and moments.

And many of the enemy who, out of contempt for him, strayed from their own camp to forage he captured and destroyed in this manner.

He did this with a double purpose: at once to keep whittling down the enemy from their fixed numbers, and at the same time gradually to build up and restore the spirits of his own troops, which had been beaten down in the larger contests, through these successes in detail.

But to come down to a decisive trial of strength by mutual agreement he was in no way willing.

None of this, however, pleased Marcus, his master of the horse. Currying favor with the crowd, he disparaged Fabius to everyone, alleging that he was conducting affairs in an ignoble and sluggish way, while he himself was eager to take the risk and fight it out.

The Carthaginians, after laying waste the districts mentioned, crossed the Apennines and descended into the land of Samnium—a prosperous country untouched by war for many years—and found themselves amid such abundance of provisions that they could not exhaust the plunder by use or by destruction. They also overran the territory of Beneventum,

which is a Roman colony, and took the city of Venusia, which was unwalled and full of property of every kind in great quantity.

The Romans kept following continually behind, staying one or two days' march away, yet they were unable to come near or grapple with the enemy.

Therefore Hannibal, seeing that Fabius was plainly avoiding battle but was not on the whole giving up the open country, made a bold move into the plains around Capua, and within them to the place called Falernum,

convinced that one of two things would result: either he would force the enemy to fight, or he would make it clear to all that he was master of the field and that the Romans were yielding the open country to him.

Should that happen, he hoped the cities, struck with dismay, would be moved to revolt from Rome.

For up to that time, though the Romans had now been defeated in two battles, not a single city in Italy had gone over to the Carthaginians; they all kept their loyalty, even though some were suffering badly.

From this one may gauge the awe and esteem the Roman state inspired among its allies.

Chapter 91 Fertility and Beauty of the Plains Near Capua

And in fact Hannibal had good reason for arriving at these calculations.

For the plains around Capua are the most renowned in all Italy, both for their richness and their beauty and because they lie right on the sea and have at their disposal those trading ports into which sailors bound for Italy run from nearly every part of the inhabited world.

They also contain within them the most famous and most beautiful cities of Italy.

Their coastline is occupied by the people of Sinuessa, of Cumae, and of Puteoli, and besides these the Neapolitans, and lastly the nation of the Nucerians.

Of the interior, the parts toward the north are inhabited by the people of Cales and of Teanum, and those toward the east and south by the Daunii*

and the Nolans. In the very center of the plains lies Capua, the city that was once the most blessed of all.

The story told even by the mythographers about these plains is most plausible: these too are called the Phlegraean plains, just like others among the famous plains. And it is most likely that the gods quarreled over these in particular because of their beauty and their fertility.

Along with the advantages already mentioned, the plains are thought to be strong and altogether difficult to enter; for they are enclosed on one side by the sea and for the greater part by great mountains, continuous on every side, through which there are only three passes from the interior, narrow and hard to traverse:

one from Samnium, a second from Latium, and the last from the region around the Hirpini.

For this reason the Carthaginians, by encamping in these plains as in a theater, were bound to strike everyone with astonishment at the unexpected sight, to expose their enemies as cowards shrinking from battle, and to show themselves beyond dispute the masters of the open country.

Chapter 92 Hannibal Selects Winter Quarters

Reasoning along these lines, then, Hannibal marched out of Samnite territory through the pass by the hill called Eribianus and encamped beside the river Vulturnus, which divides the plains just described into roughly two halves.

He kept his camp on the side facing Rome, and with his foraging parties he ranged over the whole plain and plundered it without hindrance.

Fabius was thoroughly alarmed at the enemy's daring stroke, but for that very reason he held all the more firmly to the course he had decided upon.

His colleague Marcus, however, along with all the military tribunes and company commanders in the army, believed they had caught the enemy in an excellent position, and thought they ought to press on, close with them on the plain, and not stand by while the most celebrated part of the country was being ravaged.

Fabius pressed forward only as far as reaching the area, going along with those who were eager and ready to take risks,

but once he had drawn near to Falernum, he showed himself along the lower slopes and kept pace with the enemy, so as not to seem to his own allies to be surrendering the open country.

He would not, however, bring his army down into the plain, taking care to avoid an all-out engagement, both for the reasons already mentioned and because the enemy was plainly far superior in cavalry.

As for Hannibal, when he had tested the enemy and ravaged the entire plain, gathering an immense quantity of plunder,

he set about breaking camp, intending not to squander the booty but to deposit it in a place where he could also pass the winter, so that the army might have not merely a present feast but a steady abundance of supplies.

Fabius understood his plan—that he was preparing to make his return by the same route by which he had entered—and seeing that the ground was narrow and exceptionally well suited for an attack,

he stationed about four thousand men at the defile itself, urging them to use their courage at the right moment together with the natural advantage of the terrain, while he himself, with the greater part of his force, took up a position on a commanding hill in front of the narrows.

Chapter 93 The Cattle With the Burning Fagots

...he encamped. When the Carthaginians arrived and pitched their camp on the level ground right at the foot of the slope, he expected to carry off their plunder without a fight, and even, in all likelihood, to put an end to the whole affair, thanks to the favorable lie of the land.

So he was occupied with these deliberations and bent upon them, considering where and how he should make use of the terrain, and which men were to begin the attack on the enemy, and from what quarter.

But Hannibal, while the enemy was making these preparations for the coming day, reasoned out the likely course of events and gave them no time or opportunity to carry out their designs.

He summoned Hasdrubal, the officer in charge of the work details, and ordered him to bundle together torches from dry brushwood of every kind, as many as possible and with all speed, and to pick out from the whole of the plunder the sturdiest of the draft oxen, about two thousand of them, and collect them in front of the camp.

When this was done, he gathered the work crews together and pointed out to them a certain ridge lying between his own camp and the narrows through which he intended to march; toward this ridge he ordered them to drive the oxen hard and by force, once the order was given, until they reached the heights.

After this he told them all to take their supper and rest at the proper hour.

As soon as the third part of the night had passed, he at once led out the work crews and ordered them to fasten the torches to the oxen's horns.

This was quickly done because of their numbers, and he gave the order to light them all and directed the men to drive the oxen forward and force them up toward the ridge tops,

while he posted the spearmen behind them, telling them to help the drivers up to a certain point, but, once the animals had taken their first headlong rush, to run out along the flanks and, raising a din, to make for the high ground and seize the ridge tops in advance, so that they might lend support and engage the enemy if they should meet any at the heights.

At this same moment he himself moved out, taking first the heavy infantry, behind them the cavalry, next the booty, and after all the rest the Iberians and Celts...

Chapter 94 Fabius Returns to Rome

...he came to the narrows and the defiles. As for the Romans guarding the narrows, the moment they saw the lights advancing toward the heights, they supposed Hannibal was making his push that way, and so they abandoned the difficult ground and hurried to the help of the heights.

But as they drew near the oxen they were thrown into confusion by the lights, imagining and expecting something greater and more terrible than what was actually happening. Then, when the Carthaginian spearmen arrived,

after the two sides had exchanged a few long-range shots, with the oxen now charging in among them, both parties drew apart and held to the heights, waiting expectantly for the coming of day, since they could not make out what was going on.

Fabius, for his part, was partly baffled at what was taking place and, in the poet's words, "suspected it was some trick," and partly, in keeping with his original resolve, by no means judged it right to throw the dice or stake everything on a general engagement; so he kept quiet within his palisade and waited for daylight.

Meanwhile Hannibal, his plan succeeding as he had intended, brought his force safely through the narrows along with the booty, since those guarding the difficult ground had abandoned their posts.

At daybreak, observing the men stationed on the heights facing his spearmen, he sent over some of the Iberians, who closed with the Romans, cut down about a thousand of them, and easily relieved their own light troops and brought them down.

So Hannibal, having made his exit from Falernum in this fashion, now camped in safety and proceeded to survey and plan where and how he should pass the winter, having instilled great fear and much bewilderment in the cities and peoples of Italy.

Fabius, meanwhile, was spoken of badly by the masses, on the grounds that he had unmanfully let the enemy slip away from such ground; yet he did not abandon his purpose.

And being compelled, a few days later, to go to Rome for certain sacrifices, he handed the legions over to his colleague, and as he departed he charged him repeatedly not to be as eager to harm the enemy as to see that his own men suffered no serious hurt.

But Marcus took not the slightest of this to heart, and even while Fabius was still speaking he was wholly and utterly bent on hazarding battle and risking all.

Chapter 95 Hasdrubal Equips a Fleet

Such, then, was the situation in Italy.

Around the same time as the events just described, Hasdrubal, the general appointed over Iberia, had during the winter refitted the thirty ships left him by his brother and manned ten more; and at the beginning of summer he put to sea from New Carthage with forty decked vessels, having appointed Hamilcar admiral of the fleet.

At the same time he assembled his land force out of its winter quarters and set off: with the ships he made his voyage close along the shore, and with the infantry his march along the beach, hastening to bring both forces together at the river Ebro.

Gnaeus, reckoning up the designs of the Carthaginians, at first intended to come out of his winter quarters and meet them both by land and by sea.

But on hearing of the size of their forces and the scale of their preparations, he gave up the idea of meeting them by land; instead he manned thirty-five ships and, taking from his land army the men best suited for service as marines, he put to sea and on the second day made the run from Tarraco to the region of the river Ebro.

Coming to anchor about eighty stades from the enemy, he sent ahead two fast-sailing Massiliot ships to reconnoiter; for these men took the lead and the first risks, and rendered every service to the Romans without stint.

For the people of Massilia, if any others ever did, nobly shared in the fortunes of Rome—often on later occasions, but most of all during the war with Hannibal.

When the men sent out to reconnoiter reported that the enemy's fleet happened to be lying at anchor off the mouth of the river, Scipio put to sea in haste, wishing to fall upon them suddenly...

Chapter 96 Naval Success of the Romans In Spain

Hasdrubal and his men, having been warned well in advance by their scouts that the enemy was bearing down on them, drew up their land forces along the shore and at the same time ordered the crews to embark in the ships.

When the Romans were already close at hand, they gave the signal for battle and put out to sea, having resolved to fight. They engaged the enemy and for a short while contended for the victory, but before long they began to give way.

For the support of the infantry stationed along the shore did them less good in lending them courage for the danger than it did harm by holding out a ready hope of safety.

In the end, after losing two ships together with their crews, and the oar-banks and marines of four others, they fled, turning aside toward the land.

As the Romans pressed on against them with fury, they ran their ships up onto the beach and, leaping out of the vessels, made their escape to the troops drawn up there.

The Romans came boldly right up to the shore, took in tow such of the vessels as could still be moved, and sailed off in overwhelming joy, having beaten the enemy at the first onset, gained command of the sea, and captured twenty-five of their ships.

So in Iberia, as a result of this, the prospects of the Romans had grown more promising on account of the success just described.

The Carthaginians, when news of this setback reached them, at once manned seventy ships and sent them out, having judged it essential, for the sake of all their designs, to keep their hold on the sea.

These ships made first for Sardinia, and from there put in at the region around Pisa in Italy, since those aboard were convinced that they would link up there with Hannibal's forces.

But the Romans quickly put out against them from Rome itself with a hundred and twenty quinqueremes, and when the Carthaginians learned of this advance, they sailed back again to Sardinia and after that returned once more to Carthage.

Gnaeus Servilius, who commanded the fleet just mentioned, followed the Carthaginians for some distance, convinced that he would overtake them, but as he fell far behind he gave up the chase.

He first put in at Lilybaeum in Sicily; after that he sailed down to Libya, to the island of the Cercinitae, and after taking money from them on condition of not ravaging their territory, he departed.

On the voyage back he gained control of the island of Cossyrus and, after installing a garrison in its little town, he put in again at Lilybaeum.

For the rest, having moored his fleet there, after no long time he himself

Chapter 97 Spanish Hostages Given Up To the Scipios

went back to the land forces. Meanwhile the Senate, learning of the advantage that Gnaeus had won in the sea battle, and considering it useful—or rather essential—not to abandon affairs in Iberia, but to make a stand against the Carthaginians and to press the war forward,

made ready twenty ships and put Publius Scipio in command of them, in accordance with the plan formed at the outset, and dispatched him in haste to his brother Gnaeus, to manage the campaign in Iberia jointly with him.

For they were deeply anxious that the Carthaginians might gain control of those regions and, securing abundant supplies and manpower, lay claim to the sea more completely and join in the attack on Italy, sending armies and money to Hannibal.

For this reason, regarding this war too as of great importance, they sent out the ships and Publius. On reaching Iberia and joining his brother, he rendered great service to the common cause.

For never before had the Romans ventured to cross the river Iber—they had been content with the friendship and alliance of the tribes on the near side—but now they crossed it, and for the first time found the courage to lay claim to affairs on the far side, with chance, too, lending them considerable help in the circumstances that surrounded them.

For after overawing the Iberians living about the crossing, they came to the city of the Saguntines and pitched camp about forty stades away, near the temple of Aphrodite,

having taken up a position naturally well suited both for safety from the enemy and for the supply of provisions from the sea;

for it happened that their fleet was at the same time making its passage along the coast beside them. It was there that

Chapter 98 Treason of Abilyx

a reversal of affairs of the following kind took place. At the time when Hannibal was making his march to Italy, from all the cities of Iberia whose loyalty he distrusted he took as hostages the sons of the most prominent men, and he deposited them all in the city of the Saguntines, both because of its strength and because of the loyalty of the men left in charge of it. Now there was a certain Iberian,

Abilyx by name, second to none of the Iberians in standing and in the circumstances of his life, and reputed to surpass all the rest by far in his goodwill and loyalty toward the Carthaginians.

This man, observing how affairs stood and judging that the prospects of the Romans were the more promising, worked out in his own mind a calculation about betraying the hostages—a calculation thoroughly Iberian and barbarian.

For, convinced that he could rise to great power among the Romans if he offered, at the critical moment, a proof of loyalty together with a useful service, he set about breaking faith with the Carthaginians and handing the hostages over to the Romans.

He observed that Bostar, the Carthaginian general—who had been sent by Hasdrubal to stop the Romans from crossing the river, but, not daring to do this, had withdrawn and was encamped in the parts of Saguntum facing the sea—was a guileless man, gentle by nature,

and well-disposed and trusting toward himself; so he opened the matter of the hostages to Bostar, saying that, now that the Romans had crossed the river, the Carthaginians could no longer hold Iberia together by fear, but that the situation called for the goodwill of their subjects;

now therefore, with the Romans drawn near and laying siege to Saguntum, and the city in danger, if Bostar were to bring out the hostages and restore them to their parents and their cities, he would frustrate the ambition of the Romans—for this was the very thing they were most eager to accomplish, by getting control of the hostages—

and he would call forth the goodwill of all the Iberians toward the Carthaginians, since he had foreseen what was coming and had taken thought for the safety of the hostages. And he said that he would multiply the favor many times over by personally taking charge of the affair.

For, by restoring the boys to their cities, he would win over the goodwill not only of those who had fathered them but also of the people at large, setting before their eyes, through what was happening, the chosen policy and magnanimity of the Carthaginians toward their allies.

He urged Bostar also to expect a host of gifts privately from those who recovered their children; for each of them, unexpectedly regaining the dearest of their kin, would compete in showering benefits on the man in charge of the affair.

By arguing these points and many others like them in the same vein, he persuaded Bostar to agree to

Chapter 99 The Boys are Restored to Their Native Cities

what he proposed. And for the time being Abilyx went away, having fixed a day on which he would come with everything needed for conveying the boys back.

Arriving by night at the Roman camp and falling in with some of the Iberians serving with the Romans, through them he came before the generals.

Reckoning up at length the surge of feeling and the change of allegiance toward them that would come about among the Iberians if they gained control of the hostages, he undertook to hand the boys over to them.

Publius and his colleague received the prospect with the greatest eagerness and promised large rewards, and for the moment Abilyx went off to his own country, having agreed on the day, the hour, and the place at which those who were to receive him would have to wait.

After this he took the friends he needed and came to Bostar, and when the boys had been handed over to him from Saguntum, he set out by night, as though wishing to escape notice, slipped past the enemy's stockade, and came at the appointed time and place and delivered all the hostages into the hands of the Roman commanders.

Publius and his colleague honored Abilyx exceptionally and made use of him for the restoration of the hostages to their homelands, sending along their own trusted men.

Going from city to city and, through the restoration of the boys, setting before everyone's eyes the mildness and magnanimity of the Romans in contrast to the faithlessness and harshness of the Carthaginians, and adding to this the example of his own change of sides, he spurred many of the Iberians on toward friendship with the Romans.

Bostar, having shown himself, in handing the hostages over to the enemy, more childish than befitted his years, fell into no ordinary dangers.

For the present, with the season now pressing, both sides broke up their forces into winter quarters, the affair of the boys having proved a considerable piece of luck for the Romans in view of the designs that lay before them. Such was the state of affairs in Iberia.

Chapter 100 Hannibal In Apulia

The general Hannibal—to pick up where we left off—learned from his scouts that there was a very large supply of grain in the territory around Luceria and the place called Geronium, and that Geronium was well suited for collecting it.

He therefore decided to make his winter quarters there, and advanced, marching past Mount Liburnum toward the places just mentioned. When he reached Geronium,

which lies two hundred stades from Luceria, he at first tried through negotiation to win the inhabitants over to friendship and offered them guarantees of his promises; but when no one would listen, he set about besieging it.

He quickly took control of the town, put the inhabitants to death, but kept most of the houses and the walls intact, intending to use them as grain stores for the winter.

He stationed his army in front of the city and fortified the camp with a trench and palisade.

Once this was done, he sent two-thirds of his force out to gather grain, ordering each man to bring back a fixed measure every day for his own unit, this being the assigned quota for those put in charge of this management,

while with the remaining third he guarded the camp and watched over the foragers at various points.

Since most of the countryside was easily traversed and flat, the men gathering the grain were practically beyond counting, and the season was at its peak for the harvest, an immense quantity of grain came to be collected every day.

Chapter 101 Successes of Minucius

Marcus, having taken over the forces from Fabius, at first kept pace with the enemy along the mountain ridges, convinced that sooner or later he would clash with the Carthaginians somewhere at the passes.

But when he heard that Hannibal's men already held Geronium, were foraging the countryside for grain, and were encamped behind a palisade thrown up in front of the city, he turned away from the ridges and came down by the spur that runs out toward the plains.

Arriving at the height that lies in the territory of Larinum and is called Calene, he encamped near it, ready by any means whatever to engage the enemy.

When Hannibal saw the enemy approaching, he left a third of his force to forage, and taking the other two-thirds advanced sixteen stades from the city and encamped on a hill facing the enemy, intending both to intimidate his opponents and to provide security for his foragers.

After this, since there was a low hill between the two camps, conveniently situated and lying close to the enemy's position, he sent out about two thousand of his spearmen while it was still night and seized it.

When day came and Marcus caught sight of them, he led out his light-armed troops and assaulted the hill.

After a spirited skirmish, the Romans finally prevailed, and afterward they moved their whole camp to this spot.

For a while, because the camps faced each other, Hannibal kept the greater part of his force close to himself.

But as more days passed, he was forced to detach some men to pasture the livestock and others to forage for grain,

being eager—in keeping with his original plan—both to avoid spoiling his plunder and to gather as much grain as possible, so that there would be an abundance of everything for his men during the winter, and no less for the pack animals and the horses;

for he placed the greatest hopes of his army in his cavalry corps.

Chapter 102 The Romans Capture the Carthaginian Foragers

It was at this point that Marcus, observing that a large part of the enemy was scattered about the countryside on the tasks just described, picked the most favorable hour of the day and led out his army.

Coming up close to the Carthaginian camp, he drew up his heavy infantry in line, and dividing his cavalry and light troops into detachments, sent them against the foragers with orders to take no prisoners.

When this happened, Hannibal fell into great difficulty: he was strong enough neither to march out against the troops drawn up before him nor to relieve his men scattered about the countryside.

Of the Romans, those sent against the foragers killed many of the scattered men, while the troops drawn up in line finally reached such a pitch of contempt that they even began tearing down the palisade and all but besieging the Carthaginians.

Hannibal was in dire straits, yet even under this storm he held on, beating off those who came near and barely keeping his camp,

until Hasdrubal, gathering up the men who had fled from the countryside into the camp near Geronium—about four thousand of them—came to his aid.

Then, taking a little courage, he sallied out, drew up his line a short distance in front of the camp, and with difficulty fended off the immediate danger.

Marcus, having killed many of the enemy in the fighting around the palisade and still more out in the countryside, withdrew for the time being, with high hopes for what was to come.

The next day, when the Carthaginians abandoned the palisade, he advanced and occupied their camp.

For Hannibal, anxious that the Romans might seize by night the now-deserted camp at Geronium and become masters of his baggage and stores, decided to withdraw there himself and make his camp there once more.

From this time on, the Carthaginians went about their foraging more warily and cautiously, while the Romans, on the contrary, did so more boldly and rashly.

Chapter 103 Minucius Made Co-Dictator

The people in Rome, when news of what had happened reached them magnified beyond the truth, were overjoyed: first, because out of their previous despair about the whole situation some sort of change for the better seemed to be dawning for them,

and second, because they could now believe that the inaction and dismay of the armies up to this point had come about not through any cowardice in the forces, but through the caution of their commander.

And so everyone blamed and found fault with Fabius for handling his opportunities without daring, while they exalted Marcus so highly for what had occurred that something now happened which had never happened before:

they made him too a commander with absolute authority, convinced that he would soon bring the campaign to an end. Thus there came to be two dictators for the same operations—something that had never before occurred among the Romans.

When Marcus was informed of the people's goodwill and of the office granted him by the popular assembly, he was doubly spurred on to take risks and act boldly against the enemy.

Fabius too returned to the army, in no way altered by what had happened, but holding even more firmly to his original judgment.

Seeing that Marcus was puffed up, contending against him at every turn, and on the whole strongly bent on risking a battle, he offered him the following choice: either to command by turns, or to divide the forces and let each use his own legions according to his own preference.

Marcus accepted the division all too gladly, and so they split the troops and encamped apart from one another, about twelve stades apart.

Chapter 104 Minucius In Difficulties

Hannibal, partly from what he heard from the prisoners taken and partly from what he observed of what was being done, came to understand the rivalry between the two commanders, as well as the impetuosity and ambition of Marcus.

For this reason, judging that what was happening among his opponents told not against him but in his favor, he turned his attention to Marcus, eager to strip away his boldness and to forestall his rash impulse.

There was a certain rise of ground between his own camp and that of Marcus, capable of harming either side, and he set out to seize it. Knowing clearly, from the success that had gone before, that Marcus would come to oppose this move at once, hand to hand, he devised the following scheme.

Since the ground around the hill was bare of trees but full of many folds and hollows of every kind, he sent out during the night, into the most suitable hiding places, parties of two and three hundred at a time — five hundred horsemen in all, and light-armed and other foot soldiers numbering in all about five thousand.

And so that they should not be spotted early by the men going out to forage, at the first light of dawn he seized the hill with his light troops.

When Marcus saw what was happening, he thought it a piece of luck and immediately sent out his light-armed troops, ordering them to fight and contend for the position; after them he sent the cavalry.

Next, behind these, he himself led up the heavy infantry in a continuous line, just as before, handling every part of the operation

Chapter 105 Cautious Fabius Saves the Day

in much the same way. Just as day was breaking, and everyone's thoughts and eyes were wholly absorbed by the men fighting on the hill, the planting of the ambush went unsuspected.

As Hannibal kept sending up fresh reinforcements to his men on the hill, and followed close on their heels himself with his cavalry and his main force, it soon came about that the cavalry of the two sides also clashed.

When this happened, and the Roman light troops were being hard pressed by the mass of the cavalry, they fell back upon the heavy infantry and threw it into confusion;

and at the same moment the signal was given to the men in the ambush, who appeared on every side and charged in. So now not only the light troops but the whole army faced grave danger for the Romans.

At this critical moment Fabius, seeing what was happening and gravely afraid that they would suffer a complete disaster, led out his forces and hurried to the aid of the men in danger.

When he quickly drew near, the Romans took heart again; and although they had by now lost all order, they gathered once more around their standards and withdrew, taking refuge under the protection of his army — having lost many of their light troops and still more of the men from the legions, including their best soldiers.

Hannibal's men, struck by the unbroken strength and good order of the relieving army, broke off the pursuit and the fighting.

To those who had been in the thick of the danger it was plain that everything had been all but lost through the rashness of Marcus, and had been saved — both now and before — through the caution of Fabius.

And to those at Rome it now became openly clear what a difference there is between a soldier's recklessness and vainglory on the one hand, and a general's foresight and steady, sensible calculation on the other.

In any case, the Romans, taught by events, threw up a single palisade and all encamped together in one place, and from then on gave their attention to Fabius and to the orders he issued.

The Carthaginians, for their part, dug a trench across the ground between the hill and their own camp, and threw a palisade around the crest of the captured hill and set a guard upon it; and from then on they made their preparations for wintering in safety.

Chapter 106 New Consuls Elected

As the season for elections drew near, the Romans chose as their commanders Lucius Aemilius and Gaius Terentius. Once these had been appointed, the dictators laid down their office.

The consuls of the previous year, Gnaeus Servilius and Marcus Regulus — who had been appointed in succession after the death of Flaminius — were then commissioned as proconsuls by Aemilius and his colleagues; and, taking over command in the field, they managed the affairs of the army according to their own judgment.

Aemilius and his colleagues, after consulting with the Senate, at once enrolled the number of soldiers still lacking for the whole undertaking and dispatched them.

They instructed Gnaeus and his men by no means to risk a general engagement of any kind, but to carry out partial skirmishes as vigorously and as continuously as possible, in order to train the young men and prepare them, full of confidence, for the decisive battles —

since they reckoned that their earlier reverses had come about, in no small part, from their having relied on troops that were newly levied and wholly untrained.

They themselves sent Lucius Postumius, a praetor with six lictors, to Gaul with an army, wishing to create a diversion against the Celts who were serving with Hannibal.

They also took thought for bringing back the fleet wintering at Lilybaeum, and sent across to the commanders in Iberia everything that was urgently needed for the campaign.

So these men busied themselves carefully with these and the rest of their preparations.

Gnaeus and his officers, having received their instructions from the consuls, handled every detail according to their judgment.

For this reason I will refrain from writing more about them. Nothing decisive or worth recording was done at all, because of these instructions and because of the circumstances of the season;

there were only more frequent skirmishes and partial engagements, in which the Roman commanders won a good name — for they were thought to handle each matter both bravely and sensibly.

Chapter 107 Hannibal Occupies Cannae

So through the winter and the spring season the two armies remained encamped facing each other. But when the time was already at hand for drawing supplies from the year's crops, Hannibal moved his army out of the camp near Geronium.

Judging it to his advantage to force the enemy by every possible means to give battle, he seized the citadel of the town called Cannae.

For it was here that the Romans had been gathering their grain and other supplies from the region around Canusium, and from here these were continually brought up to the camp as need required.

The town itself had in fact already been razed earlier; but now that the stores and the citadel had been captured, no small disturbance arose among the Roman forces —

for they were in difficulty not only on account of the supplies, because the aforesaid place had been taken, but also because of its commanding position over the surrounding country.

So they kept sending to Rome and asking what they should do, since, if they drew near the enemy, they would not be able to avoid battle, with the country being laid waste and all their allies hanging in suspense.

The Senate resolved that they should fight and engage the enemy. They told Gnaeus and his men to hold back still, while they themselves sent out the consuls.

It happened that everyone looked to Aemilius and rested most of their hopes on him, both because of the nobility of his life in general and because, a short time before, he was thought to have conducted the war against the Illyrians both bravely and with advantage to the state.

They resolved to risk the venture with eight legions, something that had never before happened among the Romans, each legion containing about five thousand men apart from the allies.

For the Romans, as we have said somewhere before, always levy four legions. Each legion takes about four thousand foot and two hundred horse.

But whenever some more pressing need arises, they make the foot in each legion about five thousand and the horse three hundred.

Of the allies they make the number of foot equal to that of the Roman legions, but the horse, as a rule, three times as many.

Half of these allies, together with two legions, they assign to each of the consuls and send them out on campaign.

Most of their battles they decide with a single consul and two legions and the aforesaid number of allies, and only rarely do they employ them all at one moment and for a single venture.

On this occasion, however, they were so dismayed and fearful of what was to come that they chose to risk the venture not with four but with eight Roman legions together.

Chapter 108 Aemilius Paulus Harangues the Army

For this reason they summoned Aemilius and his colleague, set vividly before their eyes the magnitude of what would follow from the battle in either direction, and sent them off with instructions to bring the whole matter to a decision at the right moment, with courage and in a manner worthy of their homeland.

When the two men reached the army and assembled the troops, they made the Senate's decision clear to the rank and file and urged upon them what the present circumstances demanded, Lucius delivering his words out of genuine personal feeling.

Most of what he said was directed toward this single aim: the recent disasters that had befallen them. For it was on this account, more than anything, that the men had become demoralized and stood in need of encouragement.

He therefore tried to establish that, as for the defeats in the earlier battles, one could find not just one or two but several causes that had brought about such an outcome,

but that under present conditions no excuse remained—if only they proved themselves men—for failing to defeat the enemy.

For at that earlier time, he said, the two commanders had never fought side by side with the legions, nor had they made use of well-trained forces; instead the troops had been newly levied and had never set eyes on any danger at all.

And, most important of all, the men had been so ignorant of the enemy's situation that they had drawn up for battle and descended into all-out combat practically without ever having laid eyes on their opponents.

"For the men who were beaten at the Trebia River had arrived from Sicily only the day before, and at first light on the very next day they were drawn up for battle.

And as for those who fought in Etruria, not only had they not seen the enemy beforehand, but they could not even make them out during the battle itself, because of the misfortune that occurred with the weather.

Now, at any rate, everything is the opposite of what has just been described."

Chapter 109 Paulus's Speech Continued

"For in the first place, both of us consuls are here, not only to share the dangers with you ourselves, but we have also persuaded last year's commanders to remain on hand and take part in these same struggles.

You yourselves, moreover, have not only seen the enemy's weaponry, their formations, and their numbers, but you have now spent a second year fighting against them almost daily.

Since, then, every detail is the opposite of what obtained in the previous battles, it is reasonable to expect that the outcome of the present contest will likewise be the opposite.

For it would be strange—indeed, one might say, impossible—that men who in piecemeal skirmishes, engaging on equal terms, have for the most part come out on top should, when drawn up all together and outnumbering the enemy by more than two to one, be defeated.

Therefore, men, since everything has been prepared for you to win, the situation needs only one thing: your will and your eagerness—and on that point I do not think it fitting to exhort you further.

For those who serve someone else for pay, or who as allies are about to risk their lives on behalf of others—men for whom the moment of battle itself is most fearful, while the consequences make little difference to them—for such men a manner of exhortation is necessary.

But for men like you now, whose danger is not for the sake of others but for yourselves, your homeland, your wives, and your children, and for whom what follows afterward makes a difference many times greater than the dangers of the moment—for such men only a reminder is needed, not exhortation.

For who would not wish, above all, to win as he fights, and, if that should prove impossible, to die fighting first rather than live to look upon the outrage and ruin of those I have named?

Therefore, men, apart from anything I say, take it upon yourselves to set before your eyes the difference between losing and winning and all that goes with each, and so present yourselves for the battle as though it is not merely the legions that your country now risks, but its very existence.

For if the present situation should somehow be decided otherwise, she has nothing left to add to her current resources that would let her prevail over the enemy.

She has staked all her eagerness and strength upon you, and she holds all her hopes of survival in your hands. Do not now disappoint her of them,

but render to your homeland the thanks that are its due, and make it clear to all mankind that the earlier defeats came about not because Romans are lesser men than Carthaginians, but because of the inexperience of those who fought at the time and because of the circumstances arising from the conditions then."

Having delivered these and similar words of encouragement, Lucius then dismissed the troops.

Chapter 110 Skirmishes Before Cannae

The next day they broke camp and led the army to where they heard the enemy was encamped. Arriving on the second day, they pitched camp about fifty stades from the enemy.

Now Lucius, observing that the surrounding terrain was flat and bare, said they ought not to engage where the enemy was superior in cavalry, but should instead draw the enemy on and advance into ground of a kind where the battle would be decided more by the infantry forces.

But since Gaius, out of inexperience, held the opposite view, there was disagreement and friction between the commanders—which is the most dangerous thing of all.

When command fell to Gaius for the following day—since the consuls take over authority on alternate days, according to custom—he broke camp and advanced, wanting to draw near the enemy, despite Lucius's many protests and attempts to stop him.

Hannibal took up his light-armed troops and his cavalry, went out to meet them, and, falling upon them unexpectedly while they were still on the march, came to grips with them and threw them into great confusion.

The Romans withstood the first onslaught by putting forward some of their heavy-armed troops; then, sending in their javelin-men and cavalry, they gained the upper hand all through the engagement, because the Carthaginians had no significant reserves on hand, whereas the Romans had some maniples mixed in with their light troops to share the fighting.

For the moment, then, with night coming on, the two sides separated, the attack having turned out for the Carthaginians otherwise than they had hoped.

But on the next day Lucius, judging it best neither to fight nor any longer able to lead the army away safely, encamped with two-thirds of it beside the river called the Aufidus—the only river that cuts right through the Apennines—

(this being a continuous mountain range that separates all the watercourses of Italy, sending some to the Tyrrhenian Sea and others to the Adriatic; the Aufidus runs through it, having its sources in the regions of Italy facing the Tyrrhenian side and discharging into the Adriatic)—

while with the remaining third he set up a fortified camp across the river, eastward from the crossing, about ten stades from his own camp and a little more from the enemy's,

intending that these men should both cover the foraging parties from the camp on the far side and harass those of the Carthaginians.

Chapter 111 Hannibal Encourages his Troops

Hannibal, at this same time, seeing that circumstances were calling for a battle and an engagement with the enemy, but wary that his men might be demoralized by their recent setback, decided that the moment called for some encouragement and assembled the troops.

When they had gathered, he ordered them all to look around at the surrounding terrain and asked them what greater thing they could have prayed to the gods for, under the present circumstances, had they been given the choice, than to settle the whole issue in ground like this while holding so great a superiority in cavalry over the enemy.

When they all signaled their agreement at what he said, because its truth was so plain, he went on: "For this, then, first give thanks to the gods; for it is they who, in helping to secure our victory, have led the enemy into ground like this.

And second, give thanks to me, because I have forced the enemy to fight—for they can no longer escape it—and to fight openly on ground favorable to us.

But to exhort you now at any length to be confident and eager for the danger does not seem to me at all appropriate.

When you had no experience of fighting the Romans, that was necessary, and I did then address many arguments to you, with examples;

but now that you have, by common agreement, beaten the Romans three times in a row in battles of such magnitude, what argument could instill stronger confidence in you than the deeds themselves?

So then, through the earlier battles you have gained control of the countryside and its riches, in keeping with my promises, since I have proved truthful in everything I told you. But the present contest is for the cities and the riches within them.

If you prevail in it, you will at once be masters of all Italy; freed from your present hardships and gaining control of the whole prosperity of Rome, you will become, through this battle, the leaders and lords of everything.

Therefore there is no longer any need for words, but for deeds; for, if the gods are willing, I am convinced that I shall make good my promises to you any moment now."

Having said this and things much like it, while the men eagerly signaled their approval, he praised them, welcomed their enthusiasm, and dismissed the assembly. He at once made camp, setting his palisade along the same side of the river as the larger camp of the enemy.

Chapter 112 The Armies Face To Face

On the following day he ordered everyone to busy themselves with their equipment and with getting into condition. The day after that he drew up his troops along the river and made it clear that he was eager to fight the enemy.

Lucius Aemilius, however, was displeased with the ground, and since he could see that the Carthaginians would soon be forced to move camp in order to procure supplies, he kept quiet, securing his encampments with reserve guards.

Hannibal waited a considerable time, and when no one came out against him, he withdrew the rest of his army back into the entrenched camp, but loosed his Numidians against the men who were fetching water from the smaller camp.

When the Numidians charged right up to the rampart itself and prevented the watering, Gaius was provoked still further by this; the troops too were straining for battle and bore the postponements with impatience.

For waiting is the heaviest of all burdens to any man: but once a thing has been decided, then whatever one must suffer, even out of all the things reckoned terrible, must be endured.

When word reached Rome that the two armies were encamped facing each other and that clashes between the advance forces were taking place day after day, the city was on edge and full of fear,

for the mass of the people dreaded what was coming, because they had so often already been beaten before, and in their minds they foresaw and reckoned in advance what would happen if they were utterly defeated.

At that time all the oracles preserved among them were on everyone's lips; every temple and every house was full of portents and omens, so that vows and sacrifices and supplications and prayers to the gods filled the city.

For in times of crisis the Romans are formidable at propitiating both gods and men, and they consider nothing of the sort unseemly or beneath them in such circumstances.

Chapter 113 The Order of Battle

When Gaius took over the command on the next day in succession, just as the sun was beginning to rise, he set the army in motion from both camps at once.

Those from the larger camp he led across the river and at once drew up in line; joining to them those from the other camp, he arranged the whole force on the same straight line, making them all face south.

The Roman cavalry he stationed on the right wing, right beside the river; the infantry he extended continuously next to them along the same line, setting the maniples closer together than usual and making the depth of each company many times greater than its frontage.

The cavalry of the allies he posted on the left wing; and in front of the whole force he placed the light-armed troops, at a distance.

Together with the allies there were about eighty thousand infantry and a little more than six thousand cavalry.

At the same time Hannibal sent his Balearic slingers and javelin-men across the river and posted them in front of his force; the rest he led out of the camp and, bringing them over the stream at two places, drew them up against the enemy.

Right at the river, on his left, he placed the Iberian and Celtic cavalry facing the Roman cavalry; next to them, half of the Libyan infantry armed in the heavy fashion; next to these, the Iberians and Celts; beside them he placed the remaining portion of the Libyans; and on the right wing he posted the Numidian cavalry.

Once he had extended everything along a single line, he then took the central units of the Iberians and Celts and pushed them forward, arranging the other units next to them in proportionate gradation, so that the line formed a crescent-shaped bulge and grew thin in its own formation,

his intention being that the Libyans should hold the position of a reserve in the battle, while the Iberians and Celts bore the brunt of the first fighting.

Chapter 114 Arms of the Libyans, Iberians, and Celts

The Libyans' equipment was Roman, for Hannibal had armed them all with a selection from the spoils taken in the earlier battle.

As for the Iberians and Celts, their shields were much alike, but their swords were of opposite design.

For the Iberian sword could thrust just as effectively as it could strike downward, whereas the Gallic blade had only one use, the downward cut, and that one only with room to swing.

Since their companies were drawn up alternately—the Celts naked, the Iberians arrayed in their national fashion in short linen tunics bordered with purple—the sight that resulted was at once strange and terrifying.

The whole strength of the Carthaginian cavalry came to about ten thousand, and that of the infantry to not much more than forty thousand, including the Celts. Aemilius held the Roman right,

Gaius the left, and the center was held by Marcus and Gnaeus, who had been the commanders of the previous year.

On the Carthaginian side, Hasdrubal held the left and Hanno the right, while at the center was Hannibal himself, with his brother Mago beside him.

Since the Roman line faced south, as I said above, and the Carthaginian line faced north, the rising sun did no harm to either of them.

Chapter 115 The Battle of Cannae

When the first clash had come about between the forward troops, at the outset the fighting among the light-armed themselves was evenly matched.

But as soon as the Iberian and Celtic cavalry on the left closed with the Romans, these men made the battle a real and barbaric one:

for the combat did not follow the rules, with wheeling and counter-maneuver, but once they had collided they fought grappling man against man, dismounting from their horses.

When the Carthaginian horsemen had won the upper hand and killed most of their opponents in the struggle—for the Romans all fought with passion and courage—and were driving the rest along the river, slaughtering them and laying hands on them without mercy, then the infantry lines took over from the light-armed and engaged one another.

For a short time the ranks of the Iberians and Celts held and fought the Romans gallantly; but after that, crushed by the weight, they gave way and fell back, breaking up the crescent.

The Roman maniples, following them eagerly, easily cut through the enemy's line, since the Celts had been drawn up thinly while the Romans had massed together from the wings toward the center and the point of danger.

For the wings and the center did not come into action at the same time; rather the center engaged first, because the Celts, having been arranged in a crescent formation, projected far ahead of the wings, since the convex of the crescent faced the enemy.

But as the Romans pursued these troops and crowded in toward the center and the yielding part of the enemy, they pressed forward so far that on either side, along their exposed flanks, the Libyans in their heavy armor came up against them:

those on the right wing wheeled to the left and, charging from the spear side, took position alongside the enemy's flank,

while those on the left made their turn to the right and charged in from the shield side—the situation itself showing them what had to be done.

The result, just as Hannibal had foreseen, was that the Romans were cut off in the middle by the Libyans, caught there by their headlong pursuit of the Celts.

These men, then, no longer fighting in phalanx formation but turning individually and by maniples against those who were attacking them on the flanks...

Chapter 116 The Slaughter at Cannae

The Romans now had to carry on the fight over the bodies of the fallen. Lucius Aemilius, though he had been stationed on the right wing from the start and had shared in part of the cavalry struggle, was nevertheless still alive at this point.

Wishing to act in keeping with the words he had spoken in his address to the troops, and seeing that the crux of the whole decision of the battle lay in the infantry legions,

he rode along to the center of the entire battle line. There he both engaged personally and laid hands on the enemy, and at the same time encouraged and urged on his own soldiers.

Hannibal did the same on his side, for he too had taken up his position from the beginning at this part of his forces.

The Numidians on the right wing, charging the enemy cavalry posted on the Roman left, neither inflicted nor suffered much harm because of the peculiar manner of their fighting; but they did render the enemy ineffective by keeping them occupied and charging in upon them from every side.

But when Hasdrubal's men, having killed all but a very few of the cavalry by the river, came across from the left to support the Numidians, the Roman allied cavalry, foreseeing their attack, gave way and withdrew.

At this moment Hasdrubal appears to have done a practical and shrewd thing. Seeing that the Numidians were many in number and most effective and most fearsome against troops once they had been forced to give ground, he handed the fugitives over to the Numidians and led his own men toward the infantry battle, eager to bring help to the Libyans.

Falling upon the Roman legions from the rear and launching his squadrons against them in relays at many points at once, he both heartened the Libyans and humbled and dismayed the spirits of the Romans.

It was at this moment that Lucius Aemilius too, after suffering violent blows in the thick of hand-to-hand fighting, ended his life — a man who, if any ever did, rendered his country every duty throughout the rest of his life and at its final hour.

The Romans, as long as they could fight by wheeling about on the surface of their ranks to face those who had encircled them, held out;

but as those on the outside were continually being killed, and they were gradually pressed into a smaller and smaller compass, in the end they all fell there on the spot — among them Marcus Atilius and Gnaeus Servilius, the consuls of the previous year, men who had proved themselves brave and worthy of Rome in the moment of danger.

During this slaughter and struggle the Numidians, pursuing the fleeing cavalry, killed most of them and threw the rest down from their horses.

A few escaped to Venusia, among them Gaius Terentius, the Roman commander, a man who made his own soul a disgrace and his magistracy a loss to his country.

Chapter 117 Superiority in Cavalry Wins Battles

So the battle of Cannae between the Romans and the Carthaginians was fought out in this way — a battle in which the bravest of men were found among both the victors and the vanquished.

This became clear from the facts themselves. Of the six thousand cavalry, seventy escaped to Venusia with Gaius, and about three hundred of the allied horse made their way safely, scattered, into the towns;

while of the infantry, about ten thousand who were not part of the main battle were taken prisoner fighting, and from the battle itself only about three thousand perhaps escaped to the neighboring towns.

All the rest, numbering about seventy thousand, died nobly — the throng of cavalry having, both on this occasion and before it, furnished the Carthaginians their greatest asset for winning.

And it became clear to later generations that for the occasions of war it is better to have half the number of infantry but be superior in cavalry than to risk a decisive battle with all forces evenly matched against the enemy.

On Hannibal's side, about four thousand Celts fell, about fifteen hundred Iberians and Libyans, and about two hundred cavalry.

The Romans who were taken alive had been outside the main battle, and for the following reason.

Lucius had left ten thousand infantry at his own camp, so that if Hannibal, neglecting the protection of his palisade, should draw up his whole army for battle, these men might fall upon it during the fighting and gain control of the enemy's baggage;

or, if Hannibal should foresee what might happen and leave a sufficient guard, the contest over the main issue would be against fewer of the enemy.

They were taken captive in roughly the following way. When Hannibal had left an adequate guard at his palisade, the Romans, as soon as the battle began, laid siege to it according to their orders, assaulting those left behind in the Carthaginian camp. At first the defenders held out;

but when they were already under pressure, and Hannibal had by then decided the battle at every point, he came to their relief, routed the Romans, penned them up in their own camp, killed two thousand of them, and took all the rest prisoner.

In the same way the Numidians stormed those who had fled together to the strongholds in the countryside and brought them back — about two thousand of the cavalry who had been put to flight.

Chapter 118 The Consequences of the Battle of Cannae

The battle having been decided in the way described, the whole situation took a turn that followed from what both sides had expected.

For the Carthaginians, through this action, were at once masters of almost all the rest of the coast.

The Tarentines, indeed, immediately put themselves into their hands; the Argyrippans and some of the Capuans summoned Hannibal; and all the rest were now already looking to the Carthaginians.

These had high hopes of becoming masters of Rome itself at the first onset.

The Romans, for their part, at once gave up the rule of Italy on account of the defeat, and were in great fear and danger both for themselves and for the soil of their fatherland, expecting that at any moment Hannibal himself would arrive.

And indeed, as though Fortune were measuring out yet more and joining in the contest against them on top of what had already happened, it came about that a few days later, while fear gripped the city, the general who had been sent to Gaul fell unexpectedly into an ambush and was utterly destroyed, together with his army, by the Celts.

Nevertheless the Senate left undone none of the things in its power, but exhorted the people, secured the affairs of the city, and deliberated about the present crisis like men. This became evident from what happened afterward;

for although the Romans were on that occasion admittedly beaten and had yielded their claim to excellence in arms,

by the distinctive character of their constitution and by deliberating well they not only recovered the rule of Italy, afterward defeating the Carthaginians, but within a few years became masters of the whole inhabited world.

Accordingly, we shall close this book at these events — those of Spain and of Italy that the one-hundred-and-fortieth Olympiad embraced, having now set them forth.

When, in recounting the Greek affairs that took place during the same Olympiad, we come up to these same times, then at last we propose to compose, on its own, an account of the Roman constitution itself,

believing that an exposition of it is not only suited to the framework of our history, but also contributes greatly, for men who love learning and are concerned with practical affairs, toward the reform and construction of constitutions.

Chapter 1 Review of Achaean History

In the book before this one I set out the causes of the second war that broke out between the Romans and the Carthaginians, and I gave an account of Hannibal's invasion of Italy.

In addition to this, I described the battles the two sides fought against one another, down to the engagement that took place by the river Aufidus and the city of Cannae.

Now I shall go through the affairs of Greece that were carried out during the same period as the events already related, beginning from the 140th Olympiad.

But first I shall briefly remind those who take up this work of the preliminary account I gave in the second book concerning Greek affairs, and especially concerning the Achaean nation—since this political body too achieved a remarkable growth, both in the times before our own and in our own day.

I began with Tisamenus, one of the sons of Orestes, and stated that from his time the Achaeans were ruled by kings in unbroken succession down to Ogygus; that afterwards they adopted, by an excellent choice, a democratic constitution; and that at first they were broken apart, city by city and village by village, by the kings from Macedonia.

Following this, I set out to tell how they began once more to unite in common purpose, and when and which cities were the first to band together.

Next in order I explained by what method and with what policy they went about winning over the cities and undertook to bring all the Peloponnesians under the same name and constitution.

After giving a general account of the plan just described, I then touched continuously on the particular actions, until I came to the downfall of Cleomenes, king of the Lacedaemonians.

Having summed up the events of this preliminary survey down to the deaths of Antigonus, Seleucus, and Ptolemy—since all of these passed away at about the same time—I announced, as what remained, that I would make the beginning of my own work the events that follow upon those already described.

Chapter 2 Why Begin With This Period of History

I judged this to be the best starting point, first because it is here that the history of Aratus ends; and by joining my narrative to his I have chosen to give the account of Greek affairs that follows directly upon it.

Second, because the periods that follow, and those that fall within my own history, run together in such a way that some belong to our own time and some to the time of our fathers; from which it comes about that I was personally present at some of the events, while others I have heard from those who saw them.

To reach further back in time, and to write down a report of a report, did not seem to me a safe basis either for forming judgments or for making assertions.

But above all I began from these times because it was then that fortune, so to speak, made everything in the inhabited world new.

For Philip, the natural son of Demetrius, while still a boy, had just taken over the rule of the Macedonians;

Achaeus, who held power over the region on this side of the Taurus, possessed not merely the outward standing of a king but real power as well;

and Antiochus, surnamed the Great, a little earlier, on the death of his brother Seleucus, had succeeded while still quite young to the kingdom of Syria.

At the same time as these, Ariarathes took over the rule of Cappadocia, and Ptolemy Philopator had in the same period become master of affairs in Egypt.

Not long afterward Lycurgus was established as king of the Lacedaemonians, and the Carthaginians had recently chosen Hannibal as their general for the operations already mentioned.

With such a renewal taking place in all the dynasties, there was bound to be the beginning of new affairs; for this is the natural course of things and tends to happen so—and that is just what came about at this time.

For the Romans and the Carthaginians entered upon the war already described; Antiochus and Ptolemy, at the same time as these, the war over Coele-Syria; and the Achaeans and Philip the war against the Aetolians and the Lacedaemonians. The causes of this last came about as follows.

Chapter 3 Dorimachus In the Peloponnese

The Aetolians had long chafed at peace and at having to meet expenses from their own resources, since they were accustomed to live off their neighbors and needed lavish means to support their ingrained arrogance. Enslaved to it, they always live a grasping, beast-like life, regarding nothing as belonging to others and everything as theirs to plunder.

Nevertheless, in the time before this, so long as Antigonus was alive, fear of the Macedonians kept them quiet.

But when he departed this life, leaving behind the boy Philip, they grew contemptuous and began looking for openings and pretexts for meddling in the Peloponnese—drawn by their old habit of plundering that country, and at the same time reckoning that they were a match for the Achaeans themselves in war.

While they were set on this purpose, chance gave them a little assistance, and they got the following openings for their design.

Dorimachus of Trichonium was the son of that Nicostratus who broke the truce at the festival of the Pamboeotia. Being young and full of Aetolian impetuosity and greed, he was sent out by public authority to the city of the Phigaleans,

which lies in the Peloponnese, on the borders of the Messenians, and which at that time happened to be in political union with the Aetolians—

ostensibly to guard the territory and city of the Phigaleans, but in fact holding the post of a spy upon affairs in the Peloponnese.

When a band of pirates gathered and came to him at Phigalea, he had no way of providing them with plunder by lawful means, since the general peace among the Greeks that had been concluded under Antigonus was still in force.

At last, at a loss what to do, he allowed the pirates to carry off the livestock of the Messenians, although they were friends and allies.

At first they did their wrong to the flocks on the outlying lands, but afterward, as their recklessness grew, they set about breaking into the farmhouses as well, appearing without warning by night.

The Messenians were indignant at this and sent embassies to Dorimachus; but at first he turned a deaf ear, wishing partly to benefit the men under his command and partly to profit himself by taking a share of the plunder.

When the embassies kept coming in greater numbers because of the continual wrongdoing, he said that he would come in person to Messene to argue the case against those who were bringing charges against the Aetolians.

But when he arrived, and the injured parties approached him, he ridiculed some with mockery, browbeat others, and frightened still others with abuse.

Chapter 4 Dorimachus Leaves Messene

While he was still staying in Messene, the pirates approached the city by night, set scaling-ladders against the walls, and broke into the farmstead called Chiron's villa; those who resisted they cut down, and the rest of the household slaves they bound and led away, together with the cattle.

The Messenian ephors, who had long been grieved both at what was happening and at Dorimachus's presence among them, and who now felt themselves insulted on top of it, summoned him before the assembled magistrates.

On this occasion Sciron, who was at that time an ephor of the Messenians and was also highly esteemed by his fellow citizens for the rest of his conduct, advised that they should not let Dorimachus leave the city unless he restored to the Messenians everything that had been lost and handed over the wrongdoers to stand trial for those who had been killed.

When everyone signified that Sciron was speaking justly, Dorimachus flew into a rage and declared that they were complete fools if they imagined they were now insulting Dorimachus and not the common body of the Aetolians; in general he regarded what was happening as outrageous, and said that they would incur a collective reckoning, and would suffer it deservedly.

Now there was at that time in Messene a depraved fellow named Babyrtas, a man debased in every possible way, upon whom, if one put Dorimachus's sun-hat and cloak, it was impossible to tell them apart,

so closely did he resemble the said Dorimachus in his voice and in the other features of his body—and this did not escape Dorimachus's notice.

So while he was speaking to the Messenians in this threatening and exceedingly arrogant manner, Sciron, in a burst of anger, said: "Do you suppose we care a whit for you or your bluster, Babyrtas?" When this was said,

Dorimachus for the moment yielded to the circumstances and agreed to make redress to the Messenians for all the wrongs that had been done;

but on returning to Aetolia he took what had been said so bitterly and so hard that, having no other reasonable pretext, for this reason alone he kindled the war against the Messenians.

Chapter 5 The Revenge of Dorimachus

At this time the general of the Aetolians was Ariston. Because of certain physical infirmities he was unfit for active military service, and since he was moreover a kinsman of Dorimachus and Scopas, he had in effect handed over the whole of his command to Dorimachus.

Now Dorimachus did not dare to urge the Aetolians publicly to take up the war against the Messenians, because he had no pretext worth mentioning. Everyone knew that his impulse arose from his own lawless conduct and from the insult he had suffered.

So he gave up that idea and instead set about privately persuading Scopas to join him in his design against the Messenians. He pointed out that there was no danger from Macedonia, on account of the youth of its ruler — for Philip was then no more than seventeen years old —

and he set before him the hostility of the Lacedaemonians toward the Messenians, and reminded him of the goodwill and alliance of the Eleans toward themselves. From all this he argued that their invasion of Messenia would be perfectly safe.

But the heart of his Aetolian appeal was that he held before their eyes the profits to be had from the Messenian territory, which was unguarded and had remained the only part of the Peloponnese untouched throughout the Cleomenic war.

On top of all this he urged the popularity they would win among the mass of the Aetolians as a result.

As for the Achaeans, he argued that if they tried to block the passage through their land, the Aetolians could not be blamed for defending themselves; and if the Achaeans kept quiet, they would be no hindrance to the enterprise.

Against the Messenians, he said, they would not be short of a pretext, since the Messenians had long been guilty of wrongdoing by promising the Achaeans and Macedonians that they would join their alliance.

By saying this, and other things to the same effect, he stirred up such eagerness in Scopas and his friends that, without waiting for a general assembly of the Aetolians, without consulting the Apocleti, and without taking any of the proper constitutional steps —

acting entirely on their own impulses and decisions — they launched a war simultaneously against the Messenians, Epirotes, Achaeans, Acarnanians, and Macedonians.

Chapter 6 Acts of Hostility Against Macedonia, Epirus, and Acarnania

At sea they at once sent out privateers, who fell in with a royal Macedonian vessel near Cythera, brought it crew and all to Aetolia, and sold off the ship-owners, the sailors, and the marines, along with the ship itself. They also ravaged the coast of Epirus,

using Cephallenian ships to carry out the outrage; and they set about seizing Thyrium in Acarnania as well.

At the same time they secretly sent some men through the Peloponnese, who occupied the stronghold called Clarium in the heart of the territory of Megalopolis. Using it as a market for their plunder, they made it their base for their raids.

However, Timoxenus, the general of the Achaeans, together with Taurion — who had been left by Antigonus in charge of the king's affairs in the Peloponnese — stormed the place completely within a few days.

For King Antigonus held Corinth by the consent of the Achaeans on account of the circumstances of the Cleomenic war; and having taken Orchomenus by force, he had not restored it to the Achaeans but had appropriated and kept it,

wishing, as it seems to me, not only to control the entrance into the Peloponnese but also to keep watch over its interior by means of his garrison and military stores in Orchomenus.

Dorimachus and Scopas watched for the moment when little time remained of Timoxenus's term of office, and when Aratus, though appointed by the Achaeans as general for the coming year, was not yet due to take up the command.

Then, gathering the Aetolians in full force at Rhium, preparing transport vessels and making the Cephallenian ships ready, they ferried their men across into the Peloponnese and advanced on Messenia.

Marching through the territory of the Patraeans, Pharaeans, and Tritaeans, they pretended that they wished to do no wrong to the Achaeans;

but since their forces could not keep their hands off the country, in their lack of restraint where booty was concerned, they passed through doing harm and damage until they reached Phigalea.

From there they made a sudden and reckless dash, and burst into the territory of the Messenians, taking no account whatever either of the friendship and alliance that had long existed between them and the Messenians, or of the principles of justice recognized among all mankind.

Setting all this below their own greed, they plundered without fear, while the Messenians did not dare to come out against them at all.

Chapter 7 Strength and Weakness of Aratus

The Achaeans, since their regular assembly fell due by law at this time, gathered at Aegium. When they had come together in the assembly,

the Patraeans and Pharaeans gave an account of the wrongs done to their territory during the Aetolians' passage through it, and the Messenians, present as envoys, begged them to help, since they were being wronged and treated in violation of the treaty.

After hearing what was said, the Achaeans shared the anger of the Patraeans and Pharaeans and sympathized with the misfortunes of the Messenians.

But they thought it especially outrageous that, without anyone having granted the Aetolians a passage, and without their ever having so much as asked permission, the Aetolians had dared to set foot with an army on Achaean soil in breach of the treaty.

Provoked by all this, they voted to assist the Messenians, and that the general should call the Achaeans together under arms; and whatever the assembled levy decided when it met should be binding.

Now Timoxenus, who was still general at the time — his term being all but over — and who moreover had no confidence in the Achaeans, since at present they had grown slack in their training under arms, kept putting off the expedition and the gathering of the levy altogether.

For after the downfall of Cleomenes, king of the Spartans, the Peloponnesians, worn out by the earlier wars and trusting in the present state of peace, had all neglected their preparations for war.

Aratus, however, indignant and provoked at the audacity of the Aetolians, dealt with the situation more hotly, the more so because of the long-standing hostility he already felt toward them from earlier times.

He was therefore eager to call the Achaeans together under arms and keen to engage the Aetolians.

In the end, five days before his proper term began, he took over the public seal from Timoxenus and wrote to the cities, summoning all those of military age, under arms, to Megalopolis.

About this man it seems to me fitting to say a few words first, on account of the peculiar nature of his character.

Chapter 8 Character of Aratus

In all other respects Aratus was a man perfectly suited to practical statesmanship.

He was capable of speaking, of devising, and of keeping a decision to himself; he was second to none in bearing political quarrels with composure, in binding men to him as friends, and in winning over allies;

and he was supremely skilled in mounting actions, deceptions, and plots against his enemies, and in carrying them through to the end by his own endurance and daring.

Clear proofs of such qualities are many, but the most conspicuous to those who have studied the details are the captures of Sicyon and Mantinea, the expulsion of the Aetolians from the city of the Pelleneans, and, greatest of all, the affair of the Acrocorinthus.

Yet this same man, whenever he wished to contest the open field, was sluggish in his plans, timid in his undertakings, and unable to face danger in plain sight.

And so he filled the Peloponnese with trophies erected against him, and in this respect he was always, in one way or another, easy prey for his enemies.

So true is it that human natures contain much that is varied, not only in their bodies but still more in their minds; so that the same man is not only gifted for some kinds of activity and incapable of others, but often, even in closely similar matters, the very same man proves both highly intelligent and exceedingly slow, and likewise both extremely bold and extremely cowardly.

This is no paradox; it is a familiar and well-known thing to those willing to take note of it.

Some men, for instance, are bold in hunting when it comes to closing with wild beasts, yet those same men are faint-hearted in the face of weapons and enemies; and in warfare itself some are ready and effective in fighting man to man and on their own account, but useless when acting in common and in equal battle order with the line.

The Thessalian cavalry, at any rate, are irresistible by squadron and in phalanx formation, but apart from a set battle line, when it comes to risking themselves man by man as time and place demand, they are awkward and slow; the Aetolians are the opposite of this.

The Cretans, both by land and by sea, are irresistible at ambushes, raids, thefts from the enemy, night attacks, and every kind of operation involving guile and piecemeal action, but for a frontal charge in line, agreed upon and face to face, they are faint-hearted and crooked in spirit; the Achaeans and Macedonians are the opposite of this.

Let this be said by me so that my readers may not distrust what I say, if at some point I make contradictory statements about the same men in regard to closely similar pursuits.

Chapter 9 Dorimachus Consents To Depart

When the men of military age had assembled under arms at Megalopolis in accordance with the decree of the Achaeans —

for it was from this point that I digressed — and when the Messenians once again came before the assembly and begged them not to look on while they were so flagrantly being wronged in violation of the treaty, declaring also their wish to join the common alliance and their eagerness to be enrolled together with the rest,

the leaders of the Achaeans rejected the request for alliance, saying that it was not possible to admit any new member apart from Philip and the other allies.

For the alliance that had been concluded through Antigonus during the period of the Cleomenic war was still binding by oath on them all — on the Achaeans, the Epirotes, the Phocians, the Macedonians, the Boeotians, the Acarnanians, and the Thessalians.

They said, however, that they would march out and come to the Messenians' aid, provided that the envoys present handed over their own sons as hostages to the city of the Lacedaemonians, as a guarantee that they would not make a settlement with the Aetolians without the consent of the Achaeans.

The Lacedaemonians too were encamped on the borders of Megalopolitan territory, having marched out in accordance with the alliance, though they held the position of reserves and onlookers rather than active allies.

Aratus, having settled matters with the Messenians in this way, sent word to the Aetolians, making the decisions known and ordering them to withdraw from Messenian territory and not to set foot in Achaea; otherwise, he warned, he would treat any who entered it as enemies.

When Scopas and Dorimachus heard what was said and learned that the Achaeans had mustered, they judged that it was to their advantage for the moment to comply with the orders.

So they immediately dispatched letter-carriers both to Cyllene and to Ariston, the general of the Aetolians, requesting that the transport vessels be sent to them with all speed from Elis to the island called Pheias.

Two days later they themselves struck camp, laden with booty, and advanced as if toward Elis. For the Aetolians always cultivated the friendship of the Eleans, so that through them they might gain a foothold for their raids and piratical expeditions out of the Peloponnese.

Chapter 10 Aratus Dismisses the Achaean Troops

Aratus waited two days and, naively believing that they would make their return by the route they had indicated, dismissed all the rest of the Achaeans and the Lacedaemonians to their homes,

but keeping three thousand foot and three hundred horse together with the soldiers under Taurion, he advanced along the road to Patrae, intending to march parallel to the Aetolians.

When Dorimachus and his men learned that Aratus was keeping pace with them and remaining under arms — partly fearing that they might be attacked while they were preoccupied with embarking on the ships, and partly being eager to provoke the war —

they sent their booty off to the boats, assigning enough capable men suited to its transport, with instructions to those sent out that the goods should be brought to Rhium, where they intended to make their embarkation.

They themselves at first lay in wait, attending to the dispatch of the booty, and after that changed direction and advanced as if toward Olympia.

But hearing that Taurion with the aforementioned force was in the neighborhood of Cleitor, and reckoning that even so they would not be able to make the crossing from Rhium without danger and a clash,

they decided it was to the advantage of their cause to engage with Aratus's men as quickly as possible, while they were still few in number and unsuspecting of what was coming,

supposing that, if they routed them, they could plunder the country in advance and so make the crossing from Rhium secure, during the time the Achaean levy was hesitating and deliberating about mustering again,

while if Aratus's men were alarmed and avoided battle, unwilling to engage, they could effect their withdrawal without danger whenever it seemed advantageous to them.

So, reasoning along these lines, they advanced and pitched camp near

Chapter 11 Bad Strategy of Aratus

Methydrium in Megalopolitan territory. The Achaean commanders, perceiving the presence of the Aetolians, handled the situation so badly that they left no room for greater folly.

For having turned back from Cleitor, they encamped near Caphyae.

When the Aetolians made their march from Methydrium past the city of Orchomenus, the Achaean leaders led their troops out into the plain of Caphyae and drew them up there, using as a protective barrier the river that flows through it.

But the Aetolians — both because of the difficult ground in between (for in front of the river there were also several ditches hard to cross) and because of the apparent readiness of the Achaeans for battle — lost their nerve for attacking the enemy according to their original intention,

and instead made their march in good order toward the passes leading up to Olygyrtus, content if no one would attack them and force them to risk an engagement.

But Aratus and his officers — when the Aetolian vanguard was already beginning its ascent toward the passes, while the cavalry were bringing up the rear across the plain and approaching the place called Propus at the foot of the hills — sent out the cavalry and the light-armed troops, putting Epistratus the Acarnanian in command, with orders to fasten upon the enemy's rearguard and harass them.

And yet, if an engagement had to be risked at all, they ought not to have come to grips with the rear, when the enemy had already crossed the level ground, but with the vanguard, the moment it had pushed forward into the plain.

For in that way the whole battle would have taken place on flat, level ground, where the Aetolians happened to be at their most ineffective, owing to their equipment and their whole order of arms, while the Achaeans were at their most effective and powerful, for the opposite reasons just stated.

As it was, abandoning the ground and circumstances suited to themselves, they descended into conditions that favored the enemy. The outcome, accordingly,

Chapter 12 The Achaeans Defeated

matched their plans. For as the light-armed troops fastened upon them, the Aetolian cavalry kept their formation and withdrew toward the lower slopes, eager to join up with their own infantry.

But Aratus and his men, neither seeing clearly what was happening nor reckoning properly what would result from it, the moment they saw the cavalry retiring, supposed that they were in flight,

and so sent out the heavy-armed troops from the wings, ordering them to go to the aid of their own light-armed men and link up with them, while they themselves wheeled the army into column and led it forward at a run and in haste.

The Aetolian cavalry, meanwhile, having crossed the plain, as soon as they joined their infantry drew back and halted under cover of the lower slopes,

while they massed their infantry on the flanks and called them up, the men readily running back at the shouting and constantly reinforcing them as they arrived from the line of march.

And when they judged that they were now a match for the enemy in numbers, they closed up and charged the Achaean cavalry and light troops fighting at the front. Being more numerous, and making their assault from higher ground, they fought for a long time, and finally routed those drawn up against them.

As these men gave way and fled, the heavy-armed troops coming to their aid, arriving in disorder along the line of march and scattered — some at a loss over what was happening, others colliding head-on with the fleeing men during the withdrawal — were forced to turn back and do the same.

The result was that those actually defeated in the engagement numbered no more than five hundred, while those in flight numbered more than two thousand.

And since the affair itself taught the Aetolians what they had to do, they followed close behind, employing their shouting in an overbearing and relentless way.

As the Achaeans made their withdrawal toward their heavy infantry, on the assumption that these were standing fast in safety in their original formation, the flight at first was orderly and free from danger.

But when they saw that these troops too had abandoned the safety of their position and were strung out and broken up on the march, some of them at once dispersed and made their retreat in disorder to the neighboring towns,

while others, colliding head-on with the phalangites advancing toward them, had no need of the enemy at all, but threw themselves into a panic and forced one another into headlong flight. They directed their flight, during the withdrawal,

as I said before, toward the towns; for Orchomenus and Caphyae, being close by, were the salvation of many. Had this not been so, they would all have been in danger of being destroyed in an unexpected disaster.

So this, then, was the engagement that took place near Caphyae —

Chapter 13 Aratus Denounced For His Failure

...in this way it turned out. When the Megalopolitans learned that the Aetolians were encamped near Methydrium, they came at the call of the trumpet, with their whole population, to give aid on the day immediately following the battle.

And the very men alongside whom, while still alive, they had hoped to face the danger against the enemy—these they were now forced to bury, men who had been killed by their foes.

So, having dug a trench in the plain of Caphyae and gathered up the dead, they performed the funeral rites for those unfortunate men with every mark of honor.

The Aetolians, meanwhile, having unexpectedly won their advantage by means of their cavalry and light-armed troops alone, from then on marched in complete safety straight through the middle of the Peloponnese.

During this time they made an attempt on the city of the Pellenians, overran the territory of Sicyon, and finally made their withdrawal by way of the Isthmus.

These, then, were the cause and the pretext from which the Social War arose; its formal beginning came from the decree that was afterward passed by all the allies.

For they assembled at the city of the Corinthians and ratified the resolution, with Phi-

Chapter 14 Aratus is Denounced and Defends Himself

-lip the king presiding. A few days later the general body of the Achaeans, gathered for their regular assembly, were bitterly hostile—both collectively and individually—toward Aratus, on the grounds that he was, by common agreement, the man responsible for the disaster just described.

And so, when his political opponents brought charges against him and presented vivid demonstrations of his guilt, the multitude grew still more angry and incensed.

For it seemed that his first plain error was this: that, before his term of office had even legally begun, he had seized upon a time that belonged to another in order to take up the very sort of enterprises in which he knew he had often failed.

His second error, and greater than this, was that he had disbanded the Achaeans while the Aetolians were still in the heart of the Peloponnese—and this especially when he had known in advance that Scopas and Dorimachus were eager to upset the established order and stir up war.

His third error was to engage the enemy as he did, with so few men and under no pressing necessity, when he could have withdrawn safely to the neighboring cities, mustered the Achaeans, and only then given battle to the enemy, if he judged that course to be wholly advantageous.

His last and greatest error was that, having decided to fight, he conducted matters so recklessly and so heedlessly that he abandoned the plains and the usefulness of his heavy infantry, and made the contest against the Aetolians on the hillsides with his light-armed troops alone—the very ground than which nothing could have been more useful or more suited to the Aetolians.

Nevertheless, as soon as Aratus came forward and reminded them of his earlier political career and of what he had accomplished before, and offered his defense on the charges—arguing that he was not responsible for what had happened, and asking their pardon if he had indeed overlooked something during the engagement, and urging that they should consider the whole matter not with bitterness,

but with humanity—the multitude so quickly and so magnanimously changed their minds that they became thoroughly displeased with those of his political opponents who had joined in attacking him, and resolved all subsequent measures in accordance with Aratus' judgment. These events, then, fell in the earlier Olympiad,

while what follows fell in the one hundred and fortieth.

Chapter 15 Lukewarmness of the Allies

The Achaeans' resolutions were these: to send envoys to the Epirotes, the Boeotians, the Phocians, the Acarnanians,

and to Philip, and to make clear in what manner the Aetolians, in violation of the treaties, had already twice invaded Achaia under arms; to call upon them for aid in accordance with the agreements; and also to receive the Messenians into the alliance;

and that the general of the Achaeans should pick out five thousand foot and five hundred horse from among the Achaeans and go to the support of the Messenians, should the Aetolians set foot in their territory;

and to arrange with both the Lacedaemonians and the Messenians how many horse and foot were to be furnished by each for the common needs. When these measures had been resolved upon,

the Achaeans, bearing what had happened nobly, abandoned neither the Messenians nor their own purpose; and those appointed as envoys to the allies carried out their missions,

while the general picked out the men from Achaia in accordance with the decree, and arranged with the Lacedaemonians and the Messenians that each should furnish two thousand five hundred foot and two hundred and fifty horse,

so that the whole combined force for the needs that would arise should be ten thousand foot and a thousand horse.

The Aetolians, meanwhile,

when their regular assembly had come around, met and resolved to keep peace with the Lacedaemonians, the Messenians, and all the rest—acting in bad faith and wishing to ruin and injure the allies of the Achaeans;

but with the Achaeans themselves they voted to keep peace on condition that they withdraw from the alliance with the Messenians, and otherwise to make war—a thing utterly absurd.

For being themselves allies of both the Achaeans and the Messenians, if these two should maintain friendship and alliance with each other, they declared war on the Achaeans; whereas if the Achaeans chose enmity toward the Messenians, they would grant them peace separately—

so that their injustice could not even be brought within the bounds of reason, because of the perversity of their very schemes.

Chapter 16 The Aetolians and Illyrians Invade Achaia

The Epirotes and King Philip, on hearing the envoys, admitted the Messenians into the alliance;

and as for what the Aetolians had done, though they were indignant for the moment, they were not greatly astonished, since the Aetolians had done nothing extraordinary but only something in keeping with their usual ways.

For this very reason they were not angered for long, but voted to keep peace with them—so true is it that continual wrongdoing meets with more forgiveness than rare and unexpected wickedness.

The Aetolians, at any rate, behaving in this manner—constantly plundering Greece and waging undeclared wars upon many peoples—no longer even thought it worth their while to answer those who accused them, but actually mocked anyone who summoned them to arbitration over what had happened, or, by Zeus, over what they intended to do.

And the Lacedaemonians, though they had recently been set free through Antigonus and the generous zeal of the Achaeans, and were bound to do nothing hostile toward the Macedonians and Philip, sent secret messages to the Aetolians and concluded a covert treaty of friendship and alliance with them.

When the Achaean young men had already been picked out and assigned to the support of the Lacedaemonians and Messenians, Scerdilaidas, together with Demetrius of Pharos, sailed out from Illyria with ninety galleys beyond Lissus, in violation of the treaty with the Romans.

These men first put in at Pylos and, after making assaults upon it, were beaten off;

afterward Demetrius, taking fifty of the galleys, set out for the islands, and sailing around them exacted money from some of the Cyclades and plundered others;

while Scerdilaidas, making his voyage homeward, put in at Naupactus with forty galleys, persuaded by Amynas, king of the Athamanians, who happened to be his brother-in-law.

Having made an agreement with the Aetolians, through Agelaus, concerning the division of the spoils, he promised to join the Aetolians in invading Achaia together with them.

Having concluded this agreement with Scerdilaidas, Agelaus, Dorimachus, and Scopas—since the city of the Cynaethians was being intrigued into their hands—mustered the Aetolians with their whole force and invaded...

Chapter 17 Factions At Cynaetha

...Achaea, together with the Illyrians. Meanwhile Ariston, the general of the Aetolians, pretended to take no notice of any of these events and stayed quietly at home, claiming that he was not making war on the Achaeans but keeping the peace—a foolish and childish way to behave.

For it is plain that a man of this sort is bound to look silly and absurd whenever he imagines that mere words can hide what the facts make obvious.

Dorimachus and his men, however, marched through Achaean territory and suddenly appeared before Cynaetha.

Now the Cynaethans, who are Arcadians, had for many years been gripped by relentless and violent civil strife. The rival parties had repeatedly inflicted on one another massacres and banishments, and on top of these the plundering of property

and redistributions of land. In the end the faction that favored the Achaean cause prevailed and took control of the city, holding the walls with a garrison and a commandant brought in from Achaea.

Such was the situation when, a little before the Aetolians arrived, the exiles sent appeals to those in the city, begging to be reconciled with them and allowed to return to their homeland.

The party holding the city was persuaded and sent an embassy to the Achaean League, wishing to carry out the reconciliation with the League's approval.

The Achaeans readily gave their consent, convinced that both sides would be well disposed toward them—since the party in control of the city had placed all its hopes in the Achaeans, while those about to return would owe their safe restoration to Achaean agreement.

So the Cynaethans dismissed the garrison and the commandant from the city, made peace, and brought back the exiles, who numbered close to three hundred, after exacting from them the pledges reckoned the most binding among mankind.

But once they were home, the returned exiles did not even wait for some cause or pretext to arise that might give the appearance of a fresh quarrel breaking out; on the contrary, the moment they were back they immediately began plotting against their country and against the very men who had saved them.

Indeed, it seems to me that at the very moment when, over the sacrificial victims, they were exchanging oaths and pledges with one another, they were already turning over in their minds this crime against the gods and against those who had trusted them.

For as soon as they were admitted to citizenship, they at once began drawing in the Aetolians and intriguing with them to seize the city, eager to bring utter ruin upon those who had saved them and upon the city that had nurtured them.

Chapter 18 Treason of the Cynaethans

...to destroy it root and branch. The deed they carried out with the following piece of daring, and in the following way.

Some of the returned exiles had been appointed polemarchs. It is the duty of this office to close the gates, to keep custody of the keys during the time they remain shut, and to spend the day on station at the gatehouses.

The Aetolians, then, fully equipped and with their ladders ready, watched for their opportunity;

and the polemarchs from among the exiles, after butchering their fellow officers at the gatehouse, threw open the gate.

When this happened, some of the Aetolians rushed in through the gate, while others set up their ladders, forced their way over them, and took possession of the walls. The whole population of the city,

panic-stricken at what was happening, were helpless and at a loss how to meet the situation. They could not concentrate on resisting those pouring in through the gate because of the men attacking the walls, nor could they defend the walls because of the men forcing their way through the gate.

The Aetolians, having for these reasons quickly gained control of the city, did amid all their unjust acts one wholly just thing: the very men who had let them in and betrayed the city to them they slaughtered first of all, and plundered their property.

They treated all the others of that party in the same way; and finally, quartering themselves in the houses, they ransacked them for valuables and tortured many of the Cynaethans whom they suspected of having money, plate, or anything else of unusual worth hidden away.

Having ruined the Cynaethans in this fashion, they broke camp and moved off, leaving a garrison to guard the walls, and advanced in the direction of Lusi.

On reaching the temple of Artemis, which lies between Cleitor and Cynaetha and is regarded as inviolable by the Greeks, they threatened to carry off the goddess's herds and the other property around the temple.

But the people of Lusi prudently handed over some of the goddess's sacred objects and so dissuaded the Aetolians from their impiety, sparing themselves any irreparable harm.

The Aetolians accepted the gift, immediately moved on, and pitched their camp before the city of the Cleitorians.

Chapter 19 More Aetolian Outrages

About this same time Aratus, the general of the Achaeans, sent off to Philip an appeal for help, began mustering his picked troops, and sent for the contingents that Sparta and Messene were bound to supply under the terms of their agreements.

The Aetolians at first tried to persuade the Cleitorians to abandon the Achaeans and choose alliance with them instead.

But when the Cleitorians flatly refused to entertain the proposal, the Aetolians launched assaults, set their ladders against the walls, and tried to take the city by storm.

When the defenders inside resisted bravely and boldly, the Aetolians gave way to circumstances, broke camp, and marched off once more toward Cynaetha, driving away with them, even so, the goddess's herds.

At first they offered Cynaetha to the Eleans; but when the Eleans refused to take it, they resolved to hold the city themselves and put Euripidas in command of it.

Afterward, however, taking fright at reports of the relief force coming from Macedonia, they set fire to the city and withdrew, advancing once more toward Rhium, where they had decided to make their crossing.

Now Taurion, learning of the Aetolian invasion and of what had been done at Cynaetha, and observing that Demetrius of Pharos had sailed in from the islands to Cenchreae, urged him to come to the aid of the Achaeans and, after hauling his galleys across the Isthmus, to fall upon the Aetolians as they made their crossing.

Demetrius, who had made his return from the islands profitable but inglorious—since the Rhodians had put to sea against him—gladly agreed to Taurion's request, once Taurion had undertaken to cover the cost of getting the galleys across.

So Demetrius hauled his ships over the Isthmus but arrived two days too late for the Aetolian crossing; after raiding some places along the Aetolian coast in advance, he sailed back to Corinth.

As for the Lacedaemonians, they shirked sending the relief force as arranged, dispatching only a very small body of cavalry and infantry, merely to keep up appearances.

Aratus, though he had his Achaean troops, dealt with the situation more as a politician than as a general.

For up to this point he kept quiet, holding back and mindful of his earlier disaster, until Scopas and Dorimachus had accomplished everything they intended and returned home—even though they made their march through country easy to attack, full of narrow defiles, where a single trumpeter would have sufficed to bring them down.

As for the Cynaethans, although they had fallen into great misfortunes and great calamities at the hands of the Aetolians, they were nevertheless thought to have suffered, of all people, the most deservedly.

Chapter 20 Music in Arcadia

Since the Arcadian nation as a whole enjoys a certain reputation for virtue among all the Greeks—not only for the hospitality and kindness of their character and way of life, but above all for their reverence toward the gods—

it is worth pausing briefly to consider the savagery of the Cynaethans, and to ask how it was that, while admittedly Arcadians, they so far surpassed the rest of the Greeks at that time in cruelty and lawlessness.

In my view it was because they were the first and only Arcadians to abandon those practices which their ancestors had wisely devised and thoughtfully adapted, in keeping with nature, to all the inhabitants of Arcadia. I mean music—

genuine music, that is—which it is beneficial for all people to practice, but for Arcadians is positively essential. For we must not suppose, as Ephorus does—

who, in the preface to his whole work, tossed off a remark utterly unworthy of him—that music was introduced among mankind to deceive and bewitch them.

Nor should we imagine that the ancient Cretans and Spartans had no good reason for substituting the pipe and rhythmic movement for the trumpet in war,

or that the early Arcadians acted without purpose in giving music so prominent a place in their whole constitution that they made it a compulsory part of upbringing not only for children but for young men up to the age of thirty, though in all other respects they led the most austere of lives.

For these facts are familiar to everyone: that among the Arcadians, almost alone, the children are first trained from infancy to sing, in accordance with custom, the hymns and paeans by which each community celebrates its local heroes and gods in the traditional way;

and that afterward they learn the compositions of Philoxenus and Timotheus, and dance with great enthusiasm each year to the Dionysian pipers in the theaters—the boys in the boys' contests, the young men in what are called the men's contests.

Likewise throughout their whole lives, at their gatherings, they provide their entertainment not so much through imported performers as by their own efforts, each in turn being called on to sing.

And while they consider it no disgrace to admit ignorance of any other accomplishment, singing is something they can neither disclaim—since all are compelled to learn it—nor, having learned it, openly refuse to practice, because that too is reckoned shameful among them.

Moreover, practicing marching-songs to the pipe and in formation, and laboring at dances, they display these every year in the theaters to their fellow citizens, with shared attention and at public expense.

Chapter 21 Why the Ancient Arcadians Turned to Music

It seems to me that the men of old introduced these practices not for the sake of luxury or abundance, but because they observed, on the one hand, that everyone worked the land with their own hands and that their way of life was, in a word, toilsome and harsh; and on the other hand, they saw the severity of character that goes with such a life because of the coldness and gloom that prevail throughout most of the region—conditions to which all of us human beings are naturally bound to conform.

For it is by this cause, and no other, that, in our distinctions by nation and by broad geographical separation, we differ so widely from one another in character, in physical form, and in coloring, and likewise in most of our customary pursuits.

Wishing, then, to soften and temper the willfulness and harshness of their nature, they introduced all the things mentioned above, and in addition established the custom of common assemblies and frequent sacrifices shared alike by men and women, and also choral dances of girls together with boys.

In short, they devised every means, eager to tame and gentle the unyielding quality of the soul through the cultivation of these habits.

The people of Cynaetha neglected these things entirely—and that although they needed such help more than anyone, since they hold by far the harshest air and territory in all Arcadia—and instead gave themselves over to their mutual feuds and rivalries.

In the end they grew so savage that no Greek city has ever been the scene of greater or more continual acts of impiety.

Here is a sign both of the Cynaethans' misfortune in this regard and of the displeasure of the other Arcadians toward such conduct:

at the time when the Cynaethans, after committing their great massacre, sent an embassy to the Spartans, every other Arcadian city they entered on the road immediately ordered them out by herald;

and the Mantineans, after the envoys had departed, even performed a purification, carrying sacrificial victims around the city and the whole of their territory.

Let this much, then, be said by me so that the common character of the Arcadians may not be slandered on account of a single city, and likewise so that no one among the inhabitants of Arcadia may suppose that the cultivation of music is carried so far among them merely for the sake of indulgence and so be tempted to neglect this branch of education;

and also for the sake of the Cynaethans themselves, that, if ever god grants them better fortune, they may humanize themselves by turning to education, and above all to music; for only in this way could they ever be rid of the savagery that then prevailed among them.

Now that we have set out what came to mind concerning the Cynaethans, let us return once more to our digression.

Chapter 22 Philip V. In the Peloponnese

So the Aetolians, having done such things throughout the Peloponnese, returned home safely.

Philip, coming with an army to the aid of the Achaeans, arrived at Corinth. Finding that he had come too late, he sent dispatch-bearers to all the allies, urging each of them to send delegates with all speed to Corinth to deliberate about the common interest.

He himself broke camp and advanced toward Tegea, having learned that the Spartans had fallen into bloodshed and turmoil against one another.

For the Spartans, being accustomed to being ruled by a king and to obeying their leaders in all things, had recently been set free through Antigonus; and now, with no king among them, they were in a state of faction with one another, since they all assumed they had an equal share in the government.

At first, two of the ephors kept their views concealed, while the other three made common cause with the Aetolians, convinced that because of his youth Philip would not yet be able to deal effectively with affairs in the Peloponnese.

But when, contrary to their expectation, the Aetolians made a swift withdrawal from the Peloponnese, and Philip arrived from Macedonia even more swiftly,

the three distrusted one of the other two, Adeimantus, because he was privy to all their schemes but did not very much approve of what was being done; and they were anxious that, once the king drew near, he would reveal everything that was going on to Philip.

For this reason, after conferring with some of the young men, they issued a proclamation that all those of military age should go in arms to the sanctuary of Athena of the Brazen House, on the pretext that the Macedonians were advancing on the city.

When, owing to the suddenness of it, a crowd had quickly gathered, Adeimantus, displeased at what was happening, came forward and tried to exhort and instruct them, saying:

"These proclamations and these musters under arms ought to have been ordered earlier, at the time when we were hearing that the Aetolians, who were our enemies, were drawing near the borders of our land—not now, when we learn that the Macedonians, our benefactors and saviors, are approaching with their king."

But while he was still pressing this argument, the young men who had been suborned fell upon him and stabbed him to death, and with him Sthenelaus, Alcamenes, Thyestes, Bionidas, and a good many other citizens.

But Polyphontas and certain men with him, prudently foreseeing what was to come,

Chapter 23 Differences of Opinion Among the Lacedaemonians

withdrew to join Philip. Having done this, the ephors now in control of affairs at once sent men to denounce to Philip those who had been killed and to urge him to hold back his approach until the city's affairs, after the disturbance that had occurred, had returned to their settled state—and meanwhile to be assured that it was their fixed intention to maintain toward the Macedonians everything that was just and friendly.

These men, meeting the king when he was already near Mount Parthenium, addressed him in accordance with their instructions.

When he had heard them out, he urged the envoys to make their return home with all speed and to inform the ephors that he would continue his march without a break and make his camp at Tegea, and that he thought they ought, as quickly as possible, to send him men of sufficient standing to confer with him about the present situation.

When those who had met him had carried out his command, the leaders of the Spartans, after hearing the king's message,

sent ten men to Philip. These men went to Tegea and entered the king's council; with Omias at their head, they accused the party of Adeimantus of being responsible for the disturbance,

and promised that they themselves would do everything for Philip that pertained to the alliance, and would show themselves second to none in goodwill toward him among those reckoned to be his true friends.

So the Spartans, having spoken these things and others like them, withdrew, and the members of the council differed with one another in their opinions.

Some, knowing the malice of those in Sparta and convinced both that the party of Adeimantus had perished because of their loyalty to the Macedonians and that the Spartans had set their minds on making common cause with the Aetolians, advised Philip to make an example of the Spartans, treating them in the same way that Alexander had treated the Thebans immediately after taking power.

But others, the older men, declared that such anger was too severe for what had happened, and that the right course was to censure those responsible, depose them, and put the government and the magistracies into the hands of his own

Chapter 24 The King Decides Not to Punish Sparta

friends. The king then decided the whole matter—if one ought to speak of these views as the king's: for it is not likely that a boy of seventeen could reach clear judgments about matters of such magnitude.

It is, however, proper for us who write history to attribute the opinions that decided the deliberations to those in supreme command; yet the readers themselves should bear in mind that such proposals and decisions probably came from his associates, and especially from those closest to him.

Of these, one would most fairly assign to Aratus the opinion then expressed by the king.

For Philip said that, as for the wrongs the allies committed privately against one another, it fell to him to correct and mark these only by word of mouth and by letter;

but that matters affecting the alliance as a whole were the only ones that called for joint attention and correction by all.

Since the Spartans had committed no manifest offense against the common alliance, and were promising to do everything that was just toward us, it was not right to deliberate any irrevocable measure concerning them;

for it would be absurd that his father, having conquered them when they were enemies, had done nothing harsh, while he himself, for so small a cause, should decide on some irreparable action against them.

This opinion having been ratified—that the incident should be overlooked—the king at once sent Petraeus, one of his own friends, together with the party of Omias, to urge the people to hold fast to their goodwill toward himself and the Macedonians, and at the same time to give and receive the oaths concerning the alliance.

He himself broke camp with his army and advanced once more toward Corinth, having set before the allies, in his decision regarding the Spartans, a fine example of his own policy.

Chapter 25 War Declared With the Aetolians

When he reached Corinth, he found that the representatives from the allied cities had already arrived. He held a council with them and deliberated about what should be done and how they ought to deal with the Aetolians.

The Boeotians charged that the Aetolians had plundered the temple of Athena Itonia while a state of peace prevailed; the Phocians, that they had marched against Ambrysus and Daulium and tried to seize those cities;

the Epirotes, that they had ravaged their territory; and the Acarnanians demonstrated in detail how the Aetolians had organized a plot against Thyrium and had even dared to assault the city while it was still night.

In addition to these, the Achaeans set out their case: that the Aetolians had seized Clarium in the territory of Megalopolis; that they had ravaged the lands of Patrae and Pharae as they passed through them; that they had thoroughly sacked Cynaetha; that they had plundered the temple of Artemis at Lusi; that they had besieged the people of Cleitor; and that they had made designs against Pylus by sea, and by land against the recently founded city of the Megalopolitans, striving together with the Illyrians to lay it utterly waste.

When the councillors of the allies had heard all this, they all with one accord resolved to declare war on the Aetolians.

Having set out the aforementioned grievances in the preamble of their resolution, they appended a decree, making the further declaration that they would help the allies recover any territory or city of theirs that the Aetolians had been holding since the time when Demetrius, the natural father of Philip, died;

and likewise, as for those who had been compelled by circumstances to take part unwillingly in the Aetolian confederacy, that they would restore all of these to their ancestral forms of government, in possession of their own land and cities, free of garrisons, free of tribute, and independent, living under their own constitutions and ancestral laws.

They also wrote that they would help the Amphictyons recover their laws and their authority over the temple, which the Aetolians had now taken away from them, since the Aetolians wished to control the affairs of the temple themselves.

Chapter 26 Opening of the Social War

When this resolution had been ratified, in the first year of the 140th Olympiad, the war called the Social War had taken its beginning—a beginning that was just and fitting in view of the wrongs that had been committed.

The councillors at once sent envoys to the allies, so that, once the resolution had been confirmed among each people by a vote of the citizens at large, all might join in declaring war on the Aetolians from their respective territories.

Philip also sent a letter to the Aetolians, making clear that, if they had anything just to say in their defense regarding the charges against them, they should even now come together and settle the matter through discussion;

but that if they supposed they could, without any common declaration of war, plunder and ravage everyone, while those they wronged would not defend themselves—and that, if these did defend themselves, they would be judged to have started the war—then they were the most simple-minded of all people.

When the magistrates of the Aetolians received this letter, at first they expected that Philip would not come, and so they fixed an appointed day on which they would meet him at Rhium.

But when they learned that he was actually on his way, they sent a courier explaining that they were not able, before the assembly of the Aetolians met, to settle anything on their own authority concerning matters of general policy.

The Achaeans, having gathered for their regular assembly, all ratified the resolution and proclaimed the right of reprisal against the Aetolians.

And when the king too came before the council at Aegium and spoke at some length, they received what he said with goodwill and renewed with Philip himself the friendly relations that had existed between their ancestors.

Chapter 27 Disingenuous Policy of the Spartans

At about the same time the Aetolians, the season of their elections having arrived, chose as their Strategus Scopas, the very man who had been responsible for all the wrongful acts just described.

About these matters I scarcely know how one ought to speak. For to pass a public decree against making war, and yet to march out in full force and plunder and carry off their neighbors' property; and to punish none of those responsible, but on the contrary to elect as generals and to honor the leaders in such deeds—this seems to me to be brimming with utter villainy.

For what else could one call such wickedness? My meaning will be made clear from the following examples.

When Phoebidas treacherously seized the Cadmeia in violation of the treaty, the Lacedaemonians penalized the man responsible, but did not withdraw the garrison—as though the wrong were undone by the punishment of the man who committed it, when in fact the opposite course was open to them; for it was the garrison that mattered to the Thebans.

Again, they proclaimed that they were leaving the cities free and self-governing in accordance with the peace concluded under Antalcidas, yet they did not withdraw their governors from the cities.

And when they had driven the Mantineans from their homes—men who were their friends and allies—they claimed they were doing no wrong, on the grounds that they had merely resettled them from one city into several;

acting with a folly that was joined to wickedness, plainly because they imagined that, if a man shuts his own eyes, his neighbors too cannot see.

For both peoples, then, this devotion to such a policy became the cause of the greatest disasters; and it is one that should in no way and on no account be emulated, either by individuals or by states, if they deliberate rightly.

King Philip, having concluded his business with the Achaeans, set out with his army for Macedonia, hastening to make his preparations for the war,

and through the aforementioned decree he held out fair hopes not only to the allies but to all the Greeks, of his mildness and royal magnanimity.

Chapter 28 The Wars in Italy, Greece, and Asia Become Interlaced

These events were taking place at the same time as when Hannibal, who had by now become master of all the territory south of the Iber river, was launching his attack on the city of Saguntum.

Now, if it had happened that Hannibal's first undertakings were from the very outset interwoven with affairs in Greece, it would clearly have been my duty to have given an account of them in the previous book, alternating and setting them side by side with the affairs in Iberia, following the order of the dates.

But since the wars in Italy, in Greece, and in Asia had their beginnings separately, while their conclusions were shared, I have decided to give my account of them separately as well, until we arrive at the point at which the aforementioned events became interwoven with one another and began to tend toward a single end—

for in this way both the account of the several beginnings will be clear and the interweaving evident (the very interweaving I indicated at the start, showing when, how, and for what causes it came about)—and from then on it remains to make my history of them all a single, common one.

The interweaving of events occurred near the conclusion of the war, in the third year of the 140th Olympiad. Therefore, from that point onward I shall give my account following the dates in a common narrative, but I shall treat the events before it separately,

as I have said, merely calling to mind those events of the same period that have been related in the previous book, so that my narrative may become not only easy to follow but also striking to those who attend to it.

Chapter 29 The Illyrians and Acarnanians Join

While wintering in Macedonia, Philip carefully enrolled his forces for the campaign ahead, and at the same time secured his position against the barbarians who lived above Macedonia.

After this he met with Scerdilaidas and, boldly placing himself in his hands, discussed terms of friendship and alliance with him.

Partly by promising to help him set in order his affairs in Illyria, and partly by denouncing the Aetolians—who gave ample grounds for denunciation—he easily persuaded him to agree to what he proposed.

For private wrongdoing differs in no real way from public wrongdoing, but only in the number and scale of what results from it. Indeed, in private life the tribe of cheats and thieves comes to ruin chiefly in this way: by failing to deal justly with one another, and in short through their treacheries toward each other. And this is exactly what happened in the case of the Aetolians at that time.

For they had agreed to give Scerdilaidas a share of the plunder if he would join them in invading Achaea; and when he had been won over and had done so,

they sacked the city of the Cynaetheans, and after driving off many captives and herds of cattle, they made Scerdilaidas no sharer at all in what had been taken.

Because of this, resentment was already smouldering in him, so that with only a brief reminder from Philip he quickly gave his assent and agreed to join the common alliance, on these terms: that he should receive twenty talents a year, and should put to sea with thirty galleys and wage war against the Aetolians by sea.

Chapter 30 The Acarnanians Enter the War

So Philip was occupied with these matters. Meanwhile the envoys who had been sent out to the allies came first to Acarnania and met with the people there.

The Acarnanians sincerely confirmed the decree on their part and carried the war from their own territory against the Aetolians—even though they, if anyone, would have been justified in being excused for postponing it, hesitating, and in general fearing a war with their neighbours.

For they lay directly alongside the Aetolians, sharing a common border with their country; and still more because, on their own, they were easy to overpower; and, most of all, because only a short time before they had had a taste of the most dreadful sufferings on account of their hostility with the Aetolians.

But it seems to me that men of genuine character, both in public and in private affairs, never set anything above their duty; and this principle the Acarnanians, on most occasions, are found to have maintained as well as any of the Greeks, even though they set out from but slender resources.

With such people one should not hesitate to share in undertakings when circumstances demand it, but should rather be eager to do so, more than with any other of the Greeks; for both in private and in public life they have something steadfast and devoted to liberty about them.

The Epirotes, by contrast, after listening to the envoys, confirmed the decree in much the same way, and voted to wage war against the Aetolians—but only once King Philip too should have begun it.

To the envoys who came from the Aetolians, however, they replied that the Epirotes had resolved to maintain peace with them—conducting their affairs in an ignoble and double-dealing manner.

Envoys were also sent to King Ptolemy to urge him neither to send money to the Aetolians nor to furnish them with any other aid against Philip and the allies.

Chapter 31 Mistaken Policy of the Messenians

As for the Messenians—on whose account the war had begun in the first place—they answered those who had come to them that, since Phigalia lay on their borders and was subject to the Aetolians, they would not enter into the war until that city had been wrested away from the Aetolians.

This decision was forced through, though the common people were by no means pleased with it, by the ephors Oenis and Nicippus and certain others of the oligarchical party, who feared the boldness of the Aetolians—men who, in my judgement at least, were gravely mistaken and wide of the mark of what was needed.

For I maintain that, while war is indeed a fearful thing, it is not so fearful that one should endure anything whatever in order to avoid taking it up.

Otherwise, why do we all make so bold with our talk of equality before the law, freedom of speech, and the very name of liberty, if nothing is to count for more than peace?

We do not, after all, praise the Thebans for their conduct in the Persian Wars, because out of fear they withdrew from the dangers undertaken on behalf of Greece and chose the side of the Persians; nor do we praise Pindar, who joined them in counselling that they keep quiet, in these verses:

"Let a man set the common good of the citizens in fair weather, and seek out the bright light of high-hearted peace." For though at the moment he seemed to have spoken persuasively,

it was not long before his pronouncement was found to be the most shameful and most harmful of all;

for peace, when it goes with justice and honour, is the fairest and most profitable of possessions, but when it goes with baseness or disgraceful cowardice it is the most shameful and most ruinous of all things.

Chapter 32 The Messenians Too Much Inclined to Peace

The oligarchs who led the Messenians, aiming at their own immediate private advantage, were always more eager for peace than was right.

Because of this, although they had many opportunities and favourable moments, they let them slip, and at times escaped from fears and dangers as well; but along with this policy the reckoning against them was always mounting up, and in the end they made their country wrestle with the gravest disasters.

For my own part, I think the cause was this: that they bordered on two of the most powerful peoples in the Peloponnese—indeed almost in all of Greece—I mean the Arcadians and the Laconians,

of whom the one had been hostile and irreconcilable toward them ever since they had occupied the land, while the other was friendly and protective; yet they neither nobly took up their enmity against the Lacedaemonians nor their friendship with the Arcadians.

The result was that whenever these peoples were preoccupied in war against one another or against others, things went well for the Messenians; for they always enjoyed peace and fine weather, as it were, because their country lay off to one side.

But whenever the Lacedaemonians, having leisure and nothing to distract them, turned to doing them harm,

the Messenians were neither able by themselves to look the weight of Lacedaemon in the face, nor had they prepared in advance true friends who would stand by them in everything; and so they were forced either to be slaves to the Lacedaemonians, bearing their burdens, or, in fleeing that slavery, to be driven from their homes and made fugitives, abandoning their country together with their children and wives—

which is just what has now befallen them more than once, and not so very long ago.

Now it would be best if the present state of affairs among the Peloponnesians could grow together into something permanent, so that there should be no need of what I am about to say.

But should these arrangements ever undergo upheaval and change, I see only one hope for the Messenians and the Megalopolitans of being able to keep possession of their own land for the longer term: namely, that they come to a common mind in accordance with the judgement of Epaminondas, and choose to share with one another truly in every crisis and every undertaking.

Chapter 33 Troubles In Sparta

This observation of mine may perhaps find some confirmation in events of long ago as well.

For the Messenians, among many other testimonies, set up a pillar beside the altar of Lycaean Zeus in the days of Aristomenes—as Callisthenes too records—on which they inscribed these lines:

"Time in the end found out the unjust king;

with Zeus's help Messene found the traitor easily. Hard it is for a perjured man to escape the notice of a god. Hail, King Zeus, and keep Arcadia safe."

For after they had been robbed of their own land,

it was, as I see it, as though for a second fatherland that they prayed the gods to preserve Arcadia, and so dedicated this inscription.

And they did so with good reason. For not only had the Arcadians taken them in at the time of their expulsion from their own country during the Aristomenic war, sharing their hearths with them and making them citizens, but they had also voted to give their daughters in marriage to those of the Messenians who were of suitable age,

and, beyond this, had investigated the treachery of their king Aristocrates in the battle known as the Battle of the Trench, and had put him to death and wiped out his entire line.

Yet quite apart from these ancient events, what happened most recently, after the joint refounding of Megalopolis and Messene, would by itself give ample support to what I have said.

For at the time when the battle near Mantinea had left the victory of the Greeks in dispute because of the death of Epaminondas, the Lacedaemonians tried to bar the Messenians from sharing in the treaty, still coveting Messenia in their hopes;

but the Megalopolitans and all the Arcadians who shared in their alliance pressed the matter so hard that the Messenians were admitted by the allies and took part in the oaths and the settlement, while the Lacedaemonians alone among the Greeks were left out of the treaty.

Considering all this, what man of later times could fail to judge that what I set out a little earlier has been rightly said?

Let this, then, be said by me for the sake of the Arcadians and Messenians, so that, remembering the disasters that have befallen their homelands at the hands of the Lacedaemonians, they may hold genuinely fast to their goodwill and loyalty toward one another,

and may neither, out of dread of some danger nor out of longing for peace, abandon each other in the gravest crises.

Chapter 34 Machatas Addresses the Spartan Public

The Lacedaemonians, for their part, behaved exactly as was their habit—this being of a piece with what came before—for in the end they sent the envoys of the allies away without any answer. Such was the impasse into which their own folly and bad faith had driven them.

And this, it seems to me, proves the truth of the saying that excessive daring often ends in senselessness and comes to nothing.

Afterward, however, once new ephors had been installed, the men who had set the whole affair in motion from the start, and who were responsible for the slaughter mentioned above, sent word to the Aetolians, inviting them to dispatch an envoy.

The Aetolians readily complied, and a little later Machatas arrived at Lacedaemon as their ambassador.

He at once approached the ephors ****, the men holding that Machatas ought to be granted access to the people, that kings should be appointed in accordance with ancestral custom, and that the rule of the Heraclidae should no longer be allowed to remain abolished in defiance of the laws.

The ephors, though displeased with the whole business and unable to face down the agitation, but fearful of the band of young men, said that they would deliberate about the kings later, but granted Machatas the assembly.

When the people had gathered, Machatas came forward and at considerable length urged them to choose the alliance with the Aetolians, recklessly and brazenly denouncing the Macedonians while extolling the Aetolians without reason or truth.

When he had withdrawn, the matter became the subject of great dispute: some spoke in favor of the Aetolians and advised concluding the alliance with them, while others spoke against it.

But when some of the older men brought the people's attention to bear on the benefactions of Antigonus and the Macedonians, and on the harm done through Charixenus and Timaeus—when the Aetolians had marched out in full force and ravaged their land, enslaved the inhabitants of the surrounding country, and plotted against Sparta itself by bringing back the exiles through trickery and force—the people came round to a different view,

and in the end were persuaded to maintain the alliance with Philip and the Macedonians.

This being so, Machatas departed again without having achieved anything

Chapter 35 Restoration of Royalty In Sparta

and returned home; but those who had been the original authors of the upheaval, wholly unable to yield to the present circumstances, once more set about doing a thing more impious than anything else, having first corrupted some of the young men.

For at a certain ancestral sacrifice it was required that the men of military age process under arms to the temple of Athena of the Bronze House, while the ephors carried out the rites of the sacrifice, remaining there about the precinct.

At this very moment some of the young men in the procession, fully armed, suddenly fell upon the ephors as they were sacrificing and cut them down—even though the sanctuary afforded safety to all who took refuge in it, even to a man condemned to death.

But on this occasion, through the savagery of the men who dared the deed, contempt for the sacred reached such a pitch that all the ephors were slaughtered around the altar and the table of the goddess.

Next, acting in accordance with their design, they killed Gyridas and the other elders of his party, exiled those who had spoken against the Aetolians, chose ephors from among their own number, and concluded the alliance with the Aetolians.

They did all this—and submitted to the hatred of the Achaeans, the ingratitude toward the Macedonians, and, in general, their unreasonable conduct toward everyone—not least because of Cleomenes and their goodwill toward him, forever cherishing the hope and expectation of his coming and of the deliverance he would bring with it.

So true is it that men who have the skill to deal tactfully with those around them leave behind, not only while present but even when far away, certain sparks of goodwill toward themselves that are exceedingly strong.

These men, for instance, among other things, though they had been governed under their ancestral constitution for nearly three years now since the expulsion of Cleomenes, had never once even thought of appointing kings of Sparta;

yet the moment the report of Cleomenes' death reached them, both the masses and the board of ephors at once rushed to install kings.

And so the ephors who shared in the faction of the partisans—the same men who had concluded the alliance with the Aetolians of which I spoke just now—appointed the one king lawfully and properly, namely Agesipolis, who was a boy in age, son of Agesipolis and grandson of Cleombrotus;

this Cleombrotus had reigned at the time when Leonidas was driven from the throne, because by descent he was the nearest to that house.

As guardian of the boy they chose Cleomenes, son of Cleombrotus and brother of Agesipolis.

From the other royal house there were two sons of Archidamus, son of Eudamidas, by the daughter of Hippomedon, while Hippomedon himself—son of Agesilaus, son of Eudamidas—was still alive and in his prime, and there were several other members of that house besides, more distantly related than those just named but still kin by descent;

yet all of these they passed over and appointed as king Lycurgus, not one of whose ancestors had ever attained that title. By giving a talent to each of the ephors he became a descendant of Heracles and king of Sparta.

So cheap, everywhere, has nobility become. And so it was that not the children's children, but the very men who set it up, were the first to pay the wages of their folly.

Chapter 36 Machatas Proposes Foreign War to Quell Domestic Strife

Machatas, learning what had taken place among the Lacedaemonians, turned back once more and came to Sparta, and urged the ephors and the kings to carry the war to the Achaeans;

for only in this way, he said, could an end be put to the contentiousness of those Lacedaemonians who were trying by every means to sever the alliance with the Aetolians, and likewise of those in Aetolia who were acting in the same fashion.

The ephors and the kings were persuaded, and Machatas departed, having accomplished his aim through the blindness of those who worked with him.

Lycurgus then took the soldiers and some of the citizens and invaded the Argolid, the Argives being completely off their guard because of the settlement that had previously been in place.

By a sudden assault he seized Polichna, Prasiae, Leucae, and Cyphanta, but in his attacks on Glympes and Zarax he was beaten off.

After he had done this, the Lacedaemonians proclaimed the right of plunder against the Achaeans. Machatas and his party also persuaded the Eleans, using arguments much like those they had used with the Lacedaemonians, to carry the war to the Achaeans.

Since matters had advanced for the Aetolians beyond expectation and to their liking, they entered upon the war with confidence, while the Achaeans were in the opposite case.

For Philip, on whom their hopes rested, was still occupied with his preparations; the Epirotes were only about to go to war;

the Messenians remained inactive; and the Aetolians, having now added the folly of the Eleans and Lacedaemonians to their cause, were hemming them in with war from every side.

Chapter 37 Universal War

At this time it happened that Aratus's term of office was already coming to an end, and that his son, Aratus, who had been elected by the Achaeans, was taking over the generalship.

Scopas was general of the Aetolians, and just then his term of office stood at about its midpoint. For the Aetolians held their elections immediately after the autumn equinox, whereas the Achaeans held theirs about the time of the rising of the Pleiades.

Now, as summer was already setting in and the younger Aratus had taken over the generalship, all these affairs at once took up their undertakings and their beginnings.

For at this same period Hannibal set about besieging Saguntum, while the Romans were dispatching Lucius Aemilius with a force into Illyria against Demetrius of Pharos—matters of which we have given an account in the previous book.

Antiochus, after Theodotus had handed over Ptolemais and Tyre to him, was setting out to make an attempt on the regions of Coele-Syria, while Ptolemy was occupied with preparations for the war against Antiochus.

Lycurgus, wishing to begin in the same manner as Cleomenes, had encamped before the Athenaeum of the Megalopolitans and was besieging it. The Achaeans were gathering mercenary cavalry and infantry for the war that surrounded them.

Philip, meanwhile, set out from Macedonia with his army, having ten thousand Macedonian phalangites, five thousand peltasts, and along with these eight hundred cavalry.

All these matters, then, were in such a state of undertaking and preparation. And about this same time the Rhodians declared war on the Byzantines for certain

Chapter 38 Byzantium

such reasons. As far as the sea is concerned, the Byzantines inhabit a site that is the most favorable, both for security and for prosperity, of any in the whole of our inhabited world; but as regards the land, it is in both respects the most unfavorable of all.

For by sea they so command the mouth of the Pontus that no merchant can sail either in or out without their consent.

And since the Pontus holds many things useful for the livelihood of the rest of mankind, the Byzantines are masters of all of them.

For toward the necessary needs of life, the regions of the Pontus furnish us with livestock and with the great number of persons brought into slavery, supplying them, by common admission, in the most abundant and most serviceable quantity; while toward our comforts they provide us unstintingly with honey, wax, and salt-fish.

They also receive what is surplus in our own regions—olive oil and every kind of wine—and they exchange these for grain, sometimes giving it when it is opportune, sometimes taking it.

From all these things the Greeks would necessarily have been either wholly cut off, or else have found the exchange of them entirely unprofitable, had the Byzantines chosen to be obstructive and to make common cause now with the Gauls, now still more with the Thracians—or had they not inhabited the place at all.

For owing to the narrowness of the passage and the multitude of barbarians lying alongside it, the Pontus would, by common admission, have been closed to our ships.

Now perhaps the greatest advantages for their own livelihood accrue to the Byzantines themselves, because of the special features of their location.

For everything that is surplus among them finds a ready and profitable export, and whatever they lack a ready and profitable import, without any hardship or danger.

Yet, as we have said, many useful things also come to other peoples through them. Therefore, being in a way common benefactors of all, they would reasonably deserve from the Greeks not only gratitude but also a shared defense in times of crisis brought on by the barbarians.

But since it has come about that the special character and natural advantage of the place are unknown to most people—because it lies a little outside the parts of the inhabited world that are commonly surveyed—

and since we all wish to know such things, and above all to become eyewitnesses of places that have something exceptional or distinctive, or, if that is not possible, at least to hold in our minds notions and impressions of them as close to the truth as may be,

it would be right to state what the circumstance is, and what it is that produces such great and such remarkable abundance for the aforementioned city.

Chapter 39 The Black Sea

The sea called the Pontus has a circumference of close to twenty-two thousand stades, and two mouths lying diametrically opposite to each other, the one opening from the Propontis, the other from the Maeotic Lake, which itself by itself has a circumference of eight thousand stades.

Into the aforementioned basins many great rivers discharge from Asia, and still greater and more numerous ones from Europe; and so it comes about that the Maeotis, being filled up by these, flows into the Pontus through its mouth, and the Pontus into the Propontis.

The mouth of the Maeotis is called the Cimmerian Bosporus, which has a breadth of about thirty stades and a length of sixty, and is shallow throughout.

The mouth of the Pontus is likewise named the Thracian Bosporus, and its length is one hundred and twenty stades, while its breadth is not everywhere the same.

The mouth begins, on the Propontis side, at the channel between Calchedon and Byzantium,

which is fourteen stades across; and on the Pontus side, at the place called Hieron, where they say that Jason, on his return voyage from Colchis, first sacrificed to the twelve gods. This place lies on the Asiatic side, and is twelve stades distant from Europe, measured to the Sarapieum of Thrace, which lies directly opposite.

There are two causes of the continual outflow of both the Maeotis and the Pontus. The first is immediate and plain to everyone: as many streams fall into vessels of fixed circumference, the liquid keeps growing greater and greater;

and if there were no outlet, it would necessarily keep rising and take up an ever greater and larger area of the basin, whereas, since outlets do exist, the water that is added and grows excessive must overflow and run off and be carried away continuously through the existing mouths.

The second cause is this: since the rivers carry much sediment of every kind into the aforementioned basins during heavy rains, the water, pressed out by the accumulating silt deposits, keeps rising and is carried away in the same manner through the existing outlets.

And since the silting and the inflow from the rivers are unceasing and continuous, the discharge through the mouths must necessarily be unceasing and continuous too.

These, then, are the true causes of the outflow of the Pontus, deriving their credibility not from merchants' tales, but from observation according to nature—

Chapter 40 The Black Sea Being Silted Up

than which it is not easy to find a more accurate method. And since we have settled on this topic, we must leave nothing idle or resting on mere assertion—as most writers are accustomed to do—but must employ a more demonstrative manner of exposition, so that we leave none of the points under inquiry unresolved for our attentive readers.

For this is the peculiar mark of the present age, in which, all seas and lands having become navigable and passable, it would no longer be fitting to use poets and myth-writers as witnesses concerning things unknown—

which is what our predecessors did about most matters, offering, as Heraclitus says, untrustworthy guarantors for disputed points. We must rather try, through history itself, to present sufficient credibility to our hearers.

We assert, then, that the Pontus has been silting up both in the past and now, and that in time both the Maeotis and the Pontus will be entirely filled up—provided the same arrangement of the regions remains, and the causes of the silting continue to operate without interruption.

For whenever time is infinite, and the basins are in every way wholly finite, it is plain that, even if only a trifling amount is brought in, they will be filled in time.

For by nature, a finite thing that is continuously being formed or destroyed in infinite time—even if it happens by the smallest degree (for let this now be supposed)—must inevitably reach completion according to the proposition.

And whenever it is not a trifling amount, but actually a very great deal of silt that is brought in, it is clear that what we are now describing will come to pass not at some distant time, but quickly.

And this is indeed seen to be happening. The Maeotis, then, has already become silted up: for the greater part of it lies at a depth of seven or five fathoms, and on this account it can no longer be sailed by large ships without a pilot.

And although from the beginning it was a sea flowing together with the Pontus, as the ancients agree, it is now a freshwater lake, the sea-water having been pressed out by the silt deposits, and the inflow of the rivers having prevailed.

The same will happen with the Pontus, and is in fact happening now; but it is not very evident to most people, because of the size of the basin. To those, however, who have given even a little attention, even now

Chapter 41 Flow of the Danube into the Black Sea

What is happening is clear. Since the Danube empties from Europe into the Pontus through several mouths, the result is that opposite it, at a distance of nearly a thousand stades, there has formed a long bank, lying a day's sail out from the shore [the bank that exists there now], built up from the silt carried out through the mouths.

Ships sailing into the Pontus, while still apparently running through open water, are caught off guard and run aground on these places at night. Sailors call them the Breasts.

As for why the deposit does not build up right against the shore but is instead pushed far out, this must be reckoned the cause.

For just so far as the currents of the rivers prevail through the force of their flow and drive back the sea, exactly that far must the soil and everything else carried along by the streams be pushed forward too, finding no rest or fixed position at all;

but once the currents are spent by the depth and great mass of the sea, then it is natural that the silt, now sinking downward by its own nature, comes to rest and settles into a fixed position.

This is why, in the case of violent and great rivers, the deposits build up far out, while the water close to the land is deep; whereas with smaller, gently flowing rivers the sandbanks form right at their mouths.

This becomes especially evident during heavy rains: for then even the most ordinary streams, once they overpower the surf at their mouths, drive the silt out to sea to such an extent that the distance is proportional in each case to the force of the streams pouring in.

And as to the size of the bank just described, and in general the quantity of stones, timber, and earth carried down by the rivers, there is no reason whatever to be skeptical —

for that would be foolish — when we see before our own eyes how some chance torrent in a short time will often gouge out and cut through sheer places, carry off every kind of timber, earth, and stone, and pile up such mounds that at times it alters a place and makes it unrecognizable in a brief span of time —

Chapter 42 Concentration of Salt

— these same places. From all this it is not reasonable to wonder how rivers of such size and such character, flowing continuously, accomplish some of the effects described and in the end fill up the Pontus.

For by right reasoning it appears not merely probable but inevitable that this should come to pass.

A sign of what is to come is this: by just the degree to which the Maeotis is now fresher than the Pontic sea, by that same degree the Pontus is plainly seen to differ from our own sea.

From this it is clear that, whenever the time it takes for the Maeotis to be filled bears the same ratio to the time required as the size of the one basin bears to the other, then the Pontus too will come to be shallow, fresh, and marsh-like, just as the Maeotic lake is.

Indeed, we must suppose this will happen even sooner, in proportion as the streams of the rivers emptying into it are greater and more numerous.

Let this, then, be our answer to those who are inclined to disbelieve that the Pontus is now being silted up, and that one day it will be filled, and that so vast an open sea will become a lake and a marsh.

And let it be said all the more for the sake of the falsehoods and marvel-mongering of seafarers, so that we may not be forced, like children, to gape at everything that is said out of inexperience, but instead, having some traces of the truth, may be able from them to judge to some degree whether what is reported by various people is true or the opposite.

Now let us return to the continuous account of the favorable situation of the Byzantines.

Chapter 43 The Site of Byzantium

The mouth that joins the Pontus and the Propontis is, as I said just now, one hundred and twenty stades in length. Hieron marks its boundary toward the Pontus, while the narrows at Byzantium mark its boundary toward the Propontis.

Between these two points lies the Hermaeum, set on a kind of promontory of Europe that juts out into the strait. It lies about five stades from Asia and stands at the very narrowest point of the whole mouth. It was here, they say, that Darius bridged the channel at the time when he made his crossing to attack the Scythians.

Now along the rest of its course from the Pontus the flow of the current is fairly uniform, because the lands bordering the strait on either side are alike in form.

But when the stream, carried down from the Pontus and squeezed together, strikes with force against the European Hermaeum, where I said the narrowest point lies, it then turns aside, as if from a blow, and dashes against the regions of Asia on the opposite side.

From there, in turn, as if recoiling, it makes its return back toward the headlands of Europe called the Hestiae.

Setting out from there once again, it falls upon what is called the Cow, a place in Asia, the spot on which the myths say Io first set foot after she had crossed over.

Finally the current, starting from the Cow, runs straight toward Byzantium itself. Splitting around the city, a small part of it is cut off into the gulf called the Horn, while the greater part swerves away once more.

It is no longer strong enough, however, to reach the land opposite, on which Calchedon stands.

For having made its returns back and forth many times, and since the channel here is broad, the current has by now spent its force at this point and no longer makes short reflections at a sharp angle toward the far shore, but rather at an obtuse one.

For this reason it falls short of the city of the Calchedonians and runs

Chapter 44 Contrast between Byzantium and Calchedon

down the middle of the channel. And the very thing that makes the city of the Byzantines so excellently situated, and that of the Calchedonians the opposite, is just what I have now described—even though, to the eye, the position of both seems equally favorable for advantage.

Yet, all the same, it is not easy to sail into the one even if you wish to, whereas to the other the current carries you of necessity, even against your will, as I said just now.

Here is the proof of this: those who want to cross from Calchedon to Byzantium cannot sail straight across because of the current between them, but instead skirt along toward the Cow and the place called Chrysopolis.

It was this place that the Athenians once seized, on the advice of Alcibiades, when they first set about levying tolls on those sailing into the Pontus; and from there they let their ships go forward with the current, which carries them of necessity to Byzantium.

The situation is similar for a voyage on the other side of the city of the Byzantines.

For whether a man runs from the Hellespont before the south winds, or toward the Hellespont from the Pontus before the Etesian winds, the voyage along Europe from the city of the Byzantines is straight and at the same time easily made, on toward the narrows of the Propontis at Abydos and Sestos, and back again likewise from there to Byzantium.

But from Calchedon along the Asian coast it is just the opposite, because the passage is full of bays and because the territory of the Cyziceni projects far out.

For a ship carried from the Hellespont toward Calchedon to make use of the voyage along Europe, and then, as it draws near the region of Byzantium, to bend and run across to Calchedon, is difficult on account of the current and the things already mentioned.

Likewise, again, for a ship sailing out, to run straight for Thrace is utterly impossible, both because of the current between them and because both winds blow against both attempts.

For the south wind carries ships into the Pontus and the north wind out of it, and one must use these very winds for each of the two voyages.

These, then, are the things that give the Byzantines their advantage by sea; the matters concerning the land

Chapter 45 Disadvantages of Byzantium On Land

What I am about to describe is the source of their difficulties. Since Thrace surrounds their territory on every side, running from one sea to the other, the Byzantines are locked in a perpetual and grueling war against the Thracians.

For they cannot, even by mounting a full campaign and defeating them, rid themselves of the war once and for all, because of the sheer number both of the common tribes and of the chieftains.

If they overcome one ruler, three others still more formidable march into their land.

Nor do they gain anything by giving way and submitting to tribute and treaties: for if they make a concession to one, they find by that very act five times as many enemies on their hands.

For this reason they are gripped by a perpetual and grueling war—for what is more precarious than a war with a barbarian neighbor on your own doorstep?

What is more terrible? Yet beyond wrestling with these utterly ruinous troubles on land, and apart from the other evils that attend any war, they also endure a kind of punishment worthy of Tantalus, as the poet describes it.

For though they possess the most fertile of lands, when they have worked it hard and the harvest comes in, outstanding in its abundance and quality, then the barbarians descend upon them and either destroy the crops or gather them up and carry them off.

And so, on top of the lost labor and expense, they look on at the devastation and, because the harvest was so fine, they cry out in indignation and bear what has happened with great bitterness.

Still, since they were accustomed to enduring the war with the Thracians, they kept it within its usual bounds and held to their original fair dealings with the other Greeks.

But when, on top of all this, the Gauls under Comontorius fell upon them as well—

Chapter 46 Byzantium, The Gauls, And Rhodians

—they were brought to the very brink of ruin. These Gauls had set out from their homeland together with Brennus; but having escaped the disaster at Delphi and reached the Hellespont, they did not cross over into Asia. Instead they stayed where they were, drawn to the region around Byzantium for its appeal.

Having defeated the Thracians and established Tyle as their royal seat, they brought the Byzantines into the gravest danger.

At first, during the raids carried out under Comontorius, their first king, the Byzantines kept buying them off with gifts of three thousand, or five thousand, and sometimes even ten thousand gold pieces, on the condition that they not ravage their land.

In the end the Byzantines were forced to agree to pay a yearly tribute of eighty talents, and this continued down to the reign of Cavarus, under whom the kingdom was dissolved and the whole Gallic people was wiped out, conquered in turn by the Thracians in a reversal of fortune.

It was during this period that the Byzantines, hard pressed by the tribute payments, at first sent embassies to the Greeks, asking them for help and joint support to meet the crisis surrounding them.

But since most of the Greeks paid no attention, the Byzantines, driven by necessity, set about—

Chapter 47 The Byzantines Institute a Toll

—levying a duty on those sailing into the Pontus. Since the Byzantines' collection of a toll on goods exported from the Pontus proved a serious loss and inconvenience to everyone, people regarded it as an outrage, and all the seafaring traders directed their complaints against the Rhodians, on the grounds that the Rhodians were considered the leading power at sea. It was out of this that the war arose,

the war I am now about to recount.

For the Rhodians,

roused to action partly by the injury done to themselves and partly by the loss falling on their neighbors, at first took their allies along and sent an embassy to the Byzantines, demanding that they abolish the transit toll.

But the Byzantines would not yield at all on the matter; they were convinced that they had justice on their side, on the strength of the rebuttal delivered before them by Hecatodorus and Olympiodorus to the Rhodian envoys—

for these men were at that time at the head of the Byzantine government—and so on that occasion the Rhodians went away having accomplished nothing.

On their return home, they voted for war against the Byzantines for the reasons stated above.

At once they dispatched envoys to Prusias, urging him too to join the war; for they knew that Prusias was already at odds, on several grounds, with the—

Chapter 48 Achaeus and Prusias I. of Bithynia

—Byzantines. The Byzantines, for their part, did much the same thing: they sent envoys both to Attalus and to Achaeus, asking them for help.

Now Attalus was eager to assist, but at that moment his influence carried little weight, since he had been hemmed in by Achaeus and confined to his ancestral dominion.

Achaeus, on the other hand, who controlled the territory on this side of the Taurus and had recently proclaimed himself king, promised to send aid.

His commitment to this course raised great hopes among the Byzantines, and produced the opposite effect—dismay—among the Rhodians and Prusias.

Achaeus was a kinsman of the Antiochus who had inherited the kingdom of Syria, and he came to hold the dominion just mentioned through circumstances such as these.

When Seleucus—the father of the aforementioned Antiochus—died, and Seleucus, the eldest of his sons, succeeded to the throne, Achaeus, because of his kinship, crossed the Taurus together with him, about two years before the events now being described.

For as soon as Seleucus the younger had succeeded to the kingdom and learned that Attalus had already brought the whole dominion on this side of the Taurus under his own control, he was spurred to defend his interests.

But after crossing the Taurus with a large army, he was treacherously murdered by Apaturius the Gaul and by Nicanor, and so lost his life.

Achaeus, as his kinship required, immediately avenged the murder by killing Nicanor and Apaturius, and took charge of the army and of affairs as a whole with prudence and magnanimity.

For although the opportunity lay open to him, and the impulse of the troops favored his placing the diadem on his own head, he chose not to do so; instead he kept the kingdom safe for Antiochus, the younger of the sons, and pressed on energetically to recover the whole region on this side of the Taurus.

But when affairs flowed his way beyond all expectation—since he had shut Attalus up within Pergamum itself and had become master of all the rest—he was carried away by his successes and at once ran off course.

Placing the diadem on his head and proclaiming himself king, he was at that time the weightiest and most formidable of all the kings and princes on this side of the Taurus.

And it was above all in him that the Byzantines placed their trust at that time when they took on the war against the Rhodians and Prusias.

Chapter 49 Complaints of Prusias

Prusias had grievances against the Byzantines that went back some time. In the first place, he complained that, although they had voted to set up certain statues of him, they had never actually erected them, but instead let the matter drift into neglect and oblivion.

He was also displeased with them for throwing all their energy into reconciling Achaeus and Attalus and bringing their feud and war to an end, since he reckoned that a friendship between those two would, in many respects, work against his own interests.

He was further irritated by the fact that the Byzantines, as it appeared, had sent delegates to Attalus to take part in the sacrifices at the festival of Athena, but had sent no one to him for the Soteria.

And so, with his anger quietly smoldering on account of all these things, he gladly seized upon the opening the Rhodians offered him. Coming to terms with their ambassadors, he agreed that they should wage the war by sea, while he himself reckoned he would do the enemy no less harm by land.

Such, then, was the war of the Rhodians against the Byzantines.

Chapter 50 The War between Rhodes and Byzantium Begins

This was how it came about and how it began. At first the Byzantines fought the war vigorously, convinced that Achaeus would come to their aid, and that they themselves, by bringing Tiboetes over from Macedonia, would in turn confront Prusias with fears and dangers.

But Prusias, prosecuting the war with the determination already described, took from them the place called Hieron at the mouth of the strait,

which the Byzantines had purchased at great expense a little while before and made their own because of the convenient position of the spot, for they wished to leave no one any base from which to operate—neither against the merchants sailing into the Pontus, nor with respect to the slave trade and the fisheries of that very sea.

He also took from them the territory in Asia, in Mysia, which the Byzantines had held for many years already.

The Rhodians, for their part, manned six ships and, together with these, took on four more from their allies, and, having appointed Xenophantus as admiral, sailed for the Hellespont with ten ships in all.

With the rest they lay at anchor off Sestos and barred those sailing into the Pontus, while the admiral, putting out with a single ship, tested the Byzantines, to see whether they had by now had a change of heart, cowed by the war.

When they paid him no attention, he sailed off, took up the remaining ships, and withdrew with the whole fleet to Rhodes.

The Byzantines meanwhile sent to Achaeus, asking him to help, and dispatched men to Tiboetes to bring him from Macedonia,

for it was thought that the rule of Bithynia belonged no less to Tiboetes than to Prusias, since he was Prusias' uncle on his father's side.

But the Rhodians, observing the firm stand of the Byzantines, set about practically achieving their aim.

Chapter 51 Byzantium, Rhodes, and Prusias Treaties

For seeing that the mainstay of the Byzantines' endurance in the war lay in their hopes resting on Achaeus, and observing that Achaeus' father was being held at Alexandria while Achaeus himself set the highest store by his father's safety, they resolved to send an embassy to Ptolemy and to ask for the release of Andromachus.

They had made this request before only as a side matter, but now they pressed for it in earnest, so that by rendering Achaeus this favor they might put him under such an obligation to them that he would grant whatever they asked.

When the ambassadors arrived, Ptolemy at first considered keeping Andromachus back, in the hope of using him at an opportune moment, both because his own disputes with Antiochus remained unresolved and because Achaeus, having recently proclaimed himself king, now controlled a domain of considerable importance—

for Andromachus was the father of Achaeus and the brother of Laodice, the wife of Seleucus.

Nevertheless, since Ptolemy was inclined toward the Rhodians in his whole policy and was eager to oblige them in everything, he gave his consent and handed Andromachus over to them to convey to his son.

Having accomplished this, and having added some honors for Achaeus besides, they stripped the Byzantines of their most substantial hope.

And another awkward thing also befell the Byzantines: Tiboetes, while being brought down from Macedonia, wrecked their plans by departing this life.

When this happened, the spirits of the Byzantines collapsed, while Prusias, emboldened in his hopes for the war, at once pressed it on himself energetically from the Asian side, and at the same time hired Thracians who kept the Byzantines from passing through their gates on the European side.

So the Byzantines, cheated of their own hopes and hard pressed by the war on every side, began to look about for a way out—

Chapter 52 Cavarus, Gallic King, Negotiates Peace

—a respectable way out of their situation. And when Cavarus, the king of the Gauls, arrived at Byzantium and showed himself eager to put an end to the war, ambitiously extending his hands in mediation, both Prusias and the Byzantines agreed to his proposals.

When the Rhodians learned of Cavarus' eagerness and of Prusias' compliance, and being themselves anxious to bring their own design to completion,

they appointed Aridices as ambassador to the Byzantines and sent off along with him Polemocles in command of three triremes,

wishing, as the saying goes, to send the Byzantines both the spear and the herald's staff at once. On their arrival the settlements were concluded, in the year when Cothon, son of Calligeiton, was Hieromnemon at Byzantium.

With the Rhodians the terms were straightforward: the Byzantines were to levy no toll on those sailing into the Pontus, and, this being done, the Rhodians and their allies were to be at peace with the Byzantines.

With Prusias the terms were roughly these: that there should be peace and friendship between Prusias and the Byzantines for all time, and that neither the Byzantines should make war on Prusias in any way nor Prusias on the Byzantines;

that Prusias should restore to the Byzantines their lands, their forts, their populations, and their prisoners of war without ransom, and, in addition to these, the vessels captured at the start of the war and the missiles seized in the strongholds, and likewise the timber, the stonework, and the roof tiles from the place called Hieron—

for Prusias, in his anxiety over the return of Tiboetes, had demolished all the forts that seemed conveniently situated for any purpose—

and that Prusias should also compel those among the Bithynians who held any property taken from the territory of Mysia that was subject to the Byzantines to give it back to the farmers.

Such, then, were the beginnings the war of the Rhodians and Prusias against the Byzantines took—

Chapter 53 War In Crete

…the end. At about this time the Cnossians sent envoys to the Rhodians and persuaded them to dispatch the ships under Polemocles' command, together with three more undecked vessels which they were to launch and send in addition.

When this had been done and the ships had arrived in Crete, the people of Eleutherna, suspecting that Polemocles and his men had put to death their fellow-citizen Timarchus as a favor to the Cnossians, first proclaimed a right of reprisal against the Rhodians, and after that went to open war.

The Lyttians too, a little before this time, met with an irreparable disaster. For the affairs of Crete as a whole were at that time in roughly the following state.

The Cnossians, having come to an understanding with the Gortynians, had brought the whole of Crete under their power except the city of the Lyttians; and since this city alone refused to submit, they set about making war on it, eager to destroy it utterly, as an example and a source of terror to the rest of the Cretans.

At first, then, all the Cretans together waged war against the Lyttians; but when rivalry arose out of trivial occasions—as is the way with the Cretans—they fell into faction against one another.

The Polyrrhenians, the Ceraïtae, and the Lappaeans, and with them the Horii together with the Arcadians, with one accord broke away from their friendship with the Cnossians,

and resolved to make common cause with the Lyttians. Among the Gortynians, the older men chose the side of the Cnossians, while the younger chose that of the Lyttians, and so they fell into faction with each other.

The Cnossians, since this upheaval among their allies had come upon them unexpectedly, called in a thousand men from Aetolia in accordance with their alliance.

As soon as this had happened, the older men of the Gortynians seized the citadel and brought in the Cnossians and the Aetolians; and some of the young men they expelled, and others they killed,

Chapter 54

and they handed the city over to the Cnossians. At about the same time, when the Lyttians had marched out in full force into enemy territory, the Cnossians, perceiving what had happened, seized Lyttos while it was stripped of its defenders.

They sent off the children and the women to Cnossus, and after burning the city, razing it to the ground, and ravaging it in every possible way, they returned home.

The Lyttians, arriving back at their city from the expedition and seeing what had befallen it, were so overcome with grief in their hearts that not one of those present had the courage even to enter his homeland;

but all of them, after marching around it in a circle, and after wailing aloud and lamenting again and again the fate of their fatherland and their own, turned back and withdrew once more to the city of the Lappaeans.

The Lappaeans received them kindly and with all eagerness; and these men, who in a single day had become cityless strangers instead of citizens, joined their allies in making war against the Cnossians.

Thus Lyttos—a colony and kinswoman of the Lacedaemonians, the most ancient of the cities of Crete, and by common consent the constant nurse of the bravest men among the Cretans—was utterly and unexpectedly swept away.

Chapter 55 Polyrrhen and Lappa Join the Alliance

The people of Polyrrhenia and Lappa, together with all their allies, observed that the Cnossians were holding fast to their alliance with the Aetolians, and they saw that the Aetolians were at war with both King Philip and the Achaeans. They therefore sent envoys to the king and to the Achaeans to ask for military aid and for admission into alliance.

The Achaeans and Philip received them into the common alliance and dispatched a relief force: four hundred Illyrians under the command of Plator, two hundred Achaeans, and a hundred Phocians.

These troops arrived and, after no long time, sailed home again, having greatly strengthened the position of the Polyrrhenians and their allies.

For in a very short span of time they penned the Eleuthernaeans and the Cydonians, and the people of Aptera as well, within their walls, and forced them to abandon the alliance with the Cnossians and share in the same hopes as the Polyrrhenians. Once this had been accomplished,

the Polyrrhenians and the allies who stood with them sent five hundred Cretans to Philip and the Achaeans, while the Cnossians, a little earlier, had sent a thousand to the Aetolians. Both contingents fought alongside their respective sides in the war then under way.

Meanwhile the Gortynian exiles also seized the harbor of Phaestus, and likewise held the harbor of Gortyn itself by a daring stroke; and using these places as their bases of operations, they made war on the party within the city.

Chapter 56 Raid of Aetolians In the Peloponnese

Such, then, was the state of affairs in Crete. Around this same time Mithridates also opened war against the people of Sinope, and this became, as it were, the beginning and the pretext of the misfortune that was ultimately brought upon the Sinopeans.

When, with a view to this war, they had sent an embassy to the Rhodians and called upon them for aid, the Rhodians resolved to appoint three men and to give them a hundred and forty thousand drachmas, with which those appointed were to procure the supplies needed by the Sinopeans.

The men so commissioned made ready ten thousand jars of wine, three hundred talents of dressed hair, a hundred talents of prepared sinew, a thousand suits of armor, three thousand stamped gold pieces, and besides these four catapults together with the men to operate them.

The Sinopean envoys took these and returned home; for the Sinopeans were in dread that Mithridates might undertake to besiege them both by land and by sea, and so they were directing all their preparations to that end.

Sinope lies on the right-hand side of the Pontus as one sails toward Phasis, and it is settled on a peninsula that juts out into the sea. The neck of this peninsula, joining it to Asia, is no more than two stades across, and the city, set upon it, effectively closes it off from sea to sea.

The remainder of the peninsula projects out into the open sea; it is level ground and entirely easy to approach toward the city, but all around, on the seaward side, it is sheer, hard to land upon, and offers altogether very few points of access.

For this reason the Sinopeans were anxious that Mithridates might construct siege works along the side facing Asia, and likewise, on the side opposite to it, make a landing from the sea onto the level ground and the heights overlooking the city, and so attempt to besiege them.

They therefore set about fortifying the seaward circuit of the peninsula, staking off and entrenching the approaches from the sea, while at the same time placing missile weapons and soldiers at the points of advantage.

For the whole extent of it is not large, and is altogether easy to control and of modest size.

Chapter 57 Philip Starts for Aetolia

So the affairs at Sinope stood as I have described. Meanwhile King Philip, having set out from Macedonia with his army — for it was at this stage of his undertakings that I broke off my account of the Social War — marched toward Thessaly and Epirus, eager to make his invasion of Aetolia by that route.

At about this same time Alexander and Dorimachus, having an intrigue under way against the city of the Aegiratans, gathered around twelve hundred Aetolians at Oeanthe in Aetolia, which lies directly opposite the aforesaid town, and, having made ready ferry boats for them, were watching for a chance to sail across in fulfillment of their plan.

For one of the deserters from Aetolia, who had spent a considerable time among the Aegiratans and had observed that the men guarding the gate facing Aegium got drunk and carried out their watch carelessly,

had crossed over again and again to Dorimachus and his party and invited them to attempt the venture, since they were thoroughly at home in enterprises of this kind.

The city of the Aegiratans is built on the Peloponnesian shore of the Corinthian Gulf, between the cities of Aegium and Sicyon. It sits upon rugged and hard-to-climb hills, faces by its position toward Parnassus and that part of the coast opposite, and lies about seven stades back from the sea.

When a chance to sail offered itself to Dorimachus and his men, they put out and came to anchor, while it was still night, at the mouth of the river that flows down past the city.

Alexander and Dorimachus, then, and with them Archidamus the son of Pantaleon, having the main body of the Aetolians about them, began advancing toward the city along the road that comes from Aegium.

But the deserter, taking the twenty fittest men, made his way over the cliffs by the trackless routes faster than the rest thanks to his familiarity with the ground, and slipping in through a certain water channel, caught the men at the gate still asleep.

Having cut them down while they were still in their beds, and having hacked through the bars with their axes, he opened the gates to the Aetolians.

These rushed in, but then handled the situation with conspicuous lack of forethought — which proved to be a contributing cause of the Aegiratans' salvation and of the Aetolians' destruction.

For supposing that getting inside the gates was the whole point of taking an enemy's city, in this manner

Chapter 58 The Aetolians Repulsed At Aegira

they handled their affairs. And so, after staying together only a very short time around the marketplace, they then, in their passion for plunder, drifted apart, broke into the houses, and began carrying off the people's property — and by now it was broad daylight.

The Aegiratans, the affair having befallen them utterly unhoped-for and unexpected, were thrown into panic and terror: those upon whose houses the enemy had descended all turned to flight out of the city, supposing that it was already firmly in the enemy's hands.

But all those who, hearing the shouting, came out to help from houses that had not yet been touched, ran together to the citadel.

These kept growing more numerous and more confident, while the body of Aetolians, on the contrary, grew smaller and more disordered, for the reasons already given.

Nevertheless Dorimachus and his men, seeing the danger now closing around them, rallied together and charged the men holding the citadel, supposing that by their boldness and daring they would strike panic into those who had assembled for the defense and put them to flight.

But the Aegiratans, cheering one another on, fought back and grappled with the Aetolians nobly.

Since the citadel was unwalled, and the fighting was hand to hand and man against man, the contest was at first what one would expect, the one side fighting for fatherland and children, the other for their own survival. In the end, however, the Aetolians who had broken in were routed.

The Aegiratans, seizing the opening of their enemies' wavering, pressed upon them vigorously and terrifyingly. As a result it came about that most of the Aetolians, in their panic, fleeing of their own accord, were trampled together at the gates.

Alexander fell in hand-to-hand fighting in the thick of the action, while Archidamus perished in the crush and suffocation at the gates.

Of the rest of the Aetolian host, part was trampled underfoot, and part, fleeing over the cliffs by the trackless ways, broke their necks.

What part of them did get through safely to the ships threw away their arms in utter disgrace and made their voyage back, as unexpectedly as they had come.

Thus the Aegiratans, having lost their fatherland through negligence, recovered it again, against all expectation, through their courage and gallantry.

Chapter 59 Euripidas

At about the same time Euripidas, who had been sent out by the Aetolians as general for the Eleans, overran the territory of Dyme, Pharae, and also Tritaea, and after rounding up a considerable quantity of plunder, began withdrawing toward Elis.

But Miccus of Dyme, who happened at that time to be deputy general of the Achaeans, came out to the rescue with the full levy of the Dymaeans and Pharaeans, and with the Tritaeans as well, and fell upon the enemy as they were retiring.

Pressing too eagerly upon the retreating force, however, he ran into an ambush and was checked, and lost many of his men: forty were killed, and about two hundred of the infantry taken prisoner.

Euripidas, then, having won this advantage and being elated at what had happened, marched out again a few days later and seized, near the Araxus, a well-placed fort of the Dymaeans called the Wall —

which the myths say Heracles built long ago, when he was at war with the Eleans, wishing to use it as a base of operations against them.

Chapter 60 Philip Advances Southward

The peoples of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea, having come off the worse in their attempt at relief and fearing what was to come from the seizure of the fort, at first sent messengers to the general of the Achaeans, reporting what had happened and asking him to help them; afterwards they dispatched envoys to make the same request.

But Aratus was unable to assemble the mercenary force, because during the Cleomenic War the Achaeans had fallen behind in some of the pay owed to the hired soldiers; and in general he conducted his undertakings — in a word, the whole business of the war — without daring and sluggishly.

For this reason Lycurgus took the Athenaeum of the Megalopolitans, and Euripidas, following up the successes already mentioned, took Gortyna in the territory of Telphusa.

And the people of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea, having lost hope in any help from the general, agreed among themselves not to pay the common contributions to the Achaeans,

but to raise mercenaries of their own — three hundred infantry and fifty cavalry — and through these to secure their territory.

In doing this they were thought to have deliberated reasonably enough regarding their own affairs, but the opposite regarding the common interest; for they seemed to have become the originators and leaders of a wicked approach and pretext for those who wished to break up the confederacy.

Yet the greatest share of the blame for this action one might justly lay upon the general, who was negligent, kept procrastinating, and continually abandoned those who needed him.

For every man who is in danger, so long as he can hold on to some hope from his kinsmen and allies, is inclined to rely on them; but when, in his straits, he gives up that hope, then at last he is forced to help himself as best he can.

Therefore the Tritaeans, Pharaeans, and Dymaeans are not to be blamed for raising mercenaries of their own when the leader of the Achaeans was dragging his feet; but for renouncing the contributions to the common treasury they deserve reproach.

For they ought not to have neglected their own need — being indeed in a good position and able to act — yet they should at the same time have kept up their just obligations toward the common commonwealth, all the more since recovery of such payment was guaranteed without fail under the common laws, and, above all, since they had been founders of the Achaean confederacy.

Chapter 61 Philip Arrives in Epirus

Such, then, was the state of affairs in the Peloponnese. King Philip, having passed through Thessaly, arrived in Epirus.

Taking up the Epirotes alongside the Macedonians in full force, together with the three hundred slingers from Achaia who had joined him, and in addition the five hundred Cretans sent by the Polyrrhenians, he advanced; and having passed through Epirus, he arrived in the territory of the Ambracians.

Now, if he had at once pressed straight on and thrust into the interior of Aetolia, falling upon it suddenly and unexpectedly with so heavy a force, he would have put an end to the whole business.

But as it was, persuaded by the Epirotes to reduce Ambracus first by siege, he gave the Aetolians a breathing space in which to make a stand, to take some forethought, and to prepare for what lay ahead.

For the Epirotes, placing their own interest above the common interest of the allies and being intensely eager to bring Ambracus under their own control, begged Philip to lay siege to the stronghold and to capture this first,

since they counted it of the greatest importance to recover Ambracia from the Aetolians, and hoped that this could be accomplished only if, having gained mastery of the aforementioned place, they should then settle down to besiege the city.

For Ambracus is a stronghold well fortified with both outworks and a wall, and it lies amid marshes, having a single narrow, raised causeway as its approach from the land; and it is conveniently situated so as to command both the territory of the Ambracians and the city.

Philip, then, won over by the Epirotes and having encamped around Ambracus, set about

Chapter 62 Scopas Destroys Dium

the preparations for the siege. Scopas, meanwhile, at this same time took up the Aetolians in full force, and making his march through Thessaly, invaded Macedonia; he advanced and destroyed the grain throughout Pieria, and after gathering a great quantity of plunder, he set off back, making his march toward Dium.

When the inhabitants had abandoned the place, he entered it and razed the walls, the houses, and the gymnasium; and besides these he burned the colonnades around the sacred precinct and destroyed the rest of the offerings—all that served for adornment or for the use of those gathering for the festivals; and he overturned all the statues of the kings as well.

This man, then, having from the very outset of the war and in his very first action carried on war not only against men but also against the gods, made his way back.

And on arriving in Aetolia, he was honored and admired—not as one who had committed sacrilege, but as a man who had proved himself good in the public service—having filled the Aetolians with empty hopes and irrational arrogance.

For from these events they conceived the notion that no one would dare even to come near Aetolia, while they themselves would fearlessly plunder not only the Peloponnese, as had been their custom, but Thessaly and Macedonia as well.

Chapter 63 Philip's Aetolian Campaign

Philip, however, on hearing of the events in Macedonia—and having at once reaped the consequences of the Epirotes' ignorance and contentiousness—was besieging Ambracus.

Making vigorous use of his earthworks and the rest of his siege apparatus, he quickly cowed those within, and took the stronghold in forty days all told.

He let the garrison—some five hundred Aetolians—depart under truce, and so fulfilled the Epirotes' desire by handing Ambracus over to them.

He himself, taking up his force, advanced past Charadra, eager to cross the so-called Ambracian gulf where it is narrowest, near the Acarnanian temple called Actium.

For the aforementioned gulf issues from the Sicilian sea between Epirus and Acarnania through an altogether narrow mouth—less than five stades wide—

but as it advances inland it stretches to a breadth of a hundred stades, while in length it runs in from the sea about three hundred stades; and it forms the boundary between Epirus and Acarnania, having Epirus on the north and Acarnania on the south.

Having ferried his force across at the aforementioned mouth, and having passed through Acarnania, he came to the Aetolian city called Phoeteiae, having taken along on the way two thousand Acarnanian infantry and two hundred cavalry.

Having encamped around the aforementioned city and made vigorous and terrifying assaults upon it for two days, he took it by capitulation, releasing the Aetolians within under truce.

But on the following night, since the city was thought to be still untaken, five hundred Aetolians came to its aid; the king, learning of their approach beforehand, set ambushes at certain well-chosen spots, killed most of them, and took the rest captive, except for a very few.

After this, having measured out grain rations for thirty days to his force from the captured stores—for a great quantity had been found amassed at Phoeteiae—he advanced, making his march into the territory of Stratus.

At a distance of about ten stades from the city he encamped beside the river Achelous, and from there he set out and fearlessly ravaged the country, since none of the enemy dared to come out against him.

Chapter 64 Philip Marches Toward Metropolis

At this time the Achaeans, hard pressed by the war and learning that the king was close at hand, sent ambassadors asking him to come to their aid.

These men, meeting Philip while he was still near Stratus, discussed the rest of their business according to their instructions, and, pointing out to the army the spoils to be had from the enemy's country, tried to persuade him to cross the Rhium and invade Elis.

The king, having heard them out, detained the ambassadors, saying that he would deliberate about their requests; he himself broke camp and advanced, making his march toward Metropolis and Conope.

The Aetolians held the citadel of Metropolis but abandoned the town. Philip, having set fire to Metropolis, pressed straight on toward Conope.

When the Aetolian cavalry had gathered and dared to confront him at the crossing of the river, which lies twenty stades in front of the city, and were confident that they would either stop him altogether or do much harm to the Macedonians during the crossing,

the king, perceiving their design, ordered his peltasts to enter the river first and to make the crossing in a dense body, locked together unit by unit with shields interlocked.

His men obeyed; and as soon as the first company had crossed, the Aetolian cavalry made a brief trial against it, but since this company stood fast with shields locked, and the second and third, as they crossed, joined their arms to the one already in place, the cavalry, accomplishing nothing and finding themselves in difficulty, withdrew toward the city.

And from then on the spirit of the Aetolians, having taken refuge in their cities, held itself quiet.

Philip, having crossed over with his army and fearlessly ravaged this district too, advanced, making his march toward Ithoria. This is a stronghold that lies squarely on the pass and is remarkable for its strength, both natural and man-made.

As he drew near, the garrison, terror-stricken, abandoned the place; and the king, having gained mastery of it, razed it to the ground.

In the same way he ordered his foraging parties to deal likewise with the remaining towers throughout the country

Chapter 65 Philip Takes Paeanium

...to bring it down. Once he had passed through the narrows, he made the rest of the march at an easy, unhurried pace, allowing his army the chance to gather plunder from the countryside.

When the camp was fully stocked with every kind of provision, he came to Oeniadae.

Pitching his camp near Paeanium, he decided to capture this place first. By mounting continuous assaults he took it by storm—a city not large in its perimeter, for it measured less than seven stades, but in the whole construction of its houses, walls, and towers inferior to none.

He razed the entire wall to the ground, and, dismantling the houses, he fitted the timber and roof-tiles onto rafts and kept floating them down the river to Oeniadae with great enthusiasm.

At first the Aetolians set out to hold the citadel at Oeniadae, having secured it with walls and the rest of their works; but as Philip drew near they took fright and abandoned it.

The king, having taken over this city as well, advanced from it and encamped in Calydonia at a stronghold called Elaeus, which had been made exceptionally secure with walls and the other defenses—Attalus having undertaken to build up its fortifications for the Aetolians.

Carrying this place too by storm, the Macedonians ravaged the whole of Calydonia and then returned again to Oeniadae.

Philip, observing how advantageously the place was situated, both for other purposes and especially for the crossings into the Peloponnese, set about walling the town.

For Oeniadae happens to lie by the sea, at the edge of Acarnania where it borders on the Aetolians, around the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf.

The town is positioned opposite the coastline of the Dymaeans in the Peloponnese, and lies nearest to the region around Araxus, for it is no more than a hundred stades distant. With his eye on these advantages, he fortified the citadel by itself,

and, throwing a wall around the harbor and the dockyards together, he undertook to connect them to the citadel, using the materials from Paeanium to manage the work.

Chapter 66 Philip Recalled To Macedonia

While the king was still occupied with this work, a messenger arrived from Macedonia making it clear that the Dardani, suspecting his intended expedition into the Peloponnese, were gathering forces and making great preparations, having resolved to invade Macedonia.

On hearing this, and judging it necessary to come quickly to the aid of Macedonia, he dismissed the envoys from the Achaeans, giving them the reply that, once he had dealt with what had just been reported to him, he would after that make nothing more pressing than to help them to the best of his power.

He himself broke camp and made his return march in haste, by the same route as that by which he had come.

Just as he was about to cross the Ambracian Gulf from Acarnania into Epirus, Demetrius of Pharos appeared, sailing in a single boat, having been driven out of Illyria by the Romans—matters I have made clear in the earlier parts of this work.

Philip received him kindly and told him to sail toward Corinth and from there to come through Thessaly into Macedonia; while he himself crossed into Epirus and pressed steadily onward.

When he reached Pella in Macedonia, the Dardani—learning of Philip's arrival from some Thracian deserters—took fright and at once broke up their expedition, even though they were already close to Macedonia.

Philip, on learning of the Dardani's change of heart, dismissed all the Macedonians to gather in the autumn harvest, while he himself went to Thessaly and spent the remaining part of the summer at Larisa.

It was around this time that Aemilius brought his triumph into Rome in splendid style for his Illyrian campaign, and that Hannibal, having taken Saguntum by storm, dismissed his forces into winter quarters;

while the Romans, when news of the capture of Saguntum reached them, sent envoys to demand the surrender of Hannibal from the Carthaginians, and at the same time made their preparations for the war, appointing as consuls Publius Cornelius and Tiberius Sempronius.

I have set out the particulars of these matters in the previous book; but I have now brought them forward by way of reminder, in keeping with my original undertaking, so that the corresponding events may be known.

And so the first year of the present...

Chapter 67 Philip Returns To the Peloponnese

So this Olympiad year was drawing to a close. Among the Aetolians, the time of the elections having now arrived, Dorimachus was chosen general. He at once took up his office, gathered the Aetolians under arms, and invaded the upland regions of Epirus, ravaging the country and pursuing its destruction with unusual ferocity.

For in most of what he did his aim was not so much his own profit as the injury of the Epirotes.

And when he reached the sanctuary at Dodona, he burned the colonnades, destroyed many of the votive offerings, and even razed the sacred building to the ground,

so that the Aetolians observed the bounds neither of peace nor of war, but in both circumstances alike acted on their designs in defiance of the common customs and laws of mankind.

Having accomplished these and similar deeds, Dorimachus then withdrew once more to his own country.

The winter was still advancing, and everyone had given up expecting Philip to appear because of the season. But the king took up three thousand bronze-shielded troops, two thousand peltasts, three hundred Cretans, and in addition to these about four hundred horsemen of the royal guard, and set out from Larisa.

He moved them across from Thessaly into Euboea, and from there to Cynos, and came through Boeotia and the Megarid to Corinth about the time of the winter solstice, having made his approach so swift and secret that not one of the Peloponnesians suspected what had happened.

He closed the gates of Corinth, posted guards to control the roads, and on the very next day summoned Aratus the elder to come to him from Sicyon. He also sent off dispatches to the general of the Achaeans and to the cities, in which he made clear when and where they must all assemble under arms.

Having arranged these matters, he broke camp and advanced, and pitched camp

Chapter 68 Euripidas Intends to Attack Sicyon

in Phliasia, near the temple of the Dioscuri. At about this same time Euripidas, who had two companies of Eleans together with the pirates and mercenaries—so that the whole force amounted to about two thousand two hundred men, and along with these a hundred horsemen—set out from Psophis and made his march through Pheneus and Stymphalia. He knew nothing of Philip's movements, but intended to overrun the territory of the Sicyonians.

On the very night during which Philip happened to be encamping near the temple of the Dioscuri, Euripidas passed by the king's camp and was on the point of breaking into Sicyonian territory around dawn.

But some of Philip's Cretans, who had left their ranks and were ranging about in search of plunder, fell in with Euripidas and his men.

He questioned them, and so learned of the presence of the Macedonians. Without revealing to anyone any of what had happened, he took up his force, turned about, and withdrew again by the same road along which he had come,

wishing—and indeed hoping—to outstrip the Macedonians by getting through Stymphalia and reaching the difficult country that lay beyond it.

The king, knowing nothing of the enemy's doings, broke camp at dawn in accordance with his own plan and advanced, having resolved to make his march past Stymphalus itself in the direction of Caphyae;

for it was there that he had written to the Achaeans to assemble

Chapter 69 Euripidas Deserts the Eleans

...were gathering under arms. As the vanguard of the Macedonians reached the top of the pass near the place called Apelaurus—which lies about ten stades in front of the city of Stymphalus—it happened that at that very moment the vanguard of the Eleans also came up onto the same pass.

Euripidas, realizing from the reports brought to him what had occurred, took some of the cavalry with him, slipped away from the immediate crisis, and made his retreat to Psophis by the trackless cross-country routes.

The rest of the Elean host, abandoned by their commander and thrown into panic by what had happened, halted on the march, at a loss what to do and which way to turn.

At first their officers supposed that the troops they saw were some of the Achaeans who had come up to lend support; and what deceived them most of all were the bronze-shielded men.

They imagined these to be Megalopolitans, because the soldiers of that city had carried such arms in the battle near Sellasia against Cleomenes, when King Antigonus had equipped them for the occasion.

For this reason they withdrew in good order toward some higher ground that commanded the position, not yet despairing of getting away safely. But as soon as the advancing Macedonians drew close to them and they grasped the truth of the matter, they all threw down their arms and rushed into flight.

About twelve hundred of them were taken alive, while the rest of the host was destroyed—some by the Macedonians, others over the cliffs—and no more than a hundred escaped.

Philip sent the spoils and the prisoners off to Corinth and pressed on with the business in hand.

To all the Peloponnesians what had happened seemed beyond belief, for they learned of the king's arrival and of his victory in one and the same moment.

Chapter 70 Philip In Arcadia

Marching through Arcadia and enduring heavy snow and great hardship in the passes around Mount Olygyrtus, he came down on the third day, by night, to Caphyae.

After resting his force there for two days and taking on Aratus the younger together with the Achaeans he had gathered—so that the whole force came to about ten thousand men—he advanced through the territory of Clitor toward Psophis, collecting missiles and scaling ladders from the towns he passed through.

Psophis is, by common agreement, an ancient foundation of the Arcadians, belonging to the district of Azanis. With respect to the Peloponnese as a whole it lies in the interior, but with respect to Arcadia itself it stands on the western frontier, bordering on those who dwell at the farthest edges of the western Achaeans.

It is also well placed to overlook the territory of the Eleans, with whom at that time it happened to share a political alliance.

Reaching it on the third day from Caphyae, Philip encamped on the hills that rise opposite the city, from which he could safely survey both the whole town and the country round about it.

But when the king observed the strength of Psophis, he was at a loss what to do.

Along its western side rushes a violent winter torrent, which for the greater part of the winter is impassable, and which in any case makes the city secure and hard to approach because of the size of the ravine that its waters have gradually carved out over time as they sweep down from the higher ground.

Along its eastern side it has the Erymanthus, a great and violent river about which much has been said by many writers.

Since the torrent flows into the Erymanthus on the southern side of the city, the result is that three of its faces are enclosed by the rivers and protected in the manner described.

On the remaining side, that toward the north, there rises a strong fortified hill, which serves as a well-placed and serviceable citadel; and the city also has walls remarkable for their size and construction.

On top of all this, a relieving force from the Eleans had come into the town, and Euripidas, having survived his flight, was now inside it.

Chapter 71 Philip Captures Psophis

Taking all of this in and weighing it up, Philip was in part dissuaded by his calculations from forcing and besieging the city, yet in part eager for it, seeing the strategic advantage of the place.

For in proportion as it then bore down upon the Achaeans and Arcadians and served the Eleans as a secure base of war, so, if it were taken in turn, it would shield the Arcadians and become a well-placed jumping-off point for the allies against the Eleans.

Having therefore set his mind on this course, he ordered all the Macedonians to take their breakfast at first light and to stand ready in full equipment.

After this he crossed the bridge over the Erymanthus, and since no one stood in his way—so unexpected was the move—he came right up to the city itself with energy and to terrifying effect.

Euripidas and all those in the city were thrown into confusion by what was happening, for they had been convinced that the enemy would neither dare to attack and storm so strong a city in a single onset, nor be able to mount a prolonged siege, given the difficulty of the season.

And as they reasoned thus, they grew distrustful of one another, fearing that Philip had arranged some treachery against the city through men within it.

But when they saw nothing of the kind arising among themselves, the greater part rushed to the walls to defend them, while the Elean mercenaries went out by a gate on the higher ground, meaning to fall upon the enemy.

The king arranged the men who were to bring the ladders against the wall at three points, distributed the rest of the Macedonians likewise among them, and then, giving each party the signal by trumpet, launched the assault on the walls from every side at once.

At first the defenders of the city resisted gallantly and hurled many men down from the ladders.

But when the supply of missiles and of the other things needed ran short—as was bound to happen, since the preparations had been made on the spur of the moment—and the Macedonians, far from being daunted by what was happening, kept replacing each man thrown from the ladders, the next coming up without hesitation into his place,

at last the men of the city broke and all fled toward the citadel. Of the king's troops, the Macedonians mounted the wall, while the Cretans closed with the mercenaries who had sallied out by the upper gate and forced them to throw down their arms and flee in utter disorder.

Pressing upon them and laying hands on them, the Cretans burst in through the gate along with them; and so it came about that the city was taken from every side at once.

The Psophidians, then, withdrew with their children and wives into the citadel, and with them Euripidas and his men, and likewise the rest of the survivors.

Chapter 72 The People of Psophis Surrender

The Macedonians, pouring in, at once plundered all the household goods from the houses, and after that quartered themselves in the dwellings and held the city.

Those who had taken refuge in the citadel, having no provisions of any kind, foresaw what was coming and decided to surrender themselves to Philip.

So they sent a herald to the king, and having obtained leave to send an embassy, they dispatched their magistrates and Euripidas along with them; these men made a truce and secured safety for all who had taken refuge there, foreigners and citizens alike.

The envoys then returned to the place from which they had set out, carrying instructions to stay where they were until the army should march off, so that none of the soldiers might disobey and plunder them.

The king, however, was forced by a fall of snow to remain on the spot for some days. During this time he gathered the Achaeans who were present and first pointed out to them the strength and strategic value of the city for the present war.

He then recounted the goodwill and devotion he felt toward their nation, and ended by declaring that he now ceded and gave the city to the Achaeans; for it was his settled aim to grant them what favors he could and to fall short in nothing of his zeal for them.

When Aratus and his men, along with the rest of the gathering, thanked him for this, Philip dismissed the assembly, set his army in motion, and marched toward Lasion.

The Psophidians came down from the citadel and recovered their city, each man his own dwelling, while Euripidas and his men departed to Corinth and from there to Aetolia.

Of the Achaean magistrates who were present, they set Prolaus of Sicyon over the citadel with an adequate garrison, and Pythias of Pallene over the city.

Such was the conclusion of the affair at Psophis.

Chapter 73 The Wealth of Elis

...in this fashion. The Eleans who were keeping watch over Lasion, learning of the Macedonians' arrival and having also heard of what had happened at Psophis, immediately abandoned the town.

So as soon as the king arrived, he took the place at his first approach; and, furthering the goodwill he felt toward the Achaean nation, he handed Lasion over to them as well. In the same way, when the Eleans evacuated Stratus too, he restored it to the people of Telphusa.

Having settled these matters, he reached Olympia on the fifth day. There he sacrificed to the god, gave a banquet for his officers, and at the same time rested the remainder of his army for three days, after which he broke camp once more.

Advancing into Elean territory, he loosed his foraging parties upon the countryside while he himself pitched camp near the place called the Artemisium.

After taking in the plunder there, he moved on again to the Dioscurium. As the land was being ravaged, the number of those captured was large, but still larger was the number of those who fled together into the neighboring villages and the fortified places.

For it happens that the territory of the Eleans is exceptionally well populated and full of people and property, beyond the rest of the Peloponnese.

Indeed, some of them are so devoted to life on the land that there are men who, for two and three generations, though possessing ample estates, have never once set foot in a public assembly.

This comes about because those who manage public affairs take great care and forethought for the people living in the countryside, so that justice may be administered to them on the spot and they may lack nothing for the necessities of life.

It seems to me that they devised and enacted all these arrangements in ancient times both because of the great extent of their land and, above all, because of the sacred manner of life they once enjoyed,

when, having received from the Greeks a concession on account of the contest of the Olympic Games, they inhabited Elis as a land sacred and inviolate, untouched by any...

Chapter 74 Peace the Only Unquestioned Blessing

...terror or any circumstance of war. But afterward, when the dispute with the Arcadians over Lasion and the whole of Pisatis forced them to defend their territory and to change their ways of living,

they no longer took even ordinary trouble to recover from the Greeks their ancient and ancestral immunity from pillage, but remained as they were—not, in my judgment at least, making correct provision for the future.

For consider: there is one thing that we all pray to the gods to obtain, and for the sake of which we endure anything in our longing to share in it—the one thing among our reckoned goods that is beyond all dispute among men—I mean peace. If, then, certain people who are able to acquire this from the Greeks, with justice and propriety and uncontested for all time, neglect it or treat something else as more important than it, how could they fail to seem, by common consent, to be blind to their own interest? "Yes, by Zeus,"

someone may object, "but perhaps by such a manner of life they become an easy target for those who set out to make war and to violate treaties."

Yet such a thing is rare, and even if it should ever occur, it would be eligible for the common protection of the Greeks.

And as for the lesser, particular injustices, given the means that would have accrued to their estates—as would naturally be the case for people living always in peace—it is plain that they would not have lacked foreign troops and mercenaries to stand on guard at the various places and occasions.

As it is, fearing the rare and the unexpected, they hold their land and their livelihoods amid continual wars and devastations.

Let this, then, be said by us for the sake of admonishing the Eleans, since the circumstances of the times have never before offered a more favorable disposition than the present for them to acquire, by the agreement of all, their immunity from pillage. As for their country, as I said above, since some sparks, as it were, of the old custom still remain...

Chapter 75 Capture of Thalamae

...among them, the Eleans dwell exceptionally well off. For this reason, during Philip's presence the number of those captured was vast, and still greater the number of those who had fled for refuge.

The greatest quantity of movable goods and the greatest throng of people and livestock had been gathered into the place they call Thalamae, because the country around it was narrow and hard to penetrate, and the place itself was inaccessible and difficult to approach.

When the king heard of the multitude that had taken refuge in the aforesaid place, and resolved to leave nothing untried or unfinished, he sent his mercenaries ahead to seize the spots that lay conveniently at the entrance,

while he himself, leaving his baggage and the larger part of his force in the entrenched camp, took the peltasts and the light-armed troops and advanced through the narrow pass; and, with no one hindering him, he came up to the place.

The refugees, terrified at his onset—being, as they were, inexperienced and unprepared for any military need, and being moreover a confused rabble that had run together—quickly surrendered themselves;

among them were also two hundred mixed mercenaries, whom Amphidamus, the general of the Eleans, had brought with him.

Philip, having become master of a great quantity of goods and of more than five thousand persons, and having in addition driven off an innumerable multitude of four-footed plunder, returned at that time to his camp.

But afterward, since his army was overloaded with spoils of every kind and had thereby become heavy and unwieldy, he withdrew on that account and marched back again to Olympia.

Chapter 76 Popularity of Philip In the Peloponnese

Now Apelles—who was one of the guardians of the boy left in charge by Antigonus, and who at that time happened to have more influence than anyone else with the king—wishing to bring the Achaean nation into a condition like that of the Thessalians, set about doing a wicked thing.

For the Thessalians were thought to govern themselves by their own laws and to differ greatly from the Macedonians, but in fact they differed not at all: they suffered everything just as the Macedonians did and carried out every order given by the royal officials.

And so, fitting his action to this design, the man just mentioned set out to make trial of his fellow soldiers.

First, then, he permitted the Macedonians to evict from their quarters, on every occasion, those Achaeans who had taken possession of lodgings first, and likewise to strip them of their plunder.

After that, through his subordinates he laid hands on them on any chance pretext, and those who shared the others' indignation, or came to the aid of the men being flogged, he himself, being present, hauled off in chains,

convinced that by such a method he would, little by little and unnoticed, bring them into the habit of regarding nothing as outrageous, whatever a man might suffer at the king's hands;

and this although only a short time before he had campaigned alongside Antigonus and had seen that the Achaeans had endured the trial of every terror rather than do what Cleomenes commanded.

Nevertheless, when a group of young Achaeans banded together and approached Aratus and his circle and made clear to them the intention of Apelles, Aratus and his men went to Philip, having decided to take a stand on such matters from the outset and not to delay. And when they met with the king about these things,

Philip, having heard out what had happened, encouraged the young men to take heart, assuring them that nothing of the kind would happen to them anymore, and ordered Apelles to impose no command on the Achaeans without the consent of their general.

Chapter 77 Phillidas and the Aetolian Troops Arrive

Philip, then, was winning a high reputation—both for his conduct in his dealings with the men who shared the open-field life of the camp, and for his action and daring in matters of war—not only among the soldiers serving with him, but among all the rest of the Peloponnesians as well.

For it would not be easy to find a king more abundantly furnished by nature with the resources needed for acquiring power.

He possessed, indeed, a keen intelligence, a strong memory, and an exceptional charm, and on top of these a kingly bearing and authority—and, most important of all, capacity and boldness in war.

But what it was that in the end overcame all these qualities, and turned a king of fine natural gifts into a savage tyrant, is not easy to explain in a few words. For that reason it will be more fitting to examine and work through these questions at some other occasion than the present one.

Philip, having broken camp at Olympia, took the road toward Pharae and came to Telphusa, and from there to Heraea. There he sold off the plunder as spoils, and set about repairing the bridge over the Alpheus, intending to make his invasion of Triphylia by that route.

At about this same time Dorimachus, the general of the Aetolians, in response to the appeal of the Eleans for help against the ravaging of their land, sent them six hundred Aetolians under the general Phillidas.

When Phillidas arrived in Elis, he took over the Elean mercenaries, who numbered about five hundred, and a thousand citizen soldiers, and along with these the Tarentine cavalry, and came to the relief of Triphylia.

This district has received its name from Triphylus, one of the sons of Arcas. It lies in the Peloponnese along the sea, between the territories of Elis and Messenia, faces toward the Libyan Sea, and forms the farthest edge of Arcadia in the direction of the winter sunset (the southwest).

It contains the following cities: Samicum, Lepreum, Hypana, Typaneae, Pyrgos, Aepium, Bolax, Stylangium, and Phrixa.

A short time before this the Eleans had gained control of these and had also annexed the city of the Aliphereans, which had originally belonged to Arcadia [and Megalopolis], after Lydiadas the Megalopolitan, during his tyranny, had handed it over to the Eleans in an exchange to serve certain private purposes of his own.

Chapter 78 Continued Success of Philip

Phillidas, however, sent the Eleans off to Lepreum and the mercenaries to Aliphera, while he himself, keeping the Aetolians with him at Typaneae, waited to see what would come of it.

The king, meanwhile, having set aside his baggage train and crossed the river Alpheus by the bridge—the river that flows right past the city of the Heraeans—

came to Aliphera. This town lies on a hill that is sheer on every side, with an ascent of more than ten stades, and it has a citadel on the very summit of the whole hill, together with a bronze statue of Athena, outstanding in beauty and size.

As for this statue—from what intention or with what funding the work was first undertaken—it happens to be a matter of dispute even among the local people, for it cannot be clearly established either from where or by whom it was dedicated.

The finished work of art, however, is acknowledged by everyone to be among the most magnificent and skillfully executed of works, made by Hypatodorus and Sostratus.

Be that as it may, when a clear and bright day had dawned, the king at first light drew up at several points the men carrying the scaling ladders, with the supporting detachments of mercenaries stationed in front of them,

and, posting the Macedonians divided up behind each of these forces, gave orders to all, the moment the sun came up, to advance against the hill.

As the Macedonians carried out the order with spirit and to terrifying effect, it came about that the Aliphereans kept rushing and running together against them to whatever spots they saw the Macedonians most closely approaching.

At this moment the king himself, with the most suitable men, climbed up unnoticed by way of certain cliffs to the suburb of the citadel.

When the signal had been given, all at once set their ladders against the walls and made their attempt on the city.

The king was the first to seize the suburb of the citadel, finding it deserted. As this was being set ablaze, the men defending the walls, foreseeing what was about to happen and terrified that, if the citadel were seized first, they would be robbed of their last hope as well, abandoned the walls and rushed to flee toward the acropolis.

When this happened, the Macedonians at once gained control of both the walls and the city.

After this the men on the citadel sent envoys to Philip, and he, granting them safe conduct, took possession of it too by agreement.

Chapter 79 Surrender of Typanae and Phigalia

When these things had been accomplished, all the people throughout Triphylia were struck with alarm and began to deliberate about their own safety and that of their respective home cities.

Phillidas, for his part, abandoned Typanae—after first plundering some of the houses there—and withdrew to Lepreum.

This, indeed, was the kind of reward that the allies of the Aetolians regularly received at that time: not only to be openly deserted at the moments of greatest need, but, on top of that, to be plundered or betrayed and so to suffer at the hands of their own allies precisely what is the due lot of those defeated by an enemy.

The people of Typanae handed their city over to Philip, and the inhabitants of Hypana did much the same.

At the same time, the people of Phigalia—hearing of what had happened throughout Triphylia and being discontented with the alliance with the Aetolians—seized, in arms, the area around the polemarchium.

The Aetolian pirates who were lingering in this city for the sake of the plunder to be had from Messenia were at first able to lay hands on the Phigalians and bully them;

but when they saw the citizens gathering with one accord to defend themselves, they gave up the attempt, came to terms, took up their own belongings, and departed from the city.

The Phigalians then sent an embassy to Philip and put themselves and their city into his hands.

Chapter 80 The People of Lepreum Evict the Garrisons

While these affairs were still in progress, the people of Lepreum seized a certain quarter of their city and demanded that the Eleans, the Aetolians, and likewise the troops from the Lacedaemonians evacuate both the citadel and the city—for a relief force had come to them from the Lacedaemonians as well.

At first Phillidas and his men paid no heed but stayed put, expecting to overawe those in the city;

but when the king dispatched Taurion with soldiers to Phigalia and himself advanced toward Lepreum, drawing close to the city, Phillidas and his men, realizing the situation, were cowed, while the Lepreates were further emboldened in their resolve.

It was indeed a fine feat that the Lepreates accomplished: although there were within the walls a thousand Eleans, a thousand Aetolians together with the pirates, five hundred mercenaries, and two hundred Lacedaemonians, and although the citadel was held by these troops, they nonetheless made a stand for their own homeland and refused to give up their hopes.

Phillidas, seeing the Lepreates holding their ground like men and the Macedonians drawing near, withdrew from the city along with the Eleans and the troops from the Lacedaemonians.

So the Cretans sent by the Spartans returned home through Messenia, while Phillidas and his men made their retreat in the direction of Samicum. The mass of the Lepreates,

now in control of their homeland, sent out ambassadors to put their city into Philip's hands.

The king, on hearing what had happened, sent the rest of his force on to Lepreum, but took the peltasts and the light-armed troops and led them himself, eager to catch up with Phillidas and his men.

He overtook them and gained possession of all their baggage, but Phillidas and his men hurried on and managed to slip into Samicum.

Encamping before the place and bringing up the rest of his force from Lepreum, he made it appear to those inside that he intended to besiege the position.

The Aetolians, together with the Eleans, having nothing ready for withstanding a siege except their bare hands, were dismayed at their predicament and entered into talks with Philip about their safety.

Having obtained permission to march out under arms, they set off for Elis; and the king at once became master of Samicum.

After this, when the other towns also came over to him bearing the suppliant's olive branch, he took over Phrixa, Stylangium, Aepium, Bolax, Pyrgos, and Epitalium.

Having accomplished all this, he returned again to Lepreum, having brought all of Triphylia under his control in six days.

After exhorting the Lepreates as the occasion required and installing a garrison in the citadel, he set out with his army for Heraea, leaving Ladicus the Acarnanian as overseer of Triphylia.

On reaching the aforementioned city, he distributed all the spoils, then took up his baggage and, leaving Heraea, arrived at the height of winter at Megalopolis.

Chapter 81 Chilon's Fruitless Attempts In Sparta

At about this same time, while Philip was occupied with affairs in Triphylia, Chilon the Lacedaemonian—holding that the kingship belonged to him by right of birth, and bitterly resenting the slight that the Ephors had shown him in the decision regarding the kingship, when they awarded it to Lycurgus—set out to overturn the established order.

He reasoned that if he followed the same path as Cleomenes and held out to the common people the hope of land allotments and a redistribution of property, the masses would quickly fall in behind him; and so he launched into the enterprise.

Having conferred about the matter with his friends and won as many as two hundred men to share in the venture, he set about carrying his plan to completion.

But seeing that the greatest obstacle to his design was Lycurgus and the Ephors who had conferred the crown upon him, he directed his first attack against these men.

He caught the Ephors at dinner and slaughtered every one of them on the spot—Fortune thus exacting from them the penalty they had earned; for whether one considers the man at whose hands, or the man on whose account, they suffered this fate, one would have to admit that they suffered it justly.

After finishing with these men, Chilon went to the house of Lycurgus and found him inside, but was unable to lay hold of him.

For Lycurgus was smuggled out by some of his neighbors and slipped away unnoticed. He then withdrew by back-country tracks to the place in Tripolis called Pellene.

Chilon, having been foiled in the most crucial point of his attempt, was thoroughly dispirited, yet he was forced nonetheless to press on with what he had begun.

So he burst into the marketplace, laid violent hands on his enemies, appealed to his kinsmen and friends, and held out to the rest the hopes just described.

But when no one paid him any heed, and the people instead began to band together against him, he grasped what was happening, slipped away in secret, and making his way across the country arrived alone in Achaia, an exile. As for the Lacedaemonians,

terrified at the approach of Philip, they cleared away everything from the countryside, and after demolishing the Athenaeum of the Megalopolitans, abandoned it.

So then the Lacedaemonians—

who from the time of Lycurgus's legislation had enjoyed a most admirable constitution and held very great power down to the battle of Leuctra, but after whom Fortune turned against them, their political condition steadily and ever more sliding toward the worse—

in the end experienced a great many hardships and civil factions, struggled through countless redistributions of land and banishments, and tasted the most bitter servitude down to the tyranny of Nabis; they who in former days could scarcely bear to hear even the word "tyrant."

Now the ancient history of Sparta, and most of its later history, has been recounted by many writers on both sides of the question. But the clearest part of it begins from the point at which Cleomenes utterly abolished the ancestral constitution; and this I shall relate at the appropriate moments as they arise.

Chapter 82 Intrigue of Apelles Against Aratus

Philip, breaking camp from Megalopolis and marching by way of Tegea, arrived at Argos, where he spent the remainder of the winter, having won admiration beyond his years both for his general conduct and for his achievements in the campaigns described above.

Apelles, however, even so did not abandon his scheme, but was bent on bringing the Achaeans gradually under the yoke.

Seeing that Aratus and his circle stood in the way of such a design, and that Philip listened to them—and especially to the elder Aratus, both because of his earlier connection with Antigonus and because he wielded the greatest influence among the Achaeans, and above all because of the man's resourcefulness and good sense—he set about working against them and scheming in something like the following way.

Investigating who the political opponents of Aratus were, he drew each of them out from their cities, and once he had them in his grasp he flattered them and urged them into friendship with himself.

He also presented them to Philip, pointing out to him at every turn that, if he followed Aratus, he would have to deal with the Achaeans according to the written terms of the alliance; but that if he listened to Apelles and took on friends of this sort, he would be able to handle all the Peloponnesians as he pleased.

He also at once threw himself into the matter of the elections, wanting to secure the office of Strategus for one of his own party and to drive Aratus and his people out of their position of power.

For these reasons he persuaded Philip to come to the Achaean elections at Aegium, on the pretext that he was at the same time making his way toward Elis.

The king having agreed, Apelles was present himself at the critical moment, and partly by entreaty, partly by intimidation, he barely managed it—but in the end he prevailed in having Eperatus of Pharae made Strategus, and in having Timoxenus, the candidate put forward by Aratus and his circle, rejected.

Chapter 83 Philip Captures the Wall

After this the king broke camp and, marching by way of Patrae and Dyme, came to the fortress called the Wall, which lies on the frontier of the territory of Dyme; this had been seized a short time before, as I mentioned earlier, by Euripidas and his men.

Eager to recover it for the Dymaeans by any means, he encamped before it with his whole army.

The Elean garrison, struck with alarm, surrendered the fortress to Philip—a place not large, but exceptionally well fortified:

for its circumference was no more than a stade and a half, while the height of its wall was nowhere less than thirty cubits.

Having handed it over to the Dymaeans, he advanced and ravaged the territory of the Eleans; and after devastating it and carrying off a great quantity of plunder, he returned with his army to Dyme.

Chapter 84 Aratus Defends Himself

Meanwhile Apelles, supposing that he had accomplished part of his purpose now that the Achaean Strategus had been installed through his own efforts, again set to work against Aratus and his circle, wishing to detach Philip entirely from his friendship with them. He set about fabricating his slander by means of a contrivance of the following kind.

Amphidamus, the Strategus of the Eleans, who had been captured at Thalamae together with those who had taken refuge there—as we related earlier concerning these events—when he arrived at Olympia, brought along with the other prisoners, made urgent efforts through certain intermediaries to obtain an interview with the king.

Having secured this, he stated that he was able to bring the Eleans over into friendship and alliance with the king. Philip, convinced, sent Amphidamus off without ransom,

instructing him to promise the Eleans that, if they chose friendship with him, he would return all their captives without ransom, would himself guarantee the security of their territory against every outside attack,

and besides this would preserve them free, ungarrisoned, exempt from tribute, and governed by their own institutions.

The Eleans, however, when they had heard these terms, paid them no heed, attractive and substantial though the offers seemed to be.

Apelles then, fashioning his slander out of this affair, brought it before Philip, claiming that Aratus and his circle did not bear genuine friendship toward the Macedonians, nor were they truly well disposed toward the king; for it was they who had been responsible even now for the estrangement of the Eleans.

He alleged that at the very time when the king dispatched Amphidamus from Olympia to Elis, these men had taken the fellow aside privately and worked on him, telling him that it was in no way to the advantage of the Peloponnesians for Philip to become master of the Eleans;

and that for this reason the Eleans had spurned all the offers made to them, choosing instead to keep up their friendship with the Aetolians and to persist in their war against the Macedonians.

Chapter 85 Apelles Repeats his Accusation to Aratus Before Philip

At first Philip, having accepted these arguments, ordered that Aratus and his party be summoned, and that Apelles state these same charges in their presence.

When they had arrived, Apelles repeated what he had said before, boldly and in a menacing manner; and while the king still kept silent, he added something further of this kind:

"Since the king finds you, Aratus, so ungrateful and so utterly unreasonable, he has resolved to call the Achaeans together, to render an account of these matters before them, and then to withdraw again to Macedonia."

But the elder Aratus took him up and urged Philip, as a general principle, never to believe anything that was said hastily or without examination,

and that whenever some report reached him against one of his friends or allies, he should make a more careful investigation before accepting the slander; for such conduct was both kingly and advantageous in every respect.

Therefore he now demanded that, concerning the things alleged by Apelles, the king should summon those who had heard them, bring forward into the open the man who had reported them to him, and leave nothing undone of what was possible toward learning the truth, before making any statement about these matters to the Achaeans.

Chapter 86 Aratus is Cleared

The king was satisfied with what was said, and declared that he would not treat the matter lightly but would investigate it; and so for the time being the meeting was dissolved.

In the following days Apelles brought forward no proof of his allegations, while for Aratus and his party there occurred a coincidence of the following kind.

For the Eleans, at the time when Philip was ravaging their country, grew suspicious of Amphidamus and set out to arrest him and, after binding him, to send him off to Aetolia.

But he, perceiving their intention beforehand, withdrew at first to Olympia, and afterward, learning that Philip was occupied at Dyme with the disposal of the spoils, hurried to make his way across to him.

So Aratus and his friends, when they heard that Amphidamus had been driven out of Elis and was present, were overjoyed—since they were conscious of no wrongdoing—and, approaching the king, urged that he ought to summon Amphidamus;

for that man, to whom the words had been spoken, would know best about the charges and would make the truth plain, since he had fled from his home on Philip's account and now placed his hopes of safety, for the present, in the king.

Persuaded by these arguments, the king sent for Amphidamus and found that the accusation was false.

For this reason, from that day onward, he received and esteemed Aratus ever more and more, while toward Apelles he grew more distrustful; yet, being still held in the grip of his thorough regard for him, he was forced to overlook much of what Apelles did.

Chapter 87 Further Intrigues of Apelles

But Apelles in no way abandoned his purpose. Rather, he set about slandering Taurion, who had been appointed over affairs in the Peloponnese—

not by faulting him, but by praising him and asserting that he was the right man to spend his time in the field at the king's side; his real aim being to have someone else, of his own choosing, set over affairs in the Peloponnese.

For this is indeed a novel kind of slander that has been devised: to injure those around one not by blaming them, but by praising them.

And such malice, spite, and cunning have been invented above all and first by those who pass their lives about the courts, springing from their jealousy and greed toward one another.

In the same way he also kept biting at Alexander, who had been appointed over the king's personal attendants, whenever he found an opportunity, wishing both to bring the guard of the king's person under his own control and, in general, to overturn the arrangement left in place by Antigonus.

For Antigonus, while he lived, presided nobly over both the kingdom and his son, and at his death he likewise made good provision beforehand, with respect to the future, for all his affairs.

For he left a will in which he wrote to the Macedonians about how matters had been administered, and likewise gave instructions about the future—how and through whom each thing was to be handled—wishing to leave no occasion for the courtiers to engage in rivalry and faction with one another.

Among those who were then on campaign with him, Apelles himself had been left as one of the guardians, Leontius over the peltasts, Megaleas over the secretariat, Taurion over affairs in the Peloponnese, and Alexander over the king's personal attendants.

Now Leontius and Megaleas he had wholly under his own control, but Alexander and Taurion he sought to remove from their posts, eager to manage both these offices and all the others through himself and his own friends.

And this he would easily have accomplished, had he not raised up Aratus as an adversary to himself; but as it was, he quickly got a taste of his own folly and greed.

For the very thing he set out to do against those around him, this he himself suffered, and that in a very short time indeed.

But how and in what manner this came to pass we shall postpone for the present, and shall bring this book to a close; in what follows we shall try to report clearly on each of these events.

Philip, having made the arrangements described above, returned to Argos, and there spent the winter quarters with his friends, while he dismissed his forces to Macedonia.

Chapter 1 The Situation in the Summer of B. C. 218

The year of office held by the younger Aratus had reached its end about the rising of the Pleiades; for that was how the Achaean people reckoned time in those days.

So he laid down his office, and Eperatus took over the leadership of the Achaeans. Dorimachus was general of the Aetolians.

At the same time, as summer was beginning, Hannibal, now openly committed to war against Rome, set out from New Carthage, crossed the Iber River, and began his advance and march into Italy.

The Romans, meanwhile, were sending Tiberius Sempronius to Libya with a force, and Publius Cornelius to Iberia.

Antiochus and Ptolemy, having given up on embassies and on settling their dispute over Coele-Syria by negotiation, began making war on one another.

King Philip, being short of grain and money for his forces, summoned the Achaeans to an assembly through their magistrates.

When the people had gathered at Aegium according to law, he saw that Aratus and his supporters were holding back out of resentment because of the mischief worked against them by Apelles and his circle during the elections, while Eperatus was by nature ineffective and held in contempt by everyone.

Reflecting on what had already happened, and on the poor judgment of Apelles and Leontius, he decided once again to align himself with Aratus and his party.

So he persuaded the magistrates to transfer the assembly to Sicyon. Then he took both the elder Aratus and the younger Aratus aside, placed all the blame for what had happened on Apelles, and urged them to remain committed to the policy they had adopted from the beginning.

They readily agreed. Philip then entered the Achaean assembly and, with the help of the men just mentioned, secured every measure needed for his purpose.

It was decreed that the Achaeans should give him fifty talents at once for his first mobilization, provide three months' pay for the army, and add ten thousand measures of grain.

After that, for as long as he remained in the Peloponnese and campaigned as their ally, he was to receive seventeen talents each month from the Achaeans.

Chapter 2 Philip Decides to Fight at Sea

After these measures had been approved, the Achaeans dispersed to their cities. The king, after consulting with his friends, decided, once the forces had come together from winter quarters, to wage the war by sea.

He was convinced that only in this way would he be able to appear quickly against the enemy at every point, while his opponents would be least able to come to one another's aid,

since they were separated by their territories and each would be anxious for his own safety because of the uncertainty and speed with which an enemy could arrive by sea. For he was at war with the Aetolians, the Lacedaemonians, and the Eleans as well.

Once this decision had been made, he assembled both the Achaean ships and his own at Lechaeum, and by repeatedly putting out to sea he trained the phalanx troops and got them used to the oars, the Macedonians responding eagerly to every order he gave.

For in the dangers of pitched battle on land they are the bravest of men, and for the demands of service at sea when circumstances require it they are the readiest; and in trench-digging, palisade-building, and every hardship of that sort they are exceptionally hardworking,

the kind of men Hesiod depicts in the sons of Aeacus:

delighting in war as in a feast.

So the king and the mass of the Macedonians remained at Corinth, occupied with training and preparation for fighting at sea.

But Apelles, unable either to control Philip or to endure being disregarded and reduced in influence, formed a conspiracy with Leontius and Megaleas. The agreement was that those two, by remaining on the spot at the critical moment, should deliberately neglect matters and damage the king's operations, while Apelles himself would withdraw to Chalcis and see to it that no supplies reached him for his campaigns.

After making this arrangement and plotting maliciously with the men mentioned above, he left for Chalcis, having found some plausible excuses to offer the king.

By staying there, he kept his sworn agreement so firmly, and everyone obeyed him so completely because of the trust he had established earlier, that in the end the king was forced by shortage of funds to pawn pieces of silver plate needed for his own use and maintain himself from that source.

When the ships had assembled and the Macedonians were already trained at the oars, the king issued grain and pay to the army, put to sea, and on the second day came down to Patrae with six thousand Macedonians and twelve hundred mercenaries.

Chapter 3 Philip In Cephallenia

At the same time Dorimachus, the Aetolian general, sent Agelaus and Scopas to the Eleans with five hundred Neo-Cretans. The Eleans, fearing that Philip might move to besiege Cyllene, were gathering mercenary troops, preparing their citizen forces, and carefully fortifying Cyllene as well.

Seeing this, Philip gathered the Achaean mercenaries, some of the Cretans serving with him, some of the Gallic cavalry, and along with them about two thousand picked infantry from Achaea, and left them in the city of Dyme, both as a reserve force and as an advance guard against danger from Elis.

He himself had already written to the Messenians and the Epirotes, and also to the Acarnanians and Scerdilaidas, instructing each of them to man whatever ships they had and meet him in Cephallenia. Then he sailed out from Patrae according to the agreed plan and put in at Cephallenia near Pronnoi.

But when he saw that the little town there was difficult to besiege and that the country was narrow, he sailed past with the fleet and anchored near the city of the Paleis.

Seeing that this district was rich in grain and capable of feeding an army, he landed his forces and encamped beside the city. He drew the ships together at anchor, enclosed them with a trench and palisade, and sent the Macedonians out to collect provisions.

He himself went around the city, examining how it might be possible to bring siege works and engines against the wall, since he wanted both to wait for the allies and to take the city,

first so as to deprive the Aetolians of their most useful support—for it was by using the ships of the Cephallenians that they made crossings into the Peloponnese and ravaged the coasts of Epirus and Acarnania—

and second so as to secure for himself and his allies a naturally well-placed base of operations against enemy territory.

For Cephallenia lies along the Corinthian Gulf, stretching out toward the Sicilian Sea,

and faces the parts of the Peloponnese that slope toward the north and west, especially the territory of Elis, and also the parts of Epirus, Aetolia, and Acarnania that look toward the south and west.

Chapter 4 Philip Besieges Palus

That is why, since the island was well suited both for gathering his allies and, by its position, for operations against enemy territory and for the protection of friendly land, he was eager to master it and bring it under his control.

Observing that all the other sides of the city were enclosed either by the sea or by cliffs, but that there was one small stretch of level ground on the side facing Zacynthus, he decided to bring up his siege works there and to concentrate the entire siege on that point.

The king was occupied with these matters. At this time fifteen light vessels arrived from Scerdilaidas—for he had been prevented from sending most of them because of plots and disturbances among the local dynasts in Illyria—

and the allied contingents assigned from Epirus, Acarnania, and Messenia arrived as well.

For after the capture of Phigalia, the Messenians no longer had any excuse, and from that point onward they took part in the war.

When the preparations for the siege were ready, the king stationed the missile troops and stone-throwers in suitable positions to keep the defenders from resisting effectively, encouraged the Macedonians, brought the siege engines up to the walls, and under their cover began the mining.

The Macedonians worked with such eagerness that a section of the wall two plethra long was soon left hanging. Then the king approached the walls and urged those inside the city to make peace with him.

When they paid no attention, he set fire to the supports and brought down the entire propped section of wall all at once.

Once this happened, he sent in first the peltasts under Leontius, drawn up in companies and ordered to force their way through the fallen masonry.

But Leontius and his men, keeping to the arrangement they had made with Apelles, three times in succession threw the young soldiers into confusion after they had crossed the breach, so that they failed to complete the capture of the city.

They had already corrupted the most prominent officers of the individual units, and they themselves, through deliberate neglect, showed cowardice at every stage.

In the end they were driven out of the city after receiving many wounds, although they could easily have overcome the enemy.

The king, seeing that the officers were acting cowardly and that many Macedonians had been wounded, abandoned the siege and took counsel with his friends about what to do next.

Chapter 5 Philip Invades Aetolia

At the same time Lycurgus had invaded Messenia, and Dorimachus, taking half the Aetolian forces with him, had set out for Thessaly, both men being convinced that this would draw Philip away from the siege of Palaea.

On this matter envoys came to the king both from the Acarnanians and from the Messenians. The Acarnanians urged him to invade Aetolian territory, to force Dorimachus to abandon his advance against Macedonia, and then to overrun and plunder all Aetolia without fear.

The envoys from Messenia begged him to come to their aid, explaining that since the annual winds had now set in, the crossing from Cephallenia to Messenia could be made in a single day.

Therefore Gorgus of Messenia and his associates argued that an attack on Lycurgus would be sudden and effective.

Leontius and his party, keeping to their own design, strongly supported Gorgus and his friends, since they believed that Philip's summer campaign would come to nothing.

For it was easy enough to sail to Messenia,

but impossible to sail back from there while the Etesian winds were blowing.

So it was clear that Philip would be shut up in Messenia with his army and forced to remain inactive for the rest of the summer, while the Aetolians would roam through Thessaly and Epirus, sacking and plundering the whole country without danger.

Such were the destructive schemes and counsels these men were offering. But Aratus, who was present, championed the opposite view.

He said Philip ought to sail to Aetolia and make that the focus of operations; for with the Aetolians campaigning abroad under Dorimachus, this was the best possible moment to invade and ravage Aetolia. The king, already distrusting Leontius because of his deliberate slackness during the siege, and recognizing in these discussions about the voyage the same malicious maneuvering, decided to follow Aratus's advice.

Accordingly he wrote to Eperatus, the Achaean general, ordering him to take the Achaeans and help the Messenians, while he himself sailed from Cephallenia and on the second day reached Leucas by night with the fleet.

After making the necessary arrangements at the channel called the Dioryctus and getting his ships through there, he sailed into what is called the Ambracian Gulf.

This gulf stretches far inland from the Sicilian Sea into the interior of Aetolia, as I have already said.

After traversing it and anchoring shortly before daybreak near the place called Limnaea, he ordered the soldiers to eat breakfast and, leaving behind most of their baggage, to make themselves ready to march lightly equipped.

He himself gathered the guides and questioned them closely about the country and the neighboring towns.

Chapter 6 Aristophanes the Acarnanian Joins Forces with Philip

At this time Aristophanes the general arrived, bringing the Acarnanians in full force. Because they had suffered many terrible wrongs from the Aetolians in earlier years, they were eager to avenge themselves in every possible way and to harm the Aetolians.

So they gladly seized this chance of Macedonian support and came under arms, not only those whom the law required to serve, but even some older men as well.

The Epirotes were no less eager for similar reasons; but because of the size of their country and the suddenness of Philip's arrival, they were too late to gather in time.

Of the Aetolians, as I said, Dorimachus had marched out with half their force, while he had left the other half behind, thinking this reserve sufficient to meet any unexpected attack on their cities and countryside.

The king left an adequate guard over the baggage, marched out from Limnaea in the evening, and after advancing about sixty stades made camp.

After supper and a short rest for the army, he set out again, and marching continuously through the night reached the river Achelous just as day was breaking, between Conope and Stratus, eager to strike suddenly and unexpectedly at the district of Thermus.

Chapter 7 A Rapid March To Thermus

Leontius and his party saw, in two ways, that Philip was likely to achieve his purpose and that the Aetolians would be unable to deal with the situation: first, because the arrival of the Macedonians had been swift and unexpected;

and second, because the Aetolians would never suppose that Philip would dare so readily to expose himself by moving against Thermus, given the strength of the country there. So they were bound to be caught off guard and wholly unprepared for what was happening.

With this in mind, and still keeping to their own purpose, Leontius and his friends thought Philip ought to encamp by the Achelous and let the army recover from the night march, since they were eager to allow the Aetolians even a brief chance to rally to the defense.

But Aratus and his party, seeing that the opportunity for attack was fleeting and that Leontius was plainly trying to obstruct the operation, protested strongly and urged Philip not to let the moment pass or lose time in delay.

The king accepted their advice and, now already offended with Leontius, kept the army marching without interruption.

After crossing the river Achelous, he pressed on hard toward Thermus; and as he advanced he also laid waste and devastated the country.

On his left he passed by Stratus, Agrinium, and the land of the Thestians; on his right, Conope, Lysimachia, Trichonium, and Phytaeum.

When he came to the town called Metapa, which lies on Lake Trichonis itself and beside the narrow pass along it, about sixty stades from the place called Thermus,

he found that the Aetolians had abandoned it; so he brought in five hundred soldiers and occupied it, intending to use it as a reserve post to secure both the entrance to and the exit from the pass.

For the whole stretch beside the lake is mountainous and rough, thickly covered with woods, and therefore the passage there is extremely narrow and hard to traverse.

After this he put the mercenaries at the head of the whole march, the Illyrians behind them, and then followed with the peltasts and the phalanx. The Cretans brought up his rear, while on the right the Thracians and light-armed troops moved parallel to him across the country.

For on the left the lake itself secured the line of march for nearly thirty stades.

Chapter 8 Thermus

After traversing the places just mentioned and reaching the village called Pamphia, he likewise secured this place with a garrison and advanced toward Thermus by a road that was not only steep and exceptionally rough, but also hemmed in on both sides by deep precipices,

so that in some places the path was very dangerous and narrow, the whole ascent being nearly thirty stades.

Yet he covered this stretch too in a short time, because the Macedonians made the march with great energy.

He reached Thermus late in the day, and after pitching camp he let the army plunder the surrounding villages and sweep over the plain of Thermus; likewise they looted the houses in Thermus itself, which were full not only of grain and similar provisions, but also of the finest equipment and possessions belonging to the Aetolians.

For since every year their most notable markets and festivals, and also the appointments of magistrates, were held in this place, each person stored there the most splendid of his possessions for entertaining guests and for the preparations connected with those occasions.

Quite apart from their practical use, they also believed this place gave them the greatest security, because no enemy had ever yet dared to invade these districts, and because the natural character of the site made it, as it were, the acropolis of all Aetolia.

That is why, as the country had long enjoyed peace, the buildings around the sanctuary and all the surrounding places were full of abundant goods.

So that night they encamped there loaded with every kind of profit; but on the following day they gave orders to carry off the most valuable furnishings and whatever could be transported, while they piled the rest in heaps before the tents and burned it.

They treated in the same way the arms dedicated in the porticoes: the finest they took down and carried off, some they exchanged for their own, and the rest they gathered together and burned. These amounted to more than fifteen thousand.

Chapter 9 Plunder and Sacrilege At Thermus

Up to this point everything had been done properly and justly according to the laws of war; but what came after that, I do not know how one ought to describe.

For when they remembered what the Aetolians had done at Dium and Dodona, they set fire to the porticoes and destroyed the rest of the votive offerings, some of which were lavishly made and had been produced with great care and expense.

And they did not stop with damaging the roofs by fire, but pulled the buildings down to the ground. They also threw down the statues, no fewer than two thousand of them, and many they smashed to pieces, except for those that bore inscriptions or images of the gods; these they spared.

They also wrote on the walls the famous verse then in circulation, a sign that the cleverness of Samus was already beginning to show — Samus being the son of Chrysogonus and the king's foster-brother.

The verse was:

"Do you see where the god's bolt flew?"

At this the king and his friends were greatly pleased with themselves, thinking that they were acting justly and as they should, paying back the Aetolians in kind for their impious conduct at Dium. But I think the exact opposite.

If my argument is right, anyone may judge the matter from examples taken not from elsewhere, but from the history of this very royal house.

When Antigonus won a pitched battle against Cleomenes, king of the Lacedaemonians, and gained possession of Sparta,

though he had full power to do whatever he wished with the city and its inhabitants, he was so far from mistreating those who had fallen into his hands that, on the contrary, he restored their ancestral constitution and their freedom, and, after becoming the cause of the greatest benefits both publicly and privately to the Spartans, went back home.

Therefore he was judged not only at the time to be a benefactor, but after his death a savior, and he won immortal honor and glory not only among the Spartans but among all Greeks.

Chapter 10 The Present Philip Compared to his Ancestors

Such was the honor won by the men just mentioned. And indeed the first of them, Philip, who enlarged the kingdom and became the founder of the greatness of the house, after defeating the Athenians in the battle of Chaeronea accomplished his purpose not so much by force of arms as by the fairness and humanity of his character.

For by war and weapons alone he overcame only those drawn up against him and became master of them; but by good sense and moderation he brought all the Athenians together with their city under his influence.

He did not let anger dictate his actions, but fought and pressed the conflict only until he had gained the chance to display his own gentleness and nobility.

Therefore he sent the prisoners home without ransom, buried the Athenian dead, and even had Antipater carry back their bones; he also clothed most of those who were released. Thus by a small expense, through his intelligence, he achieved a very great success.

For by astonishing the pride of the Athenians with his magnanimity, he made them all eager to serve as his allies instead of his enemies.

And what of Alexander? Though he was so enraged with the Thebans that he sold the inhabitants into slavery and razed the city to the ground, even in taking the city he did not neglect reverence toward the gods.

On the contrary, he took the greatest care that no injury, even by accident, should be done to the temples or, generally, to the sacred precincts.

Again, when he crossed into Asia to avenge on the Persians their impiety toward the Greeks, he tried to exact from men a punishment worthy of what they had done, but kept his hands off everything dedicated to the gods, although this was precisely where the Persians had sinned most grievously in Greece.

These are the things Philip ought to have kept continually in mind at that time, and so to show himself the heir and successor of those men not so much in power as in purpose and magnanimity.

Yet while throughout his life he was very eager to appear a kinsman of Alexander and Philip, he paid not the slightest attention to being their imitator.

So by pursuing the very opposite course from those men, he came to have the opposite reputation among all as he grew older.

Chapter 11 Philip's Crime and Blunder

What happened then was one example of this. In his anger he joined in the Aetolians' acts of impiety, and, trying to cure evil with evil, he thought he was doing nothing out of place.

He used to denounce Scopas and Dorimachus at every turn for their lawlessness and outrage, citing their impiety toward the gods at Dodona and Dium; yet when he himself did much the same, he did not think that those who heard of it would judge him in the same way as them.

For stripping the enemy and destroying forts, harbors, cities, men, ships, crops, and the like — things by which one may weaken the opposition and strengthen one's own position and enterprises — these acts the laws and usages of war do indeed compel us to do.

But to ravage temples, and with them statues and every such adornment, when one is about to gain no help for one's own cause and bring no reduction upon the enemy in the present war — how could anyone fail to call that the act of a frenzied temper and a maddened spirit?

Good men ought not to wage war for the destruction and annihilation of those who have done wrong, but for the correction and reform of what has been done amiss. Nor should they destroy the innocent together with the guilty, but rather preserve the innocent and thereby save even those who seem to have done wrong.

It is the part of a tyrant to do harm and hold unwilling subjects in obedience through fear, while he hates them and is hated by those he rules; but it is the part of a king, by doing good to all, to lead and govern willing subjects, loved because of his beneficence and humanity.

One may best grasp Philip's mistake on that occasion by considering what impression the Aetolians would likely have had if he had done the opposite of what I have described, and had destroyed neither the porticoes nor the statues nor mistreated any of the offerings.

For my own part, I think their reaction would have been the best and most humane possible: conscious of what they themselves had done at Dium and Dodona, and clearly seeing that Philip at that moment had complete power to do whatever he wished, and that if he had inflicted the harshest measures he would have seemed justified, at least as far as they were concerned—

—yet by his own gentleness and greatness of spirit he chose not to imitate their conduct in any respect.

Chapter 12 Philip Should Not Receive All the Blame

From this it is clear that they would probably have condemned themselves, while approving and admiring Philip for acting in a kingly and magnanimous way, showing both reverence toward the gods and anger against the Aetolians.

And indeed, overcoming one's enemies by nobility and justice brings no less advantage — rather more — than successes won by force of arms.

In the one case the defeated yield from necessity; in the other they submit by deliberate choice. The former kind of victory corrects wrongdoing only through heavy losses, whereas the latter turns those who have gone astray to the better course without harm.

And most important of all, in the one case most of the achievement belongs to the troops under command, whereas in the other the victory is wholly the leaders' own.

Still, perhaps one should not lay all the blame for what happened then on Philip himself, because of his youth, but mostly on the friends who were with him and assisted in the business, among whom were Aratus and Demetrius of Pharos.

And about these men it is not difficult to say, even without having been present at the time, from which of the two such advice was likely to have come.

For apart from the settled character each showed throughout life — where in Aratus one would find nothing rash or ill-considered, but in Demetrius the opposite — we also have a generally acknowledged example revealing the disposition of each in the similar advice they gave Philip.

When the proper occasion comes, I will make the appropriate mention of this.

Chapter 13 The Return From Thermus

Philip — for I had digressed from this point — took from Thermus as much plunder as could be carried away, whether driven or borne, and advanced by the same route on which he had come, placing the booty and the heavily armed troops in front, and leaving the Acarnanians and the mercenaries in the rear.

He was eager to get through the difficult ground as quickly as possible, because he expected that the Aetolians, trusting in the strength of the terrain, would attack his rear.

And that is exactly what happened at once. For the Aetolians had come up to help and had gathered in a force of nearly three thousand. As long as Philip remained on the heights they did not come near, but stayed concealed in certain hidden places under the command of Alexander of Trichonium. But as soon as the rear began to move, they immediately fell upon it from the direction of Thermus and pressed hard on the last men in the column.

As confusion arose around the rear, the Aetolians attacked with even greater boldness and came to close quarters, relying on the ground.

But Philip, having foreseen what would happen, had posted the Illyrians and the most effective of his peltasts under cover of a certain hill on the descent.

When these men rose up against the attackers and charged the enemy who had pushed too far forward, the rest of the Aetolians were forced to flee headlong over pathless ground. A hundred and thirty were killed, and only slightly fewer were taken prisoner.

After winning this advantage, the troops in the rear burned Pamphium and, passing safely through the narrow defile, rejoined the Macedonians.

For Philip had encamped near Metapa and was there waiting for the men from the rear to come up. The next day he razed Metapa and advanced, encamping near the city called Acrae.

On the following day, as he advanced, he ravaged the countryside and, after encamping near Conope, remained there through the next day.

On the day after that he broke camp again and marched along the Achelous as far as Stratus. After crossing the river, he drew up his force out of missile range,

Chapter 14 Skirmish at Stratus

to test those inside the city. For he had learned that about three thousand Aetolian infantry, around four hundred cavalry, and as many as five hundred Cretans had gathered in Stratus.

Since no one dared to come out against him, he set the van in motion again and continued the march toward Limnaea and the ships.

But as soon as the rear had passed the city, at first a few of the Aetolian horsemen rode out and began harassing the last ranks.

Then, when the whole body of the Cretans came out from the city and some Aetolian troops joined their cavalry, the engagement became more serious, and the men in the rear were forced to turn and fight for their lives.

At first the danger was evenly balanced for both sides. But when the Illyrians came up in support of Philip's mercenaries, the Aetolian cavalry and mercenaries gave way and fled in scattered disorder.

The king's troops pursued most of them as far as the gates and the walls, and killed about a hundred.

After this action, the troops from the city kept quiet from then on, and the men from the rear reached the camp and the ships safely.

Philip, having pitched camp early in the day, offered thank-offerings to the gods for the success of his undertaking, and at the same time summoned the commanders because he wished to entertain them all at dinner.

For he thought that he had committed himself to hazardous country of a kind into which no one had ever before dared to lead an army and make camp.

Yet he had not only entered it with his force, but, after accomplishing everything he had intended, had also made his return in safety. For these reasons he was in high spirits as he prepared to receive the commanders.

But Megaleas and Leontius took the king's success badly, since they had joined with Apelles in trying to obstruct all his operations, yet had been unable to do so.

Instead, events were turning out exactly the opposite of what they wanted, and they were plainly being proved wrong. Nevertheless, they came to the dinner.

Chapter 15 Megaleas and Crinon Fined

From the very beginning they aroused suspicion in the king and the others by not sharing the joy over what had happened as fully as everyone else did.

As the drinking went on, and then became untimely and excessive, they were forced to go along with the rest, and quickly revealed what they really were.

For when the gathering broke up, driven on by drunkenness and want of self-control, they went about looking for Aratus.

When they met him on his way back, at first they abused him, and then they tried to stone him.

As more people came running up on both sides, there was shouting and disturbance throughout the camp. Hearing the uproar, the king sent men to find out what had happened and put an end to the disorder.

When they arrived, Aratus explained what had taken place and produced the men who were present as witnesses, and so withdrew from this outrage to his own tent.

Leontius somehow slipped away in the confusion without thinking. But the king sent for Megaleas and Crinon, and when he learned what had happened, he rebuked them sharply.

They not only refused to submit, but answered back, declaring that they would not stop until they had made the men around Aratus pay for it.

The king, angered by this language, immediately required them to post security for a fine of twenty talents and ordered them to be taken into custody.

Chapter 16 Arrival at Leucas

On the next day he sent again for Aratus and told him to take heart, because he would settle the matter as far as circumstances allowed.

Leontius, when he learned what had happened to Megaleas, came to the king's tent with some peltasts, convinced that by overawing the king because of his youth he would quickly make him change his mind.

When he met him, he demanded to know who had dared to lay hands on Megaleas and who had dared to lead him off to prison.

But when the king answered firmly that he himself had given the order, Leontius was taken aback, let out some cry of vexation, and went away in anger.

The king then put to sea with the whole fleet, crossed the gulf, and came to anchor at Leucas as quickly as possible. There he instructed the officers appointed to manage the spoil not to delay in carrying out that business; then he gathered his friends and brought the case of Megaleas to judgment.

Aratus, in his speech for the prosecution, set out from the beginning the conduct of Leontius and his circle, going through the massacre they had committed at Argos after the departure of Antigonus, their agreements with Apelles, and also the obstruction they had caused in the affair of the people of Palairos.

As he presented all this with proof and witnesses, Megaleas and his associates were unable to answer a single point, and were unanimously condemned by the king's friends.

Crinon remained in custody, while Leontius went surety for Megaleas' money penalty.

So this was the outcome of the scheme of Apelles and Leontius, its course now turning back in the opposite direction from what they had hoped at first.

For they thought that by frightening Aratus and isolating Philip they would be able to do whatever seemed advantageous to themselves; but the result was exactly the reverse.

Chapter 17 Philip Comes to Corinth

About this time Lycurgus returned from Messenia, having accomplished nothing worth mentioning there. Afterward he set out again from Sparta and seized the city of the Tegeans.

But when the inhabitants withdrew into the citadel, he undertook to besiege it. Since he was unable to make any progress at all, he once more withdrew to Sparta.

The Eleans made a raid into the territory of Dyme, and by drawing into an ambush the cavalry who had come to help, they routed them easily.

They killed quite a number of the Gallic troops, and among the citizens they took prisoner were Polymedes of Aegium and the Dymaeans Agesipolis and Diocles.

Dorimachus had made his first expedition with the Aetolians because he was convinced, as I said above, that he could ravage Thessaly without danger to himself and would force Philip to raise the siege of the Paleis.

But when he found Chrysogonus and Petraeus ready in Thessaly to risk battle with him, he did not dare come down into the plain, and instead kept close to the foothills.

Then, when word reached him of the Macedonian invasion of Aetolia, he gave up his operations in Thessaly and hurried to go to their aid. But when he arrived and found that the Macedonians had already withdrawn from Aetolia, he was left behind and proved too late in every respect.

Meanwhile the king sailed from Leucas, ravaged the territory of the Oeantheans as he passed along the coast, and came down with his whole fleet to Corinth.

After mooring his ships at Lechaeum, he disembarked his troops and sent messengers to the allied cities in the Peloponnese, naming the day on which everyone was to be in Tegea with arms by nightfall.

Chapter 18 Philip Appears At Sparta

After making these arrangements and spending no time at all in Corinth, he gave the Macedonians orders to break camp. Marching by way of Argos, he reached Tegea on the second day.

There he took with him the Achaeans who had assembled and advanced by the mountain road, eager to enter Laconian territory without the Lacedaemonians noticing.

After going around through the deserted country, on the fourth day he came upon the hills opposite the city and passed along toward Amyclae itself, keeping the Menelaeum on his right.

The Lacedaemonians, watching from the city as the army moved along, were struck with panic and fear, marveling at what was happening.

For their minds were still unsettled by the reports that had come in about Philip's destruction of Thermus and, in general, about his actions in Aetolia; and there was even a rumor among them that Lycurgus would be sent out to aid the Aetolians.

But that the danger would come upon them so quickly from so great a distance had never entered any of their minds at all, especially since the king's youth made him seem in some measure easy to despise. So, because events were turning out contrary to all expectation, they were naturally dumbfounded.

For Philip, handling his enterprises with more daring and more practical skill than one would expect from his age, reduced all his enemies to helplessness and confusion.

For, as I said above, he had sailed from the middle of Aetolia and crossed the Ambracian Gulf by night, then put in at Leucas.

He stayed there two days, and on the third, putting out before dawn, reached Lechaeum on the second day after that, ravaging the Aetolian coast as he sailed.

After this he continued his marches without interruption, and on the seventh day came upon the hills above the city near the Menelaeum, so that most people who saw what had happened could hardly believe it.

So the Lacedaemonians, thrown into fear by the unexpected nature of the event, were at a loss and in a difficult position for the moment.

Chapter 19 Philip Marches Through Laconia

Philip, on the first day, encamped around Amyclae.

Amyclae is a place in Laconia, richly wooded and very fruitful, about twenty stades from Sparta.

There is also there a sanctuary of Apollo, one of the most famous among the sacred places in Laconia. The place lies in the part of the country that slopes toward the sea from the city.

On the following day, ravaging the countryside as he went, he descended to the stockade called Pyrrhus.

After raiding and laying waste the neighboring districts for the next two days, he encamped near Carnium. Setting out from there, he marched on Asine; and after making assaults on it but accomplishing nothing of importance, he broke camp again. From that point on, as he continued his advance, he devastated all the country facing the Cretan Sea as far as Taenarum.

Then, changing direction once more, he marched past the Lacedaemonian naval station, which is called Gythium, has a secure harbor, and lies about two hundred and thirty stades from the city.

Leaving this on his right as he marched, he encamped near Helos, which, viewed as a district, is the largest and finest stretch of land in Laconia.

From there he sent out raiding parties and burned and devastated the whole region and destroyed the crops in it; and his foragers reached as far as Acriae and Leucae, and also the territory of Boeae.

Chapter 20 Philip's Return Opposed

When the Messenians received Philip's letters concerning the campaign, they were no less eager than the other allies in their initial zeal, but set out promptly and sent their men in the prime of life: two thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry.

But because of the length of the journey they were delayed and missed Philip at Tegea, and at first they were at a loss what they should do.

Then, anxious not to seem to be hanging back because of the suspicions previously entertained about them, they marched through Argolis into Laconia, wanting to join Philip.

When they reached a place called Glympes, which lies on the borders of Argolis and Laconia, they encamped there both awkwardly and carelessly.

For they neither dug a trench nor put up a palisade around their camp, nor did they choose a naturally advantageous site; instead, trusting in the goodwill of the people who lived in the place, they encamped unsuspectingly in front of its wall.

But when the arrival of the Messenians was reported to Lycurgus, he took his mercenaries and some of the Lacedaemonians, advanced to the place, and at daybreak boldly attacked their camp.

The Messenians had made bad decisions in every respect, and especially in marching out from Tegea without a force strong enough in numbers and without relying on experienced advisers; yet when the danger actually came upon them, they still did the best that circumstances allowed for their own safety.

For as soon as they saw the enemy appearing, they abandoned everything and rushed for refuge to the place.

As a result, Lycurgus got possession of most of the horses and the baggage, but he took not a single man alive, and of the cavalry he killed only eight.

So the Messenians, after meeting with this reverse, returned home again through Argos.

Lycurgus, elated by what had happened, went to Sparta, made his preparations, and conferred with his friends, determined not to let Philip get out of the country again without danger and a clash.

But the king, breaking camp from Helos, advanced while ravaging the country as he went, and on the fourth day again reached Amyclae with his whole army about midday.

Chapter 21 Lycurgus Goes Out to Resist

After giving instructions to the commanders and his friends about the coming danger, Lycurgus himself marched out of the city and occupied the ground around the Menelaeum, with no fewer than two thousand men in all.

He arranged with those in the city to keep watch, so that whenever he raised the signal they would quickly lead the troops out in front of the city from several points at once and draw them up facing the Eurotas, where the river comes nearest to the city.

Such were the measures of Lycurgus and the Lacedaemonians.

But lest unfamiliarity with the ground make what I say obscure and hard to follow, I should also explain the nature and arrangement of the place,

which indeed is what I try to do throughout this work, always connecting places that are unknown and making them familiar by comparison with places already known and described.

For since in war, both on land and at sea, differences of terrain are what cause most successes and failures, and since we all want to know not merely what happened but how it happened,

one must not neglect topographical description in any kind of narrative, least of all in military affairs, nor hesitate to use as points of reference at one time harbors, seas, and islands, and at another sanctuaries, mountains,

named regions, and finally even the differences presented by the surrounding sky, since these are the most universal things shared by all human beings.

For only in this way, as I have said before, is it possible to bring listeners to an understanding of places they do not know.

The terrain in this case is as follows.

Chapter 22 Position of Sparta and Disposition of Troops

Sparta as a whole is circular in shape and lies on level ground, though in its several parts it includes uneven and hilly places of various kinds.

The river that runs past its eastern side is called the Eurotas, and for most of the year it is uncrossable because of its size.

So it happens that the hills on which the Menelaeum stands lie beyond the river, to the southeast of the city; they are rugged, hard to climb, exceptionally high, and they command the strip between the river and the city.

Through this strip the river just mentioned flows along the very foot of the hill, and the whole width there is no more than a stade and a half.

Through this Philip was necessarily obliged to make his return march, with the city and the Lacedaemonians, ready and drawn up for battle, on his left, and on his right the river and Lycurgus's men standing on the hills.

The Lacedaemonians had also devised the following in addition to these advantages: by damming the river upstream they diverted it into the ground between the city and the hills, and once that area had been soaked through, it was impossible for not only horses but even infantry to enter it.

So the only course left was to lead the army close under the foothills, thus exposing themselves to the enemy in a long marching column in which they could scarcely support one another.

Seeing this, Philip took counsel with his friends and decided that the most urgent necessity of the moment was first to drive Lycurgus and his men from the positions around the Menelaeum.

So he took the mercenaries and the peltasts, and with them the Illyrians as well, crossed the river, and advanced toward the hills.

Lycurgus, perceiving Philip's intention, prepared the troops with him and encouraged them for the coming danger, and he also gave the signal to those in the city.

When this was done, the magistrates responsible immediately led out the citizen troops according to the arrangement and drew them up in front of the wall, placing the cavalry on the right wing.

Chapter 23 Defeat of Lycurgus Near Sparta

When Philip came near Lycurgus's men, he first sent the mercenaries against them.

As a result, the Lacedaemonians had the advantage at the outset and fought with greater confidence, since both their equipment and the ground contributed greatly in their favor.

But when Philip brought up the peltasts to support those engaged, keeping them in reserve formation, and launched the Illyrians in a flank attack,

the mercenaries under Philip, encouraged by the support of the Illyrians and peltasts, were much more strongly emboldened for the fight, while Lycurgus's men, alarmed by the attack of the heavy-armed troops, gave way and fled.

About a hundred of them fell, and a little more than that number were taken prisoner; the rest escaped into the city. Lycurgus himself struck off by trackless routes and during the night made his way into the city with a few companions.

Philip occupied the hills with the Illyrians, and then, taking the light-armed troops and peltasts with him, returned to the main force.

At this time Aratus, leading the phalanx from Amyclae, had already come near the city.

So the king, after crossing the river, remained in support with the light-armed troops and peltasts, and also with the cavalry, until the heavy infantry had safely passed beneath the hills through the difficult ground.

When the troops from the city tried to attack the cavalry serving as the covering force, and the engagement became more general, the peltasts fought with courage.

And about this time Philip gained an acknowledged advantage, and after joining in the pursuit and chasing the Lacedaemonian cavalry to the gates, he then crossed the Eurotas safely and brought up the rear of his phalanx.

Chapter 24 Philip Proceeds to Tegea

As the day was already drawing on, he was forced to encamp where he was, so he made camp near the exit from the pass,

his officers having by chance chosen such a place as no one could have found a better for making an invasion into Laconia right by the city itself.

For at the beginning of the pass just mentioned, when one approaches Sparta from Tegea or generally from the inland country, there is a place at most two stades from the city and situated directly on the river.

Its side facing the city and the river is entirely enclosed by a great sheer cliff that is completely inaccessible; but the ground above these precipices is level, fertile, and well watered, and at the same time conveniently situated for the entrance and exit of forces.

So anyone encamped there and holding the hill above it would seem to be camping in safety because of the position relative to the city, and also in an excellent place, since he controlled the entrance and passage through the narrow defile.

Philip accordingly encamped there in safety, and on the next day sent the baggage on ahead, but drew up his army on the level ground where it was plainly visible to those in the city.

He remained there for a short time, and after that wheeled his line toward one flank and marched in the direction of Tegea.

When he reached the place where Antigonus and Cleomenes had joined battle, he encamped there.

On the following day, after inspecting the ground and sacrificing to the gods on each of the two hills, one called Olympus and the other Euas, he advanced, having strengthened his rearguard.

When he arrived at Tegea, he sold off all the booty, and after that marched through Argos and came with the army to Corinth.

While ambassadors from Rhodes and Chios were present there to discuss ending the war, he gave them audience and, pretending agreement, said that he was ready now as before to make peace with the Aetolians; then he sent them away, instructing them also to speak with the Aetolians about a settlement,

while he himself went down to Lechaeum and made preparations for a voyage, since he had some more substantial operations to carry out in the region of Phocis.

Chapter 25 Leontius, Megaleas, and Ptolemy Rouse the Guard

At this time Leontius, Megaleas, and Ptolemy, still convinced that they could overawe Philip and in that way undo their earlier offenses, began spreading talk among both the peltasts and the unit the Macedonians call the agema.

They said that these men were risking everything, yet received none of what was justly theirs, nor did they get the full share of the advantages that custom assigned to them.

By this they stirred up the younger soldiers to gather together and try to plunder the quarters of the king's most prominent friends, to smash in the doors, and to hack away the roof tiles of the royal residence.

As this was happening, and the whole city had fallen into uproar and confusion, Philip heard of it and came running with all haste from Lechaeum into the city.

After gathering the Macedonians in the theater, he partly exhorted them and partly rebuked them all for what had happened.

There was loud shouting and great disorder: some thought the men responsible should be arrested and stoned, while others thought the matter should be settled and no grudge held against anyone.

So for the moment Philip pretended to be persuaded, urged them all to calm down, and withdrew. He knew perfectly well who the leaders of the disturbance were, but because of the circumstances he did not yet reveal it.

Chapter 26 Leontius Calls In Apelles

After this disturbance, the operations that had begun in Phocis met with certain delays.

Leontius and his associates, having lost hope in their own resources because none of their plans were succeeding, turned to Apelles for refuge and kept sending repeated messages calling him from Chalcis, explaining the embarrassment and difficulty they were in because of their quarrel with the king.

Now Apelles happened to be conducting himself in Chalcis with more authority than was proper for him.

For he represented the king as still a young man, mostly under his control and master of nothing, while he drew to himself the handling of affairs and power over everything.

Accordingly, the overseers and administrators from Macedonia and Thessaly made their reports to him, and the Greek cities, in their decrees and in the honors and gifts they voted, mentioned the king only briefly; in practice Apelles was everything to them.

Philip had long been hearing of this and had been indignant and offended by it, especially since Aratus was at his side and was actively working on the matter. Even so, he held himself in check and gave no one any clear sign of what direction he intended to take or what his mind was.

But Apelles, ignorant of his real position and convinced that if he only came into Philip's presence he would manage everything according to his own will, set out from Chalcis to support Leontius and his party.

When he arrived in Corinth, Leontius, Ptolemy, and Megaleas, who were commanders of the peltasts and of the other most distinguished divisions, made great efforts and urged the young men to go out to meet him.

So, because of the crowd of officers and soldiers who went out to receive him, his entry had an almost theatrical grandeur, and straight from the road he went to the royal quarters.

But when he wanted to go in, according to his former custom, one of the mace-bearers stopped him as he had been ordered to do, saying that the king was not available at a suitable time.

Astonished and perplexed for a long while by this unexpected treatment, Apelles at last turned back in dejection; and all the rest immediately and openly drifted away from him, so that in the end he went into his lodging with no one but his own attendants.

For brief turns of fortune, more than anything else, generally raise all men up and then cast them down again, but they do so most of all in the case of those who live at royal courts.

Such people really are like counters on an abacus: those counters, according to the will of the man reckoning with them, are at one moment worth a mere copper and the next a talent; and so those about a court, at a king's nod, are blessed one moment and pitiable the next.

Megaleas, seeing that the support he had expected through Apelles had turned out contrary to his hopes, was filled with fear and began thinking of flight.

Apelles, however, was still admitted to banquets and honors of that sort, but he took no part in deliberations or in the king's daily companionship.

In the following days the king again set sail from Lechaeum for operations in Phocis and took Apelles with him.

Chapter 27 Execution of Leontius

When the expedition failed, the king was on his way back from Elatea; and during this same time Megaleas withdrew to Athens, leaving Leontius bound as surety for the twenty talents.

But the generals in Athens would not receive him, so he went on again to Thebes.

The king put to sea from the region of Cirrha and sailed with the hypaspists to the harbor of the Sicyonians. From there he went up to the city, excused himself to the magistrates, took lodging with Aratus, and spent all his time with him, while ordering Apelles to sail to Corinth.

When reports about Megaleas reached him, he sent the peltasts, whose commander was Leontius, off to Triphylia with Taurion, on the pretext that some urgent business required it; and once they had departed, he gave orders to take Leontius into custody over the surety.

But when the peltasts realized what had happened, Leontius having sent someone to them, they dispatched envoys to the king, begging him that if Leontius had been arrested on some other charge, he should not conduct the trial on the accusations against him without them being present,

otherwise they would all think that they themselves were being grossly slighted and implicitly condemned as well—for the Macedonians had always enjoyed this kind of frank speech with their kings—

but if it was because of Megaleas's surety, then they themselves would raise the money by a common contribution and pay it.

The king, however, angered by the zeal shown by the peltasts, put Leontius to death more quickly than he had originally intended.

Chapter 28 Death of Megaleas

The ambassadors from Rhodes and Chios returned from Aetolia, having arranged a truce of thirty days and reporting that the Aetolians were ready for a settlement,

and having fixed a definite day on which they asked Philip to meet them at Rhium, promising that they would bring the Aetolians to agree to whatever was necessary for making peace.

Philip accepted the truce and wrote to the allies, instructing them to send to Patrae the men who were to sit in council and deliberate on a settlement with the Aetolians; he himself sailed from Lechaeum and reached Patrae on the second day.

About this time some letters were forwarded to him from the region of Phocis, letters that Megaleas had been sending to the Aetolians, in which he urged them to take heart and remain in the war because Philip's situation was utterly desperate for lack of supplies. Besides this, the letters contained accusations against the king and bitterly hostile abuse.

When Philip read these and concluded that Apelles was the instigator of all the mischief, he at once placed him under guard and sent him off in haste to Corinth, together with his son and his favorite.

He also sent Alexander to Thebes after Megaleas, with orders to bring him before the authorities to answer for the surety.

When Alexander carried out the order, Megaleas did not have the nerve to face the proceedings, but laid hands on himself.

And about the same days Apelles too lost his life, along with his son and his favorite.

So these men met the ruin they deserved and passed from life, especially because of the outrageous treatment they had shown toward Aratus.

Chapter 29 Disturbed State of Achaia

The Aetolians, who had been hoping to exploit the situation in their own favor, were now eager to conclude peace because the war was weighing them down and events had gone in a way they had not expected.

For they had assumed that, because of Philip’s youth and inexperience, they would be dealing with a mere child; instead they found him fully grown, not only in the boldness of his plans but in the way he carried them out, while they themselves showed how contemptible and childish they were in both the details and the overall conduct of the war.

And when news reached them of the uproar among the peltasts and of the deaths of Apelles and Leontius, they hoped that there was some great and serious disturbance at the royal court, and so they kept putting off the meeting until they had gone past the appointed day at Rhium.

Philip, however, gladly took advantage of this excuse, since he was confident of success in the war and had already decided not to accept any settlement. So he urged the allies who had come to meet him to prepare, not for peace, but for war, and then set sail again for Corinth.

He dismissed the Macedonian troops by way of Thessaly to spend the winter at home, while he himself sailed from Cenchreae, coasted along Attica, passed through the Euripus, and reached Demetrias. There he held Ptolemy, who was still the last surviving member of the conspiracy around Leontius, to account before a tribunal of Macedonians and had him executed.

At this same time Hannibal, having invaded Italy, was encamped opposite the Roman forces near the river called the Padus. Antiochus, after subduing most of Coele-Syria, had once again dismissed his army into winter quarters, and Lycurgus, king of the Lacedaemonians, fled to Aetolia in alarm at the ephors.

For the ephors, acting on a false report that he was planning revolutionary action, gathered the young men and came by night to his house. But Lycurgus, having caught wind of what was happening, withdrew with his own household servants.

Chapter 30 Aratus Elected Strategus

When winter had come, Philip the king had returned to Macedonia, and Eperatus, the Achaean strategus, had fallen into contempt among the political young men and was altogether disregarded by the mercenaries; as a result, no one obeyed orders and nothing had been prepared for the defense of the country.

Pyrrhias, the Aetolian commander sent to the Eleans, saw this. He had with him thirteen hundred Aetolians and the mercenaries of the Eleans, together with a thousand Elean infantry and two hundred cavalry, making up a total force of three thousand.

With this army he kept ravaging not only the territory of Dyme and Pharae, but that of Patrae as well. Finally he camped on the mountain called Panachaeum, which rises above the city of Patrae, and laid waste the whole district sloping toward Rhium and toward Aegium.

As a result, the cities, already suffering and receiving no help, had some difficulty meeting their contributions; and the soldiers, because their pay was continually delayed and never given on time, behaved in the same way when it came to providing aid. Since both sides kept retaliating in this way, matters worsened steadily and in the end the mercenary force broke up altogether.

All this happened because the man in command was incompetent.

When the time for the election arrived with Achaean affairs in such a condition, Eperatus laid down his office, and at the beginning of summer the Achaeans appointed Aratus the elder as their strategus.

So this was the situation in Europe.

Now that I have reached the proper point both in the sequence of time and in the order of events, I shall move on to the affairs of Asia and once again narrate the events that took place there in the same Olympiad as those just described.

Chapter 31 Return to Narrative of the War in Coele-Syria

I shall now resume the account, and first I will attempt, in accordance with my original plan, to explain the war that arose between Antiochus and Ptolemy over Coele-Syria.

I do so fully aware that at the point where I left off in my Greek history, that war was already nearly settled and brought to an end; nevertheless, I have deliberately chosen this as the place to divide the narrative.

My reason is that I believe this arrangement will best keep readers from making mistakes about the dates of individual events, if I point out, as I go, the years within this Olympiad in which the events in each region of the world, and in Greece, began and ended.

For I am convinced that, if listeners are not to miss the exact dating of each event, it is enough to remind them of the beginnings and endings of each matter, and of the Olympiad years in which the Greek events occurred.

And I think that, for the sake of clarity, nothing is more important in this Olympiad than not mixing the different stories together, but separating and distinguishing them as far as possible, until we come to the next Olympiad and begin recording, year by year, the events that happened alongside one another.

For since I have chosen to write not a partial history but a universal one, and since I have taken on, as I have already explained elsewhere, a task on a much larger scale than my predecessors, I must be even more careful than they are about method and arrangement, so that my work will be clear both in its details and in its overall design.

Accordingly, I shall now turn back a little to the kingdoms of Antiochus and Ptolemy, and try to establish a starting point that is both agreed upon and readily recognizable for what I am about to say, since that is the most important thing of all.

Chapter 32 Dimidium Facti Qui Coepit Habet, Well Begun is Half Done

The old writers used to say that the beginning is half of the whole, and they advised people to take the greatest care in every undertaking to begin well.

They seem to have spoken in exaggerated terms, but to me they appear to have said less than the truth. One might confidently say that the beginning is not half of the whole, but reaches all the way to the end.

For how is it possible to begin anything well without first having grasped in one’s mind the completion of the plan, and without knowing where one is aiming, toward what end, and for what purpose one is undertaking the task?

And how can anyone properly sum up events without bringing their beginning into the account, and without showing where they started from, how they began, and for what reason they have arrived at the present situation?

For this reason, when we say that beginnings extend not merely to the middle but to the end, we must take the greatest care with them, both as speakers and as listeners, when it comes to the whole course of events.

That, too, is what we shall now try to do.

Chapter 33 Previous "Universal" Histories Not Really Universal

I am not unaware that many other historians too make the same claim as I do, saying that they write universal history and have taken up the greatest subject among past events.

As for these writers, setting aside Ephorus, the first and only man who truly undertook to write universal history, I will neither say much nor mention any of the others by name.

I will only note this much: some writers of our own time, after disposing of the war between Rome and Carthage in three or four pages, claim that they are writing universal history.

Yet who is so ignorant as not to know that at that time the most numerous and greatest actions took place in Iberia and Libya, and also in Sicily and Italy, and that the war of Hannibal, apart from the war over Sicily, became the most famous and longest-lasting of wars, while all of us were compelled by its magnitude to keep our eyes fixed on it, in fear of the final outcome?

And yet some of these authors, without recording even as much as those who from time to time scribble public notices on walls, say that they have included all the events of Greece and of the non-Greek world.

The reason is that it is perfectly easy to lay claim in words to the greatest achievements, but it is not easy in practice to attain anything worthwhile.

The former lies open and is common to all, one might say, who are capable only of daring; the latter is exceedingly rare and has fallen to very few in the course of life.

I have been led to say this because of the boastfulness of men who glorify themselves and their own works. Now I return to the beginning of my own subject.

Chapter 34 Weakness of Ptolemy Philopator

As soon as Ptolemy, called Philopator, after his father's death had removed his brother Magas and those who were working with him, took over the kingdom of Egypt,

he supposed that by his own action and by the deed just mentioned he had freed himself from dangers at home, and that fortune had delivered him from dangers abroad, since Antigonus and Seleucus were dead, while Antiochus and Philip, who had inherited their realms, were extremely young, scarcely more than boys.

Trusting therefore in the circumstances of the moment, he conducted the business of his rule in an increasingly festive spirit,

making himself inaccessible and hard to approach for the people at court and for the other officials who managed affairs in Egypt, while showing himself negligent and idle toward those appointed over matters abroad,

though his predecessors had paid no less attention to these matters, but rather more, than to the rule of Egypt itself.

Accordingly they kept pressure on the kings of Syria both by land and by sea, because they controlled Coele-Syria and Cyprus.

They also stood over the dynasts of Asia, and likewise over the islands, because they were masters of the most important cities, districts, and harbors all along the coast from Pamphylia to the Hellespont and the region around Lysimacheia.

They also kept watch over affairs in Thrace and Macedonia, since they controlled the cities around Aenus and Maroneia and even places farther on.

Having thus stretched out their hands far afield and pushed the reach of their power well forward before them, they never felt anxiety about their rule in Egypt. Naturally, then, they took great pains over foreign affairs.

But this king, neglecting each of these matters because of shameful lusts and senseless, constant drunkenness, naturally in a very short time found more than one man plotting against both his life and his throne,

the first of whom was Cleomenes the Spartan.

Chapter 35 Cleomenes Asks for Help from Egypt

As long as the king called Euergetes was alive—the man with whom he had entered into partnership and solemn agreement—Cleomenes remained quiet, convinced that through him he would always obtain the support needed to recover his ancestral kingdom.

But when that king died, and time kept passing, while the situation in Greece all but called for Cleomenes by name—since Antigonus was dead, the Achaeans were at war, and the Spartans, in accordance with Cleomenes' original purpose and policy, were joining the Aetolians in their hostility to the Achaeans and Macedonians—

then indeed he was compelled all the more to hurry and exert himself to secure departure from Alexandria.

So at first he sought interviews and urged the king to send him out with the necessary funds and force.

After that, when he was ignored, he begged at least to be released with only his own attendants; for, he said, the circumstances were showing him opportunities enough to regain his ancestral rule. But the king,

taking no notice of any such matters and making no provision for the future because of the reasons already given, kept on senselessly and foolishly refusing Cleomenes.

But Sosibius and his circle—for he was at that time the leading man in affairs—met together and held discussions about what should be done concerning him.

They decided not to send him out with a fleet and funds, because, despising foreign affairs after the death of Antigonus, they thought that any expense spent on such matters would be wasted.

Besides this, they were afraid that, with Antigonus dead and no rival left, Cleomenes might quickly bring Greece under his own control without a struggle and become for them a serious and formidable opponent,

since he had seen their position at close quarters, had come to despise the king, and could observe that many parts of the kingdom were only loosely attached and far removed from the royal center, and offered many opportunities for decisive action.

For there were no small number of ships in the region of Samos and a considerable body of troops in the region of Ephesus.

For these reasons, then, they rejected the plan of sending him out with support; but they did not think it in any way advantageous to themselves to carelessly dismiss such a man, an obvious enemy and foe.

The course left was to keep him there against his will. This too they all rejected at once and without discussion, thinking it unsafe to stable a lion and sheep together. Sosibius above all viewed this course with suspicion for something like the following reason.

Chapter 36 Cleomenes In Alexandria

At the time when they were arranging the murder of Magas and Berenice, they were anxious that their attempt might fail, especially because of Berenice's boldness, and so they were forced to flatter everyone at court and to hold out hopes to all if events turned out according to their plan.

At that moment Sosibius, seeing that Cleomenes needed help from the king but possessed judgment and a real understanding of affairs, held out great hopes to him and at the same time let him into the plot.

And Cleomenes, seeing that he was alarmed and especially afraid of the foreign troops and mercenaries, urged him to be confident; for he promised that the mercenaries would do him no harm, but would actually help him.

When Sosibius showed even greater amazement at this promise, he said, "Do you not see that there are nearly three thousand foreign troops here from the Peloponnese and about a thousand Cretans, and that if we merely give the signal, they will all readily serve us?

Once these men are assembled, whom are you afraid of?

Surely not the soldiers from Syria and Caria?"

At the time, then, Sosibius was pleased to hear this and was doubly encouraged in his action against Berenice.

But afterward, as he observed the king's slackness, he kept renewing the thought in his mind, and kept before his eyes both the boldness of Cleomenes and the goodwill that the foreign troops felt toward him. Therefore it was especially then that he urged the king and his friends to act first and shut Cleomenes up.

To carry out this plan...

Chapter 37 Sosibius Plots Against Cleomenes

To carry out this plan, he made use of the following opportunity. There was a Messenian named Nicagoras, a hereditary guest-friend of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians.

Before this, the connection between the two men had been slight. But when Archidamus fled Sparta out of fear of Cleomenes and came to Messenia, Nicagoras not only eagerly received him into his house and supplied his other needs, but from their subsequent life together there grew between them complete goodwill and close familiarity.

Accordingly, when Cleomenes later held out to Archidamus hopes of returning home and of being reconciled with him, Nicagoras devoted himself to carrying messages between them and arranging the terms that were to guarantee good faith.

When these terms had been ratified, Archidamus went back down to Sparta, trusting the agreements made through Nicagoras.

But Cleomenes, when he met him, killed Archidamus, though he spared Nicagoras and the others who were with him.

So Nicagoras outwardly pretended that he owed Cleomenes gratitude for saving his own life, but inwardly he took the affair very hard, believing that he himself had become responsible for the king's destruction.

This same Nicagoras had sailed to Alexandria a short time earlier, bringing horses.

As he was disembarking from the ship, he came upon Cleomenes, Panteus, and Hippitas with them, walking in the harbor beside the quay.

When Cleomenes saw him and came up to him, he greeted him warmly and asked what had brought him there.

When Nicagoras said that he had arrived with horses, Cleomenes said, "I wish you had brought male prostitutes and harp-girls instead of horses; that is what the present king is eager for."

At that moment Nicagoras merely laughed and said nothing. But a few days later, after he had become more closely acquainted with Sosibius through the horse business, he repeated to him the remark just quoted against Cleomenes,

and, seeing that Sosibius listened with pleasure, laid out for him the whole grievance he had long felt against Cleomenes.

Chapter 38 Cleomenes Is Arrested

Sosibius, seeing that Nicagoras was hostile in his attitude toward Cleomenes, partly by giving him money on the spot and partly by promising more for the future, persuaded him to leave behind a sealed letter accusing Cleomenes,

so that, when Nicagoras sailed away a few days later, his servant could bring the letter to Sosibius as though Nicagoras had sent it.

When Nicagoras had played his part in the scheme, and after his departure the letter had been brought by the servant to Sosibius,

Sosibius immediately went to the king, taking both the servant and the letter with him. The servant said that Nicagoras had left the letter behind and instructed him to deliver it to Sosibius,

and the letter explained that Cleomenes intended, unless they arranged to send him off with the fitting equipment and financial support, to rise against the king's interests.

Sosibius at once seized on this opening and urged the king and the other royal friends not to delay, but to keep Cleomenes under watch and shut him up.

When this had been done, and a very large house had been assigned to him, he spent his time there under guard, differing from the other men placed in custody only in this, that he lived in a larger prison.

Seeing the situation he was in, and having grim expectations for the future, Cleomenes decided to try every possible course.

He did so not because he was convinced he could carry out his plan successfully—for he had none of the conditions that could reasonably promise success—but rather because he was eager to die nobly and to endure nothing unworthy of the courage he had shown before.

At the same time, as it seems to me, he was turning over in his mind and setting before himself the thought that often comes to high-spirited men:

"No, let me not die without effort and without glory, but only after doing some great deed that men yet to come may hear of."

Chapter 39 Death of Cleomenes

So, after watching for the king's departure to Canopus, he spread a report among those guarding him that the king was about to release him. On that pretext he gave a feast to his own attendants, and sent sacrificial meat, garlands, and wine to the guards as well.

They made use of these things without suspicion and became thoroughly drunk. Then Cleomenes took with him the friends who were with him and the young attendants around his person, and about midday slipped out past the guards carrying daggers.

As they advanced and met Ptolemy, who had then been left in charge of the city, in the broad street, they struck terror into the men with him by their daring, dragged him down from his four-horse chariot, secured him, and called on the crowds to win their freedom.

But because no one paid attention to them or joined their movement, owing to the unexpected nature of the attempt, they turned back and rushed toward the citadel, intending to force open its gates and make use of the men who had been taken there for imprisonment.

But when this attempt also failed, because those in charge had foreseen what was coming and secured the gate, they laid hands on themselves in a very brave and Spartan manner.

So Cleomenes ended his life in this way, a man who was engaging in company, naturally gifted in the management of affairs, and, in sum, kingly and fitted by nature to command.

Chapter 40 Origin of War in Coele-Syria

Not long after this, Theodotus, the man appointed over Coele-Syria, an Aetolian by birth, partly because he despised the king on account of the licentiousness of his life and his whole character,

and partly because he had lost confidence in the men at court, since only a short time before he had rendered the king notable services in other matters and especially in Antiochus's first move against Coele-Syria, yet had received no gratitude for this, but on the contrary had been recalled to Alexandria and had narrowly escaped with his life,

for these reasons now resolved to open communication with Antiochus and hand over to him the cities of Coele-Syria. Antiochus gladly welcomed the prospect, and the affair quickly began to move forward.

But so that we may do the same for this royal house as we did for that of Egypt, let us go back to Antiochus's accession to power and from that point give a summary survey down to the beginning of the war that is now to be described.

For Antiochus was the younger son of Seleucus, surnamed Callinicus. When his father died and his brother Seleucus succeeded to the kingship by right of age, Antiochus at first withdrew to the upper regions and made his residence there.

But when Seleucus, after crossing Taurus with an army, was assassinated, as we have said before, Antiochus in turn took over the government and became king himself,

entrusting the rule on this side of Taurus to Achaeus, and placing the upper parts of the kingdom in the hands of Molon and Molon's brother Alexander, Molon being satrap of Media and his brother of Persia.

Chapter 41 The Royal Family of Syria

These men, despising him because of his youth, hoping that Achaeus would become their partner in the attempt, and above all fearing the brutality and malicious interference of Hermeias, who at that time was in control of the whole administration, set about revolting and drawing the upper satrapies away with them.

Hermeias was a Carian, and he had come to preside over affairs because Seleucus, the king's brother, had entrusted him with this confidence when he undertook his campaign against Attalus.

Once he had gained this authority, he envied everyone at court who held a prominent position; and, being cruel by nature, he punished some by putting the worst construction on mere mistakes, while against others he brought fabricated and false accusations, acting as an unforgiving and bitter judge.

Most of all he was eager, and made it his business in every way, to destroy Epigenes, who had brought back the troops that had marched out with Seleucus, because he could see that the man was capable of judgment, speech, and action, and was held in high esteem by the army.

With this purpose in mind, he kept waiting for some opportunity and pretext to use against the man I have mentioned.

When the council was assembled to consider Molon's revolt, and the king ordered each member to state his view on how they ought to deal with the rebels,

Epigenes spoke first and advised that there should be no delay, but that they should take the matter in hand at once, and above all that the king should proceed to the region himself and be present on the spot at the critical moments.

For in that way either Molon's party would not dare at all to engage in revolutionary action, with the king present and visible to the masses with a force of proper size,

or, if they did venture it and persisted in their plan, they would quickly be swept up by the crowds and handed over into the king's power.

Chapter 42 Antiochus Encouraged to Attack Coele-Syria

While the man just mentioned was still speaking, Hermeias, in a burst of anger, declared that for a long time he had escaped notice despite being a plotter and traitor against the kingdom.

But now, he said, he had done well to reveal himself by the advice he had given, since he was eager to deliver the king's person to the rebels with only a few attendants.

For the moment, however, after as it were merely breathing life into the slander, he let Epigenes pass, making it look more like an ill-timed outburst of bitterness than settled hostility.

As for his own opinion, terrified by the danger and inexperienced in war, he shrank from the expedition against Molon, but urged an expedition against Ptolemy, convinced that this war was safe because of that king's indolence.

So for the time being, after overawing everyone in the council, he sent Xenon and Theodotus the Hemiolius with a force as generals against Molon, while he kept continually urging Antiochus on, thinking that he ought to lay hands on affairs in Coele-Syria.

He thought that only in this way, if war hemmed the young king in on every side, would he neither pay the penalty for his former wrongdoing nor be deprived of his present power, because of the king's needs and the contests and dangers that would always surround him.

And so at last he forged a letter as though it had been sent by Achaeus and presented it to the king, setting out that Ptolemy was inviting Achaeus to assert his claim to power and saying that he would furnish ships and money for every undertaking, if only he would take up the diadem and openly make himself known to all as a claimant to the throne,

which, the letter said, he already possessed in fact even now, but by begrudging himself the title he was pushing aside the crown that fortune offered him.

The king believed what was written and stood ready and eager to campaign against Coele-Syria.

Chapter 43 Revolt of Molon In Media

While he was at Seleuceia-on-the-Zeugma at this time, Diognetus the admiral arrived from Cappadocia on the Euxine, bringing Laodice, the daughter of King Mithridates, still a maiden, who had been designated as the king's wife.

Mithridates claimed to be descended from one of the seven Persians who overthrew the Magus, and he had preserved the dynasty that had been handed down to his ancestors from the beginning by Darius along the Euxine Sea.

Antiochus received the girl with the fitting welcome and protection, and at once celebrated the marriage, employing magnificent and royal preparations.

After the wedding had been completed, he went down to Antioch, proclaimed Laodice queen, and thereafter busied himself with preparations for the war.

Meanwhile Molon, having made the populations of his own satrapy ready for anything, partly through hopes of profit and partly through the fears he instilled in their leaders by circulating threatening forged letters supposedly from the king,

and having his brother Alexander as a ready ally, while also securing the neighboring satrapies through the goodwill and bribery of their governors, took the field with a large force against the king's generals.

Xenon and Theodotus, alarmed by his advance, withdrew into the cities.

Molon, once master of the territory of Apolloniatis, had supplies in more than enough abundance. Even before this he was formidable because of the greatness of his province.

Chapter 44 Geography of Media

For all the royal horse-breeding lands are entrusted to the Medes, and they possess an incalculable abundance of grain and livestock.

As for the strength and size of the country, no one could describe them adequately.

For Media lies in the middle of Asia, and, considered as a single region, surpasses all the lands in Asia both in extent and in elevation.

It also borders on some of the greatest and most warlike peoples. Along its eastern side, toward the sunrise, lies the desert plain that stretches between Persia and Parthia.

It also commands the so-called Caspian Gates and joins the mountains of the Tapyri, which are not far from the Hyrcanian Sea.

On the southern side it slopes down toward Mesopotamia and the territory of Apolloniatis, and it lies beside Persia, screened by the projecting barrier of Mount Zagros,

which has an ascent of about a hundred stades, and, having many separate ridges and converging passes within it, is broken up by valleys and in some places by ravines, inhabited by Cossaei, Corbrenae, Carchi, and many other barbarian peoples who are thought to be exceptionally suited for war.

On the western side it joins the people called the Satrapeioi, who are not far distant from the tribes that extend down to the Euxine Sea.

Its northern parts are enclosed by the Elymaeans and the Aniaracae,

and also by the Cadusians and the Matiani, and they lie above the parts of Pontus that join the Maeotis.

Media itself is divided by several mountain ranges running from east to west, and between them lie plains crowded with cities and villages.

Chapter 45 Xenoetas Sent Against Molon

Now that he was master of this region, which had all the resources of a kingdom, Molon had long been formidable, as I said before, because of the scale of his power.

But at this point, since the king's generals seemed to have yielded the open country to him, and since his own forces were emboldened because their first hopes were advancing exactly as they had expected, he came to seem utterly terrifying and impossible to withstand to everyone living in Asia.

Accordingly, his first plan was to cross the Tigris and lay siege to Seleucia.

But when Zeuxis blocked the crossing by seizing the river boats, Molon withdrew and went back to the place called the camp at Ctesiphon, where he prepared winter quarters for his forces.

When the king heard of Molon's advance and of the retreat of his own generals, he himself was ready once more to campaign against Molon, abandoning his move against Ptolemy and refusing to let the right moment slip away.

But Hermeias, sticking to his original plan, sent Xenoetas the Achaean with an army against Molon as commander with full powers, saying that rebels should be fought by generals, while the king ought himself to make war on kings and undertake struggles that concerned the whole realm.

Meanwhile Hermeias, keeping the young king under his control because of his age, pressed matters forward and assembled the forces at Apamea; then, breaking camp from there, he came to Laodicea.

From that place the king set out with his whole army, crossed the desert, and entered the valley called Marsyas,

which lies between the foothills of Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon and is squeezed into a narrow pass by the mountains just mentioned.

At its narrowest point this place is broken up by marshland.

Chapter 46 Xenoetas Has Early Success

There are also lakes there, from which the aromatic reed used in perfumes is cut. Overlooking the narrows, on one side, is a place called Brochi, and on the other Gerrha, leaving only a narrow passage between them.

After marching for several days through the valley just described and bringing the neighboring cities under his control, the king arrived at Gerrha.

Finding that Theodotus the Aetolian had already occupied Gerrha and Brochi, and had fortified the narrow route beside the lake with trenches and palisades and posted guards in favorable positions, he at first attempted to force a passage.

But because of the strength of the terrain, and because Theodotus still stood firm, he suffered more damage than he inflicted and abandoned the attempt.

So, since the country there was so difficult, and news reached him that Xenoetas had suffered a complete defeat and that Molon was master of all the upper country, he let this enterprise go and set out to bring help to his own dominions.

For Xenoetas, the general sent out with full powers, as I said above, had gained greater authority than he had expected, and so treated his own friends with more arrogance and acted against the enemy with greater rashness.

Nevertheless, after marching down to Seleucia and summoning Diogenes, the governor of Susiana, and Pythiades, the governor of the Persian Gulf region, he led out his forces and encamped opposite the enemy with the river Tigris as his protection.

Then many men swam across to him from Molon's camp and told him that if he crossed the river, Molon's whole army would come over to his side; for they said the troops envied Molon, but were strongly loyal to the king. Elated by these reports, Xenoetas resolved to cross the Tigris.

He gave the impression that he intended to bridge the river at a place where there was a sort of island, but made no preparations suitable for that part of the river.

As a result, Molon's men came to despise this announced move.

Meanwhile Xenoetas gathered boats, fitted them out, and took great care over these preparations. Then, choosing from the whole army the strongest cavalry and infantry, and leaving Zeuxis and Pythiades at the camp, he marched by night to a point about eighty stades below Molon's camp.

After transporting his force safely in the boats, he encamped while it was still night in a naturally strong position, which was for the most part enclosed by the river and on the rest secured by marshes and bogs.

Chapter 47 Molon Withdraws Toward Media

When Molon realized what had happened, he sent out his cavalry, thinking they would easily stop those who were still crossing and crush those who had already crossed.

But when they came near Xenoetas's men, their ignorance of the terrain made them useless even without enemy action: sinking and being swallowed up in the bogs under their own weight, they were all rendered ineffective, and many of them perished.

Xenoetas, convinced that if he drew near, Molon's forces would change sides and join him, advanced along the river and encamped close to the opposing army.

At this moment Molon, either as a stratagem or because he distrusted his troops and feared that something of what Xenoetas expected might actually happen, left his baggage in the camp, broke up by night, and pushed on with a rapid march toward Media.

Xenoetas, supposing that Molon had fled in panic at his advance and because he distrusted his own forces, first occupied the enemy camp, and then ferried over to himself from Zeuxis's camp his own cavalry and their baggage.

After this he assembled the men and urged the mass of the soldiers to be confident and to hold fine hopes for the whole situation, now that Molon had fled.

With these words he ordered them all to attend to themselves and recover their strength, since at dawn he intended to march at once against the enemy.

Chapter 48 The Fall of Xenoetas

But the mass of the soldiers, now full of confidence and supplied with provisions of every kind, rushed into indulgence, drinking, and the slackness that goes along with such impulses.

Molon, after covering a considerable distance and giving his men their meal, turned back and came upon them by a countermarch; finding them all scattered and drunk, he attacked the enemy palisade just before daybreak.

Xenoetas and his officers were stunned by the unexpected turn of events, and since they were unable to rouse the mass of the men because drunkenness had them in its grip, they themselves rushed senselessly against the enemy and were killed.

Of the soldiers who were asleep, most were cut down where they lay in their beds, while the rest threw themselves into the river and tried to cross to the camp on the opposite bank; but most of these too perished.

In general there was a chaotic and indiscriminate confusion throughout the camps, for all were stricken with panic and terror.

And because the camp on the opposite bank was visible and only a very short distance away, their desire to save themselves made them forget the force and difficulty of the river.

So in their desperation and their rush for safety they threw themselves into the river, and they even drove the pack animals in along with the baggage,

as though the river, by some providential care, would cooperate with them and carry them safely across to the camp on the far side.

The result was that the stream presented a tragic and extraordinary spectacle, with horses, pack animals, weapons, corpses, and baggage of every kind all being swept along together with the swimmers.

After seizing Xenoetas's camp, Molon then crossed the river safely, since no one hindered him because Zeuxis and his men had fled at his onset; and so he became master of Zeuxis's camp as well.

Having accomplished this, he advanced with his army to Seleucia.

He took that city too at the first assault, because Zeuxis's men had fled, and with it he also seized Diomedon, the commandant of Seleucia. After that he advanced and brought the upper satrapies under his control without striking a blow.

Once he had made himself master of Babylonia and of the region along the Persian Gulf, he came to Susa.

He captured the city there too at the first assault, but when he attacked the citadel he accomplished nothing, because the general Diogenes had got inside it before him.

So he gave up that attempt, left troops behind to conduct the siege, quickly broke camp, and led his force back down again to Seleucia on the Tigris.

There he took great care of the army and encouraged the mass of the men; then he set out on the operations that followed, occupying Parapotamia as far as the city of Europus and Mesopotamia as far as Dura.

When this news reached Antiochus, as I said above, he gave up hope of success in Coele-Syria and turned to these operations.

Chapter 49 Hermeias Overruled

With his hopes now turned toward this campaign, the council met again, and the king called on them to speak about how the preparations against Molon ought to be used. Epigenes once more began the discussion by speaking about the present crisis.

He said that they ought long ago to have acted without delay on his advice, before the enemy gained such great advantages; but even now, he maintained, they still had to take the matter firmly in hand.

At this Hermeias again flew into a blind and reckless rage and began to insult him.

While lavishly praising himself and bringing charges against Epigenes that were both false and beside the point, he kept urging the king not to disregard the hopes they had in Coele-Syria so irrationally, nor to give them up.

This offended most of those present and displeased Antiochus too; and only with difficulty, because the king took great pains to reconcile them, was the quarrel brought to an end.

Since the majority thought that Epigenes had spoken more necessarily and more usefully, the decision was ratified: they were to campaign against Molon and devote themselves to that business.

Hermeias quickly put on a show of agreement and changed his tone, declaring that all ought to support the decision without excuse; and he himself at once made a great display of readiness.

Chapter 50 Death of Epigenes

When the forces had assembled at Apamea, a disturbance arose among the mass of the soldiers over the pay and rations still owed to them.

Seeing that the king was alarmed and frightened by the outbreak at so critical a moment, Hermeias promised to settle all the allowances due to the troops, provided the king would consent not to take Epigenes with him on the campaign.

For, he said, no orderly conduct of the expedition was possible when so much anger and faction had been stirred up among the men.

The king heard this with displeasure and was extremely eager, because of Epigenes' experience in warfare, to have him accompany the campaign.

But he was so hemmed in and already so dominated by Hermeias' scheming, watchfulness, and ingratiating service that he was no longer master of himself; so, yielding to the pressure of the moment, he granted what was demanded.

When Epigenes withdrew, as ordered, to his quarters, the men in the council were appalled at the spite behind it.

The troops, on the other hand, once they had received what they asked for, swung around and became well disposed toward the man responsible for setting their pay right, except for the Cyrrhestians.

These mutinied, and being nearly six thousand in number, went over to open revolt and caused a great deal of trouble for a considerable time. But in the end they were defeated in battle by one of the king's generals; most were killed, and the survivors surrendered themselves to the king's mercy.

Hermeias, having thus made the king's friends dependent on him through fear and the troops through the services he had rendered them, broke camp and marched on with the king.

As for Epigenes, he devised the following plot against him, taking as his accomplice Alexis, the commander of the citadel of Apamea.

He wrote a letter as though it had been sent from Molon to Epigenes, and by dazzling one of Epigenes' servants with great promises persuaded him to slip the letter into Epigenes' papers.

Once this had been done, Alexis immediately appeared and asked Epigenes whether he had received any letters from Molon.

When Epigenes indignantly denied it, Alexis demanded the right to search. Entering at once, he quickly found the letter, and using it as his pretext, killed Epigenes on the spot.

After this, the king was persuaded that Epigenes had justly perished; those about the court, however, suspected what had really happened, but kept silent out of fear.

Chapter 51 Antiochus Marches Through Mesopotamia

When Antiochus reached the Euphrates and took over the force stationed there, he set out again, and after marching as far as Antioch in Mygdonia he stayed there about the winter solstice, wishing to wait out the onset and height of the season.

After remaining there about forty days, he advanced to Libba.

There a council was held on the question of how they should advance against Molon and from where and in what manner they should obtain supplies for the march, since Molon happened to be in the region around Babylon.

Hermeias thought they should march along the Tigris, keeping that river, as well as the Lycus and the Caprus, in front of them.

But Zeuxis, with the fate of Epigenes before his eyes, hesitated to say what he really thought; still, because Hermeias' ignorance was so obvious, he at last found the courage to advise that they should cross the Tigris.

He pointed out both the general difficulty of marching along the river and the further fact that, after traversing a considerable distance and then passing through six days of desert, they would reach what was called the King's Canal.

If the enemy occupied that in advance, crossing would be impossible, while a retreat back through the desert would plainly be dangerous, especially because of the shortage of supplies they would then face.

By crossing the Tigris, on the other hand, he made it clear that the people of Apolloniatis would openly repent and incline toward the king, since even now they were obeying Molon not by choice but through compulsion and fear.

He also showed that the country was excellent and would furnish the army with abundant provisions.

Most important of all, he said, Molon would be cut off from returning to Media and from getting support from those regions.

As a result, Molon would be forced either to risk a battle, or, if he refused to do so, to see his troops quickly transfer their hopes to the king.

Chapter 52 Antiochus Advances Against Molon

When Zeuxis' advice was adopted, they immediately divided the army into three parts and ferried the men and baggage across the river at three separate places.

After this they marched in the direction of Dura and relieved that city from the siege by a sudden attack, for one of Molon's commanders happened to be besieging it.

Then, by continuing their marches without interruption, on the eighth day they crossed the pass called Oreicum and came down into Apollonia.

At the same time Molon learned of the king's arrival. Since he distrusted the populations of Susiana and Babylonia, because he had only recently gained control of them and that in an unexpected way, and since he also feared being cut off from a return to Media, he decided to bridge the Tigris and move his forces across.

He was eager, if possible, to seize the rough country of Apolloniatis first, because he had confidence in the large number of slingers known as Cyrtii.

Once this decision had been carried out, he pressed on with a rapid and strenuous march.

Thus it happened that, just as Molon was approaching the places just mentioned and the king was setting out from Apollonia with all his forces, the light troops sent ahead by both sides ran into one another on some heights.

At first they engaged and tested each other; but when the armies on both sides came up, they broke off. For the moment both sides withdrew to their own camps and encamped about forty stades apart.

When night fell, Molon reflected that for rebels fighting kings, a battle in daylight and face to face was dangerous and a disadvantage; so he resolved to attack Antiochus by night.

Selecting from the whole camp the men best suited for the task and in the prime of strength, he made a circuit by certain routes, intending to launch his attack from higher ground on the right.

But during the march he learned that ten young men had deserted in a body to Antiochus, and so he abandoned this plan.

Quickly reversing course, he returned to his own entrenchment and arrived around dawn, filling the whole camp with noise and confusion.

For the men posted by the palisade, startled from sleep by the rush of those approaching, nearly bolted from the camp.

Molon, for his part, did what he could to calm the disturbance...

Chapter 53 Disposition of Troops

But while Molon was doing what he could to quiet the disorder that had broken out among his men, the king, ready for battle, moved his whole army out of the camp at daybreak.

On the right wing he stationed first the lancer cavalry, putting Ardys, a man distinguished in military affairs, in command.

Next to them he placed the allied Cretans, and after these the Galatian Rhigosages. Beside them he stationed the mercenaries and foreign troops from Greece, and next to these he drew up the phalanx.

He assigned the left wing to the cavalry known as the Companions. The elephants, ten in number, he placed in front of the line at intervals.

Dividing the reserve bodies of infantry and cavalry between the two wings, he ordered them, once battle was joined, to outflank the enemy.

After this he rode along the line and addressed the troops in a few words suited to the moment. He entrusted the left wing to Hermeias and Zeuxis, while he himself held the right.

Molon, by contrast, found it hard to lead his army out,

and their deployment too was confused and disordered because of the senseless panic of the previous night.

Still, he divided his cavalry between the two wings, judging from the enemy's formation what arrangement they would probably use, and in the space between the cavalry bodies he stationed the shield-bearing infantry, the Gauls, and in general all his heavy troops.

His archers, slingers, and that whole class of troops he posted outside the cavalry on either flank.

And he drew up his scythed chariots in front of the army at intervals. He gave the left wing to his brother Neolaus, while he himself took the right.

Chapter 54 Defeat and Death of Molon

When the armies advanced to engage, Molon's right wing remained loyal and attacked Zeuxis' division with vigor, but his left wing no sooner came within sight of the king than it went over to the enemy.

As a result, Molon's men lost heart, while the king's troops were strengthened twofold in confidence.

Molon understood what had happened and, now being surrounded on every side, thought of the outrages that would be inflicted on him if he were taken alive and fell into the enemy's hands. So he laid violent hands on himself.

In much the same way all who had shared in the revolt fled each to his own place and ended their lives by the same kind of death.

Neolaus escaped from the battle and reached Persis, where Alexander, Molon's brother, was staying. There he slaughtered their mother and Molon's children; and after their deaths he killed himself as well, having persuaded Alexander to do the same.

The king, after plundering the enemy camp, ordered Molon's body to be impaled in the most conspicuous place in Media.

Those appointed for the task carried this out at once, transporting the body to Callonitis and impaling it close to the ascent toward the Zagros.

After this the king rebuked the rebel troops at length and then, giving them his right hand in pledge, restored them and appointed officers to lead them back into Media and settle the affairs of the country.

He himself went down to Seleucia and set the neighboring satrapies in order, treating everyone with moderation and intelligence.

Hermeias, however, true to his own disposition, brought charges against the people of Seleucia and fined the city a thousand talents; he drove the officials called Adeiganes into exile, and by mutilating, executing, and torturing many men, he destroyed a large number of Seleucians.

With great difficulty the king finally calmed and restored the city, partly by persuading Hermeias, partly by managing matters on his own judgment, and by exacting from them only a fine of one hundred and fifty talents for their error.

When he had arranged these things, he left Diogenes as governor of Media and Apollodorus of Susiana. Tychon, the chief secretary, he sent to command the regions along the Erythraean Sea.

Such was the way the revolt of Molon and the disturbance caused by it in the upper satrapies were corrected and brought to an end.

Chapter 55 Artabazanes Makes a Treaty with Antiochus

Elated by this success, and wishing to raise himself up and strike fear into the barbarian rulers who bordered on his satrapies, so that they might never dare either to supply or to join in war with any of his rebels, the king resolved to campaign against them, first against Artabazanes.

For Artabazanes was thought to be the strongest and most energetic of those dynasts, and to rule over the people called the Satrapeii and the neighboring tribes as well.

At this time Hermeias feared the expedition into the upper country because of its dangers, and still longed, in keeping with his original plan, for the campaign against Ptolemy.

Yet when news came that a son had been born to the king, he reasoned that Antiochus might perhaps suffer some misfortune among the barbarians in the upper country and that such a situation would give him an opportunity to remove him; so he agreed to the expedition.

He was convinced that, if Antiochus were removed, he himself, as guardian of the child, would hold power over the kingdom.

Once this had been decided, they crossed the Zagros and invaded the territory of Artabazanes,

which borders on Media, being separated from it by the mountain chain that lies between; while farther north some parts of it look toward the Pontus in the region above the Phasis, and it stretches to the Hyrcanian Sea.

It contains a large population of brave men, especially cavalry, and it is self-sufficient in the other equipment needed for war as well.

This rulership, it so happens, had survived from Persian times, because it had been overlooked in the age of Alexander.

But Artabazanes, alarmed by the king's advance and especially by reason of his age, for he was by then extremely old, yielded to the circumstances and made terms acceptable to Antiochus.

Chapter 56 Death of Hermeias

After this settlement had been ratified, Apollophanes the physician, who enjoyed the king's special affection, saw that Hermeias was no longer bearing his power within any proper limits. He was anxious for the king, but even more suspicious and fearful for himself.

So when he found an opportunity he addressed the king, urging him not to be careless or unsuspecting of Hermeias' audacity, and not to wait until he had to struggle with misfortunes like those that had overtaken his brother.

He said the danger was not far off, and begged the king to be alert and to come quickly to the aid of himself and his friends.

Antiochus answered that he too disliked and feared Hermeias, and said that he was deeply grateful to Apollophanes for daring to speak to him about the matter with such loyal concern.

This made Apollophanes confident, since he saw that he had not been mistaken in judging the king's feelings and attitude.

Antiochus then asked Apollophanes to help secure the safety of himself and his friends, not only with words but with action.

Apollophanes declared himself ready for anything. So they came to an understanding and put forward the excuse that attacks of dizziness had come upon the king. For a few days they suspended both the treatment and the attendance of those who were accustomed to wait on him.

At the same time they gave themselves the freedom, under cover of the medical visits, to confer privately with whatever friends they wished.

In that period they prepared the men suited to the undertaking, and because everyone readily cooperated out of hatred for Hermeias, they moved toward carrying out the plot.

Since the physicians declared that Antiochus ought to take walks at daybreak in the cool air, Hermeias came at the appointed time, and with him came the king's friends who knew of the plan.

The others were late, because the king's departure was taking place at a very different hour from his usual one.

So they drew Hermeias away from the camp to a lonely place, and when the king turned aside a little, as though for a necessary purpose, they stabbed Hermeias to death.

Hermeias, then, ended his life in this way, suffering no punishment equal to the deeds he had done.

The king, freed from great fear and embarrassment, continued his march homeward, and all the people of the country approved both his actions and his designs; above all, as he passed, they celebrated the removal of Hermeias.

At the same time in Apamea the women stoned Hermeias' wife to death, and the boys did the same to his sons.

Chapter 57 Achaeus Attempts Treason

When Antiochus had returned home and distributed his troops into winter quarters, he kept sending messages to Achaeus,

reproaching him first for having dared to put on the diadem and act as king, and second for warning him that his dealings with Ptolemy and, in general, his excessive agitation had not escaped notice.

For while the king was campaigning against Artabazanes, Achaeus had convinced himself that Antiochus might suffer some disaster; and even if he did not, Achaeus hoped that, because of the great distance,

he would be able to forestall him by invading Syria and, using the Cyrrhestians who had revolted from the king as his allies, quickly gain control of the kingdom's affairs. With this in mind he set out from Lydia with his whole army.

When he reached Laodicea in Phrygia, he put on the diadem and for the first time dared to conduct himself and write to the cities as king, being urged on above all in this direction by the exile Garsyeris.

But as he continued his advance and was already near Lycaonia, the troops mutinied, displeased at the thought that the campaign was being directed against the man who was by nature and from the beginning their lawful king.

So Achaeus, recognizing the change in their feelings, gave up the enterprise he had planned; and wishing to persuade the troops that he had never intended from the beginning to march into Syria, he wheeled about and ravaged Pisidia.

By thereby providing abundant profit for the camp, he returned home with all his soldiers favorable to him and fully trusting him.

Chapter 58 Seleucia

The king understood all these matters clearly; so while he kept sending repeated warnings to Achaeus, as I said above, he threw his whole energy into the preparations against Ptolemy.

Therefore, when spring approached and he had gathered his forces at Apamea, he invited his friends to deliberate on how they ought to conduct the invasion of Coele-Syria.

Many things were said on this question, about the terrain, the necessary preparations, and the cooperation to be expected from the naval force; but Apollophanes, whom I mentioned before, a native of Seleucia, cut short all the proposals just described.

He said it was foolish to desire Coele-Syria and march against it while allowing Seleucia to remain in Ptolemy's hands, when that city was the founding center and, so to speak, the hearth of their own dominion.

Quite apart from the disgrace involved in seeing it garrisoned by the kings of Egypt, it also offered, in practical terms, the greatest and finest bases for action.

So long as it was held by the enemy, it was the greatest hindrance to all their plans.

For wherever they might decide to advance, they would need to exercise no less care and guarding over their own territory, because of the danger that enemy operations launched from that city posed.

But if they took it, he said, they would not only secure their own country firmly, but would also gain powerful support for their other undertakings and designs, both by land and by sea, because of the site's strategic advantages.

Everyone was persuaded by what he said, and it was decided to make the capture of this city their first step.

For Seleucia was still at that time held by garrisons of the Egyptian kings, dating from the time of Ptolemy called Euergetes,

when, because of what had happened to Berenice and in anger on her behalf, he campaigned in Syria and gained possession of this city.

Chapter 59 Description of Seleucia

Once this had been decided, Antiochus ordered Diognetus the admiral to sail against Seleucia, while he himself set out from Apamea with the army and, after coming to within about five stades of the city, encamped near the hippodrome.

He also sent Theodotus Hemiolius with the proper force toward Coele-Syria, to seize the passes and at the same time secure the way for his own operations.

The position of Seleucia and the peculiar nature of the surrounding country are as follows.

The city lies on the sea between Cilicia and Phoenicia, and above it towers a very great mountain called Coryphaeus.

Its western side is washed by the stretch of sea that lies between Cyprus and Phoenicia, while its eastern parts rise above the territory of Antioch and Seleucia.

On its southern slopes lies Seleucia, separated by a deep and hard-to-cross ravine, descending toward the sea and enclosed for the most part by cliffs and sheer rocks.

On the side sloping toward the sea, on the level ground below, lie the trading quarter and the suburb, strongly fortified.

Likewise the whole body of the city is secured by expensive walls and adorned in splendid fashion with temples and impressive buildings.

There is only one approach on the sea side, an artificial stair-like ascent broken up by frequent turns and awkward steps.

Not far from the city the river called the Orontes empties into the sea. It takes its source in the region of Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon and, after traversing the plain called Amyce, reaches Antioch.

Flowing through that city and carrying off all its human refuse by the force of its current, it finally discharges into the sea just mentioned not far from Seleucia.

Chapter 60 Capture of Seleucia

Antiochus first sent messages to the officials of the city, offering money and many inducements if they would hand over Seleucia without danger.

When he could not persuade the men in chief authority, he corrupted some of the subordinate commanders; trusting in them, he prepared his forces so that the assault from the sea side would be made by the fleet, and that from the landward side by the troops from the camp.

So he divided the army into three parts, encouraged them with words suited to the moment, and publicly proclaimed large rewards and crowns for bravery, both for common soldiers and for officers.

He assigned to Zeuxis and his men the positions by the gate leading toward Antioch; to Hermogenes the sector near the Dioscurium; and to Ardys and Diognetus he entrusted the assaults on the dockyards and the suburb.

For he had made such agreements with certain men inside that, if he took the suburb by force, the city itself would then be handed over to him.

When the signal was given, all of them together and from every side pressed the attack with energy and violence; but the men with Ardys and Diognetus attacked with the greatest daring.

For at the other points the ground did not really admit an assault by scaling ladders at all, unless men somehow clung and scrambled upward on all fours; but the dockyards and the suburb did allow ladders to be brought up, planted, and leaned securely against them.

So, while the men from the fleet fixed their ladders against the dockyards and Ardys' men against the suburb and pressed the attack hard, and while those inside the city could not bring help to these places because danger surrounded them everywhere at once, the suburb quickly fell into the hands of Ardys and his men.

As soon as it was taken, the corrupted subordinate officers ran to Leontius, the chief commander, and urged him to send envoys and come to terms with Antiochus before the city was stormed outright.

Leontius, unaware that the commanders had been corrupted but alarmed by their panic, sent men to offer guarantees and arrange for the safety of everyone in the city.

Chapter 61 Theodotus Proposes to Help Antiochus

The king accepted the proposal and agreed to grant safety to all the free inhabitants, who numbered about six thousand.

When he had taken over the city, he not only spared the free population but also brought back those of the Seleucians who had been exiled, restoring to them both their citizenship and their property; and he secured the harbor and the citadel with garrisons.

While he was still occupied with these matters,

a letter arrived from Theodotus, in which he urgently summoned the king and offered to put the affairs of Coele-Syria into his hands. This threw Antiochus into great perplexity and uncertainty as to what he should do and how he ought to handle the news brought to him.

This Theodotus was an Aetolian by birth who, as I have related above, had rendered great services to the kingdom of Ptolemy. Yet for these he was not only judged unworthy of any gratitude, but had even been put in danger of his life, around the very time when Antiochus was conducting his campaign against Molon.

So then, having come to despise the king and lost all trust in those of the court, he seized Ptolemais himself and, through Panaetolus, took Tyre, and urgently called upon Antiochus.

The king set aside his designs against Achaeus and treated everything else as of secondary importance, and broke camp with his army, marching by the same route as before.

After passing through the valley called Marsyas, he encamped near the narrows at Gerrha, by the lake that lies between the mountains.

Learning that Nicolaus, Ptolemy's general, was encamped before Ptolemais besieging Theodotus, he left his heavy-armed troops behind, ordering their commanders to besiege Brochi—the place situated on the lake and commanding the pass—while he himself took the light-armed troops and advanced, intending to raise the siege.

But Nicolaus, having already learned beforehand of the king's approach, withdrew himself, and sent out Lagoras the Cretan and Dorymenes the Aetolian to seize in advance the narrows near Berytus.

The king attacked these men in his first assault and

Chapter 62 Invasion of Coele-Syria

routed them, and encamped at the narrows. There he waited to receive the rest of his army as well, and after exhorting them in words fitting to the undertakings before him, he then advanced with his whole army, confident and elated by the hopes that were now taking shape.

When Theodotus and Panaetolus came out to meet him, together with their friends, he received them kindly and took over Tyre and Ptolemais and the supplies in those cities, among which were also forty ships.

Of these, twenty were decked vessels of superior construction, none smaller than a quadrireme, while the rest were triremes, biremes, and cutters. These he handed over to Diognetus the admiral.

When word reached him that Ptolemy had marched out to Memphis, that all his forces had been gathered at Pelusium, and that they were opening the sluices of the canals and stopping up the supplies of drinking water,

he gave up his plan of attacking Pelusium, and instead moved against the cities, trying to bring them over to his side, some by force and others by persuasion.

Of the cities, the weaker ones, terrified at his approach, went over to him, while those that trusted in their resources and the strength of their positions held out; these he was compelled to besiege by encampment, wearing away the time.

As for Ptolemy and his people, although they had been so openly betrayed, they had not even the intention of lending immediate aid to their own affairs—as duty required—because of their incapacity:

for to such a degree had everything connected with the affairs of war been neglected by them.

Chapter 63 Preparations In Egypt

Thereafter Agathocles and Sosibius, who at that time stood at the head of the kingdom, took counsel together and did what was possible from the means available to meet the present situation.

They decided to occupy themselves with the preparation for war, while in the meantime sending embassies to hold Antiochus in check, working in concert—as it appeared—with the opinion he already held about Ptolemy.

This opinion was that Ptolemy would not dare to make war, but would through negotiation and through his friends seek to instruct and persuade Antiochus to withdraw from the regions of Coele-Syria.

Once this had been decided, Agathocles and Sosibius, who had been appointed to this task, diligently sent out their embassies to Antiochus.

At the same time they sent messages to the Rhodians, the Byzantines, and the Cyzicenes, and along with these to the Aetolians, drawing in embassies to work toward a settlement.

These embassies, on their arrival, gave the ministers great opportunities, for by going back and forth between the two kings they secured a respite and time for the preparations for war.

So they dealt with these embassies continually, holding court at Memphis, and likewise they received those that came from Antiochus, conducting the meetings in a friendly manner.

They also recalled and gathered into Alexandria the mercenaries who were stationed in the cities outside Egypt and paid by them.

They sent out recruiting officers as well, and made provision of supplies for the troops they already had and for those who were coming in.

In the same way they attended to the rest of the preparations, taking turns and traveling continually to Alexandria, so that nothing should be lacking in the resources needed for the undertakings before them.

The manufacture of arms and the selection and division of the men they entrusted to Echecrates the Thessalian and Phoxidas of Melitaea,

and along with these to Eurylochus the Magnesian and Socrates the Boeotian; with them too was Cnopias of Allaria.

It was a most fortunate stroke that they secured these men, who, having served on campaign with Demetrius and Antigonus, had some understanding of true warfare and of military service in the field generally.

These men took the multitude in hand and trained it as well as could be done and in soldierly fashion.

Chapter 64 Training of Soldiers

First of all, dividing the men by nationality and by age, they distributed to each group the arms suited to them, paying no regard to what they had borne before.

After this they organized them to suit the present need, breaking up the old units and the muster-rolls based on the former pay-scales.

Next they drilled them, making each man familiar not only with the words of command but also with the movements proper to his particular equipment.

They also held assemblies under arms and gave exhortations, in which the most useful were Andromachus of Aspendus and Polycrates of Argos,

who had recently crossed over from Greece and were still thoroughly versed in the Greek martial spirit and in the particular ideas of the various peoples, and who were besides men of distinction in their native lands and in their own lives—

Polycrates all the more so, both because of the antiquity of his house and because of the fame his father Mnasiades had won as an athlete.

These men, exhorting the troops both privately and in public, instilled in them an eagerness and zeal for the coming struggle

Chapter 65 Reform of the Egyptian Army

Each of the officers named above also held a command suited to his own particular expertise.

Eurylochus of Magnesia commanded roughly three thousand men of the corps known among the kings as the Agema, or Guard, while Socrates the Boeotian had two thousand peltasts under him.

Phoxidas the Achaean, Ptolemy the son of Thraseas, and with them Andromachus of Aspendus jointly drilled the phalanx and the Greek mercenaries on the same ground.

Andromachus and Ptolemy commanded the phalanx and Phoxidas the mercenaries; the phalanx numbered about twenty-five thousand and the mercenaries about eight thousand.

As for the cavalry, Polycrates was preparing the household horse, some seven hundred strong, together with those drawn from Libya and the native-born troops as well; he himself commanded all of these, who numbered about three thousand.

The cavalry from Greece, however, and the entire body of mercenary horse — about two thousand men — were trained with exceptional skill by Echecrates the Thessalian, who rendered the greatest service in the battle itself.

No one took more pains over the men placed under his command than Cnopias of Allaria, who had Cretans numbering three thousand in all, and among these a thousand Neo-Cretans, over whom he had set Philo of Cnossus.

They also armed three thousand Libyans in the Macedonian fashion, who were under Ammonius of Barce.

The body of Egyptians amounted to about twenty thousand phalangites and was subordinate to Sosibius.

A body of Thracians and Gauls was also assembled: about four thousand from the settlers and their descendants, while those recently brought in numbered about two thousand. These were commanded by Dionysius the Thracian.

Such, then, in its numbers and in the variety of its components, was the force being prepared for Ptolemy, and

Chapter 66 Antiochus Puts his Troops in Winter Quarters

such was its character. Antiochus, meanwhile, having undertaken the siege of the city called Dura, was unable to make any progress, both because of the strength of the place and because of the relief brought up by Nicolaus and his men.

As winter was now setting in, he agreed to the proposals of Ptolemy's envoys: to make a four-month truce and to come to terms on every point in a friendly spirit regarding the whole dispute.

In doing this he was very far indeed from sincere; his real aim was not to be kept away from his own territory for any long time, but to quarter his forces for the winter at Seleucia, because Achaeus was plainly plotting against his interests and was, by common knowledge, working together with Ptolemy.

Once these terms had been agreed, Antiochus sent off the envoys, instructing them to inform him as quickly as possible of Ptolemy's decision and to join him at Seleucia.

Then, leaving suitable garrisons in the various places and entrusting Theodotus with overall command of them, he returned home; and on reaching Seleucia he dispersed his forces into winter quarters.

From then on he neglected to keep the troops in training, being convinced that affairs would call for no further fighting, since he was already master of certain parts of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia and expected to take over the rest by their owners' consent and through negotiation,

as Ptolemy's people would not dare in any way to descend to a decisive engagement over the whole issue.

The envoys too came to hold this same view, because Sosibius, presiding over their meetings at Memphis, dealt with them in a friendly manner,

while he never allowed those going back and forth to Antiochus to become eyewitnesses of the preparations being made at Alexandria.

Chapter 67 Claims of Antiochus and Ptolemy

Even so, when the envoys arrived this time, Sosibius and his men were ready for anything,

while Antiochus was making the greatest effort to gain a complete advantage over the Alexandrians, both in arms and in the justice of his case, throughout the negotiations.

And so, when the envoys reached Seleucia and, in accordance with the instructions given by Sosibius, entered into detailed discussions about a settlement,

the king, in the pleadings on the question of the present occupation of the territory around Coele-Syria, did not regard the recent misfortune and the manifest wrong as anything serious;

indeed, for the most part he reckoned the action as no wrong at all, on the ground that he had simply laid claim to what already belonged to him by right.

He said that the original occupation of these regions by Antigonus the One-Eyed and the dominion exercised over them by Seleucus constituted the most valid and most just titles of possession, by virtue of which Coele-Syria belonged of right to themselves and not to Ptolemy;

for Ptolemy had fought the war against Antigonus not on his own behalf, but in order to help establish Seleucus's rule over these regions.

Above all he pressed the common agreement of all the kings: the one made at the time when, having defeated Antigonus, Cassander, Lysimachus, and Seleucus all deliberated together in accordance with their joint policy and decided that the whole of Syria should belong to Seleucus.

Ptolemy's representatives tried to establish the opposite. They magnified the present wrong and made much of what had happened, treating the treachery of Theodotus and the invasion of Antiochus as a breach of the treaty;

and they also brought forward the possessions held in the reign of Ptolemy son of Lagus, asserting that Ptolemy had joined Seleucus in the war on this condition: that the rule over the whole of Asia should be conferred on Seleucus, while he himself would acquire Coele-Syria and Phoenicia.

These arguments, then, and others like them, were repeatedly made by both sides in the course of the embassies and conferences, but nothing whatever was accomplished, since the pleading of the case was conducted through friends common to both parties, and there was no one standing between them with the power to restrain and check the impulse of whichever side seemed to be in the wrong.

What caused the greatest difficulty for both was the matter of Achaeus. For Ptolemy was eager to include him in the agreement,

whereas Antiochus would not tolerate so much as a word about this, considering it intolerable that Ptolemy should even dare to shelter rebels and to make any mention of such a thing.

Chapter 68 Antiochus Attempts to Complete his Conquest

Therefore, since both sides had had their fill of negotiating, no conclusion had been reached about the terms, and the spring season was now at hand, Antiochus began assembling his forces, intending to invade both by land and by sea and to subdue the remaining parts of Coele-Syria still left to him.

Ptolemy's people, having more fully entrusted the conduct of affairs to Nicolaus, supplied lavish provisions to the region around Gaza and sent out land and naval forces.

With these reinforcements at hand, Nicolaus entered upon the war with confidence, since Perigenes the admiral readily cooperated with him in everything that was ordered.

Ptolemy's people had dispatched this man in command of the naval forces, with thirty fully decked warships and more than four hundred transport vessels.

Nicolaus was an Aetolian by birth, and in experience and daring in matters of war he was second to none of those serving under Ptolemy.

Having seized in advance, with one part of his force, the narrows at Platanus, and with the rest of his army, which he commanded in person, the area around the city of Porphyrion, he guarded the king's line of approach there, with the naval force riding at anchor alongside him.

Antiochus, advancing to Marathus, received a deputation of Aradians seeking an alliance; he not only accepted the alliance but also put an end to the existing quarrel among them, reconciling the Aradians on the island with those dwelling on the mainland.

After this he made his invasion by way of the place called Theoprosopon ("the Face of God") and came to Berytus, having taken Botrys on the way and burned Trieres and Calamus.

From there he sent Nicarchus and Theodotus ahead, ordering them to seize beforehand the difficult passes around the river called the Lycus; he himself took up his force, advanced, and encamped near the river Damuras, with Diognetus the admiral sailing along the coast beside him.

Taking up again from there Theodotus and Nicarchus with the light-armed troops of the army, he set out to reconnoitre the difficult ground already held by Nicolaus's men.

After thoroughly surveying the peculiarities of the terrain, he withdrew for that day to his camp; but on the following day, leaving his heavy arms there and Nicarchus in charge of them, he advanced with the rest of his force

Chapter 69 Antiochus Forces the Pass of Porphyrion

At this point the lower slopes of Mount Lebanon press the coastline into a small and narrow strip, and this strip is itself cut across by a rugged ridge that is hard to traverse, leaving only a cramped and difficult passage right along the sea's edge.

Here Nicolaus had taken up his position. Having seized some of the points beforehand with the sheer number of his men and secured others with artificial fortifications, he was confident that he could easily bar Antiochus from getting through.

The king, however, divided his army into three parts. One he handed over to Theodotus, ordering him to close with the enemy and force his way along the very foot of Lebanon;

the second he gave to Menedemus, charging him at length to make his attempt against the middle of the ridge;

and the third he assigned to the seaward side, placing Diocles, the military governor of Parapotamia, in command of it.

He himself, with his guard, held the central position, wishing to oversee the whole action and bring help wherever it was needed.

At the same time the squadrons of Diognetus and Perigenes, fully equipped, drew up for a sea-battle, keeping as close to the shore as they could and trying to make the engagement on land and the engagement at sea look like a single unbroken front.

When everyone launched their assault at one signal and a single word of command, the sea-fight was an evenly matched struggle, since the two fleets were nearly equal in both numbers and equipment;

but on land Nicolaus's men at first had the upper hand, exploiting the strength of their positions. Soon, however, Theodotus's troops forced back those stationed on the mountain slopes, and then attacked from the higher ground, so that Nicolaus's men all broke and fled headlong.

In the rout about two thousand of them fell, and no fewer than that were taken alive; the rest all withdrew toward Sidon.

Perigenes, though he had the brighter prospects in the sea-fight, took in the defeat of the land forces and, dismayed by it, made his withdrawal safely back to the same place.

Chapter 70 Antiochus Takes More Towns

Antiochus then took up his army, advanced, and pitched camp before Sidon.

He gave up any attempt on the city, however, because of the abundant supplies already stored there and the great number of its inhabitants and of the refugees who had gathered within it.

So he took his army and marched on toward Philoteria, instructing Diognetus the admiral to sail back again with his ships to Tyre.

Philoteria lies right on the shore of the lake into which the river called the Jordan flows, and out of which it issues again into the plains around the city known as Scythopolis.

Having gained control of both of these cities by negotiated surrender, he felt confident about his coming undertakings, since the territory subject to these cities could easily supply his whole army and furnish in abundance whatever the campaign urgently required.

After securing them with garrisons, he crossed the mountain country and arrived at Atabyrium, which sits on a hill shaped like a woman's breast and has an ascent of more than fifteen stades.

On this occasion he took the city by means of an ambush and a stratagem.

He drew the men of the town out into a skirmish and lured their front-line fighters a long way down; then, by suddenly reversing his feigned flight and bringing up the men he had set in ambush, he engaged them and killed many,

and finally, pursuing them and throwing them into a panic, he took this city too in the rush of his assault.

About this same time Ceraeas, one of the officers serving under Ptolemy, deserted to Antiochus. By receiving him with great honor, Antiochus stirred the hopes of many other commanders on the enemy's side;

indeed, not long afterward Hippolochus the Thessalian came over to him with four hundred cavalry from Ptolemy's forces.

Having secured Atabyrium as well, he broke camp and, advancing, took over Pella and

Chapter 71 Continued Success of Antiochus

Camus and Gephrus. With his fortunes running so smoothly, the people inhabiting the neighboring part of Arabia urged one another on and all with one accord went over to him.

Strengthened by the hopes and the supplies they offered, he pushed on, and gaining control … into Galatis … he reached … Abila and of those who had come to its relief, who were led by Nicias, a close associate and kinsman of Menneas.

Gadara alone was now left, a town reckoned the strongest in those parts; but by encamping against it and setting up siege-works he quickly frightened it into surrender and took the city.

After this, learning that a large force of the enemy had gathered at Rabbatamana in Arabia and were plundering and overrunning the country of the Arabs who had joined him, he set everything else aside and hurried off, pitching camp by the hills on which the city happens to stand.

Going around the site and observing that the hill could be approached at only two points, he advanced against these and set up the construction of his siege-engines at them.

Assigning the supervision of the works in one place to Nicarchus and in the other to Theodotus, he himself from then on made himself available to both, overseeing and inspecting the eager efforts of each.

So great was the zeal of Theodotus's and Nicarchus's men, and so constant their rivalry over which of them would be first to bring down the wall facing his own works, that quickly and beyond expectation both sections of wall fell.

Once this had happened, they kept up assaults by night and by day and brought every kind of force to bear, letting no opportunity slip.

Yet for all their continual attempts on the city, they made no headway with their plan, because of the great number of men who had crowded together into the city—until one of the prisoners pointed out the underground passage by which the besieged used to go down to fetch water. They broke into it and blocked it up with timber, stones, and everything of that kind.

Then, giving in for lack of water, the people in the city surrendered.

Once this had happened and he had taken possession of Rabbatamana, Antiochus left Nicarchus there with a suitable garrison. He sent Hippolochus and Ceraeas, the two deserters, with five thousand infantry to the region of Samaria, with orders to take up a forward position and provide security for all those placed under his command;

and he himself broke camp with his army and marched toward Ptolemais, having decided to make his winter quarters there.

Chapter 72 Achaeus Sends Aid to Pednelissus

During this same summer the people of Pednelissus, besieged and hard pressed by the Selgians, sent to Achaeus to ask for help.

When he readily agreed, they went on enduring the siege with good courage, buoyed by their hopes of relief;

and Achaeus, appointing Garsyeris with six thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry, dispatched him in haste to relieve the Pednelissians.

The Selgians, perceiving that the relief force was at hand, seized in advance, with the greater part of their army, the narrow pass around the place called the Ladder; they held the entrance toward Saperda and tore up all the byways and approaches.

Garsyeris pushed into Milyas and encamped near the city called Cretopolis, but when he realized that the positions had been occupied beforehand and that any further advance was impossible, he devised the following ruse.

He broke camp and led his march back the way he had come, as though he had abandoned the relief because the positions were held against him. The Selgians readily believed it,

and supposing that Garsyeris had given up coming to the rescue, some withdrew to their camp and others to the city, since the gathering of the grain harvest was now pressing.

But Garsyeris, wheeling about and marching at speed, came up to the passes. Finding them deserted, he secured them with garrisons, putting Phayllus in overall command,

while he himself with his army went down to Perga, and from there conducted negotiations both with the other peoples inhabiting Pisidia and with Pamphylia,

pointing out the menace posed by the Selgians and urging all of them to join in alliance with Achaeus and in bringing aid to the [Pednelissians].

Chapter 73 Defeat of the Selgians

against the Pednelissians. The Selgians, meanwhile, sent out a general with an army at this time, hoping that by exploiting their familiarity with the terrain they could intimidate Phaÿllus and drive him out of his strongholds.

But they failed to achieve their aim; instead they lost many of their soldiers in the assaults, and so they gave up this hope—yet they pressed on with the siege and the siegeworks no less than before, indeed with greater determination.

To Garsyeris's side the Etenneis—the people of Pisidia who inhabit the highlands above Side—sent eight thousand hoplites, and the Aspendians sent half that number.

The people of Side, however, took no part in the relief effort, partly with an eye to gaining favor with Antiochus, but more out of their hatred of the Aspendians.

Garsyeris took up both the forces of his allies and his own and came to Pednelissus, convinced that he would lift the siege at the first assault. But when the Selgians showed no alarm, he took up a suitable distance and made camp.

As the Pednelissians were being hard pressed by want of supplies, Garsyeris, eager to do whatever he could, made ready two thousand men, gave each of them a medimnus of wheat, and sent them into Pednelissus by night.

But the Selgians, learning what was happening and coming out to intercept them, succeeded in cutting down most of the men carrying the supplies and in seizing all the grain.

Elated by this, they undertook to besiege not only the city but Garsyeris's force as well; for the Selgians always have a certain boldness and recklessness in the face of an enemy.

For these reasons, on this occasion too, they left only the necessary guard for their own stockade, and with the rest surrounded the enemy's camp at several points and boldly attacked it all at once.

With danger pressing unexpectedly from every side, and the palisade already being torn apart in some places, Garsyeris, seeing what was happening and holding out little hope for the whole situation, sent his cavalry out through a spot that was left unguarded.

The Selgians, supposing that these men were dismayed and were withdrawing in fear of what was to come, paid them no attention but simply disregarded them.

But the horsemen rode around, got to the rear of the enemy, fell upon them, and laid into them with vigor.

When this happened, Garsyeris's infantry took heart, and although they had already been put to flight, they turned about once more and beat back those who were rushing in on them.

As a result the Selgians, now surrounded on all sides, finally broke into flight.

At the same moment the Pednelissians attacked the troops left behind at the Selgian stockade and drove them out.

Since the flight extended over a great distance, no fewer than ten thousand fell. Of the survivors, all the allies fled to their own homes, while the Selgians escaped through the mountains to their native land.

Chapter 74 Panic at Selge

Garsyeris broke camp and followed close on the heels of the fleeing men, eager to get through the difficult passes and draw near to the city before the fugitives could halt and form any plan to deal with his arrival.

And so he came with his army up to the city.

The Selgians, despairing now of their allies because of the disaster they had all suffered together, and shaken in spirit by the misfortune that had occurred, were utterly terrified both for themselves and for their country.

For this reason they came together in assembly and resolved to send as their envoy one of their citizens, Logbasis, who had long been an intimate friend and guest-friend of the Antiochus who lost his life in Thrace;

and since Laodice, who later became the wife of Achaeus, had been entrusted to his keeping, he had reared her as his own daughter and had shown the girl extraordinary affection.

For these reasons the Selgians, thinking they had in him a man supremely suited to serve as envoy given the circumstances, sent him out.

But he, having obtained a private interview with Garsyeris, was so far from helping his country as he ought, in line with his commission, that on the contrary he urged Garsyeris to send in all haste for Achaeus, undertaking to deliver the city into their hands.

Garsyeris, then, eagerly seizing on this prospect, sent men to Achaeus to bring him and to inform him of the present state of affairs;

and toward the Selgians he made a truce and dragged out the time of the negotiations, continually raising disputes and pretexts over matters of detail, so as to wait for Achaeus to arrive and to give Logbasis room to carry on his dealings.

Chapter 75 Achaeus At Selge

and to prepare for the attempt. During this period, as the two sides came together for parley more and more often, the men from the camp grew accustomed to slipping into the city to buy grain.

This is the very thing that has already, for many people and on many occasions, been a cause of ruin. And it seems to me that of all animals man is the most easily deceived, though he is reputed to be the most cunning.

For how many camps and garrisons, how many and how great cities, have been betrayed in just this way?

And although such things have happened to so many people so often and so plainly, somehow we are always, every one of us, fresh and new to deceptions of this kind.

The cause of this is that we do not keep ready at hand the disasters of those who have stumbled before us in each kind of case; rather, we lay up—with much toil and expense—abundance of grain and money, and provision of walls and weapons, against the unexpected turns of events,

while the one thing that is easiest of all to acquire and that renders the greatest service in perilous moments, this we all neglect—and that too when we could, amid dignified relaxation and pleasant pastime, gain such experience from history and inquiry.

In any case, Achaeus arrived in good time, and the Selgians, on meeting with him, conceived great hopes of obtaining some thoroughgoing show of goodwill.

But Logbasis, during this same period, had little by little gathered into his own house some of the soldiers slipping in from the camp, and he advised his fellow citizens not to let the opportunity pass,

but to act with their eyes on the goodwill being displayed by Achaeus, and to put the finishing touch to the agreement after deliberating about the situation with the whole people present.

The assembly was quickly convened, and they began to deliberate, having summoned in as well all the men from the guard posts, so as to bring matters to completion

Chapter 76 Death of Logbasis

on the business before them. But Logbasis, having given the enemy the signal for the moment, was making ready the men gathered in his house, and was himself, together with his sons, arming and equipping himself for the fight.

On the enemy's side, Achaeus, with half the force, advanced toward the city itself, while Garsyeris took the remainder and led them on toward the place called the Cesbedium. This is a sanctuary of Zeus, and it lies conveniently above the city, for it takes the form of a citadel.

But when a goatherd happened to observe what was happening and reported it to the assembly, some rushed in haste to the Cesbedium, others to the guard posts, while the mass of the people, in their anger, made for the house of Logbasis.

When the plot became plain, some of them climbed up onto the roof, others forced their way through the courtyard doors, and they murdered Logbasis and his sons, and at the same time all the others there as well.

After this they proclaimed freedom to the slaves, divided themselves into groups, and rushed to defend the strategic points.

Garsyeris, then, seeing that the Cesbedium was already occupied ahead of him, gave up his attempt;

and as Achaeus was forcing his way right up to the gates, the Selgians sallied out, struck down seven hundred of the Mysians, and beat back the rest from their assault.

After this action Achaeus and Garsyeris withdrew to their own camp,

while the Selgians, fearing both the factional strife among themselves and the enemy's encampment against them, sent out their elders with suppliant branches, made a truce, and brought the war to an end on these terms:

that they pay four hundred talents at once, along with the Pednelissian prisoners, and after some time add a further three hundred.

So the Selgians, having endangered their country through the impiety of Logbasis, by their own daring both preserved their country and did not disgrace their freedom, nor the standing they possessed as kinsmen of the Lacedaemonians.

Chapter 77 Expedition of Attalus

[their] kinship with the Lacedaemonians. Achaeus, having brought Milyas and the greater part of Pamphylia under his control, broke camp and, on arriving at Sardis, waged continuous war against Attalus, kept up his threats against Prusias, and made himself an object of fear and oppression to all who dwelt on this side of the Taurus.

Now at the very time when Achaeus was conducting his campaign against the Selgians, Attalus, with the Aegosagae Gauls in his force, marched through the cities of Aeolis and those bordering on them—all the cities that had earlier gone over to Achaeus out of fear.

Of these, the greater number joined him willingly and even with goodwill, while a few had to be compelled by force.

The cities that went over to him at that time were, first, Cyme, Smyrna, and Phocaea; after these the people of Aegae and Temnus came over, struck with alarm at his advance.

Ambassadors also arrived from the Teians and Colophonians, putting themselves and their cities into his hands.

He received these too on the same terms as before and took hostages; but he dealt especially kindly with the envoys from Smyrna, because they above all had kept faith with him.

Continuing his advance without a break, he crossed the river Lycus and pushed on toward the settlements of the Mysians, and from there he came to Carseae.

Having overawed its people, and likewise those guarding the Twin Walls, he took over these positions as well, Themistocles handing them over—the man who happened to have been left by Achaeus as commander of this district.

Setting out from there and ravaging the plain of Apia, he crossed the mountain called Pelecas and encamped near the river Megistus.

Chapter 78 Attalus Conciliates the Gauls

While he was here, an eclipse of the moon occurred. The Gauls, who had long been chafing at the hardships of the marches—since they were conducting the campaign together with their wives and children, who followed them in the wagons—

now took the event as an omen and declared they would advance no farther.

King Attalus, who got no real service of any consequence out of them and saw that they straggled apart during the marches, encamped on their own, and in general refused obedience and were full of arrogance, fell into no ordinary perplexity.

For on the one hand he was anxious that they might defect to Achaeus and join in attacking his affairs, and on the other he was wary of the ill repute that would dog him if he surrounded his soldiers and destroyed all the men who were thought to have made the crossing into Asia in reliance on his own pledge.

Therefore, seizing on the aforementioned pretext, he promised that for the present he would restore them to the crossing and would give them a well-suited place for settlement, and that afterward he would lend them his aid in whatever they might ask of him that lay within his power and was honorable.

So Attalus,

having restored the Aegosagae to the Hellespont and dealt kindly with the people of Lampsacus, Alexandria, and Ilium because they had kept faith with him, returned [with his army to Pergamum].

Chapter 79 Forces Available to Antiochus and Ptolemy

[He withdrew] with his army to Pergamum. Antiochus and Ptolemy, as the spring season was setting in and their preparations were ready, set about deciding the conflict by battle.

Ptolemy's forces, then, set out from Alexandria with some seventy thousand infantry, five thousand cavalry, and seventy-three elephants.

Antiochus, learning of their advance, gathered his own forces together. These were: Daae, Carmanians, and Cilicians, equipped in light-armed fashion, about five thousand in number; over these Byttacus the Macedonian held both charge and command.

Under Theodotus the Aetolian, the man who had carried out the betrayal, were ten thousand men picked from the whole kingdom and armed in the Macedonian manner; most of these were Silver Shields.

The strength of the phalanx came to some twenty thousand, led by Nicarchus and Theodotus called Hemiolius.

In addition to these there were Agrianians and Persian archers and slingers, two thousand. With them were a thousand Thracians, led by Menedemus of Alabanda.

There were also Medes, Cissians, Cadusians, and Carmanians, in all about five thousand, who were assigned to obey Aspasianus the Mede.

The Arabs and some of their neighbors numbered about ten thousand, and were under the command of Zabdibelus.

The mercenaries from Greece were led by Hippolochus the Thessalian, and numbered about five thousand.

He had fifteen hundred Cretans with Eurylochus, and a thousand Neo-Cretans under the command of Zelys of Gortyna;

along with them were five hundred Lydian javelin-men and a thousand Cardaces under Lysimachus the Gaul.

The whole body of cavalry came to some six thousand; of these, Antipater, the king's nephew, held command of four thousand, while Themison was set over the rest.

The total strength of Antiochus's army was sixty-two thousand infantry, together with six thousand cavalry, and a hundred and two beasts.

Chapter 80 Antiochus Advances To Raphia

Ptolemy, making his march toward Pelusium, at first halted at that city.

Then, having taken up the stragglers who trailed behind and issued the army its grain rations, he set it in motion and advanced, marching along Mount Casius and the so-called Barathra through the waterless region.

Completing the journey to his objective on the fifth day, he encamped fifty stades from Raphia, which, after Rhinocolura, is the first of the cities of Coele-Syria as one comes from Egypt.

At the same time Antiochus arrived with his army; having reached Gaza and taken on additional forces there, he again advanced at a steady pace. Passing the aforesaid city, he encamped by night, about ten stades from the enemy.

At first, then, set at this distance, they remained encamped opposite each other.

But after some days Antiochus, wishing both to take up more favorable ground and to instill confidence in his forces, moved his camp up against Ptolemy's, so that the palisades were no more than five stades apart.

During this time there were frequent clashes over the watering-places and the foraging, and likewise skirmishes broke out between the camps, sometimes of cavalry, sometimes of infantry as well.

Chapter 81 Theodotus Attempts to Assassinate Ptolemy

At about this same time Theodotus undertook a bold and resourceful stroke—one thoroughly Aetolian in character, yet by no means lacking in courage.

Since from having formerly lived at the king's court he knew well what Ptolemy's tastes and daily habits were, he made his way, with two companions, into the enemy's camp just before dawn.

By his face he could not be recognized, because of the darkness; and by his dress and the rest of his equipment he attracted no notice, because among the enemy themselves the costume of the army was of every variety.

Having marked out the position of the king's tent during the preceding days—for the skirmishing took place right up close to it—he made boldly for it, and passed undetected through the whole front rank of attendants.

But when he came upon the tent in which the king was accustomed to conduct business and to dine, and had searched every part of it, he failed to find the king; for Ptolemy took his rest apart, outside the official tent used for audiences.

He did, however, wound two of the men sleeping there, and killed Andreas, the king's physician; then he withdrew safely to his own lines, meeting with only a brief alarm as he was already crossing back over the rampart.

So far as daring went, he had carried out his design; but in foresight he had failed, because he had not properly ascertained where Ptolemy was in the habit of taking his rest.

Chapter 82 Dispositions For the Battle of Raphia

The two kings, after lying encamped opposite each other for five days, both resolved to decide the issue by battle.

As soon as Ptolemy's forces began to move out of their camp, Antiochus at once led his own out to meet them. Both kings drew up their phalanxes and their picked troops, who were armed in the Macedonian fashion, directly facing each other.

Ptolemy's two wings were arranged in the following manner. Polycrates, with the cavalry under his command, held the left wing;

between him and the phalanx, and right beside the cavalry, stood the Cretans; next to these was the royal guard; and after them the peltasts under Socrates, adjoining the Libyans who were armed in the Macedonian fashion.

On the right wing was Echecrates the Thessalian, with the cavalry under his command; and beside him, on his left,

were stationed the Gauls and Thracians; next to these Phoxidas held the mercenaries from Greece, who linked up with the Egyptian phalangites.

Of the elephants, forty were posted on the left, where Ptolemy himself intended to take part in the fighting, while thirty-three had been drawn up in front of the right wing, facing the enemy's mercenary cavalry.

Antiochus, for his part, posted sixty of his elephants, under his foster-brother Philip, in front of his right wing, where he himself intended to engage against Ptolemy's troops.

Behind these he stationed the two thousand cavalry commanded by Antipater, and drew up another two thousand at an angle to them.

In line with the cavalry, at the front, he placed the Cretans; next to these he posted the mercenaries from Greece; and beside these, alongside the troops armed in the Macedonian fashion, he stationed the five thousand men under Byttacus the Macedonian.

On the left wing, at its very tip, he placed two thousand cavalry under the command of Themison; beside them the Cardaces and the Lydian javelin-men; next to these the light-armed troops under Menedemus, about three thousand in number;

after these the Cissians, Medes, and Carmanians; and beside them the Arabs together with the neighboring peoples, who linked up with the phalanx.

The remaining elephants he posted in front of his left wing, putting them under the command of Myiscus, one of the former royal pages.

Chapter 83 Each King Exhorts His Army

With their forces drawn up in this manner, both kings rode along the front of their own lines, accompanied by their officers and friends, exhorting the men.

Since each placed his highest hopes in his phalangites, both devoted the greatest effort and encouragement to these ranks in particular—

on Ptolemy's side with Andromachus, Sosibius, and the king's sister Arsinoe joining in the exhortation, and on Antiochus's side with Theodotus and Nicarchus doing the same, since in each army these were the men who held the command of the phalangites.

The substance of what each king urged was much the same. Neither of them could put before the men any distinguished or honored exploit of his own, since both had only recently come to power;

so instead, by recalling the glory of their ancestors and the deeds those ancestors had performed, they tried to instill spirit and confidence in their phalangites.

Above all, they set before them the hopes of advancement they might expect in time to come, and—addressing the leaders individually and all those about to fight collectively—they called upon and exhorted them to face the coming danger like men, with courage and nobility.

Speaking these words and others like them, partly in their own person and partly through interpreters, they rode along the lines.

Chapter 84 The Elephants in the Battle

When Ptolemy, accompanied by his sister, had ridden along and reached the left wing of his whole array, and Antiochus with the royal squadron had reached the right, they sounded the signal for battle and opened the fight first with the elephants.

Only a few of Ptolemy's elephants came to close quarters with those of the enemy. Mounted on these, the men in the towers put up a fine fight, thrusting and striking at one another at close range with their pikes; and finer still was the struggle of the beasts themselves, which fought with brute force, meeting head to head.

For the manner in which these animals fight is as follows. Locking together and interlacing their tusks, they shove with all their might, each straining to hold its ground, until one of them, prevailing in strength, forces aside the other's trunk;

and once it has thrown its opponent off balance and caught it sideways, it gores it with its tusks, just as bulls do with their horns.

But most of Ptolemy's elephants shrank from the fight, as is the way with Libyan elephants.

For they cannot endure the smell and the trumpeting of the Indian elephants, but—terrified, I suppose, by their size and strength—they flee from them at once while still some distance off; and that is exactly what happened on this occasion.

As these beasts were thrown into disorder and pushed back against their own ranks, Ptolemy's guard, pressed by the elephants, began to give way;

while Antiochus's men, wheeling around past the elephants and bearing down on them, charged into Polycrates and the cavalry drawn up under his command.

At the same time, on the inner side of the elephants, the Greek mercenaries stationed by the phalanx fell upon Ptolemy's peltasts and drove them out, the beasts having by now thrown their ranks too into confusion.

Thus Ptolemy's left wing was, in this way, worsted.

Chapter 85 Victory of Ptolemy

Under this pressure the whole wing gave way. Echecrates, who commanded the right wing, at first waited to see how the clash of the two wings already mentioned would turn out. But when he saw the dust being carried in the direction of his own troops, and that the elephants on his side would not even venture to approach the enemy's elephants at all,

he ordered Phoxidas, who had the mercenaries from Greece, to engage the troops drawn up directly opposite him,

while he himself, leading the cavalry and the men stationed behind the elephants out around the flank, got clear of the elephants' charge; and falling upon the enemy's cavalry—in some places riding past them, in others charging them on the flank—he quickly put them to flight.

Phoxidas and his men did much the same: charging the Arabs and the Medes, they forced them to turn and flee headlong.

So the right wing of Antiochus's army was victorious, while its left was being defeated in the manner already described.

The phalanxes, now stripped of both their wings, remained intact in the middle of the plain, their hopes for the outcome hanging in the balance.

At this moment Antiochus was caught up in pressing home his advantage on the right wing,

while Ptolemy, who had withdrawn behind the shelter of his phalanx, now came forward into the center and, showing himself to the armies, struck terror into the enemy and inspired great drive and eagerness in his own men.

So Andromachus and Sosibius and their men at once lowered their sarissas and advanced.

The picked troops of the Syrian army held out for only a short time, while the men under Nicarchus quickly broke and gave ground.

But Antiochus, young and inexperienced as he was, supposing that because he was winning in his own sector he was likewise victorious everywhere else, kept pressing on after the fleeing enemy.

At last one of the older men checked him and pointed out the dust being carried from the phalanx toward their own camp; only then, grasping what was happening, did he try to gallop back with the royal squadron to the place of battle.

But finding that all his own men had fled, he made his retreat to Raphia, convinced that he had won in his own part of the field, and reckoning that he had lost the battle as a whole through the baseness and cowardice of the rest.

Chapter 86 The Losses on Each Side

Ptolemy, having decided the whole issue by means of his phalanx, and having killed many of the enemy in the pursuit with the cavalry and mercenaries of his right wing, then withdrew and spent the night in his existing camp.

The next day, after taking up and burying his own dead and stripping the bodies of the enemy, he broke camp and advanced toward Raphia.

Antiochus, after his flight, wished at once to make camp outside the city and to rally those who had fled in their formations; but since most had made their retreat into the city, he too was forced to enter it.

Then, near daybreak, he led out the surviving portion of his army and pushed on to Gaza. Pitching camp there and sending envoys about recovering the dead, he buried the fallen under a truce.

Of Antiochus's men the dead numbered not much short of ten thousand infantry and more than three hundred cavalry, while over four thousand were taken alive.

Of his elephants, three died on the spot and two from their wounds. On Ptolemy's side about fifteen hundred infantry were killed and about seven hundred cavalry; sixteen of his elephants died, but most of them were recaptured.

Such, then, was the outcome of the battle fought at Raphia between the kings over Coele-Syria.

After recovering the dead, Antiochus withdrew with his army to his own territory, while Ptolemy took over Raphia and the other cities at the first assault, all the communities competing with one another to be the first to come over and shift their allegiance to him.

Now perhaps all people are inclined at such moments to adapt themselves somehow to the circumstances of the present; but the race of men inhabiting that region is especially well disposed and quick to seize on the favors offered by the occasion.

And at that time, since their goodwill toward the kings from Alexandria already ran ahead of events, it was natural that this should happen: for the populations of Coele-Syria have always somehow leaned more toward this house than any other.

And so they left no extreme of flattery untried, honoring Ptolemy with crowns, sacrifices, altars, and every device of that kind.

Chapter 87 A Year's Truce Between Antiochus and Ptolemy

Antiochus, on arriving at the city that bears his own name, at once sent Antipater his nephew and Theodotus Hemiolius as envoys to Ptolemy to treat for peace and a settlement, being anxious about an advance by the enemy:

for he distrusted his own people because of the defeat he had suffered, and he feared that Achaeus might seize the moment to join in the attack on him.

But Ptolemy reasoned out none of this. Delighted with the success he had won—on account of its unexpectedness—and, in a word, at having unexpectedly gained possession of Coele-Syria, he was not averse to peace; rather he was more inclined to it than he should have been, drawn that way by the indolence and dissoluteness habitual to his way of life.

So when Antipater and his colleague arrived, after a little blustering and reproaching Antiochus for what had been done, he agreed to a truce of one year.

He sent Sosibius along with the envoys to ratify the settlement,

and he himself, after spending three months in the regions of Syria and Phoenicia and putting the cities in order, then left Andromachus of Aspendus as governor over all the aforesaid territories and set out with his sister and his friends for Alexandria,

having brought the war to a conclusion in a way that, to those in his kingdom, seemed at odds with the way he conducted the rest of his life.

Antiochus, having secured the terms of the truce with Sosibius, proceeded—according to his original purpose—with his preparations against Achaeus.

Such, then, was the state of affairs in Asia.

Chapter 88 Earthquake At Rhodes

The Rhodians, around the period just mentioned, seized upon the opportunity afforded by the earthquake that had struck them a short time before, in which the great Colossus and most of the walls and dockyards happened to fall.

They handled what had happened so sensibly and practically that the disaster became for them a cause not of harm but rather of improvement.

So great, among men, is the difference that ignorance and idleness make as against care and good judgment, both in private lives and in public affairs: for the one, even successes bring harm, while for the other, even reverses become a means of recovery.

At any rate, the Rhodians then, in their management of the matter, made the disaster out to be great and terrible, while they themselves bore themselves with dignity and authority in their embassies—both in their formal audiences and in conversation case by case—and so brought the cities, and especially the kings, to such a point that they not only received extravagant gifts but actually left the givers owing them gratitude.

Hiero and Gelo, for instance, not only gave seventy-five talents of silver toward the supply of oil for those in the gymnasium—part at once, the rest within a very short time entirely—but also dedicated silver cauldrons with their stands and some water vessels,

and on top of this ten talents for sacrifices and another ten to help increase the citizen body, so that the whole gift might come to a hundred talents.

Moreover, they granted exemption from duties to those sailing to their ports, and gave fifty catapults three cubits long.

And finally, after giving so much, as though they still owed gratitude, they set up statues in the Rhodian Exchange showing the people of Rhodes being crowned by the people of Syracuse.

Chapter 89 Royal Gifts

…of the Syracusans. Ptolemy too promised them three hundred talents of silver and a million artabae of grain; ship timber for ten quinqueremes and ten triremes, amounting to forty thousand cubits, by measure, of squared pine planking;

a thousand talents of bronze coinage, three thousand talents of tow, three thousand bolts of sailcloth;

for the rebuilding of the Colossus, three thousand talents, a hundred master builders and three hundred and fifty laborers, and for these, each year, fourteen talents toward their wages;

and besides this, for the games and the sacrifices, twelve thousand artabae of grain, and moreover, for the provisioning of ten triremes, twenty thousand artabae.

Of all this he gave the greater part at once, and a third of the entire sum of silver.

In much the same spirit Antigonus promised ten thousand timbers, ranging from sixteen cubits down to eight in length, to serve as rafters; five thousand crossbeams seven cubits long; three thousand talents of iron; a thousand talents of pitch; a thousand metretae of the same pitch unboiled; and, in addition to these, a hundred talents of silver.

His wife Chryseis gave a hundred thousand measures of grain and three thousand talents of lead.

Seleucus, the father of Antiochus, granted, for his part, exemption from tolls to those of them who sailed into his kingdom, and separately ten fully fitted-out quinqueremes and two hundred thousand measures of grain;

and moreover tens of thousands of cubits of timber and thousands of talents of resin and hair.

Chapter 90 Generosity of Other Princes

Prusias and Mithridates acted in much the same way, and so too did the rulers who held power in Asia at that time—I mean Lysanias, Olympichus, and Limnaeus.

As for the cities that helped them to the best of their ability, no one could easily even count their number;

so that whenever one considers the time, and the starting point from which their city came to be settled, one cannot but greatly marvel at how, in so short a span, it had won so great an advance both in the private fortunes of its citizens and in the public affairs of the city;

yet whenever one looks instead at the favorable situation of the site, and the contributions from outside that brought its prosperity to fullness, one no longer marvels, but rather feels that the advance fell a little short of what might have been expected.

Let this, then, be said by me with a twofold purpose: first, for the sake of the Rhodians' management of public affairs—for they deserve both praise and emulation—and second, to show the small giving of the kings of our own day and the small receiving of the nations and cities,

so that the kings may not, by laying out four or five talents, suppose they are doing something great and expect to enjoy the same goodwill and honor from the Greeks that the kings of earlier times possessed,

and so that the cities, keeping before their eyes the magnitude of the gifts bestowed in former times, may not now, for small and trivial benefactions, unwittingly award the greatest and finest honors,

but may rather try to keep for each man what his desert deserves—the very thing in which the Greeks most excel the rest of mankind.

Chapter 91 Lycurgus Returns to Sparta

Just as the summer season was setting in, with Agetas serving as Strategus of the Aetolians and Aratus having taken over the strategia of the Achaeans—for it was at this point that we broke off into our account of the Social War—Lycurgus the Spartan returned once more from Aetolia.

For the ephors, having found false the slander on account of which he had fled, sent for Lycurgus and recalled him once again.

He, then, was assigned to act together with Pyrrhias the Aetolian—who happened at the time to be general among the Eleans—regarding the invasion of Messenia.

Aratus, for his part, had taken over the Achaeans' mercenary force in a ruined state, and the cities slackly disposed toward the contributions for this purpose, because the general before him, Eperatus, as I said above, had managed the common affairs badly and listlessly.

Nevertheless, after exhorting the Achaeans and obtaining a decree on these matters, he set energetically to work on the preparations for the war.

This is what the Achaeans resolved: to maintain eight thousand mercenary infantry and five hundred cavalry, and, of the Achaean picked troops, three thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry;

and of these, the Megalopolitans were to furnish bronze-shielded men—five hundred infantry and fifty cavalry—and the Argives an equal number.

It was also resolved that ships should put to sea: three around Acte and the Argolic gulf, and three off Patrae and Dyme and the sea in that quarter.

Chapter 92 Lycurgus Cannot Take Messenia

So Aratus was occupied with these affairs and was completing these preparations;

while Lycurgus and Pyrrhias, after an exchange of messages to ensure that they made their expedition on the same days, advanced into Messenia.

The general of the Achaeans, perceiving their design, came with the mercenaries and some of the picked troops to Megalopolis to support the Messenians.

Lycurgus, setting out, took Calamae, a stronghold of the Messenians, by treachery, and after this pressed forward, hastening to join the Aetolians.

But Pyrrhias, who had marched out of Elis entirely lightly equipped and was at once stopped at the pass into Messenia by the Cyparissians, turned back.

Therefore Lycurgus, being unable to join up with Pyrrhias' force and not being strong enough on his own, after making brief assaults on Andania, withdrew again to Sparta without having accomplished anything.

Aratus, now that the enemy's plan had collapsed, acting sensibly and taking thought for the future, arranged with Taurion to provide fifty cavalry and five hundred infantry, and with the Messenians that they should send out an equal number of cavalry and infantry,

intending to use these men to guard the territory of the Messenians, the Megalopolitans, the Tegeans, and also the Argives—

for these lands, bordering on Laconia, lie exposed, ahead of the rest of the Peloponnesians, to the war waged by the Lacedaemonians—

while with the Achaean picked troops and the mercenaries he would guard the parts of Achaea facing toward Elis and Aetolia.

Chapter 93 Condition of Megalopolis

Having settled these matters, Aratus also resolved the disputes among the Megalopolitans with one another in accordance with the decree of the Achaeans.

For it happened that these people, having recently been ruined by Cleomenes and—as the saying goes—shaken from their very foundations as a state, were in need of many things and short of everything.

In their spirit they held firm, but in their resources, both public and private, they were unable to meet any demand.

For this reason everything was full of quarreling, rivalry, and mutual anger; for this is exactly what tends to happen, both in public affairs and in private lives, whenever resources fall short of each person's ambitions.

First, then, they disputed over the walling of the city. One party argued that it ought to be contracted and made only as large as they could realistically manage to wall and could defend when a crisis arose; for in the recent disaster, they said, it was precisely the city's size and its emptiness that had brought about their ruin.

In addition to this, they thought the landowners ought to contribute a third of their land toward settling the new inhabitants who were to be enrolled.

The other party would neither agree to make the city smaller nor consent to contribute a third of their holdings.

But above all they quarreled with one another over the laws drafted for them by Prytanis, whom Antigonus had given them as their lawgiver, and who was one of the distinguished men of the Peripatetic school and of that philosophical persuasion.

Such being the nature of the dispute, Aratus gave it all the attention he could and put an end to their contentiousness.

The terms on which they ended their differences with one another they inscribed on a stele and set up beside the altar of Hestia in the Homarium.

Chapter 94 Aetolian Raids

After settling these disputes, Aratus broke camp and came in person to the assembly of the Achaeans, while he handed the mercenaries over to Lycus of Pharae, since this man was at that time the deputy commander of the local confederate district.

But the Eleans, dissatisfied with Pyrrhias, once again brought in Euripidas as their general from the Aetolians.

He, watching for the time of the Achaean assembly, took sixty cavalry and two thousand infantry, set out, and passing through the territory of Pharae, overran the country as far as the district of Aegium.

After rounding up a considerable amount of plunder, he began his withdrawal in the direction of Leontium.

But Lycus and his men, on learning what had happened, came to the rescue in haste; engaging the enemy and joining battle on the spur of the moment, they cut down about four hundred of them and took about two hundred alive,

among whom were the notable men Physsias, Antanor, Clearchus, Androlochus, Euanoridas, Aristogeiton, Nicasippus, and Aspasius; and they captured all their arms and baggage.

At about the same time the Achaean admiral, having made an expedition to Molycria, returned with little short of a hundred captives.

Then, turning back again, he sailed to Chalceia and captured, from those who sailed out to oppose him, two warships together with their crews; and near Rhium he also took an Aetolian cutter along with its complement.

Since the spoils both by land and by sea came in around the same time, and a sufficient revenue and supply of provisions was gathered from them, the soldiers grew confident about receiving their pay, and the cities grew hopeful that they would not be burdened by levies.

Chapter 95 More Raids

At the same time as the events just described, Scerdilaidas, believing himself wronged by the king because some of the money agreed upon under the terms he had arranged with Philip was still owed to him, sent out fifteen galleys, undertaking the recovery of the money by means of a trick.

These sailed to Leucas, where everyone received them as friends on account of the joint operations they had previously carried out together.

Now, they had no time to do any other harm, nor were they able to; but against Agathinus and Cassander, the Corinthians who were sailing in Taurion's ships and had anchored alongside them as friends with four vessels, they treacherously launched an attack, and seizing the men together with their ships, they sent them off to Scerdilaidas.

After this they put out from Leucas and, sailing toward Malea, plundered and carried off the merchants they met.

As harvest time was now approaching,

and as Taurion and his men were neglecting the protection of the cities just mentioned, Aratus, with his picked troops, kept watch over the gathering of the grain around the territory of Argos,

while Euripidas, with his Aetolians, set out, intending to ravage the territory of the Tritaeans.

But Lycus and Demodocus, the Achaean cavalry commander, on learning of the Aetolians' expedition out of Elis, gathered the men of Dymae, Patrae, and Pharae, and together with these and the mercenaries, invaded Elean territory.

Arriving at the place called Phyxium, they sent forward their light-armed troops and cavalry to raid the countryside, but concealed their heavy infantry around the aforesaid place.

When the Eleans sallied out in full force against the raiders and pressed hard upon them as they withdrew, Lycus and his men rose up and fell upon those who had rushed forward.

The Eleans did not withstand the charge, but turned and fled at the mere sight of them; the Achaeans killed about two hundred of them, took eighty alive, and brought back in safety the plunder that had been driven off.

At the same time the Achaean admiral, making repeated landings on both Calydonia and the territory of Naupactus, ravaged the countryside and twice shattered the force sent to oppose him.

He also captured Cleonicus of Naupactus, who, because he was a proxenus of the Achaeans, was not sold off on the spot, and after some time was released without ransom.

Chapter 96 Agetas Leads the Aetolians Against Acarnania

About the same time Agetas, the general of the Aetolians, having called up the Aetolians in a general levy, plundered the territory of the Acarnanians and proceeded to ravage all of Epirus without hindrance.

Having accomplished this, he returned and dismissed the Aetolians to their cities.

The Acarnanians, making a counter-invasion into the territory of Stratus, were overcome by a panic and returned in disgrace, though without any loss, since the people of Stratus did not dare to pursue them, supposing that their withdrawal was being made to lure them into an ambush.

A case of counter-treachery also occurred at Phanoteus, in the following manner. Alexander, who had been put in charge of Phocis by Philip, organized an operation against the Aetolians through a certain Jason, who happened to have been placed by him in command of the city of Phanoteus.

This Jason sent word to Agetas, the general of the Aetolians, and agreed to hand over to them the citadel at Phanoteus, and concerning this he swore oaths and made a compact.

When the appointed day arrived, Agetas came by night to Phanoteus with his Aetolians, and after hiding the rest at a distance, he stayed back, while selecting a hundred of the fittest men he sent them to the citadel.

Jason, meanwhile, had Alexander ready with soldiers inside the city, and taking the young men in accordance with the oaths, he led them all up into the acropolis.

When Alexander and his men at once burst in upon them, the picked Aetolians were captured; and Agetas, when daylight came and he understood what had happened, led his force back again, having fallen victim to a stratagem not unlike the ones he himself had often employed.

Chapter 97 Philip Secures His Frontier

At about this same time King Philip seized Bylazora, the largest city of Paeonia and very conveniently positioned with respect to the passes leading from Dardania into Macedonia, so that by this stroke he was very nearly freed altogether from his fear of the Dardani.

For it was no longer easy for them to invade Macedonia while Philip controlled the approaches through the city just mentioned.

Having secured this place, he sent Chrysogonus off in haste to muster the upper Macedonians,

while he himself, taking up the men of Bottia and Amphaxitis, came to Edessa. There he waited until the Macedonians under Chrysogonus joined him, then set out with his whole army and arrived at Larisa on the sixth day.

Pressing straight on with a hard night march, he reached Meliteia at dawn, and, setting scaling ladders against the walls, he tried to storm the town.

By the suddenness and surprise of the attack he so terrified the Meliteians that he would easily have taken the town; but because the ladders fell far short of the height required, he was cheated of his attempt.

Chapter 98 Importance of Careful Measurement

It is in failures of this sort that one might most of all blame the commanders.

For if certain men, taking no forethought and never measuring out the walls, cliffs, or other such obstacles by which they intend to make their entry, simply turn up on the spot, unprepared, to capture a city—who would not censure them?

And again, if men who have measured their own side of the matter then hand over the construction of the ladders, and of such devices generally—things that take little labor to make but are put to the proof in a great undertaking—carelessly and to any chance persons, how can it not deserve reproach?

For in operations of this kind it is not possible either to do what is needed or else to suffer nothing serious;

rather, harm follows upon failure in many ways: at the very moment of the action, danger to the bravest of the men, and still greater danger during the withdrawal, once the troops have been treated with contempt.

There are many—indeed very many—examples of such things: one would find that, of those who fail in attempts of this kind, more have perished or been brought to the utmost peril than have come off unharmed.

As for the future, moreover, they unquestionably breed distrust and hatred against themselves, and besides they put everyone on his guard;

for not only those who have suffered, but also those who merely learn of what happened, are thereby in a sense warned to take heed and be on their watch.

For this reason men placed in positions of responsibility should never undertake such schemes lightly.

The method of measuring and of constructing such equipment is easy and reliable, provided it is taken in hand methodically.

For the present, then, I must resume the thread of my narrative; but on this kind of subject I shall, taking up a suitable time and place again in the course of my work, try to show how one might best avoid mistakes in undertakings of this sort.

Chapter 99 Capture of Thebes In Phthiotis

Philip, cheated of that attempt, encamped beside the river Enipeus and gathered up the siege equipment from Larisa and the other cities, which he had had prepared during the winter for the siege;

for the whole purpose of his campaign was to capture the city called Phthiotic Thebes.

This city lies not far from the sea, about three hundred stades distant from Larisa, and is conveniently placed in relation to both Magnesia and Thessaly—commanding in particular, in Magnesia, the territory of the Demetrians, and in Thessaly, that of the Pharsalians and the Pheraeans.

From it, at that very time, while the Aetolians held it and made continual raids, great harm was being done to the Demetrians, the Pharsalians, and the Larisaeans as well;

for they often pushed their forays as far as the plain called Amyric.

For this reason Philip, regarding it as no small matter, made great efforts to take the place by storm.

When a hundred and fifty catapults and twenty-five stone-throwing engines had been assembled, he advanced upon Thebes, and dividing his army into three parts he took up the ground around the city:

with one division he encamped near Scopium, with another near the place called Heliotropium, and the third he posted by the mountain overlooking the city;

the spaces between the camps he fortified, sectioning them off with a trench and a double palisade, and he further secured them with wooden towers, stationing these at intervals of a plethron with a sufficient guard.

Next, after these works, he brought all his equipment together and began to move the engines up against the citadel.

Chapter 100 Thebes Renamed Philippopolis

For the first three days he was unable to push forward any of the works, owing to the brave, even reckless, resistance of the men in the city.

But when, through the unceasing skirmishing and the volleys of missiles, the defenders of the city who fought in the forefront were—some killed, others disabled by wounds—and a brief slackening of the defense followed, the Macedonians then began their mining.

By sheer persistence, although the ground worked against them, they barely reached the wall on the ninth day.

After this, carrying on the work in relays so as to break off neither by day nor by night, in three days they had undermined and shored up with timber two plethra of the wall.

When the props could not bear the weight but gave way, the wall came down before the Macedonians had even set fire to them.

When they had vigorously cleared away the rubble of the collapse and made their preparations for the entry, and were now on the very point of forcing their way in, the Thebans took fright and surrendered the city.

By this success Philip secured the situation in Magnesia and Thessaly and stripped the Aetolians of rich plunder; he also proved to his own forces that he had been right to put Leontius and his associates to death for their earlier deliberate treachery in the siege of the Palaeans.

Having become master of Thebes, he sold its existing inhabitants into slavery, and, settling Macedonians in their place, renamed the city Philippopolis instead of Thebes.

When he had already completed his arrangements at Thebes, envoys came once again to discuss terms—from the Chians, the Rhodians, and the Byzantines, and from King Ptolemy.

Giving them answers much like those he had given before, and declaring that he was not averse to a settlement, he sent them off, telling them to sound out the Aetolians as well.

He himself, however, cared little for a settlement, and held firmly to pursuing the next stages of his designs.

Chapter 101 Philip Hears of Thrasymene

And so, hearing that the light galleys of Scerdilaidas were raiding the waters off Malea and treating every merchant as an enemy, and that he had even broken the treaty by seizing some of Philip's own ships that lay at anchor with them at Leucas,

Philip fitted out twelve decked warships, eight undecked vessels, and thirty light craft known as hemioliae, and sailed through the Euripus, eager to catch the Illyrians and, in general, full of high hopes for his plans regarding the war against the Aetolians—since he still knew nothing of what had taken place in Italy.

For it happened that, at the very time Philip was besieging Thebes, the Romans were being defeated by Hannibal in the battle in Etruria, though the report of these events had not yet reached the Greeks.

Philip arrived too late for the galleys, and so anchored off Cenchreae. He sent away his decked warships with orders to make the voyage around Malea toward Aegium and Patrae, while he had the remaining vessels hauled across the Isthmus and ordered them all to lie at anchor at Lechaeum.

He himself hurried with his friends to Argos to attend the Nemean festival.

He had only just begun watching the gymnastic contest when a courier arrived from Macedonia making it plain that the Romans had lost a great battle and that Hannibal was master of the open country.

For the moment he showed the dispatch to Demetrius of Pharos alone, charging him to keep silent.

Demetrius seized this opening and urged that Philip ought to throw off the war against the Aetolians as quickly as possible and instead hold fast to affairs in Illyria and to a crossing into Italy.

For all of Greece, he said, was already doing Philip's bidding and would continue to do so afterward—the Achaeans out of genuine goodwill, the Aetolians cowed by what had befallen them in the present war—

while Italy and the crossing there, he said, were the beginning of the design for universal dominion, to which no one had a better claim than Philip;

Chapter 102 Philip and the Aetolians Discuss Peace

and now, he said, was the very moment, with the Romans having stumbled. By using such arguments he quickly fired Philip's ambition—naturally enough, I think, given that Philip was a young king who had been successful in his enterprises and was reckoned bold in general, and who, on top of this, sprang from a house that has always, more than any other, somehow aspired to dominion over the whole world.

In any case, Philip, as I have said, at that time disclosed the news brought by the letter to Demetrius alone. Afterward he gathered his friends and opened a debate about coming to terms with the Aetolians.

And since Aratus and his party were not opposed to such a settlement—on the view that they would be making peace as the stronger party in the war—

the king, without even waiting any longer for the ambassadors who were jointly handling the negotiations, at once sent Cleonicus of Naupactus to the Aetolians—

for he found him still lingering, after his release from captivity, awaiting the meeting of the Achaean assembly—while he himself took the ships and the land force from Corinth and came with them to Aegium.

Advancing to Lasion and taking the tower in the Perippia, he pretended he was going to invade Elis, so as not to seem too ready to bring the war to an end.

After this, when Cleonicus had gone back and forth two or three times, and the Aetolians begged that he meet them in conference, Philip consented;

and laying aside all the operations of war, he sent couriers to the allied cities, calling on them to send delegates who would sit in council and take part in the joint discussion about the settlement.

He himself crossed over with his force and encamped near Panormus—a harbor of the Peloponnese lying directly opposite the city of Naupactus—and waited for the delegates of the allies.

During the time in which these delegates were to assemble, he sailed to Zacynthus and on his own authority settled the affairs of the island, and then returned,

Chapter 103 Philip Goes to Naupactus

sailing back again. When the delegates had now gathered, he sent Aratus, Taurion, and some of those who had come along with them to the Aetolians.

They joined the Aetolians, who were assembled in full numbers at Naupactus, and after a brief discussion, seeing how eager they were for a settlement, sailed back to Philip to report on the matter.

The Aetolians, anxious to end the war, sent envoys along with them to Philip, asking him to come to them with his force, so that, with the conference conducted at close hand, affairs might reach a fitting conclusion.

Moved by these appeals, the king sailed across with his force to the place called the Hollows of Naupactus, which is about twenty stades from the city.

There he encamped, enclosed both his ships and his camp with a palisade, and waited for the time of the meeting.

The Aetolians came in full numbers but without their arms, and keeping about two stades away from Philip's camp, sent messages and held discussions about the matters at hand.

At first the king sent out all the delegates who had come from the allies, instructing them to propose peace to the Aetolians on these terms: that both sides keep what they now held.

The Aetolians readily accepted this, and from then on there was a continuous exchange of messages between them about the particulars. Most of these I shall pass over, since they contain nothing worth recording,

but I shall make mention of the exhortation of Agelaus of Naupactus, which he delivered at the first meeting before both

Chapter 104 The Cloud in the West

the king and the allies present. He said that the best thing of all would be for the Greeks never to make war on one another, but to be deeply grateful to the gods if, all speaking with one voice and joining hands like men fording a river, they might be able to beat off the assaults of the barbarians and so preserve themselves and their cities.

But if that was altogether impossible, then at least for the present he asked them to be of one mind and on their guard, foreseeing the weight of the armaments and the magnitude of the war now massing in the west.

For it was plain, he said, to anyone who paid even moderate attention to public affairs that, whether the Carthaginians defeated the Romans or the Romans the Carthaginians in the war, it was in no way likely that the victors would rest content with dominion over the Italians and the Sicilians; rather, they would come and extend their designs and their forces farther than they ought. He therefore asked them all to be on guard against the crisis,

and above all Philip.

And the way to guard against it, he said, was for Philip to abandon the aim of crushing the Greeks and making them easy prey for those who attacked them, and instead to take thought for them as he would for his own person, and in general to look after all parts of Greece as belonging and akin to himself.

For if he handled affairs in this way, the Greeks would be well disposed toward him and steadfast allies in his enterprises, while those outside Greece would be less inclined to plot against his power, dismayed by the loyalty of the Greeks toward him.

And if he longed for action, he urged him to look to the west and to fix his attention on the wars now raging in Italy, so that, biding his time prudently as one who waits in reserve, he might at the right moment make his bid for dominion over the whole world.

And the present moment, he said, was not unsuited to such a hope.

He urged Philip to put off his quarrels and wars with the Greeks to times of peace, and to make this his chief concern: to keep the power, whenever he wished, both to make peace and to make war with them—

because, if he once allowed the clouds now appearing from the west to settle upon the regions of Greece, he greatly feared that the truces and wars and, in a word, all the games we now play against one another would be so utterly struck from the hands of us all

that we should pray to the gods to grant us this very power: to make war and to make peace with one another whenever we wished, and in general to be masters of the disputes among ourselves.

Chapter 105 The Peace is Ratified

By speaking in this way, Agelaus spurred all the allies toward a settlement, and Philip most of all, since he used arguments well suited to the inclination that had already been prepared in him by the urgings of Demetrius.

And so, having reached a mutual understanding among themselves on the particular terms and having ratified the settlement, they parted, each carrying back to his own homeland peace in place of war.

All these things happened in the third year of the 140th Olympiad — I mean the battle of the Romans in Etruria, that of Antiochus over Coele-Syria, and besides these the settlement between the Achaeans and Philip on the one side and the Aetolians on the other.

This moment in time, and this single deliberation, were the first to weave together the Greek and the Italian affairs, and the Libyan ones as well.

For from now on neither Philip nor the leading statesmen of the Greeks made their wars and their settlements with one another by reference to affairs within Greece; instead they were all already fixing their gaze on the situation in Italy.

Before long the same thing happened to the islanders and the inhabitants of Asia as well.

For those who were dissatisfied with Philip, and some of those who were at odds with Attalus, no longer leaned toward Antiochus and Ptolemy, nor toward the south and the east, but from this time on looked toward the west; and some sent embassies to the Carthaginians, others to the Romans.

In the same way the Romans too sent embassies to the Greeks, fearing Philip's audacity and taking care that he should not join in attacking them amid the crisis that then surrounded them.

Now that I have, I think, shown clearly — in keeping with my promise at the outset — when, how, and for what reasons the affairs of Greece became interwoven with those of Italy and Libya,

it remains for me to carry the narrative of Greek affairs forward continuously, down to the time when the Romans were defeated at the battle of Cannae, the point at which I brought the account of Italian affairs to its climax; and there I will close this book as well, bringing it level with the events already described.

Chapter 106 Greece At the End of the Social War

As soon as the Achaeans had laid the war aside, they chose Timoxenus as their general and withdrew to their own customs and ordinary pursuits.

Together with the Achaeans, the other cities throughout the Peloponnese likewise set about recovering their private livelihoods, tending their land, and reviving their ancestral sacrifices, festivals, and the other religious observances established among each people.

For these things had all but fallen into oblivion among most of them, owing to the unbroken succession of the wars that had gone before.

Indeed I do not know how it has always somehow come about that the Peloponnesians, who of all men are by nature the most suited to a gentle and civilized life, have in earlier times enjoyed it least of all; rather, as Euripides puts it, they were always "men sold to toil and never at rest from the spear."

This, it seems to me, they suffer with good reason: for being all of them by nature fond of leadership and of freedom, they fight one another continually, never willing to yield the first place.

The Athenians, on the other hand, had been released from their fears of Macedonia and now believed they held their freedom securely.

Taking Eurycleidas and Micion as their leading men, they took no part whatever in the rest of Greek affairs, but, following the policy and the impulses of these statesmen, poured out their flattery upon all the kings, and most of all upon Ptolemy.

They submitted to every kind of decree and proclamation, paying little heed to what was fitting, because of the poor judgment of their leaders.

Chapter 107 Revolt in Egypt

As for Ptolemy, immediately after these events he found himself drawn into a war with the Egyptians.

For the aforesaid king, by arming the Egyptians for the war against Antiochus, had taken a decision adequate for the moment but mistaken as to the future.

Emboldened by their success at Raphia, they were no longer willing to submit to orders, but began looking for a leader and a figurehead, on the grounds that they were capable of defending themselves. And this is just what they did, not long afterward.

Antiochus, after making great preparations during the winter, then crossed the Taurus when the following summer came, and, having made a compact of joint action with King Attalus, set about the war against Achaeus.

The Aetolians at first were pleased with the settlement that had been reached with the Achaeans, since the war had not gone according to their expectations — which is also why they chose as their general Agelaus of Naupactus, who was thought to have contributed most to the settlement —

but after no time at all they grew dissatisfied and reproached Agelaus, on the grounds that he had cut off all their opportunities for profit from abroad and their hopes for the future, since the peace had been made not with certain particular states but with all the Greeks.

The aforesaid man, however, bearing up under this unreasonable resentment and blame, held their impulses in check; and so they were forced to restrain themselves, against their nature.

Chapter 108 Philip's Preparations

King Philip, after the settlement, was conveyed back by sea to Macedonia, where he found that Scerdilaïdas — on the pretext of money still owed to him, the same pretext on which he had broken the treaty by seizing the vessels near Leucas — had now plundered a town of Pelagonia called Pissaeum,

had brought over cities of Dassaretis, some by fear and some by promises — Antipatria, Chrysondyon, and Gertous — and had overrun much of the part of Macedonia bordering on these places as well.

He at once set out with his army, eager to recover the cities that had revolted,

and in general resolved to make war on Scerdilaïdas, considering it absolutely essential to put the situation in Illyria in order with a view both to his other designs and, above all, to his crossing into Italy.

For Demetrius kept fanning this hope and this design in the king so constantly that Philip even dreamed of these things in his sleep and was wholly absorbed in such projects.

Demetrius did this not for Philip's sake — to him he assigned perhaps only a third share in the matter — but rather out of his own hostility toward the Romans, and most of all for his own sake and his private hopes.

For he was convinced that only in this way could he recover his dominion in Pharos.

In any case, Philip took the field and recovered the cities mentioned above, and captured besides Creonion and Gerous in Dassaretis; Enchelanae, Cerax, Sation, and Boii around Lake Lychnidus; Bantia in the territory of the Calicoeni; and, among the people called the Pisantini, Orgessus.

Having accomplished this, he dismissed his forces to their winter quarters. This was the winter during which Hannibal, having ravaged the most renowned regions of Italy, was about to make his winter quarters near Gerunium in Daunia.

The Romans at that time appointed as their generals Gaius Terentius and Lucius Aemilius.

Chapter 109 Philip Prepares to Invade Italy

During the winter, Philip reflected that his plans would require ships and a force to serve at sea—though not for fighting a naval battle.

He could never have hoped to be capable of that, of fighting the Romans at sea; what he needed instead was a fleet that could ferry soldiers, cross quickly to whatever point he intended, and appear before the enemy unexpectedly.

Concluding, therefore, that the Illyrian style of shipbuilding was best suited to these purposes, he set about constructing a hundred light galleys—being almost the first of the Macedonian kings to do so.

Once these were ready, he assembled his forces at the beginning of summer, and after giving the Macedonians a little practice at the oars he put out to sea.

It was at this same time that Antiochus crossed the Taurus, while Philip, sailing through the Euripus and around Cape Malea, came to the region of Cephallenia and Leucas. There he came to anchor and waited anxiously, busily seeking news of the Roman fleet.

Learning that it lay at anchor off Lilybaeum, he took heart and put to sea, advancing on his course toward Apollonia.

Chapter 110 Philip Withdraws to Cephallenia

As he was already drawing near the area of the river Aous, which flows past the city of the Apolloniates, a panic broke out among his crews much like those that occur in armies on land.

Some of the galleys sailing at the rear of the fleet, which had put in at the island called Sason—lying at the entrance to the Ionian channel—came to Philip by night reporting that certain ships sailing from the Strait had anchored there alongside them,

and that these men reported leaving behind at Rhegium some Roman quinqueremes bound for Apollonia and for Scerdilaidas.

Philip, supposing that the fleet was all but upon him, was seized with fear; he hastily weighed anchor and gave the order to sail back the way he had come.

Making his withdrawal and return voyage in complete disorder, he reached Cephallenia on the second day, sailing continuously day and night.

Recovering a little of his confidence, he stayed there, creating the impression that he had turned back for some operations in the Peloponnese.

As it happened, the whole alarm about him proved to be false.

For Scerdilaidas, hearing that during the winter Philip was building a considerable number of galleys, and expecting him to come by sea, had sent messages to the Romans explaining this and asking for help;

and the Romans had dispatched a squadron of ten ships from their fleet off Lilybaeum—this being the very squadron that had been sighted near Rhegium.

Had Philip not fled from it in such groundless terror, that would have been the very moment when he could best have accomplished his aims in Illyria, since the Romans were occupied with all their plans and preparations against Hannibal and the battle at Cannae; and in all likelihood he would also have captured the ships.

As it was, thrown into confusion by the report, he made his way back to Macedonia—without harm, but without honor.

Chapter 111 The Gauls In Asia

At about this same time something happened involving Prusias that deserves to be recorded.

The Gauls whom King Attalus had brought over from Europe for the war against Achaeus, because of their reputation for bravery, had parted from that king on account of the suspicions just mentioned, and were ravaging the cities along the Hellespont with great wanton violence, until at last they even set about besieging the people of Ilium.

In these circumstances a noble action was performed by the inhabitants of Alexandria in the Troad as well.

For they sent out Themistes with four thousand men, raised the siege of Ilium, and drove the Gauls out of the whole Troad by cutting off their supplies and frustrating their designs.

The Gauls then seized the place called Arisba in the territory of Abydos, and from there went on plotting against and making war on the cities founded in that region.

Against them Prusias marched out with an army, and in a pitched battle he destroyed the men in hand-to-hand fighting during the engagement itself, slaughtered nearly all their children and women in their camp, and let his soldiers who had done the fighting plunder the baggage.

By this action he freed the cities of the Hellespont from great fear and danger, and he left behind a fine example to later generations, warning the barbarians of Europe not to take crossing into Asia lightly.

Such, then, was the state of affairs in Greece and Asia. In Italy, after the battle of Cannae had been fought, most of the country went over to the Carthaginians, as I have shown in the earlier parts of this work.

At this point in time I shall break off my narrative, since I have now covered the events in Asia and Greece that fell within the 140th Olympiad.

In the book that follows, after briefly recalling the introductory matters laid out here, I shall return, in accordance with the promise made at the outset, to the account of the Roman constitution.

Chapter 1 Preface: Political Constitutions

Having halted our narrative at this point, we will set out our account of the Roman constitution,

in which we will show, step by step, that the distinctive character of their political system contributed more than anything else not only to their winning dominion over the Italians and Sicilians, but also to their further acquisition of rule over the Iberians and the Celts,

and finally, after they had defeated the Carthaginians in war, to their conceiving the design of universal empire.

But when, in working through the Greek affairs that took place during the same Olympiad, we reach this period, then at last, taking it up as a subject in its own right, we will give our account of the Roman constitution itself,

believing that an exposition of it is not only suited to the design of our history, but also contributes greatly to the reform and construction of constitutions, for those men who are eager to learn and active in public affairs.

And one might well be puzzled as to what the reason is that the Romans, although they have now mastered the whole world and possess a superiority many times greater than before, could nevertheless neither man so many ships nor put to sea with such great fleets as they once did.

The causes of this difficulty, however, will be clearly understandable when we come to the exposition of their constitution.

Concerning this matter—which touches on certain aspects of their military affairs—we have already spoken at greater length earlier, in our discussion of the constitution.

This (the college of the Salii) is, as we have stated in our discussion of the constitution, one of the three colleges through which the most distinguished sacrifices to the gods are performed at Rome.

Chapter 2

I am well aware, then, that some will be puzzled as to why, abandoning the unbroken thread of our narrative—the joining and adding on of events—we have deferred to this point our account of the constitution mentioned above.

But that this part too was, from the very beginning, one of the necessary components of my whole design, I think I have made clear in many passages,

and most of all in the foundation and preliminary statement of my history, where I said that this was the finest, and at the same time the most useful, feature of my undertaking for readers of the work: to know and learn how, and by what kind of constitution, nearly the whole inhabited world was overcome and fell under the single rule of the Romans in not even a full fifty-three years—something that is found never to have happened before.

This being settled, I could see no time more suitable than the present for pausing to examine and test what is going to be said about the constitution.

For just as those who form private judgments about whether men are worthless or worthy, whenever they genuinely set out to test them, base their inquiry not on the untroubled ease of ordinary life, but on the reversals of misfortune and the successes of good fortune,

regarding this alone as the true touchstone of a complete man—the ability to bear the total reversals of fortune with greatness of soul and nobility—in just the same way one must examine a constitution as well.

For this reason, since I could see no sharper or greater change in our times than the one that befell the Romans, I have reserved for this moment my account of the matters mentioned above; and one may grasp the magnitude of that change from what follows.

What both engages the mind and brings benefit to lovers of learning is precisely this: the study of causes, and the choice of the better course in each case.

And in every undertaking we must regard the structure of the constitution as the greatest cause both of success and of its opposite;

for from it, as from a fountainhead, all the conceptions and undertakings of any enterprise not only spring, but also reach their completion.

For only genuine impossibility offers no excuse to those who fail; and impossibility belongs to the realm of falsehood alone.

Chapter 3 Classification of Constitutions

As for the Greek states, which have often risen to greatness and have often undergone a complete reversal into the opposite condition, it proves easy both to give an account of their past and to pronounce upon their future;

for it is easy to report what is already known, and easy to predict the future by conjecturing from what has already happened.

But concerning the Roman state it is not at all easy either to describe the present situation, owing to the complexity of its constitution, or to foretell the future, owing to our ignorance of the distinctive features of their past, both in public and in private life.

For this reason it calls for no ordinary attention and study, if one is to gain a clear and comprehensive view of its distinctive features.

Now it happens that most of those who wish to instruct us authoritatively on such matters speak of three kinds of constitutions, of which they call one kingship, another aristocracy, and the third democracy.

But it seems to me that one might quite reasonably raise a question against them: whether they propose these to us as the only constitutions, or, by Zeus, as the best.

For on both counts they seem to me to be mistaken. For it is clear that we must regard as best the constitution composed of all the features just mentioned;

and of this we have had proof not in theory only but in practice, since Lycurgus was the first to construct the Spartan constitution on this principle.

Nor again must we accept these as the only forms: for we have already seen certain monarchical and tyrannical governments which, though they differ as much as possible from kingship, nevertheless seem to bear some resemblance to it;

and it is on this ground that all monarchs falsely lay claim to, and make use of, the title of king as far as they are able.

And again, there have been many oligarchic governments that seem to bear some resemblance to aristocratic ones, from which, one might almost say, they differ as widely as possible.

And the same argument applies also to—

Chapter 4 The Rotation of Polities

—democracy. That what I say is true is evident from the following.

For surely not every monarchy is to be called a kingship outright, but only the one that is accepted by willing subjects and is governed more by reason than by fear and force;

nor, again, is every oligarchy to be considered an aristocracy, but only the one that is directed, through deliberate selection, by the most just and most prudent men.

In the same way, we should not call it a democracy where the whole multitude has the power to do

whatever it happens to wish and resolve. Rather, where it is the ancestral and customary practice to revere the gods, to care for one's parents, to respect one's elders, and to obey the laws—in such communities, when the will of the majority prevails, this is what we must call a democracy. And so we must say that there are six kinds of constitutions:

the three that everyone harps on, which have just been mentioned, and three more akin to these—I mean monarchy, oligarchy, and mob-rule.

First, then, monarchy arises spontaneously and by nature; and following upon it, and born from it through development and correction, comes kingship.

But when this changes into the evil naturally allied to it—I mean into tyranny—then in turn, from the dissolution of these, aristocracy springs up.

And again, when this has by its nature degenerated into oligarchy, and the people in their anger have avenged the injustices of their leaders, democracy is born.

And from the insolence and lawlessness of this, in turn, mob-rule is brought to fulfillment in the course of time.

One could grasp most clearly that these things are truly as I have just described by attending to the natural beginnings, origins, and changes of each.

For only the person who has understood how each of them comes into being could also understand the growth, the prime, and the transformation of each, and its end—when, how, and where it will come round again.

And I have supposed that this method of exposition will suit the Roman constitution best of all, because from the very beginning it took on both its formation and its growth in accordance with nature.

Chapter 5 The Origin of Constitutions

The natural process by which the various forms of government transform into one another is perhaps analyzed more precisely by Plato and certain other philosophers. But their account is intricate and developed at great length, so that few can follow it.

For this reason I will try to set out, in summary form, only as much of the matter as I judge relevant to a practical history and to the understanding of ordinary people.

And if my general overview should seem to leave anything out, the detailed discussion in what follows will make ample amends for whatever is left unresolved here.

What, then, are the origins I mean, and from what source do I say constitutions first arise?

Whenever floods, outbreaks of plague, crop failures, or other causes of this kind bring about a destruction of the human race—such as tradition tells us has happened before, and as reason tells us will happen again and again—

then, with all customs and skills perishing together, and when in the course of time a multitude of people grows up once more from the survivors, as though from seeds,

then, as with the other animals, these people too gather together. And it is only natural that they too, in their natural weakness, should band together with their own kind. In such circumstances it is inevitable that the one who excels in bodily strength and boldness of spirit should lead and rule the rest,

just as we observe among the other species of animals that lack reason—and this we must regard as the truest work of nature, since among them we see, by common agreement, the strongest taking the lead: I mean bulls, boars, cocks, and creatures like them.

It is likely, then, that in the beginning the lives of human beings were of this sort: gathering together like animals and following the most vigorous and powerful among them, whose authority was bounded only by strength, and whose rule one might call monarchy.

But when, with the passage of time, a sense of fellowship and familiarity grew up within these communities, this became the seed of kingship; and then, for the first time, the idea of what is noble and just—and likewise of their opposites—arose among human beings.

Chapter 6 Origin of Morality and Rule

The manner in which these notions begin and come into being is as follows.

All creatures are driven by nature toward sexual union, and the result is the begetting of children. Now whenever one of these offspring, having been raised and reached maturity, shows no gratitude and offers no protection to those who reared him, but instead sets about insulting or harming them,

it is clear that those who are present and who have witnessed the care and hardship the parents devoted to the rearing and nurturing of their children will likely be displeased and offended.

For since the human race differs from the other animals in that it alone possesses intelligence and reason, it is plain that men, unlike the other animals, will not let such a difference of conduct pass unnoticed.

Rather, they will take note of what happens and feel displeasure at it, since they look ahead to the future and reason that the same thing could befall any one of them.

So too, when someone who has received help or rescue from another in time of danger shows no gratitude to his preserver, but even attempts to harm him, it is clear that those who know of it will likely be displeased and offended with such a man—sympathizing with their fellow and imagining the same thing happening to themselves.

From all this there arises in each person some notion of the meaning and theory of duty, which is the beginning and end of justice.

Likewise, again, when someone stands out as the defender of all in times of danger and holds his ground against the assaults of the fiercest beasts, it is likely that such a man will receive marks of the people's goodwill and esteem, while the man who acts otherwise will meet with their condemnation and disapproval.

From this, in turn, it is reasonable that there should arise among the many some understanding of the base and the noble, and of the difference between them—the one to be pursued and imitated for the benefit it brings, the other to be shunned.

And when the leader, the man who holds the greatest power, consistently lends his support to these popular judgments, and so appears to his subjects to be one who allots to each man what he deserves,

then they no longer submit out of fear of force, but rather give their willing consent of mind, supporting his rule and helping to preserve it—even when he has grown quite old—rallying with one accord to his defense and fighting against any who plot against his sovereignty.

And in this way, without anyone noticing, a king emerges from a monarch, once reason has taken over leadership from raw spirit and strength.

Chapter 7 How Kingship Turns into Tyranny

This is the first conception of the noble and the just—and of their opposites—to arise naturally among human beings; this is the beginning and origin of genuine kingship.

For the people preserve the rule not only of such men themselves, but of their descendants as well, persuaded that those born from and raised by men of this kind will share their principles.

But if at some point they become displeased with the descendants, from then on they make their choice of rulers and kings no longer according to bodily and spirited strength, but according to differences of judgment and reason, having learned from actual experience the difference between the two.

In ancient times, then, those who had once been chosen and granted this office grew old in their kingships, fortifying strong positions and building walls and acquiring territory—partly for security, and partly for an abundant supply of necessities for their subjects.

And while they devoted themselves to these things, they remained free of all slander and envy, because they made no great distinctions in their dress, food, or drink, but lived much like everyone else, always sharing the same way of life as the common people.

But once they began to inherit their positions by succession and birth, and found the means of security already prepared for them, along with more than enough for their sustenance,

then, following their appetites because of this abundance, they came to think that their rulers ought to have distinctive clothing, distinctive and elaborate indulgences and provisions at the table, and unchallenged access to the sexual favors and embraces even of those they had no right to.

These things gave rise in some cases to envy and offense, in others to a blaze of hatred and bitter anger, so that the kingship turned into a tyranny. The first step toward its dissolution was taken, and a conspiracy began to form against the rulers—

a conspiracy that arose not from the worst men, but from the noblest, most high-minded, and most courageous, because such men are least

Chapter 8 Degeneration of Constitutions

able to endure the abuses of those in power. And when the people gained leaders and joined forces with them against the rulers for the reasons already described, the form of kingship and monarchy was utterly destroyed, while aristocracy in turn took its beginning and origin.

For the people, as though repaying an immediate debt of gratitude to those who had overthrown the monarchs, employed them as their leaders and entrusted their affairs to them.

At first these men gladly accepted the charge and put nothing ahead of the common good, managing every matter—both private and public—with care and watchfulness on behalf of the people.

But when their children inherited this same authority from their fathers—having no experience of hardship, no experience at all of civic equality and freedom of speech, and having been raised from the start amid their fathers' power and privileges—

some of them turned to greed and unjust love of money, others to drunkenness and the insatiable feasting that goes with it, and others to the violation of women and the abduction of boys. And so they transformed the aristocracy into an oligarchy,

and they quickly stirred up among the people feelings much like those just described. For this reason the end of their downfall turned out to be much like the misfortune that befell the tyrants.

Chapter 9 How Democracy Arises and Degenerates

Whenever someone, perceiving the envy and hatred that the citizens feel toward their rulers, then grows bold enough to say or do something against those in power, he finds the whole populace ready and eager to lend its support.

After that, having killed some of these rulers and driven others into exile, they do not dare to set up a king again, since they still dread the injustice of those who ruled before; nor do they have the confidence to entrust public affairs to a number of men, with the recent example of that folly fresh before their eyes.

So, with the only untainted hope left to them being the one that rests on themselves, they turn to this course: they transform the constitution from an oligarchy into a democracy, and take the management of public affairs and the public trust into their own hands.

As long as any survive who experienced the dominance and arbitrary power of the few, they are content with the present order and prize equality of speech and freedom of speech above all else.

But once a new generation has come along, and the democracy has been handed down to the children of children, then, through familiarity, they no longer set such great store by equality and freedom of speech, and they seek to have more than the common people. The ones who fall into this most of all are those who excel in wealth.

So when they set their hearts on holding office and cannot attain it through their own efforts and their own merit, they squander their fortunes, enticing and corrupting the masses in every possible way.

By this means, once they have made the many greedy for bribes and accustomed to feeding on them through their own foolish craving for honor, then once again democracy is dissolved, and it gives way to force and mob rule.

For the populace, grown used to feeding on the property of others and resting its hopes of livelihood on its neighbors' goods, as soon as it finds a leader of high ambition and daring—one shut out from the honors of public life by poverty—then brings about rule by the mob.

And then, banding together, it commits massacres, banishments, and redistributions of land, until, reduced to utter savagery, it once more finds a master and a monarch.

This is the cycle of constitutions,

this is the ordering set by nature, according to which forms of government change, pass from one to another, and come round again to where they began.

A man who has clearly grasped this may perhaps be mistaken about the timing when he speaks of the future of a constitution, but as for the point of growth or of decay that each has reached, or the direction in which it will change, he will rarely be wrong, provided he makes his judgment free of anger or envy.

And indeed it is in the case of the Roman constitution above all that, by this method of inquiry, we may come to understand its formation, its growth, its peak, and likewise the change into the opposite that will follow from these.

For if any constitution ever did, this one too, as I said just now, having had its formation and growth from the beginning according to nature, will also undergo its change into the contrary according to nature.

This will be possible to observe through what is to be said hereafter.

Chapter 10 Lycurgus

For now I will make a brief mention of the legislation of Lycurgus, since this discussion is not foreign to my purpose.

For that man, having taken to heart that each of the developments described above comes about necessarily and naturally, and having reasoned that every form of constitution that is simple and rests on a single kind of power is precarious—because it is quickly perverted into the vice that is its own and that follows it by nature—

just as rust is the dissolvent inborn in iron, and woodworms and grubs in timber, by which, even if they escape all external harm, they are destroyed by the very things that grow up within them—

in the same way, in each of the constitutions there is by nature bred and attendant some particular vice: in kingship, the form called monarchic (despotism); in aristocracy, that of oligarchy;

and in democracy, the bestial and mob-ruled form. Into these it is impossible that all the aforementioned constitutions should not, in the course of time, undergo their transformations, according to the argument just given.

Foreseeing this, Lycurgus did not make his constitution simple or of a single type, but gathered together all at once the virtues and distinctive features of the best forms of government,

so that no element, growing beyond what was due, should be perverted into the vices that are akin to it; but rather, with the power of each held in check by the others, none of them should incline anywhere or weigh down too far, but the constitution should remain in equilibrium and balanced for a long time, like a ship beating against the wind—

the kingship being prevented from growing arrogant by fear of the people, since the people too had been given a sufficient share in the constitution;

and the people in turn not daring to despise the kings, out of fear of the elders, who, having been chosen by selection on the grounds of merit, were always bound to attach themselves to what was just,

so that the party of those at a disadvantage, by holding fast to established custom, always became greater and weightier through the leaning and support of the elders.

And so, having framed it in this way, he preserved freedom for the Lacedaemonians for the longest time of any people we know of.

He, then, foreseeing by a process of reasoning the source and manner in which each thing naturally comes about, established the aforesaid constitution without harm.

The Romans, on the other hand, have arrived at the same end—the order of their own state—

yet not through reasoning, but through many struggles and difficulties, ever choosing the better course from the very knowledge gained amid reverses; and thus they came to the same end as Lycurgus, the finest political system of any in our time.

Chapter 11 The Roman Constitution

The Roman state, reckoning from the crossing of Xerxes into Greece and for thirty years after that period, was continually being refined in its particular features, and it reached its finest and most perfect form in the era of the war with Hannibal—the point from which I made this digression.

Therefore, now that I have given the account of how it came to be put together, I will try to make clear what its character was in those years, in which the Romans, defeated at the battle of Cannae, came to grief in their affairs as a whole.

I am well aware that to those who actually live under this constitution I shall seem to give a somewhat incomplete account of it, since I leave out some of the particular details.

For, knowing every part of it and having had experience of all of it through having been brought up from childhood in its customs and laws, they will not be impressed by what is said, but will look for what has been left out;

and they will not suppose that the writer has deliberately omitted the small distinctions, but rather that he has passed over in silence the origins and the essential workings of things out of ignorance.

The things I do say, they would not have admired as being trifling and incidental; but the things I omit, they single out as essential, wishing to appear to know more than the historians themselves.

But a good critic ought not to judge writers by what they leave out, but by what they say;

and if he catches any falsehood in this, he should recognize that those omissions too are due to ignorance, but if everything that is said is true, he should grant that those things too are passed over by deliberate judgment and not out of ignorance.

So much, then, let this be said by me against those who criticize historians more out of rivalry than out of fairness.

Every matter, when examined in its proper context, receives sound approval and sound criticism alike; but if that context shifts and the matter is judged against other circumstances, then what historians have often said in the best and truest way may appear not merely undesirable, but not even tolerable.

There were, then, three elements that controlled the constitution, all of which I have mentioned before; and everything was so fairly and fittingly ordered and administered, part by part, through these elements, that no one—not even a native—could ever say with certainty whether the constitution as a whole was aristocratic, democratic, or monarchic.

And this was a natural thing to experience. For whenever we fixed our attention on the power of the consuls, it appeared to be completely monarchic and kingly; whenever on that of the senate, aristocratic again; and indeed, if one looked at the power of the people, it seemed clearly to be democratic.

As for which of these forms held sway over each of the respective parts of the constitution—that, both then and still now (with a few exceptions), is as follows.

Chapter 11a

They give this town the name Pallantium, after their mother-city in Arcadia; but, as some relate—among them Polybius of Megalopolis—it was named after a youth named Pallas who died there. This Pallas was the son of Heracles and of Launa, the daughter of Evander; and his grandfather on his mother's side, having heaped up a tomb for him on the hill, named the place Pallantium after the youth.

For they did not think it enough, as Polybius of Megalopolis did, merely to say this much: "I am persuaded that Rome was founded in the second year of the seventh Olympiad," nor to leave the proof untested, resting on a single tablet—one and only one—kept in the custody of the high priests.

Aristodemus of Elis and his school relate that it was from the twenty-seventh Olympiad onward that the athletes—those, that is, who were victors—began to be recorded; for before that no one was recorded, since earlier generations had neglected to do so. In the twenty-eighth Olympiad Coroebus of Elis, winning the stadion race, was the first to be recorded; and that Olympiad was ranked as the first from which the Greeks count their dates. Polybius relates the same things as Aristodemus does. And among the Romans,

as Polybius says in his sixth book, women are forbidden to drink wine, but they drink what is called passum. This is made from the dried grape (raisin), and when drunk it is much like the sweet Aegosthenian wine and the Cretan; and so they use it to relieve pressing thirst. It is impossible for a woman to escape notice if she has drunk wine. For in the first place a woman has no authority over wine; and besides this, she is obliged to kiss her own kinsmen and those of her husband, down to the children of cousins, and to do this every day, whenever she first sees them. And then, since it is uncertain whom she will meet, she is on her guard; for if she has merely tasted it, there is no further need of accusation.

He also founded the city of Ostia on the Tiber.

Polybius, in his sixth book. [Stephanus of Byzantium, under "Ostia."]

Lucius, the son of Demaratus the Corinthian, set out for Rome trusting in himself and in his wealth, convinced that he would hold a position second to none in public life because of certain advantages, and having a wife who was useful both in other respects and as a naturally gifted partner in every practical undertaking. On arriving in Rome and obtaining citizenship, he at once adapted himself to winning the king's favor. And quickly, both through his wealth and through his natural cleverness, and most of all through his upbringing from childhood, he attached himself to the man in power and won great acceptance and trust with him. As time went on he came to such a degree of being received that he jointly managed and handled with Marcius the affairs of the kingdom. In this position, proving a benefit to everyone, working together with those in need and helping to secure for them whatever was useful, and at the same time using the resources of his living generously, suitably, and at the right moment on each occasion, he stored up gratitude in many quarters and worked goodwill in all, and won a reputation for nobility of character—and he attained the kingship as well.

He acted as a prudent and sensible man does, in recognizing, as Hesiod says, "how much the half is greater than the whole."

For learning to be truthful toward the gods is a foundation for truth toward one another.

For in most human enterprises, those who have acquired things are well suited to preserving them, while those who have received them ready-made are well suited to losing them.

Chapter 11b

All the works of virtue ought to be practiced from childhood by those who train themselves well, and above all courage.

Olcium, a city of Etruria: Polybius in his sixth book. [Stephanus of Byzantium, under "Olcium."]

Chapter 12 The Consuls

The consuls, before leading out the legions, while present in Rome, are masters of all public business.

For all the other magistrates, except the tribunes, are subordinate to them and obey them; and it is the consuls who introduce the embassies to the senate.

In addition to what has been said, they refer the urgent matters of deliberation to the senate, and they carry out the entire handling of its decrees.

Moreover, as for everything that must be accomplished through the people in matters bearing on public affairs, it falls to them to see to it and to convene the assemblies, to bring in the decrees, and to give effect to whatever the majority decides.

And indeed, with regard to the preparation for war and the whole management of operations in the field, they hold what is virtually absolute authority.

For it is within their power to impose on the allies whatever they think fit, to appoint the military tribunes, to enroll the soldiers, and to select those who are suitable.

Besides what has been mentioned, they are empowered to punish anyone they wish among those under their command while in the field.

They also have the authority to spend as much of the public funds as they propose, with a quaestor accompanying them who readily carries out every order.

So that one might reasonably say, whenever one looks at this portion, that the constitution is simply monarchic and kingly.

And if any of these powers, or of those that are about to be described, should undergo some change, either at the present time or after some interval, this would have no bearing on the statement we are now making.

Chapter 13 The Senate

The Senate, first of all, has control of the treasury. It manages all incoming revenue and likewise all expenditure.

For the quaestors cannot make any disbursement for the various departments of the state without a decree of the Senate, the one exception being payments to the consuls.

And of the single greatest and most comprehensive item of expenditure by far—the one the censors make every five years for the repair and construction of public works—the Senate has control, and it is through the Senate that the censors are granted these funds.

Likewise, whatever crimes committed in Italy call for a public inquiry—I mean such things as treason, conspiracy, poisoning, and assassination—are the concern of the Senate. And beyond this,

if any private individual or any community in Italy needs a dispute settled, or, by Zeus, a penalty imposed, or assistance, or protection, all of these matters are the Senate's responsibility.

So too, if it is necessary to dispatch an embassy to any people outside Italy—whether to reconcile parties, or to issue an appeal, or, by Zeus, to give commands, or to receive a surrender, or to declare war—the Senate is the body that sees to it.

In the same way, when embassies arrive in Rome, how each is to be dealt with and what answer is to be given them is all handled through the Senate. None of the matters just described involves the people at all.

For these reasons, in turn, anyone visiting Rome while no consul is present would conclude that the constitution is a complete aristocracy.

This is precisely what many of the Greeks, and likewise many of the kings, have come to believe, since nearly all the business they have is settled by the Senate.

Chapter 14 The People

Given all this, one might reasonably ask what role at all is left to the people in the constitution,

when the Senate has authority over the particular matters we have described, and—most important of all—manages the whole of revenue and expenditure; and when the consuls, again, have unchecked power over the preparations for war and unchecked authority in the field.

Nevertheless, a role is left to the people too, and a most weighty one at that.

For the people alone in the constitution have control of honor and of punishment—the very things by which, and by which alone, dynasties and constitutions, and in short the whole life of humankind, are held together.

For where this distinction either goes unrecognized or, when recognized, is badly managed, nothing within the existing order can be administered rationally. For how could it be, when the good are held in equal honor with the wicked?

The people, then, sit in judgment, often in cases involving a fine, whenever the penalty for the offense is substantial—especially against those who have held high office. And in capital cases the people are the sole judges.

In this connection there is a practice among them that deserves praise and commemoration. For those tried on a capital charge, once they are being condemned, are permitted by their custom to depart openly, even if a single one of the tribes whose votes ratify the verdict has not yet cast its vote—thereby sentencing themselves to voluntary exile.

Safety is guaranteed to such exiles in the cities of the Neapolitans and the Praenestines, and also of the Tiburtines, and in the other cities with which Rome has sworn agreements.

Furthermore, it is the people who confer offices on those who deserve them—the finest prize for merit that a constitution can offer.

The people also have authority over the approval of laws and, most important of all, they deliberate on questions of peace and war.

And in matters of alliance, the cessation of hostilities, and treaties, it is the people who confirm each of these and make them binding—or do the opposite.

So that here again one might reasonably say that the people hold the greatest share of power and that the constitution is a democracy.

Chapter 15 Division of Political Power At Rome

We have now described how the powers of the state are divided among each of its elements. We will now explain how each of these parts can, when it chooses, work against the others or cooperate with them.

The consul, once he has obtained the authority described above and set out with his army, appears to be supreme in carrying through the tasks before him,

yet he still needs the people and the Senate, and without them he is incapable of bringing his operations to completion.

For it is clear that supplies must be sent continually to the legions; but without the Senate's consent neither grain, nor clothing, nor pay can be provided to them,

so that a commander's designs come to nothing whenever the Senate chooses to be obstructive and to thwart his work.

Moreover, whether the plans and intentions of the generals are carried out or not rests with the Senate: for it has the authority, when the year has elapsed, either to send out another general to succeed the present one or to keep the current commander in place.

The Senate also has the power to magnify and play up the successes of the commanders, and, conversely, to dim and diminish them.

For the celebrations they call "triumphs"—through which the generals bring the achievements they have accomplished vividly before the eyes of the citizens—the generals cannot conduct with proper splendor, and sometimes cannot hold at all, unless the Senate gives its approval and grants the funds for them.

As for the people, the commanders are absolutely bound to keep them in view, even if they happen to be far from home; for it is the people, as I said above, who make agreements and treaties valid or void.

But most important of all, when commanders lay down their office they must render before the people an accounting of what they have done.

And so it is in no way safe for the generals to disregard the goodwill of either the Senate or the people.

Chapter 16 The Senate Controlled by the People

The Senate, again, for all the great power it possesses, is in the first place obliged in public affairs to defer to the multitude and to keep the people in view.

And it cannot carry out the most far-reaching and serious inquiries into, and corrections of, crimes against the state—those for which the penalty is death—unless the people also ratify what has been resolved.

The same holds for matters that touch the Senate itself: if anyone introduces a law that strips away some part of the authority the Senate holds by custom, or abolishes its privileges of precedence and its honors, or, by Zeus, makes inroads on the senators' personal property, in all such cases it is the people who have the power to enact it or not.

And the decisive point: if a single one of the tribunes interposes his veto, the Senate not only cannot bring any of its deliberations to a conclusion, but cannot even convene or assemble at all—

and the tribunes are always bound to do what the people decide and above all to keep the people's wishes in view. For all these reasons, then, the Senate fears the multitude and pays heed to the people.

Chapter 17 Powers of the Senate

In the same way, the people in their turn are dependent on the Senate and must take its wishes into account, both as a community and as individuals.

For a great many contracts—too many to enumerate easily—are let out by the censors throughout the whole of Italy for the upkeep and construction of public works; and besides these there is the collection of revenue from numerous rivers, harbors, gardens, mines, and tracts of land—in short, from everything that has come under Roman control.

All these matters are handled by the general public, so that, broadly speaking, virtually everyone is bound up in these purchases and in the business that arises from them.

For some buy the contracts directly from the censors; others go into partnership with them; others stand surety for the buyers; and still others pledge their own property to the treasury on their behalf.

Over all of these affairs the Senate holds final authority: it can grant an extension of time, and in the event of an accident it can lighten the burden, and if some genuine impossibility arises it can release a man from his contract entirely.

And there are many ways in which the Senate can do great harm, or again great good, to those who manage public business, since the referral of all such matters comes before it.

But most important of all is that the judges in most trials—both public and private—involving charges of any magnitude are drawn from its members.

For this reason all citizens, being bound to its goodwill and fearful of the uncertainty of when they may need its help, are wary of obstructing or actively opposing the Senate's wishes.

In the same way they are reluctant to work against the undertakings of the consuls, because, individually and collectively, all of them fall under the consuls' authority when on campaign in the field.

Chapter 18 Interdependency Brings Strength

Since each of the parts has this power both to injure and to assist the others, their combination is suited to meet every circumstance, so that it is impossible to find a better constitutional structure than this.

For whenever some common danger from outside presses upon them and forces them to think and act together, the power of the state becomes so great and so remarkable

that nothing whatever that is needful is left undone—since everyone, all at once, competes in devising plans for whatever has arisen—and no decision once made falls behind the right moment, as each man works, both publicly and privately, toward completing the task at hand.

As a result, the distinctive character of this constitution makes it irresistible and able to achieve anything it has resolved upon.

And again, whenever they are freed from external fears and settle into the prosperity and abundance that come from their successes, enjoying their good fortune and growing corrupted by flattery and idleness, and turn toward violence and arrogance—as commonly happens—

it is then above all that the constitution can be seen supplying the remedy out of its own resources.

For whenever one of the parts swells up, becomes contentious, and gains more power than it should, it is clear that—since, as just explained, none of them is self-sufficient, and the purpose of each can be counteracted and hindered by the others—none of the parts swells up or grows overbearing.

For all of them remain within their proper bounds: some are checked in their impulse, while others are restrained from the outset by fear of interference from those beside them.

The dictator differs from the consuls in this respect: whereas each of the two consuls is attended by twelve axes, the dictator has twenty-four; and whereas the consuls in many things need the Senate's cooperation to carry out their plans, the dictator is a commander with absolute power, and the moment he is appointed, all the magistracies in Rome are immediately dissolved, except for the tribunes of the people. But we shall give a more precise account of these matters elsewhere.

Chapter 19 On the Roman Army

VI. On the Roman Military

After they have elected the consuls, they next appoint military tribunes—fourteen from those who have already completed five years of service, and another ten in addition from those who have completed ten.

As for the rest, a man must by law complete ten campaigns in the cavalry, or sixteen in the infantry, within the forty-six years counted from his coming of age—except for those whose property is assessed below four hundred drachmas.

All of these latter are assigned to naval service. But if the pressure of circumstances ever demands it, the infantry are obliged to serve twenty annual campaigns.

No one is permitted to hold any civil office until he has completed ten annual campaigns.

When the holders of the consular office are about to carry out the enrollment of soldiers, they announce in advance before the people the day on which all Romans of military age must present themselves. They do this every year.

When the day has come and the men eligible for service have arrived in Rome, and then assembled on the Capitol, the junior military tribunes divide themselves up—

in whatever order they have been appointed by the people or by the commanders—into four groups, because the basic, primary division of their forces is made into four legions.

They assigned the first four appointed to the legion called the first, the next three to the second, the four following these to the third, and the last three to the fourth.

Of the senior tribunes, they place the first two in the first legion, the next three in the second, the two following them in the third, and the last three in the fourth.

Chapter 20 Allocation of Men to the Legions

Once the division and assignment of the tribunes has been made in such a way that all the legions have an equal number of officers,

they then take their seats apart from one another, legion by legion, and draw lots for the tribes one at a time, summoning each tribe as its lot comes up.

From this tribe they pick out four of the young men who are reasonably well matched in age and physical condition.

When these have been brought forward, the officers of the first legion take the first pick, those of the second legion second, those of the third third, and those of the fourth last.

When another four are brought forward, the officers of the second legion take the first choice, and so on in order, with those of the first legion choosing last.

After this, when yet another four are brought forward, the officers of the third legion choose first, and those of the second last.

With the selection proceeding by rotation in this regular way throughout, it turns out that the men taken into each of the legions are closely comparable.

When they have selected the prescribed number—which is sometimes four thousand two hundred infantry for each legion, and at other times five thousand, whenever some greater danger looms before them—

after this they pass the cavalry. In the old days they used to review the cavalry afterward, following the four thousand two hundred infantry, but now they do it beforehand, since the selection of the cavalry is now made by the censor on the basis of wealth; and they enroll three hundred for each legion.

Chapter 21 Fourfold Division of the Legionaries

Once the enrollment has been completed in the manner described above, the tribunes responsible in each legion assemble the men who have been selected, and from the whole body they pick out the single most suitable man.

They then make him swear that he will obey his commanders and carry out their orders to the best of his ability.

All the rest then come forward one by one and take the oath, simply declaring that they will do everything just as the first man did.

At the same time, the holders of the consular office send instructions to the magistrates of the allied cities of Italy from which they wish allied troops to serve alongside them, specifying the number required, the day, and the place at which the selected men must present themselves.

The cities then carry out a selection and administer an oath very much like the one described, appoint a commander and a paymaster, and send the men out.

Meanwhile the tribunes at Rome, after administering the oath, assign each legion a day and a place at which the men must present themselves without their arms, and for the time being they dismiss them.

When the men arrive on the appointed day, the tribunes sort them out: the youngest and poorest they assign to the skirmishers (velites), those next in age to the so-called hastati, those in the prime of life to the principes, and the oldest to the triarii.

For these are the divisions among the Romans, and this is their number, distinguished by name, by age, and also by their equipment, in each legion.

They divide them in such a way that the oldest, called triarii, number six hundred, the principes twelve hundred, the hastati an equal number to these, and the remainder, the youngest, form the skirmishers.

If the legion numbers more than four thousand, they make the division proportionally, except for the triarii, whose number always stays the same.

Chapter 22 Arms of the Youngest Roman Soldiers

The youngest soldiers are ordered to carry a sword, javelins, and a round shield (parma).

The parma is sturdily constructed and large enough to give protection: being circular in shape, it has a diameter of three feet.

The soldier is also equipped with a plain helmet, and at times he puts a wolf's skin or something of the kind over it, both for protection and as a mark of recognition, so that the officers of each unit can see whether he is fighting bravely in the front of danger or not.

The shaft of the javelin is about two cubits in length and roughly a finger thick, while its head is a span long and beaten out so fine and sharpened to such a degree that it inevitably bends on the first impact, so that the enemy cannot throw it back; otherwise the weapon would be of use to both sides alike.

Chapter 23 Arms of the Other Soldiers

To the second group by age, those called the hastati, they gave orders to carry the full panoply.

The Roman panoply consists, first, of a long shield (scutum)—its curved surface two and a half feet wide, four feet long, and the thickness at the rim a palm's breadth.

It is made of two layers of board fastened together with bull's-hide glue, then covered on the outer surface first with canvas and after that with calf's skin.

Around the rim, both on the upper and the lower parts, it has an iron edging, by which it is protected against the downward strokes of swords and against wear from being rested on the ground.

An iron boss is also fitted to it, which wards off the heavier blows of stones, pikes, and violent missiles generally.

Along with the shield they carry a sword, which is worn on the right thigh and is called the Spanish sword (gladius hispaniensis).

It has an excellent point and can deliver a powerful cut with either edge, because its blade is strong and rigid.

In addition to these they carry two heavy javelins (pila), a bronze helmet, and a greave. Of the pila, some are thick and some thin.

Of the heavier ones, the round-shafted have a diameter of a palm's breadth, and the square-shafted measure a palm on each side. The thin ones resemble moderate-sized hunting spears, and they are carried together with the ones already mentioned.

The wooden shaft of all of them is about three cubits long, and to each is fitted a barbed iron head equal in length to the wood.

They make the attachment and fitting of the head so secure that they sink it into the wood as far as the middle and fasten it down with a row of clasps, so that in use the iron breaks sooner than the binding works loose, even though at the base, where it joins the wood, its thickness is three half-fingers; so great is the care they take over the fastening.

On top of all this they adorn themselves with a circlet of feathers and three upright purple or black plumes,

about a cubit high; with these set on the crown of the head along with the rest of the arms, the man appears twice his own height, and his look is handsome and terrifying to the enemy.

Most of the soldiers, after adding a bronze plate a span square—which they place in front of the chest and call a heart-guard (pectorale)—have their full equipment complete.

But those rated above ten thousand drachmas (asses) wear, instead of the heart-guard and along with the rest, a coat of chain mail (lorica).

The principes and triarii are armed in the same manner, except that instead of the heavy javelins the triarii carry thrusting spears (hastae).

Chapter 24 Officers of Infantry and Cavalry

From each of the groups mentioned above, except the youngest, they elect ten company commanders (centurions) by merit. After these they make a second selection of ten more.

All of these they have titled company commanders, and the first one chosen is also a member of the council of war. These officers in turn select an equal number of rear-rank men (optiones).

Next, together with the company commanders, they divide each age-group into ten parts, except for the skirmishers, and they assign to each part of the selected men two leaders and two rear-rank officers.

The skirmishers they distribute in equal proportion across all the parts according to their total number.

Each part they called a unit (ordo), a company (manipulus), and a vexillum, and the leaders they called centurions and ordinum ductores.

These officers in turn select for each company, from the men left over, two of the most vigorous and noble men to serve as standard-bearers.

They reasonably appoint two leaders for each unit: since it is uncertain both what a leader may do and what may happen to him, and since the demands of war allow no excuse for delay, they never want a company to be left without a leader and commander.

When both are present, the first one chosen commands the right part of the company, and the second leads the men on the left of the unit; when one is absent, the one who remains commands them all.

They want their company commanders to be not so much bold and fond of danger as men fit to command—steady, and rather of a deep spirit—men who will not rush into attack or open the battle on their own initiative, but who, when overpowered and hard pressed, will hold their ground and die in defense of their post.

Chapter 25 Officers and Armour of the Cavalry

In much the same way they divide the cavalry into ten squadrons, and from each they choose three squadron-commanders; these three then each appoint a rear-rank officer of their own.

The first commander chosen leads the squadron, while the other two hold the rank of decade-leaders, though all alike are called decurions. If the first commander is not present, the second again takes over command of the squadron.

The equipment of the cavalry is now very similar to that of the Greeks, but in early times it was not so. First, they wore no breastplates,

but went into action in loincloths only. The result was that they were ready and efficient at dismounting and quickly springing back up onto their horses, but at close fighting they were in a precarious position, since they faced danger unprotected.

Their spears, too, were useless to them in two respects. First, because they made them thin and pliant, they could neither take aim at a chosen target, nor, before they could plant the spearhead into anything, keep the spears from being shaken by the very motion of the horses, so that most of them snapped.

Besides this, since they made the spears without butt-spikes, they had the use of only the first stroke delivered with the spearhead; after that, once the shafts had broken, the weapons were of no further use and worthless to them. As for the shield, they carried one made of ox-hide,

resembling the round, knobbed sacrificial cakes that are set out for offerings. These shields were of no use for charging, since they had no firmness, and once the rains had stripped off their leather and rotted them, they were awkward to handle even before, and now became completely so. Therefore, since this equipment proved unsatisfactory,

they quickly adopted the Greek pattern of arms.

With these weapons, the first stroke of the spearhead is at once both well-aimed and effective, since by its construction the spear is steady and stable; and likewise the reversed use of the butt-spike is firm and forceful.

The same holds for the shields: both for warding off blows and for thrusting, they have a use that is solid and dependable.

Once the Romans recognized these advantages, they quickly imitated them; for the Romans, if any people ever were, are good at taking over the customs of others and emulating what is better.

Chapter 26 The Roman Camp

Having made this division of the men, and having given these orders concerning their arms, the military tribunes then dismissed the men to their homes. When the day arrived

on which they had all sworn to assemble likewise at the place appointed by the consuls —

for each consul as a rule assigns a separate place for his own legions, since to each is given a portion of the allies and two of the Roman legions —

all those enrolled present themselves without fail, since no other excuse is allowed to those who have taken the oath, except an adverse omen from the birds or sheer impossibility.

When the allies too have assembled together with the Romans, the organization and management of them is carried out by the officers appointed by the consuls, who are called praefects and are twelve in number.

These officers first select for the consuls, out of all the allies who have come, those cavalry and infantry best suited for genuine service; they are called the extraordinarii, which, translated, means "the picked men."

The total number of the allies is, in infantry, generally about equal to the Roman legions, and in cavalry three times as many.

From these they take for the picked corps roughly a third of the cavalry and a fifth of the infantry. The rest they divide into two parts,

and call the one the right wing and the other the left wing.

When these arrangements had been made, the military tribunes took over both the Romans and the allies and made camp. They have a single, simple principle governing their camps, which they apply at every occasion and in every place.

For this reason it seems to me fitting on the present occasion to try, as far as words can do so, to bring my hearers to an understanding of how the Romans handle their forces on the march, in the camp, and in the line of battle.

For who is so indifferent to fine and serious achievements that he would not be willing to take a little extra care over such matters, about which, once he has heard them, he will be knowledgeable in one of the things genuinely worth describing and knowing?

Chapter 27 How the Camp is Constructed

The manner of their encampment is as follows. Of whatever site has been chosen for the camp, the general's tent takes the spot best suited at once for a commanding view and for issuing orders. Once the standard has been set up

where they intend to pitch it, a square area is measured off around the standard, such that all its sides lie a hundred feet from the standard, and the enclosed area amounts to four plethra.

Along one face and side of this figure — whichever appears most convenient for watering and foraging — the Roman legions are laid out in the following way.

Since there are six military tribunes in each legion, as stated just now, and since there are always two Roman legions with each of the consuls, it is clear that twelve tribunes must serve with each consul.

They place the tents of these tribunes all on one straight line, which is parallel to the chosen side of the square and stands fifty feet away from it, so that there may be room for the horses, along with the pack animals and the rest of the tribunes' baggage.

The tents are pitched turned the opposite way, facing toward the outer side — which is henceforth to be understood and called by us, once and for all, the front of the whole layout.

The tribunes' tents stand at equal distances from one another, spread over enough ground that they extend along the entire width of the Roman legions.

Chapter 28 Division by Roads and Squares

When a further hundred feet have been measured off toward the front, along the whole line of tents, then, starting from the straight line that bounds this width — which runs parallel to the tribunes' tents — they begin from this line to lay out the quarters of the legions, proceeding in the following manner.

Bisecting the aforementioned line, they quarter the cavalry of each legion at this point at right angles to the line, facing one another, fifty feet apart, making the dividing line the middle of the interval.

The arrangement of the tents for the cavalry and for the infantry is much the same, for the whole figure, both of the maniple and of the troops, comes out square.

This square faces onto the passageways, and has a fixed length along the passageway — namely a hundred feet — and for the most part they try to make the depth equal too, except in the case of the allies.

But when they employ larger legions, they add proportionally to both the length and the depth.

Chapter 29 Placement of Triarii, Principes, and Hastati

The cavalry encampment lies opposite the middle of the tribunes' tents, set crosswise—like a transverse street—to the line just described and to the area in front of the tribunes.

In fact, the layout of all the passages comes out very much like a system of streets, since on either side the units are quartered lengthwise—companies on one side, squadrons on the other.

Behind the cavalry just mentioned, they place the triarii of both legions, one company opposite each squadron, in a corresponding arrangement: the two blocks touch each other, but face in opposite directions, away from the cavalry.

They make the depth of each company only half its length, because the triarii are generally only half as numerous as the other divisions.

For this reason, although the numbers of men are often unequal, all the divisions still come out equal in length, thanks to the difference in depth.

Next, leaving a space of fifty feet on each side of these, they station the principes facing the triarii.

Since the principes also face toward the spaces just mentioned, two more streets are formed here as well. These begin from the same line and have their entrances, like those of the cavalry, from the hundred-foot space in front of the tribunes, and they run down to the side of the rampart opposite the tribunes—the side we agreed from the outset to treat as the front of the whole layout.

Behind the principes, again facing the opposite way and with their blocks touching, they station the hastati.

Since all these divisions have ten companies each, according to the original division, all the streets turn out equal in length, and their ends along the front side of the rampart line up evenly. Toward that side they also turn the last companies as they pitch their camp.

Chapter 30 Placement of the Allies

Again leaving a space of fifty feet beyond the hastati, they station the allied cavalry facing them, beginning from the same line and ending at the same one.

The number of the allies, as I said above, is in infantry roughly equal to that of the Roman legions—less by the picked troops set apart—while in cavalry it is double, after a third of these too has been drawn off for the picked troops.

Therefore, increasing the depth of the allied cavalry's quarters proportionally in the camp layout, they try to make them equal in length to the Roman legions.

Once all five passages have been completed, they next set out the companies of the allied infantry facing the opposite way—just as with the cavalry—increasing their depth proportionally, and facing toward the rampart and toward each of the two side faces.

In each company, the officers take the first tents at either end. While arranging them in the manner described, they also set the sixth squadron in each division fifty feet apart from the fifth, and likewise the infantry companies,

so that here too another passage is formed across the middle of the camp, crosswise to the streets and parallel to the tribunes' tents. They call this the fifth passage, because it runs alongside the fifth units.

Chapter 31 The Camp Market-Place

The space that lies behind, beneath the tribunes' tents, and that borders the headquarters enclosure on either side, serves on one side as the market-place, and on the other for the quartermaster's office and the supplies that go with it.

Starting from the last of the tribunes' tents on each side and running back—arranged in a kind of L-shape relative to those tents—the choicest of the picked cavalry, together with some of those serving as volunteers out of personal regard for the consuls, all encamp along the side faces of the rampart, some facing the quartermaster's stores, the others, on the opposite side, facing the market-place.

As a rule, it falls to these men not only to camp close to the consuls, but also, on the march and in other duties, to attend upon and constantly remain about the consul and the quartermaster.

Facing them, looking toward the rampart, are the infantry who perform a service like that of the cavalry just described.

Next to these a passage is left, a hundred feet wide, parallel to the tribunes' tents, extending along the far side of the market-place, headquarters, and quartermaster's office, past all the parts of the rampart already mentioned.

Along the upper side of this passage the picked cavalry of the allies encamp, facing the market-place, the headquarters, and the quartermaster's office at once.

Down the middle of these cavalry quarters, in line with the headquarters enclosure itself, a passage fifty feet wide is left, leading to the rear side of the camp and lying at right angles to the broad avenue just mentioned.

Facing these cavalry, again, are placed the picked infantry of the allies, looking toward the rampart and the rear face of the whole camp.

The space left empty on either side of these, along the side faces, is given over to foreign troops and to such allies as join at the moment.

With everything arranged in this way, the overall shape of the camp comes out as a square with equal sides, while in its detailed layout—both the street plan and the rest of the organization—it has an arrangement much like a city.

They keep the rampart two hundred feet away from the tents along every face. This empty space affords them many valuable advantages.

It is well and conveniently suited for the marching in and out of the units: each body makes its exit into this space along its own street, so that they do not all converge onto one road, overturning and trampling one another.

They also bring into it the livestock driven in and the plunder taken from the enemy, and keep them safely through the nights.

Most important of all, in night attacks neither fire nor missile reaches them, except for a very few; and even these do almost no harm, because of the great distance and the screen of the tents.

Chapter 32 Arrangements When There Are More Men

Once the number of both infantry and cavalry is fixed for each plan—whether they make each legion four thousand or five thousand strong—and likewise the depth, length, and number of the companies are fixed, along with the dimensions of the passages and avenues, and everything else as well,

it becomes possible for anyone willing to attend closely to work out both the size of the site and the entire perimeter of the camp. But if at any time the number of allies grows larger,

whether of those who set out with the army from the start or of those who join at the moment,

for those who join at the moment they fill, besides the places already described, the spaces beside the headquarters as well, contracting the market-place and quartermaster's office into whatever space the need urgently demands.

For those who march out with the army from the start, if their number is fairly large, they add one extra street on each side of the Roman legions, alongside the side faces, in addition to those already there.

When all four legions and both consuls are gathered into a single camp, one need only imagine two armies, encamped according to the scheme just described, joined together facing opposite ways and meeting at the quarters of each legion's picked troops—the men we placed facing the rear face of the whole camp.

In that case the shape becomes oblong, the site twice as large, and the perimeter half as much again.

So whenever both consuls happen to encamp together, they always lay out the camp in this way; but when they camp separately, everything else is the same, except that they place the market-place, quartermaster's office, and headquarters between the two camps.

Chapter 33 Guard Duty and Other Assignments

Once the camp has been laid out, the tribunes gather everyone in it, free and slave alike, and administer an oath to each man individually.

Each swears that he will steal nothing from the camp, and that if he finds anything he will bring it to the tribunes.

From the maniples of principes and hastati in each legion they next assign two maniples to the open square in front of the tribunes' tents.

Since the Romans spend most of the daytime in that area, they are careful to have it constantly watered and kept clean.

Of the remaining eighteen maniples, each tribune receives three by lot, since each legion under this arrangement has three such maniples assigned to each of the six tribunes.

Each of those three maniples in turn performs the following services for its tribune: when the army encamps they pitch his tent and level the ground around it; if any part of his baggage has to be fenced off for protection, they do that as well.

They also provide him with two pickets, each of four men, some stationed in front of the tent and others behind it by the horses.

Since each tribune has three maniples, and each maniple contains more than a hundred men—not counting the triarii and velites, who are exempt from this duty—

and since the duty falls to each maniple only once every four days, the burden is light, while the arrangement gives the tribunes both the service they need and an impressive dignity.

The maniples of triarii are excused from attendance on the tribunes, but each maniple supplies a daily guard to the cavalry squadron quartered just behind it.

These men keep watch in general, but especially over the horses, so that they do not get entangled in their tethers, injure themselves, or break loose and plunge into the rest, throwing the camp into confusion.

Finally, one maniple out of the whole force takes turns each day in mounting guard around the consul, both to protect him from plots and to add splendor to his rank.

Chapter 34 Daily Orders and Watchwords

For digging the ditch and building the rampart, two sides of the camp are assigned to the allies, the sides by which their two wings are quartered, and two to the Romans, one for each legion.

Each side is divided maniple by maniple, and the centurions supervise the work section by section, while two tribunes oversee the entire side.

These same tribunes also direct the rest of the camp's business. They divide themselves into pairs, and each pair takes charge in turn for two months out of the six.

Whichever pair is on duty at the time supervises the operations in the field. The prefects of the allies divide their responsibilities in the same way.

At dawn the cavalry officers and centurions report to the tribunes, and the tribunes in turn go to the consul.

He gives them whatever instructions are needed, the tribunes pass these on to the officers, and the officers then convey them to the troops whenever the occasion requires.

The night watchword is distributed in the following manner.

From each class of troops, cavalry and infantry alike, one man is chosen from the tenth and last maniple, the unit quartered at the end of the street.

This man is excused from guard duty and presents himself each evening at sunset at the tribune's tent, where he receives the watchword written on a tablet; then he withdraws.

Returning to his own maniple, he hands over both tablet and watchword before witnesses to the commander of the next maniple, and that man does the same to the commander beyond him. So it passes from hand to hand until it reaches the first maniples, those nearest the tribunes, and these must return the tablet to the tribunes before dark.

If all the issued tablets are returned, the tribune knows that the watchword has passed through the whole line.

If one is missing, he can tell from the inscription where the failure occurred and immediately investigates, so that the man responsible receives the punishment he deserves.

Chapter 35 Night Watches

Their system for the night watches is as follows. The consul and his tent are guarded by the maniple assigned to that duty.

The tribunes' quarters and the cavalry squadrons are guarded by the men detailed from each maniple in the manner already described.

Each separate unit also posts its own guard from among its own men, while the remaining watches are assigned by the consul.

Usually there are three sentries at the quaestor's tent, and two at the tent of each legate and each member of the council.

The outer perimeter is guarded by the velites, who keep watch along the whole rampart by day, and who also place sentries at the gates, ten at each entrance.

As for the men appointed to the actual watches, the rear-rank officer of each company brings the one assigned to the first watch to the tribune in the evening, one man from each picket.

The tribune gives each of them a small wooden token marked for that watch, and with these they go off to their assigned posts.

The duty of making the rounds belongs to the cavalry. The first squadron commander in each legion must early in the morning order one of his rear-rank men to notify four young troopers of that squadron that they are to patrol.

In the evening that same man informs the commander of the next squadron that the duty passes to him on the following day.

That commander makes the same arrangements for the day after, and so the responsibility continues in rotation.

The four men selected from the first squadron draw lots for the different watches, then go to the tribune and receive written notice of how many watches they must inspect and which they are.

After this, the four take up their position beside the first maniple of the triarii, for the centurion of that maniple is responsible for sounding the bugle for each watch.

Chapter 36

When the time comes, the man on whom the first watch has fallen by lot goes the rounds for that watch, taking some companions with him as witnesses.

He inspects the appointed guards—not only those on the rampart and at the gates, but also those stationed with the individual maniples and cavalry squadrons.

If he finds the men of the watch awake, he takes back their token; if he finds anyone asleep or absent from his post, he calls his companions to witness it and then moves on.

Those assigned to the later watches do the same.

The sounding of the bugle for each watch, so that the patrols and the sentries keep the same reckoning, belongs to the centurions of the first maniple of the triarii, one in each of the two camps, in daily rotation.

At daybreak each patrol brings the collected tokens back to the tribune. If all are returned, the guards are dismissed without accusation.

But if any patrol brings back fewer than the proper number, the missing picket is identified from the mark on the token.

Once the responsible watch is identified, the tribune summons the centurion, who brings forward the men assigned to that guard, and they are confronted with the patrolman.

If the fault clearly lies with the guards, the patrolman is immediately acquitted, since he is required to produce witnesses and did so. But if he failed to do that, the blame falls upon the patrolman himself.

Chapter 37 The Tribunes' Court

When an accusation is brought, the tribunes at once convene a court, and if the accused is convicted he is punished by cudgeling.

The punishment works like this: the tribune takes a cudgel and merely touches the condemned man with it.

At that signal all the men in the camp attack him with clubs and stones, and most of them are killed on the spot inside the camp itself.

Even those who manage to escape are not really saved. How could they be? They cannot return to their own country, and no relative would dare receive such a man into his house. So anyone who falls into this misfortune is completely ruined.

The same penalty applies to the rear-rank officer and to the commander of the cavalry squadron if they fail to give the proper order at the proper time, the former to the patrols and the latter to the commander of the next squadron.

Because this punishment is so severe and unavoidable, the Roman night watches are kept with unfailing strictness.

The soldiers are answerable to the tribunes, and the tribunes to the consuls.

A tribune has authority to fine a man, seize his property as security, or have him flogged; among the allies the prefects have the same powers.

This cudgeling punishment is also inflicted on anyone who steals from the camp, bears false witness, is found guilty in his prime of shameful sexual misconduct, or has been punished three times for the same offense.

These are treated as crimes. But the following are classed as cowardice and military disgrace: falsely reporting brave deeds to the tribunes in order to win honors;

or, if men have been posted in reserve, abandoning the assigned position out of fear; likewise, if in the moment of danger a man throws away any of his weapons through fear.

That is why some men openly choose death at their post, unwilling to leave their station because they dread the punishment awaiting them.

Others, if they have dropped shield, sword, or some other piece of armor in battle, throw themselves recklessly at the enemy, hoping either to recover what they lost or to escape by death the certain shame and the insults of their family.

Chapter 38 Military Punishments and Rewards

If the same offense is committed by a larger body of men—for instance, if whole standards give way and abandon their ground under pressure—then they do not think it right to cudgel or execute them all.

Instead they have found a remedy that is both effective and terrifying. The tribune assembles the legion, brings the offenders into the middle, denounces them bitterly, and then selects by lot five, or eight, or sometimes twenty, always aiming at roughly a tenth of the men who were guilty of cowardice.

Those on whom the lot falls are put to death by cudgeling without mercy; the rest are given barley instead of wheat and are ordered to camp outside the rampart and outside the protection of the camp.

Since all face the same danger from the lottery, and since all alike are made an example of by the disgrace of barley rations, this is the strongest possible way both to inspire terror and to correct the failure that has occurred.

Chapter 39 Military Decorations

The Romans are also excellent at stirring young men to face danger bravely.

Whenever a battle has taken place and some men have distinguished themselves, the consul summons an assembly of the army, brings forward those whom he thinks have done anything notable, and first praises each man for his courage, mentioning any other honorable achievements of his life as well.

After that he grants rewards: to the man who has wounded an enemy, a spear; to the man who has struck him down and stripped him, a cup if he is an infantryman, horse-trappings if he is a cavalryman. In earlier times the spear alone was given.

These rewards are not given for deeds done in a pitched battle or in the capture of a city, but rather in skirmishes and similar situations where there was no strict necessity for a man to expose himself, and he took the risk deliberately and on his own initiative.

To those who are first over the wall in the storming of a city he gives a golden crown.

In the same way, the consul marks with gifts those who have shielded and saved any citizen or ally, and the tribunes require the men who were saved to crown their rescuer, whether willingly or, if necessary, by formal decision.

The man whose life was saved honors his rescuer for the rest of his life as if he were a father, and owes him every duty that a son owes a parent.

Such encouragement stirs not only those who witness it and stand present in the ranks, but also those who remain at home, to rivalry and zeal in the face of danger.

For those who win such rewards enjoy not only glory in the camp and immediate fame at home, but after returning to their own city they also take part in processions with special distinction, since only men honored by their generals for valor may wear these decorations.

They also display the spoils in the most prominent places in their houses, as signs and proofs of their own courage.

With such care given in the camp to rewards and punishments alike, it is no wonder that Roman warfare ends in brilliant and successful results.

An infantryman receives two obols a day in pay, a centurion double that, and a cavalryman a drachma.

The infantry ration is about two-thirds of an Attic medimnus of wheat per month. The cavalry receive seven medimni of barley and two of wheat.

Among the allies, the infantry receive the same amount, while the cavalry receive one and a third medimni of wheat and five of barley.

For the allies this ration is a free grant, but from the Romans the quaestor deducts at a fixed rate the cost of grain, clothing, and any additional weapons they may need, taking it out of their pay.

Chapter 40 The Army On the March

Their method of striking camp and marching is as follows.

At the first trumpet call everyone takes down the tents and packs the baggage; but no one may either strike or raise a tent before the tents of the tribunes and the consul have been dealt with.

At the second signal they load the baggage animals; at the third the first troops must advance and set the whole camp in motion.

In the vanguard they usually place the picked troops; next comes the right wing of the allies, and behind them their baggage animals.

After these follows the first Roman legion, with its own baggage behind it.

Then comes the second legion, followed by its own baggage and by the baggage of the allied wing assigned to the rear, for the left wing of the allies takes the last position in the march.

The cavalry sometimes ride behind their own divisions, and sometimes move alongside the baggage animals, keeping them together and providing them security.

If an attack is expected from the rear, the rest of the order remains much the same, except that the picked allied troops take over the rear instead of the vanguard.

On alternate days the legions and allied wings exchange the leading place, so that all alike share the advantage of reaching water and forage first.

In especially dangerous circumstances they use another order of march, when they are moving over open ground.

They then advance in three parallel columns of hastati, principes, and triarii, placing the baggage of the leading standards in front of all, the baggage of the second line behind the first, and the baggage of the third behind the second, so that baggage and fighting units alternate in succession.

With the column arranged in this way, if danger appears they wheel either to shield-side or spear-side, bring the standards clear of the baggage, and face the enemy.

Thus in a short time and by a single movement the heavy infantry take up a battle line, except when the hastati also need to wheel farther into position.

The baggage train and all those accompanying it then remain drawn up behind the line, in the proper place for safety in the coming danger.

Chapter 41 Making Camp

Whenever, on the march, they are nearing the place where they will camp, a tribune and those centurions previously selected for the task ride ahead.

After surveying the whole site, they first determine where the consul's tent must stand, in accordance with the system already described, and on which side of the praetorium the legions are to be quartered.

Once these points are settled, they measure out the enclosure of the praetorium, then the straight line on which the tribunes' tents are to stand, and next the parallel line from which the legions' quarters begin.

In the same way they mark out the lines on the other sides of the consul's tent, following the arrangement that I explained in detail earlier.

This is done quickly, because the measurements are easy and all the intervals are fixed beforehand and familiar.

Then they set up standards: first one where the consul's tent is to stand, second one on the chosen side of the enclosure, a third in the middle of the line where the tribunes camp, and a fourth beside the line from which the legions' quarters begin. These are scarlet standards,

except for the consul's, which is white. On the other sides they sometimes plant plain spears and sometimes standards of other colors.

After this they measure out the streets and set up spears along each street.

So when the troops approach and the site of the camp comes clearly into view, everyone can immediately recognize the entire layout by taking the consul's standard as the point of reference.

Since each man already knows exactly on which street and in what place on that street he is to pitch his tent, because every unit always occupies the same position in camp, the whole thing resembles an army entering its own city.

There too, once people have passed the gates and turned off, each goes straight to his own lodging without hesitation, because he knows generally and in detail where his quarters lie within the city.

Exactly the same thing happens in Roman camps.

Chapter 42 Roman Camps Designed for Facility and Familiarity

In this matter the Romans seem to me to follow a course directly opposite to that of the Greeks, because their main aim in encampment is ease and regularity.

The Greeks think the chief consideration in choosing a camp is to take advantage of the natural strength of the site, partly because they wish to avoid the labor of digging ditches, and partly because they believe artificial defenses are not equal to the protections supplied by nature.

As a result, they are forced to alter the whole shape of the camp to fit the ground, and also to rearrange its parts in irregular and shifting ways.

That means neither the individual soldier nor the individual unit has any fixed and familiar place in camp.

The Romans, by contrast, choose to endure the labor of digging and the other hardships that go with fortification for the sake of convenience and familiarity, so that they may always have one and the same camp arrangement.

These, then, are the principal features of the Roman system of camps, and especially of the way they lay them out.

Chapter 43 The Roman Republic Compared with Others

Nearly all historians have handed down to us a reputation for excellence in the constitutions of Sparta, Crete, Mantinea, and Carthage; some have also mentioned those of Athens and Thebes.

I will set the latter aside, since I am convinced that the constitutions of Athens and Thebes do not deserve much discussion: they neither grew in an orderly way, nor remained long at their height, nor passed through their changes with moderation.

Rather, like some sudden stroke of fortune, they flashed into brilliance for a moment and then, just when they still seemed to be flourishing and likely to prosper, they encountered the opposite turn.

The Thebans won their reputation among the Greeks by taking advantage of Spartan blindness and the hatred of Sparta's allies, through the excellence of one man, or at most two, who understood the situation.

That it was not the structure of the Theban constitution but the quality of its leaders that caused those successes was soon made evident by events themselves.

For the rise, the high point, and the fall of Theban power all plainly coincided with the lives of Epaminondas and Pelopidas.

So we must conclude that it was not the constitution but those men that caused the good fortune Thebes enjoyed at that time.

Chapter 44 The Athenian Constitution

A similar judgment must be made about the Athenian constitution.

It may have enjoyed more frequent intervals of excellence, but its most brilliant flowering came with the ability of Themistocles, and it quickly experienced the opposite turn because of its unstable nature.

For the Athenian people are always like a ship without a master.

When fear at sea or the pressure of a storm makes the passengers unite and heed the helmsman, they perform admirably.

But once confidence returns and they begin to despise their officers and quarrel among themselves because they no longer all want the same thing,

with some insisting on sailing on, others pressing the helmsman to put in to harbor, some letting out the sheets while others pull them in and shout to furl the sails, then the spectacle is disgraceful to outside observers because of their conflict and disorder, and dangerous to all who share in the voyage.

So it often happens that after escaping the open sea and the fiercest storms, they wreck themselves in harbor and close to land.

The same thing has repeatedly happened to the Athenian constitution. More than once it has survived the gravest and most frightening dangers through the courage of the people and their leaders, only to stumble recklessly in times of security and ease.

So there is no need to say more about either Athens or Thebes, since in both states the whole system is managed by a mob acting on its own impulse—the one distinguished by sharpness and volatility, the other trained in violence and fury.

Chapter 45 The Cretan Constitution Compared to the Spartan

Turning now to the Cretan constitution, two questions deserve attention: first, how the most learned ancient writers—Ephorus, Xenophon, Callisthenes, and Plato—could say that it was the same as the Spartan constitution; and second, how they could also praise it.

In my judgment neither claim is true.

This can be seen from the following points, and I will first explain how unlike the Spartan system it is. The first distinctive feature of the Spartan constitution, they say, concerns landed property: no citizen may possess more than another, but all must have an equal share in the civic land.

The second concerns wealth in money. Because money-making is held in disrepute there, the rivalry that grows out of having more or less is removed altogether from the state.

A third point is that among the Spartans the kings hold office for life by hereditary right, while the men called elders likewise hold office for life, and through them and with them the whole state is governed.

Chapter 46 Greed Among the Cretans

Among the Cretans the exact opposite of all this is true. Their laws allow them, as the saying goes, to acquire land without limit according to their power.

Money is held in such honor among them that possessing it seems not only necessary but positively admirable.

Indeed greed for base profit and grasping selfishness are so deeply rooted there that among the Cretans alone of all mankind no gain of any kind is considered shameful.

Their magistracies too are annual, and their system has a democratic character.

So I often wonder how anyone could describe constitutions that are so opposite in nature as if they were kindred and closely related.

And besides overlooking differences of such importance, these writers go on at length in praise of Lycurgus, saying that he alone among lawgivers grasped the essential point.

For since there are two things by which every constitution is preserved—courage against enemies and concord among citizens—they say that by abolishing greed he abolished at the same time all civil strife and faction.

That is why the Spartans, being free from such evils, became the best-governed and most united people in Greece in their relations with one another.

Yet though these same writers can see, by direct comparison, that the Cretans because of their inborn greed are constantly entangled in private and public seditions, murders, and civil wars, they still think this does not affect their argument and boldly say the two constitutions are alike.

Ephorus even uses almost the same language for both systems, so that if someone paid no attention to the proper names, he could hardly tell which constitution was being described.

So much, then, for the ways in which the two differ. I must now explain why the Cretan constitution is neither admirable nor worthy of imitation.

Chapter 47 What Makes a Constitution Good

I think there are two fundamental principles in every constitution, and by these its powers and structure become either desirable or objectionable: customs and laws.

Good customs and laws make men's private lives reverent and self-controlled, and make the public character of the city gentle and just; bad ones do the opposite.

So whenever we see excellent customs and laws among a people, we confidently conclude that the men themselves and their constitution will also be good.

And when we see private lives marked by greed and public conduct marked by injustice, it is plainly reasonable to say that their laws, customs, and whole political order are bad.

Now apart from a very few exceptions, one could hardly find private conduct more treacherous than that of the Cretans, or public measures more unjust.

Therefore, since their constitution is neither like the Spartan nor in any way worthy of choice or imitation, I reject it from this comparison.

Nor is it right to introduce Plato's republic either, even though some philosophers speak of it with admiration.

For just as we do not admit to athletic contests those performers or athletes who have neither won recognition nor undergone proper training, so we should not admit Plato's constitution to this contest for first place unless it can first demonstrate some real achievement in practice.

As things stand, to compare it with the constitutions of Sparta, Rome, and Carthage would be like setting up a statue beside living, breathing men and inviting comparison.

Even if the statue were flawless as a work of art, comparing the lifeless with the living would still strike the spectators as inadequate and entirely out of place.

Chapter 48 Institutions of Lycurgus

Leaving those aside, I return to the Spartan constitution.

It seems to me that Lycurgus legislated and planned so well for securing harmony among the citizens, preserving Laconia safely, and maintaining Sparta's freedom that one might think his insight something more than human.

Equality in property, simplicity and commonality in daily life were likely to make private conduct disciplined and the public order free from faction, while training men to endure labor and danger would make them brave and high-minded.

When courage and self-control come together in one soul or one city, vice can hardly grow from them, nor can such men easily be overcome by their neighbors.

By constructing his constitution on these principles, Lycurgus secured lasting safety for all Laconia and left the Spartans themselves a freedom that endured for a very long time.

But as for conquering neighboring peoples, gaining supremacy, and in general competing for wider power, he seems to me to have made no provision at all, either in particular measures or in the system as a whole.

What still remained was to create in the citizens some necessity or settled purpose that would make the common spirit of the city, as well as private life, self-sufficient and moderate.

In fact, although he made them utterly disinterested and sober-minded in their own personal lives and in the institutions of their own city, he left them toward the rest of Greece excessively ambitious, hungry for rule, and greedy for advantage.

Chapter 49 The Defect in the Spartan Constitution

Who does not know that the Spartans were among the first Greeks to cast covetous eyes on their neighbors' land, and for sheer greed undertook a war to enslave the Messenians?

And who has not read that, out of stubborn rivalry, they swore not to raise the siege until they had taken Messene by force?

It is equally well known to everyone that, out of their passion for supremacy in Greece, they later submitted to take orders from the very people whom they had once defeated in battle.

For when the Persians invaded, they fought and won in defense of Greek freedom.

But after the invaders had gone back and fled, the Spartans handed over the Greek cities to them in the Peace of Antalcidas, in order to get money for their domination over Greece.

It was then that the defect in their legislation became visible.

As long as they aimed only at ruling their immediate neighbors, and later the Peloponnesians themselves, the resources and supplies of Laconia were enough for them. They had provisions ready at hand and could make rapid returns home and easy transport of supplies.

But once they undertook to send fleets overseas and to campaign with armies outside the Peloponnese, it became obvious that neither their iron currency nor the exchange of yearly produce, in accordance with Lycurgus' laws, could supply what they lacked.

Such enterprises required a currency accepted everywhere and provisions from abroad.

So they were compelled to stand at Persian doors, impose tribute on the islanders, and levy silver from all the Greeks, having learned that under Lycurgus' legislation it was impossible not only to claim the leadership of Greece but, in fact, to compete for great affairs at all.

Chapter 50 Sparta Compared with Rome

Why, then, have I gone into this digression? So that the facts themselves may make clear that Lycurgus' legislation is sufficient for the secure preservation of a people's own territory and for maintaining its freedom.

And for those who regard that as the proper end of a constitution, it must be granted that no arrangement has ever existed, or does now exist, more choiceworthy than the Spartan order and system.

But if someone aims at greater things, and thinks it finer and nobler to lead many peoples, to prevail over them and rule them, and to have all men look toward him and depend on him,

then he must admit that the Spartan constitution is deficient in this respect, while the Roman constitution is superior and possesses a stronger organization for power.

This too has been made plain by events themselves. When the Spartans set out to win the leadership of Greece, they quickly put even their own freedom at risk.

The Romans, by contrast, once they had secured dominion over Italy, in a short time brought the whole inhabited world under their power, and a great part of their success came from the abundance and ready availability of their supplies.

Chapter 51 Carthage Compared with Rome

The Carthaginian constitution, in its original form, seems to me to have been well framed in its main divisions.

They had kings, their council of elders possessed aristocratic authority, and the people held power in the matters that belonged to them. In general, the fitting together of the whole closely resembled that of Rome and Sparta.

But at the time when Carthage entered the war with Hannibal, the Carthaginian constitution was already worse, while the Roman was better.

For every body, constitution, and undertaking has a natural growth, then a peak, and after that decline; and everything is strongest at its peak. That is exactly why these constitutions differed at that moment.

Carthage had become strong and prosperous earlier than Rome; and by just so much, at that time Carthage was already past its prime, while Rome, so far as its constitution was concerned, was then at its very height.

Accordingly, in Carthage the people had already gained the greater share of power in deliberations, while at Rome the senate was still in its prime.

So where policy was being debated by the many in the one state, and by the best men in the other, Roman deliberation proved stronger in public affairs.

That is why, even after suffering grave disasters, they finally overcame the Carthaginians in the war through the soundness of their counsels.

Chapter 52 The Causes of Roman Superiority

If we look at particular matters, such as the provisions for war, the Carthaginians are naturally better practiced and better prepared for naval service, since from ancient times that skill has been hereditary among them and they are more devoted to the sea than any other people.

But in land warfare the Romans train themselves far more effectively than the Carthaginians.

The Romans devote their whole effort to this; the Carthaginians neglect their infantry altogether and take only slight thought even for their cavalry.

The reason is that the Carthaginians use foreign and mercenary forces, whereas the Romans use native troops and citizens.

In this respect the Roman constitution deserves the preference over the Carthaginian. The one rests its hopes of freedom on the courage of mercenaries; the Roman state rests them on the valor of its own citizens and the support of its allies.

That is why, even if they suffer an initial defeat, the Romans recover and continue the war, whereas the Carthaginians do the opposite.

For the Romans fight for their homeland and their children, and they can never let their anger slacken, but persist with all their spirit until they overcome their enemies.

So although the Romans, as I said before, are far inferior in naval experience, they nevertheless prevail overall because of the courage of their men.

For even though seamanship contributes a great deal in fighting at sea, the bravery of the marines weighs most heavily in deciding victory.

Indeed, all the peoples of Italy are by nature superior to Phoenicians and Libyans alike in bodily strength and in daring; and beyond that, their training powerfully encourages the young toward such conduct.

One example will be enough to show how seriously the Roman constitution is concerned with producing men willing to endure anything in order to win the reputation for courage in their own country.

Chapter 53 Roman Funeral Rites

Whenever one of their distinguished men dies, during the funeral procession the body, together with all its honors, is carried into the forum to the place called the Rostra, sometimes set upright in full view, though more rarely laid out reclining.

With the whole people standing around, his son—if he has left one of full age and he happens to be present—or otherwise some other relative, mounts the Rostra and speaks about the dead man's virtues and the achievements he accomplished in life.

By this means the deeds are brought back before the eyes of the crowd, and not only those who shared in them but even those who had no part in them are moved to sympathy, so that the loss seems not a private sorrow for the mourners but a public one for the whole people.

After the burial and the customary rites, they place the likeness of the dead man in the most conspicuous part of the house, enclosed in a small wooden shrine.

This likeness is a mask made in an extraordinarily faithful resemblance, both in features and in coloring.

They display these images at public sacrifices with great care, and whenever another eminent member of the family dies, they carry them in the funeral procession, placing them on men who seem to match the originals as closely as possible in height and general build.

These men put on the garments appropriate to the offices the dead once held: if the man was a consul or praetor, garments with purple border; if a censor, purple robes; if he had celebrated a triumph or done some equivalent deed, robes embroidered with gold.

They ride in chariots, and before them are carried the rods, axes, and all the other insignia proper to the magistracies, in proportion to the rank each had reached in the service of the state during his lifetime.

When they reach the Rostra, they all sit in order on ivory chairs. A young man who loves glory and noble deeds could hardly behold a finer sight.

For who would not be stirred by seeing all at once the images of men famous for their virtue, as if they were living and breathing? What spectacle could be more splendid?

Chapter 54 The Glorious Memory of Brave Men Kept Alive

And the speaker, after finishing his account of the man who is about to be buried, goes on to the others whose representatives are present, beginning with the most ancient and recounting the successes and deeds of each.

Thus the renown of good men is continually made new, the glory of those who achieved some noble deed is made immortal, and the fame of those who benefited their country becomes known to the multitude and handed down to later generations.

Most of all, the young are inspired to endure every hardship for the common good in hopes of winning the glory that attends brave men.

And what I say is confirmed by the facts. Many Romans have voluntarily fought single combats on which the issue of the whole battle depended, and not a few have chosen certain death, some in war for the safety of others, some in peace for the security of the commonwealth.

There have even been magistrates who put their own sons to death, against every custom and every law, valuing the interest of their country above the natural bond with their nearest kin.

Many such stories are told of many Roman men, but one example named specifically will be enough for the present, both as proof and as illustration.

Chapter 55 Patriotism and Purity At Rome

They tell the story of Horatius, surnamed Cocles. While he was fighting against two of the enemy at the far end of the bridge over the Tiber, the bridge that stands before the city, he saw a large body coming up to support them and feared that they would force their way across into the city.

So he turned and shouted to the men behind him to retreat as quickly as possible and break down the bridge. They obeyed, and while they were cutting it apart he held his ground, receiving many wounds and checking the enemy's advance—not so much because they were daunted by his strength as because they were astonished by his steadfastness and daring.

Once the bridge had been broken, the enemy's attack was stopped; and Cocles, throwing himself into the river in full armor, deliberately gave up his life, valuing the safety of his country and the glory he would win thereafter more than his present life and all the years still left to him.

Such, it seems, is the zeal and ambition for noble deeds that Roman customs implant in the young.

Chapter 56 Religion Keeps the Roman Commonwealth Together

In matters of money as well, Roman customs and principles are better than those of the Carthaginians.

Among the Carthaginians nothing connected with profit is considered shameful; among the Romans nothing is more disgraceful than taking bribes and making gain from what one ought not.

For the more one kind of people honors profit from the most successful source, the more the other treats unlawful gain as a reproach.

The proof is this: among the Carthaginians men openly give gifts to obtain office, whereas among the Romans the penalty for such conduct is death.

Since the prizes offered for virtue are thus opposite among the two peoples, it is natural that their ways of pursuing them should also be different.

But the greatest superiority of the Roman constitution, in my opinion, lies in their attitude toward the gods.

Indeed, what among other peoples is criticized as superstition is, I think, the very thing that holds the Roman state together.

This element has been carried so far among them and introduced so thoroughly into both private life and public business that nothing could surpass it, and many might find that astonishing.

For my part, I think they have done this for the sake of the multitude.

If it were possible to found a state composed of wise men, perhaps such a device would not be necessary.

But since every crowd is fickle, full of lawless desires, irrational anger, and violent passion, the only thing left is to keep the masses in check by unseen fears and such theatrical impressions.

So it seems to me that the ancients were not introducing notions about the gods and beliefs about punishments in the underworld among the people at random or without purpose; rather, those of our own day act rashly and senselessly in trying to cast them out.

This is why, among other things, Greek officials entrusted with only a single talent, though they have ten clerks, as many seals, and twice as many witnesses, still cannot be trusted to keep faith.

At Rome, by contrast, men serving in offices or embassies handle very large sums of money, yet through the force of their oath alone they remain faithful to their duty.

And whereas among other peoples it is rare to find a man who keeps his hands off public money and stays clean in such matters, among the Romans it is rare to catch anyone in the act of such wrongdoing.

Chapter 57 Conclusion: Dangers Ahead for Rome

That everything which exists is subject to decay and change hardly needs further argument, for the necessity imposed by nature is enough to establish that truth.

And since every kind of constitution naturally decays in two ways, one from external causes and one from causes that grow within itself, the external mode is impossible to define with certainty, but the internal follows a set order.

I have already explained what form of constitution naturally comes first, what comes second, and how they pass into one another,

so that those able to connect the beginning with the end of the present discussion can already predict the future for themselves. In my judgment the result is plain.

For when a state has survived many great dangers and afterwards reached undisputed supremacy and power, it is obvious that as prosperity settles into it over time, private lives become more luxurious and men grow more ambitious than they should in the pursuit of office and other objects.

As these tendencies advance, the beginning of decline will come from love of office, from resentment at loss of status, and, along with these, from arrogance and luxury in private life.

The people will be the agents through whom the change gains its name, once they come to think that some men wrong them out of greed while others puff them up with flattery because they are hunting office.

For then, in anger and making every decision under the sway of passion, the people will no longer be willing to obey or even to share power equally with their leaders, but will want the whole or the greater part for themselves.

And when that happens, the constitution will take on the finest of names—freedom and democracy—but in reality it will become the worst of things, mob-rule.

Since I have now discussed the composition, growth, zenith, present condition, and differences—both for better and for worse—of the Roman constitution as compared with others, I here bring this account of the constitution to its conclusion.

Chapter 58 Even Hannibal Acknowledges the Spirit of the Romans

Now, returning to the connected course of the history at the point from which I digressed, I will briefly recall one action, so that I may make the excellence and power of the Roman constitution at that time clear not by argument alone but by deeds, as if a master craftsman were displaying one specimen of his work.

After Hannibal won the battle at Cannae and captured the eight thousand Romans who were guarding the camp, he took them all alive and allowed them to send envoys home to negotiate their ransom and salvation.

They selected ten of their most distinguished men, and after making them swear that they would return to him, Hannibal sent them off.

But one of those chosen, after already leaving the camp, said that he had forgotten something and turned back; after retrieving what he had left behind he set out again, thinking that by his return he had kept faith and released himself from the oath.

When the envoys reached Rome, they begged and urged the senate not to begrudge the captured men their safety, but to let each of them save himself by paying three minae and returning to his family, for Hannibal, they said, was willing to grant that.

They also argued that the prisoners deserved rescue, since they had neither shown cowardice in the battle nor done anything unworthy of Rome, but had merely been left to guard the camp and, after all the others had perished in battle, had been overtaken by circumstances and surrendered to the enemy.

Yet the Romans, though they had suffered terrible losses in battle, had been deprived of almost all their allies, and could expect before long to face danger for their very fatherland,

still, after hearing these pleas, neither yielded in the face of disaster in any way unworthy of themselves nor overlooked anything that sound judgment required.

They saw Hannibal's purpose: by this act he meant both to get money and to strip the opposing troops of their eagerness for battle by showing that even the defeated still had hope of safety.

So far were they from doing what was requested that they counted neither pity for the men's relatives nor the future use they might have of greater importance.

Instead, by refusing to ransom the prisoners, they proved Hannibal's calculation and his hopes empty, and they laid down for their own people the rule that in battle they must either conquer or die, since for the defeated no other hope of safety remained.

Accordingly they dismissed the nine envoys, who returned voluntarily in accordance with their oath, but the one who had tried by a trick to escape his oath they bound and sent back to the enemy.

Thus Hannibal was not so much delighted by his victory over the Romans in battle as shaken and astonished by the steadiness and greatness of spirit the Romans showed in their deliberations.

Chapter 59

There is also a place near Stratus in Aetolia called Rhynchos, as Polybius says in his Histories.

Chapter 1 Capua and Petelia

Polybius says in the seventh book that the people of Capua in Campania, made wealthy by the excellence of their land, drifted into luxury and extravagance, surpassing even the famous reputation of Croton and Sybaris.

So, he says, being unable to bear their present prosperity, they called in Hannibal. For that reason they later suffered irreparable disasters at Roman hands.

The people of Petelia, on the other hand, kept faith with Rome and showed such endurance under Hannibal's siege that, after eating all the leather in the city and consuming the bark and tender shoots of every tree in it, and after holding out for eleven months with no help arriving—though the Romans approved of their conduct—they finally surrendered.

Capua, after going over to the Carthaginians, used its influence to draw the other cities over as well.

Chapter 2 Hieronymus of Syracuse

After the plot against Hieronymus, king of the Syracusans, and after Thraso's withdrawal, the party of Zoippus and Andranodorus persuaded Hieronymus to send envoys to Hannibal at once.

So he selected Polycleitus of Cyrene and Philodemus of Argos and sent them to Italy with instructions to discuss joint action with the Carthaginians; at the same time he sent his brothers to Alexandria.

Hannibal received Polycleitus and Philodemus graciously, held out great hopes to the young king, and quickly sent the envoys back, along with Hannibal the Carthaginian, who was then admiral of a trireme, and the Syracusans Hippocrates and his younger brother Epicydes.

These men had already been serving with Hannibal for some time and had entered Carthaginian service because their grandfather had fled Syracuse after being thought to have laid hands on Agatharchus, one of Agathocles' sons.

When they reached Syracuse, Polycleitus and his colleague delivered the report of their embassy, and the Carthaginian envoy spoke according to the instructions Hannibal had given him. Hieronymus was at once ready to join the Carthaginians in their affairs.

He declared that the Hannibal who had come to him ought to go off to Carthage at once, and he promised to send men of his own with him to conduct negotiations with the Carthaginians.

Chapter 3 Hieronymus of Syracuse

At this same time the Roman commander stationed at Lilybaeum learned what was happening and sent envoys to Hieronymus to renew the treaty that had been made with his ancestors.

But Hieronymus, already leaning strongly toward the Carthaginians, said that he pitied the Romans because wicked men had perished miserably in the battles in Italy at Carthaginian hands.

The envoys were shocked by such insolence, but they still asked who had told him such things. He pointed to the Carthaginian envoys who were present and told the Romans to expose them if they happened to be lying.

They replied that it was not their custom to trust enemies, and they urged him to do nothing contrary to the treaty, since that would be both just and greatly to his advantage. He said he would deliberate and later make his answer clear to them.

But he asked them how it had happened that, before his grandfather's death, they had sailed with fifty ships as far as Pachynus and then turned back again.

What had happened was that the Romans had shortly before heard that Hiero was dead, and had feared that some disturbance might arise in Syracuse because people would despise the age of the boy left behind.

So they admitted that they had made the voyage in order to support his youth and help preserve his rule, but that when they learned his grandfather was still alive, they had sailed back.

At this the young king answered again, "Then allow me as well, Romans, to preserve my rule now by turning back toward Carthaginian hopes."

The Romans understood the direction of his policy. For the moment they said nothing and returned, reported what had been said to the man who had sent them, and from then on kept watch on Hieronymus as an enemy.

Chapter 4 The Treaty with Carthage

Hieronymus then chose Agatharchus, Onesigenes, and Hipposthenes and sent them with Hannibal to the Carthaginians, instructing them to conclude a treaty on the following terms.

The Carthaginians were to assist him with both land and sea forces, and after driving the Romans from Sicily they were to divide the island so that the river Himera, which nearly splits Sicily in two, should be the boundary between the two spheres of rule.

When these envoys reached the Carthaginians, they negotiated on this basis and accomplished their mission, since the Carthaginians readily agreed to everything.

Meanwhile Hippocrates and his circle took the young king in hand and at first captivated him by describing Hannibal's marches, battle lines, and battles in Italy.

After that they told him that no one had a better claim than he to rule over all the Siceliots, first because he was the grandson through his mother Nereis of Pyrrhus, whom all the Siceliots alone had willingly and deliberately approved as their leader and king, and second because of the sovereign position held by his grandfather Hiero.

In the end they so completely turned the boy's head that he paid no attention to anyone else, partly because he was unstable by nature and still more because they had now filled him with lofty ambition.

At the very moment when Agatharchus and his colleagues were completing the first arrangement at Carthage, he sent another embassy, now claiming that the whole rule of Sicily belonged to him, demanding that the Carthaginians help him recover Sicily, while he in turn promised to support them in their operations in Italy.

The Carthaginians saw perfectly well the complete instability and madness of the boy, but they also believed for many reasons that it was to their advantage not to lose their hold on Sicilian affairs.

So they assented to all his demands, and, having already prepared ships and soldiers beforehand, they proceeded with plans to transport their forces to Sicily.

Chapter 5 Hieronymus Decides For War

When the Romans learned of this, they again sent envoys to him, protesting that he must not violate the treaties made with his forefathers.

Hieronymus therefore called the council together and put before it the question of what should be done.

The native members kept quiet, fearing the poor judgment of the ruler; but Aristomachus of Corinth, Damippus the Spartan, and Autonous the Thessalian urged him to stand by the treaties with Rome.

Andranodorus alone said that they must not let the opportunity slip, and that the present moment was the only one in which it was possible to win dominion over Sicily.

After he had said this, Hieronymus asked the party around Hippocrates what opinion they held. When they said they agreed with Andranodorus, the deliberation was brought to an end. In this way war against Rome was decided upon.

But because he wanted to seem clever rather than clumsy in answering the ambassadors, he fell into such a blunder that he was plainly about not only to displease the Romans, but to offend them outright.

For he said that he would keep the treaty if, first, they restored all the gold they had received from his grandfather Hiero; second, if they repaid for the whole past period the grain and the other gifts they had received from him; and third, if they acknowledged that the land and cities on this side of the river Himera belonged to the Syracusans.

On these terms the envoys and the council separated. From that time onward Hieronymus and his circle actively pushed the war forward, gathering forces, arming them, and preparing the rest of the necessary supplies.

Chapter 6 Description of Leontini

The city of Leontini as a whole faces north,

and through the middle of it there runs a level valley, in which stand the public offices, the courts, and, in general, the market-place.

On each side of this valley stretches a ridge with steep escarpments all along it; and the level tops of these hills, above the brows, are full of houses and temples.

The city has two gates. One stands at the southern end of the valley I mentioned and leads toward Syracuse; the other is at the northern end and leads to the so-called Leontine plains and the farming country.

Below one of the escarpments, the western one, there runs a river called the Lissus.

Parallel to it, immediately under the cliff, stand many continuous rows of houses; and between these houses and the river lies the road mentioned above.

Chapter 7 Fall of Heronymus

Some of the writers who have written about the downfall of Hieronymus have made a very long story of it and arranged it with a great deal of sensationalism, recounting the omens said to have come before his accession and the misfortunes of the Syracusans,

and then writing in tragic style about the savagery of his character, the impiety of his actions, and, on top of everything, the shocking and terrible circumstances of his fall, so that one would think neither Phalaris nor Apollodorus nor any other tyrant had ever been harsher than he.

And yet he was only a boy when he came to power, and after that lived no more than thirteen months.

During that time it is possible that one man or another was put to the torture and that some of his friends and some other Syracusans were killed; but it is not likely that there was any extreme excess of lawlessness or some unparalleled kind of impiety.

One should indeed say that in character he was exceptionally reckless and unlawful, but he ought not to be compared with any of the tyrants mentioned above.

It seems to me that writers of histories about particular episodes, once they have taken up subjects that are narrow and easy to cover, are forced by poverty of material to make small things great and to spend many words on matters not even worth remembering. Some too fall into much the same error through sheer lack of judgment.

How much more reasonably could someone have spent the space used to pad out books and spin the narrative out at length on Hiero and Gelo, leaving Hieronymus aside.

For such a subject is more pleasing to those who enjoy hearing history,

Chapter 8 Character of Hiero II

and altogether more useful to those who wish to learn. For Hiero, first of all, won for himself the rule over Syracuse and its allies by his own efforts, inheriting neither wealth nor reputation nor any other ready-made advantage from fortune.

Indeed, without killing, banishing, or harming a single one of the citizens, he became king of the Syracusans by his own merits,

which is the most astonishing thing of all; and still more astonishing is the fact that he not only acquired his power in this way, but preserved it in the same way.

For though he reigned for fifty-four years, he kept peace for his fatherland, preserved his own rule free from plots, and escaped the envy that usually accompanies great power.

In fact, when he more than once tried to lay down his sovereignty, he was prevented by the citizens acting together.

By proving exceptionally beneficent and eager for honor in his dealings with the Greeks, he left behind himself a great reputation and won for Syracuse no small measure of goodwill from all.

And though he lived amid immense abundance, luxury, and wealth, he survived to more than ninety years of age, kept all his senses, and preserved every part of his body unimpaired.

This seems to me no small sign, but a very great one, of a temperate life.

Gelo too, after living more than fifty years, set before himself as the noblest aim in life obedience to the father who begot him, and he counted neither wealth nor royal greatness nor anything else whatever as more important than affection and loyalty toward his parents.

Chapter 9 Treaty Between Hannibal and King Philip V. of Macedon

This is the oath that Hannibal the general, Mago, Myrcan, Barmocar, and all the Carthaginian senators who were with him, together with all the Carthaginians serving in the campaign with him, swore to Xenophanes son of Cleomachus, the Athenian envoy whom King Philip son of Demetrius sent to us on behalf of himself, the Macedonians, and their allies.

It was sworn in the presence of Zeus, Hera, and Apollo; in the presence of the god of the Carthaginians, and of Heracles and Iolaus; in the presence of Ares, Triton, and Poseidon; in the presence of the gods who go with the army, and of the Sun, the Moon, and the Earth; in the presence of rivers, harbors, and waters;

in the presence of all the gods who hold Carthage, all the gods who hold Macedonia and the rest of Greece, and all the gods of war who stand witness to this oath.

Hannibal the general, all the Carthaginian senators with him, and all the Carthaginians serving with him said that, since it seemed good both to you and to us to establish this oath concerning friendship and honorable goodwill, we should be friends, kinsmen, and brothers on the following terms.

The Carthaginians, Hannibal the general and those with him, the Carthaginian magistrates who live under the same laws, the people of Utica, all cities and nations subject to Carthage, and their soldiers and allies,

and all the cities and nations in Italy, Celtica, and Liguria with whom we are in friendship, and any others in that region with whom we may later make friendship and alliance, shall be kept safe by King Philip, the Macedonians, and the rest of the Greeks who are their allies.

Likewise King Philip, the Macedonians, and the allies among the other Greeks shall be kept safe and protected by the Carthaginians serving in this campaign, by the people of Utica, by all the cities and nations subject to Carthage, by the allies and soldiers, and by all the nations and cities in Italy, Celtica, and Liguria, and by any others who may become allies in those parts of Italy.

We shall not plot against one another or use ambush against one another, but with all zeal and goodwill, without deceit or treachery, we shall be enemies to those who make war on the Carthaginians, excepting those kings, cities, and harbors with whom we have sworn agreements and friendships.

And we in turn shall be enemies to those who make war on King Philip, excepting those kings, cities, and nations with whom we have sworn agreements and friendships.

You shall also be our allies in the war we are waging against the Romans, until the gods grant prosperity to both you and us.

And you shall help us whenever there is need and in whatever way we agree.

And if the gods grant us success in the war against the Romans and their allies, and if the Romans wish to make terms of friendship, we shall make terms on condition that the same friendship extends to you as well,

and that it shall never be lawful for them to make war against you, nor shall the Romans be masters of Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, Pharos, Dimale, Parthini, or Atintania.

They shall also restore to Demetrius of Pharos all his own people who are in the Roman commonwealth.

But if the Romans make war on you or on us, we shall help one another in the war, as each party may need.

The same shall hold if any others do so, apart from those kings, cities, and nations with whom we have sworn agreements and friendships.

And if it seems good to us to remove anything from this oath or to add anything to it, we shall remove or add it as seems good to both of us.

Chapter 10 Messene and Philip V. in B. C. 215

While democracy was in force among the Messenians, the notable men had been driven into exile, and those who had received allotments of their property held power in the state; so the members of the old citizen body who remained found it hard to endure these men's equality of speech.

Gorgus of Messene was second to no Messenian in wealth or birth, and in the prime of life he had become the most distinguished of all those who sought crowns in athletic contests.

For in outward appearance, in the dignity of the rest of his life, and in the number of his victories, he fell short of no one of his contemporaries.

And when he gave up athletics and turned to public life and the service of his country, in that sphere too he won a reputation no less than the one he already had,

being thought far removed from the vulgarity that clings to athletes, and regarded as exceptionally effective and prudent in public affairs.

Chapter 11 Philip Dissuaded from Taking Messene

For the present, after bringing my narrative to a pause, I want to speak briefly about Philip, because this was the beginning of his reversal and of his movement and change for the worse.

It seems to me that for practical men who wish, even little by little, to improve themselves from the lessons of history, this offers a very vivid example.

For both because the beginning of his career was so conspicuous and because his natural gifts were so brilliant, the impulses of this king in either direction became especially clear and widely known to all the Greeks, and the consequences that followed each set of impulses likewise stood out plainly by comparison.

That after he succeeded to the kingship Thessaly, Macedonia, and in general all the regions under his own rule were more loyal and better disposed toward him than they had been toward any former king, though he took over the Macedonian power while still a young man, can easily be learned from the following facts.

For though he was constantly drawn away from Macedonia by the war against the Aetolians and Lacedaemonians, not only did none of the peoples just mentioned break into civil disorder, but none of the neighboring barbarians even dared to touch Macedonia.

And it would not be possible to speak adequately of the affection and eagerness shown toward him by Alexander, Chrysogonus, and his other friends.

The same may be said of the Peloponnesians and Boeotians, and likewise of the Epirotes, Acarnanians, and all the others to whom in a short time he became the cause of many benefits.

Indeed, if one may put it somewhat boldly, I think this description suited Philip very well: by the beneficence of his policy he became something like the common darling of the Greeks.

A most conspicuous and important proof of what a noble purpose and good faith can accomplish is that all the Cretans, after coming to agreement and entering the same alliance, chose Philip alone as protector of the island, and this was accomplished without arms and without danger, something one would not easily find to have happened before.

From the events at Messene onward, however, everything in his case took on the opposite character; and this happened naturally.

For once he turned to a policy opposite to his former one, and kept adding to it what was consistent with that choice, he was bound to reverse other men's opinions about him and to meet with results opposite to those he had previously enjoyed.

And that indeed is what happened. This will become clear to attentive readers from the events I am about to recount.

Chapter 12 Philip's Loss of Popularity

When Philip king of Macedon wanted to seize the acropolis of the Messenians, and told the leading men of the city that he wished to see the citadel and sacrifice to Zeus, he went up with his attendants and performed the sacrifice. Then, when according to custom the entrails of the victims that had been offered were brought to him, he took them in his hands, turned a little aside, and stretching them out toward Aratus and his party asked, "What do the omens seem to signify: that I should withdraw from the citadel, or hold it?"

Demetrius at once broke in from where he stood and said, "If you have the mind of a seer, withdraw as fast as you can; but if you have the mind of an active king, keep hold of it, so that after letting it go now you may not later be looking for a better opportunity.

For in this way, by holding both horns, you alone would keep the ox under your control," by which he meant Ithome and Acrocorinth, and by the ox the Peloponnese.

Philip turned to Aratus and said, "And do you advise the same?" When Aratus hesitated, Philip pressed him to say what he really thought.

After some uncertainty Aratus said, "If you can hold this place without breaking faith with the Messenians, I advise you to hold it.

But if by occupying this place with a garrison you mean to destroy every acropolis and the very guard

—meaning good faith—by which the allies you received from Antigonus were protected, consider whether it is not better now to lead your men out and leave their trust behind, and by that trust to guard the Messenians, and likewise the rest of your allies."

Philip by his own inclination was ready to break faith, as later events made clear.

But because he had shortly before been sharply rebuked by the younger Aratus for the destruction of those men, and because on this occasion the elder Aratus spoke with frankness and authority and begged him not to ignore what was said, Philip felt ashamed.

Taking him by the right hand, he said, "Then let us go back by the same road."

Chapter 13 Philip Begins to Become a Tyrant

Aratus, seeing that Philip had openly taken up the war against Rome and had been completely altered in his policy toward his allies, only with difficulty turned Philip aside, after raising many objections and pretexts.

We, however, now wish to remind those who are following this work that what in the fifth book we mentioned only by promise and assertion has now received confirmation from the facts themselves, so that we may leave none of our conclusions unsupported or open to dispute.

For when, in narrating the Aetolian War, we paused at the point where we said that Philip had with too much passion destroyed the porticoes at Thermus and the rest of the votive offerings, and that the cause of these actions should be referred not so much to the king, because of his youth, as to the friends around him,

we then said that Aratus' life itself was a sufficient defense of the claim that he would have done nothing base, whereas Demetrius of Pharos had exactly such a cast of mind.

And we promised to make this clear from what would be recounted later, postponing until this point the proof of that earlier judgment,

the moment when, with Demetrius present, as we have just shown in the affair at Messene, and Aratus delayed by only a single day, Philip began to lay hands on the gravest acts of impiety.

And as if, after tasting human blood and the murder and betrayal of allies, he had been changed—not from a man into a wolf, as in the Arcadian myth cited by Plato, but from a king into a savage tyrant.

An even clearer proof of the character of the two men is the advice given about the citadel, helping us not to remain uncertain even about the events concerning the...

Chapter 14 Aratus a Moderating Influence on Philip

...Aetolians. Once these points are admitted, it is already easy to reckon up the difference in the policy of the two men.

For just as now, when Philip listened to Aratus, he kept faith with the Messenians in the matter of the citadel, and, as the saying goes, applied a small remedy to the great wound created by the earlier slaughter,

so in the Aetolian affair, when he followed Demetrius, he sinned against the gods by destroying consecrated offerings, wronged men by transgressing the laws of war, and missed the mark of his proper policy, making himself an implacable and bitter enemy to those who differed with him.

The same reasoning applies also to the affairs in Crete. For there too, when he used Aratus as his guide in the larger policy, he not only committed no injustice, but did not even offend any of the islanders; he kept all the Cretans under his hand and drew all the Greeks into goodwill toward himself by the dignity of his conduct.

But then again, once he followed Demetrius and became responsible for the misfortunes of the Messenians just described, he lost at once both the goodwill of his allies and the trust of the rest of the Greeks.

So great is the weight for young kings, both toward the ruin and toward the restoration of their rule, that lies in the choice and judgment of the friends who attend them—a matter about which most men, I do not know how, are careless and give not even the slightest forethought.

Chapter 14b

They sent out some of the Cretans as if for a raid, after giving them a forged letter.

Chapter 14c

The Massylians are a Libyan people. Polybius in the seventh book calls them the Massyleis.

Chapter 14d

The name is used in the masculine, as Polybius has it in the seventh book: "those who inhabit Oricus, who are also the first to lie on the right for a man sailing in toward the Adriatic."

Chapter 15 The War of Antiochus with Achaeus

Around Sardis there were unceasing and continuous skirmishes and dangers by night and by day, as the soldiers on both sides devised every kind of ambush, counter-ambush, and surprise attack against one another; to write out the details would be not only useless but altogether too long.

In the end, when the siege had already entered its second year, Lagoras the Cretan, a man with considerable experience in warfare, observed that the strongest cities generally fall most easily into the hands of enemies because of the carelessness of those who live in them, whenever, trusting in their natural or man-made strength, they neglect guard duty and grow wholly slack.

He had also recognized that captures tend to be made precisely at the strongest points, the very places the enemy thinks beyond hope.

So at that time, seeing that the prevailing opinion about the strength of Sardis had led everyone to despair of taking it by such an operation, and that they had only one hope left, namely to master the city through famine,

he paid all the more attention and explored every possible course, eager to seize on some opening of that kind.

When he noticed that the wall near the place called the Saw—this is the point joining the citadel and the city—was left unguarded, he conceived this hope and plan.

He discovered the negligence of the guards from the following sign.

The place was extremely precipitous, and below it lay a ravine into which the dead from the city and the carcasses of horses and pack animals were thrown; and so there was always a gathering there of vultures and other birds.

Observing this, the man I mentioned noticed that when the birds had eaten their fill they regularly settled and rested on the cliffs and on the wall, and from this he concluded that the wall was necessarily unguarded and remained deserted for most of the time.

After that he approached by night with care and examined the possible routes of access and the positions for ladders.

And finding that at one place, along one of the cliffs, an ascent was possible, he laid the matter before the...

Chapter 16 Antiochus Takes Sardis

...king. When the king took up the hope and urged Lagoras to carry out the attempt, the latter promised to do what he could,

but asked the king to assign to him Theodotus the Aetolian and Dionysius, the commander of the bodyguard, so that they might join him, lend their aid, and share in the enterprise, since each of them seemed to possess enough strength and daring for the plan in hand.

The king immediately did as he asked, and the men mentioned, after coming to an understanding and sharing all the details among themselves, waited for a moonless night in the hours before dawn.

Once they had obtained such a night, on the very day on which they intended to act, late in the afternoon they selected from the whole camp fifteen of the strongest men in body and spirit, who were to carry the ladders, climb up with them, and share the danger.

After these they chose another thirty men to wait in reserve at some distance, so that when the first party had crossed over and reached the gate nearby, these men should rush up from outside and try to break through the hinges and the gate-fastening, while the others from within dealt with the bar and the bolt-pins.

They also appointed two thousand men to follow after these, who, once they had burst in, were to seize the area around the theatre, which was favorably situated against both those coming from the citadel and those coming from the city.

And so that the selection of the men might not arouse any suspicion of the truth, the king spread the story that the Aetolians were about to force an entry into the city through a certain ravine, and that energetic precautions had to be taken in view of that report.

Chapter 17 The Sack of Sardis

When everything was ready for them, as soon as the moon had gone down, Lagoras and his party came secretly to the cliffs with their ladders and hid themselves under an overhanging ledge.

When day came, and the guards had left that place, and the king, according to custom, had sent some men to their reserve posts while bringing the main body out into the hippodrome and drawing them up, at first what was happening aroused no suspicion in anyone.

But once the two ladders had been set in place, and Dionysius went up first by one while Lagoras went up by the other, excitement and movement spread through the camp.

For those climbing the overhanging brow toward the cliff were out of sight for the people in the city and for Achaeus and his men in the citadel, but from the camp the daring of those who were climbing and pressing on was plainly visible.

Therefore the soldiers there stood speechless, amazed by the strangeness of the thing and at the same time, as they foresaw and feared what would happen, filled alike with dread and delight.

The king, seeing the stir throughout the whole camp and wishing to draw off both his own people and those in the city from what was actually under way, led his force forward and attacked the gates on the opposite side, called the Persian Gates.

Achaeus, seeing from the citadel that the movement among the opposing forces was different from what was usual, was greatly perplexed, distressed, and utterly unable to understand what was happening.

Still, he sent men to meet the attack at the gate; but because they had to make their descent by a narrow and precipitous route, the relief was slow in arriving.

Aribazus, who had been posted in the city, rushed in all innocence to the gates where he saw Antiochus attacking; he sent some men up onto the wall, while others he let out through the gate, urging them to keep the attackers off and engage the enemy hand to hand.

Chapter 18 Sardis Destroyed

At this very moment the party with Lagoras, Theodotus, and Dionysius crossed the cliffs and came to the gate below them.

Some of them fought with the men coming to meet them, while others cut through the bars. At the same time the men stationed outside for this purpose rushed up and did nearly the same thing.

The gates were quickly opened, the two thousand entered, and they took possession of the area around the theatre.

Once this happened, all those who had left the walls and the gate called the Persian Gate—the point to which Aribazus and his men had earlier hurried with reinforcements—rushed off in haste to bring support against those who had burst in.

And while this was happening, because the gate was standing open during the withdrawal, some of the king's men burst in as well, following close behind the men who were retreating.

When these men gained control of the gate, others were now entering in an unbroken stream, while others cut through the neighboring gates.

After only a brief struggle against those who had entered, Aribazus and all the people in the city turned and fled toward the citadel.

When that happened, the men with Theodotus and Lagoras remained at the positions by the theatre, acting with intelligence and practical skill as a reserve for the whole operation, while the rest of the force poured in from every side and took the city.

And from then on, some killed everyone they met, some set the houses on fire, and others rushed to plunder and profit, so that the destruction and sack of the city became complete.

Thus Antiochus became master of Sardis.

Chapter 1 The Necessity of Caution in Dealing with an Enemy

It does not seem to me out of place, in view of the whole plan of this work and the purpose I set out at the beginning, to call my readers' attention to the greatness of the events and to the ambitious resolve shown by each of the two states—I mean Rome and Carthage.

For who would not be struck by the fact that, while they were engaged in so great a war over Italy, and in another no less serious over Iberia, and while both alike still faced uncertain hopes for the future and dangers equally pressing in the present,

they were nevertheless not content with the enterprises already before them, but were disputing over Sardinia and Sicily as well, and were trying to grasp everything, not only in their hopes, but also with money and military preparation?

This becomes even more astonishing when one looks at the details. The Romans had two complete armies in Italy with the consuls, and two in Iberia, of which Gnaeus held the land command and Publius the naval command.

The same thing, naturally enough, was true among the Carthaginians.

And besides this, a fleet was stationed off the coasts of Greece to watch Philip's movements, first under Marcus Valerius and afterward under Publius Sulpicius.

At the same time Appius, with a hundred quinqueremes, and Marcus Claudius, with land forces, lay ready for operations in Sicily.

Hamilcar on the Carthaginian side was doing the same.

Chapter 2 Immense Exertions of Rome

These facts, I think, now prove by the events themselves the truth of what I said more than once at the beginning of this history.

What I said was that it is impossible, from writers who treat history in separate parts, to gain a view of the management of the whole.

For how can anyone who reads only a narrative of Sicilian affairs or Iberian affairs, taken by themselves, come to understand either the scale of what happened or the continuous connection of events, or by what method and under what form of government Fortune accomplished the most astonishing achievement of our age?

That achievement was to bring all the known parts of the inhabited world under one rule and power—something for which no earlier precedent can be found.

It is possible, to some extent, to learn from separate accounts how the Romans took Syracuse, or how they got possession of Iberia.

But how they reached dominion over all, and what in these separate regions opposed their larger plans, and what in turn helped them, and at what moments—this is hard to grasp without a general history of events as a whole.

For the same reasons, it is not easy to understand either the greatness of their achievements or the strength of their constitution.

Taken by itself, the statement that the Romans laid claim to Iberia or to Sicily, and campaigned there by land and sea, would not seem particularly marvelous.

But when all this is happening at once, together with many other undertakings carried out at the same time by the same state and constitution, and when one considers along with them the crises and wars within their own country that were pressing upon the men directing all these affairs,

only then do the events become fully clear and truly astonishing, and only then do they receive the attention they deserve.

Let this stand as my answer to those who suppose that acquaintance with partial narratives gives them knowledge of universal and common history.

Chapter 3 Rome and Carthage Continue to Covet Sardinia and Sicily

When Epicydes and Hippocrates gained control of Syracuse and alienated both themselves and the other citizens from friendship with Rome, the Romans, who had by then also received news of the fall of Hieronymus, tyrant of Syracuse, appointed Appius Claudius to command the land force, while Marcus Claudius was given charge of the fleet.

These commanders pitched their camp not far from the city, and decided to attack by land in the region of the Hexapylae, and by sea against Achradina at the place called the Scythian Stoa, where the wall runs directly along the edge of the sea.

Having prepared screens, missiles, and the other equipment needed for a siege, they expected, thanks to the large number of men employed, to overwhelm the defenders with their preparations within five days. They did not reckon with the power of Archimedes, nor did they foresee that, at certain moments, a single mind can achieve more than the labor of multitudes. But in this case they learned the truth from experience.

For the city was strong because the wall ran all around along high ground and overhanging ridges, to which even without opposition one could not easily approach except at certain fixed points.

The man just mentioned had prepared such defenses within the city, and likewise against those attacking from the sea, that the defenders would never need to waste time in improvising, but could meet every move of the enemy immediately and with resources already in hand.

Appius therefore advanced with screens and ladders toward the section of wall adjoining the Hexapylae on the eastern side.

Chapter 3a

Most people can least endure the lightest burden of all—I mean silence.

Chapter 4 History of Universal Supremacy Must Be a Universal History

Marcus, meanwhile, sailed against Achradina with sixty quinqueremes, each one filled with men carrying bows, slings, and javelins, by which they meant to drive back those fighting from the battlements.

At the same time, with eight quinqueremes whose oars had been removed on one side—on the right side of some and the left of others—and which had then been lashed together in pairs along the cleared sides, they brought up against the wall, by means of the outside banks of oars, the machines called sambucae.

The construction of these engines was as follows.

They prepared a ladder four feet wide and of a height equal to that of the wall from the point where it would be landed; they fenced both sides of it and roofed it over with protective coverings, and then laid it slantwise across the touching sides of the coupled ships so that it projected far beyond their prows.

Pulleys with ropes were attached high up on the masts.

Then, when they came near the point of action, they fastened the ropes to the top of the ladder, and men standing on the sterns drew on them through the pulleys, while others standing on the prows braced the machine and secured its lifting with props.

Then, using the oars on the outer sides of the paired ships, they brought the vessels close inshore and tried to set the engine against the wall.

At the top of the ladder there was a platform protected on three sides by wicker shields, on which four men stood and fought against those on the battlements who tried to prevent the sambuca from being set in place.

Once they had planted it and stood above the level of the wall, these men unfastened the side shields on either hand and stepped out onto the battlements or towers.

The rest followed them up the sambuca, since the ladder was firmly secured by ropes to both ships.

The device naturally got this name, because when it is raised the combined shape of ship and ladder looks very much like the musical instrument called a sambuca.

Chapter 5 Syracuse's Defenses

Yet while the Romans were preparing to bring their machines up against the towers in this way,

Archimedes, having readied engines for every possible range, struck at the ships while they were still far off with his stronger stone-throwers and larger missiles, and threw them into confusion and helplessness.

And when these shots began to pass over them, he switched to smaller engines proportioned to the distance at hand, and by constantly adapting his fire to the range so completely checked their advance and attack

that Marcus, driven to despair, was forced to try bringing up his ships secretly by night.

But when they came within bowshot close to land, Archimedes had prepared yet another device against the men fighting from the decks.

He had pierced the wall on the outer face, at the height of a man, with numerous loopholes about the size of a palm; and inside the wall he stationed archers and small scorpions, shooting through these openings and making the marines useless.

Thus he not only rendered the enemy ineffective both at a distance and close at hand, but destroyed a great number of them besides.

And whenever they tried to raise the sambucae, he had prepared engines all along the wall, invisible at ordinary times, but at the needed moment rising from within above the wall and projecting far out over the battlements with their beams.

Some of these carried stones weighing no less than ten talents, and others great lumps of lead.

Then, when the sambucae came near, the beams were swung into position by their pivoting apparatus and, through a release mechanism, let fall the stone upon the machine.

The result was that not only was the engine itself smashed to pieces, but the ship and those aboard it were put in extreme danger.

Chapter 6 Siege of Syracuse

He also used other machines against those who advanced and sheltered themselves behind projecting screens, believing that in this way they would suffer nothing from missiles shot through the wall. Against these men he hurled stones heavy enough to drive the fighters from the prow,

and he also let down an iron hand hanging from a chain. The man handling the beam seized whatever part of the prow he could grasp and then drew the butt of the engine down inside the wall.

When he had thus lifted the prow and made the ship stand upright on its stern, he fixed the machine fast and then, by means of a release, suddenly let go the hand and chain.

As a result some ships fell over sideways, some even capsized, and most, with their prows dropped from on high, shipped great quantities of seawater and were thrown into complete confusion.

Marcus, hard pressed by the contrivances of Archimedes and watching from within the city his own assaults beaten off with loss to himself and laughter from the defenders,

bore the situation badly, though he mocked his own failure by saying that Archimedes was ladling the sea out of his ships, and that the sambucae had been soundly whipped and disgracefully turned away from the feast.

Such was the end of the siege by sea.

Chapter 7 Archimedes

The men under Appius met with similar difficulties and gave up the attack.

For while they were still at a distance they were battered and destroyed by the stone-throwers and catapults, the missiles being extraordinary both in number and in force, since Hiero had supplied the resources and Archimedes had devised and engineered the machines.

And when they approached the city, some were kept from advancing by the archers shooting through the wall, as I said before, while others who pressed on under screens were crushed by the blows of stones and beams falling from above.

They also suffered no little harm from the grappling hands of the machines, as I said earlier; for the men were lifted up with their armor and hurled down.

In the end Appius and his officers withdrew to camp and, after consulting with the military tribunes, unanimously resolved to try every possible means of taking Syracuse except storming it—and that is what they did.

For though they sat before the city for eight months and did not shrink from any other stratagem or bold effort, they never again dared to attempt a direct assault.

So true it is that one man and one mind properly adapted to a particular situation can prove to be a thing of immense and astonishing power.

Those men at least, though they possessed such large forces by land and sea, believed that if one old Syracusan were removed they would at once become masters of the city,

but so long as he was there they did not even dare to attack it in any way against which Archimedes was able to defend it.

Instead, they thought that the people inside would most likely be brought under their power by want of necessities, because of the great number crowded within; and so they pinned their hopes on this, cutting off aid by sea with their fleet and by land with their army.

Yet, not wishing to let the time spent sitting before Syracuse be useless,

the generals divided themselves and the army, so that Appius with two parts remained before the city, while Marcus, taking the third, went out against those in Sicily who had sided with the Carthaginians.

Chapter 8 Other Inventions of Archimedes

Philip, when he arrived in Messenia, ravaged the country in a hostile spirit, acting more from anger than from reason.

For, so it seems to me, he imagined that by continually injuring men he would somehow never provoke indignation or hatred among those he was wronging.

I was led, both here and in the previous book, to speak more plainly about these matters, not only for the reasons already given before, but also because some historians have altogether passed over Philip's treatment of the Messenians,

while others, through favor toward kings or through fear, have represented Philip's impiety and lawlessness toward the Messenians not merely as no fault at all, but as something praiseworthy and successful.

Nor is it only in the case of the Messenians that writers on Philip's deeds can be seen doing this, but in other matters as well.

Hence their compositions turn out not to have the character of history at all, but rather of panegyric.

For my own part, I say that one ought neither falsely to abuse monarchs nor falsely to praise them, as many have done; one should always fit one's account to what has already been set down and to the actual character and purpose of each person.

Perhaps that is easy to say but very difficult to do, because human situations and pressures are many and varied, and men yielding to them in life often cannot say or write what truly appears to them.

For that reason some deserve pardon—but not all.

Chapter 8a

Demetrius, after rashly and recklessly attempting, with Philip's approval, to seize the city of the Messenians, was killed in the very crisis of the action. We shall explain the details of this matter when we come to the proper point in the narrative.

Chapter 9 The Assault By Land Repulsed

In this respect one might especially find fault with Theopompus. At the beginning of his history of Philip he says that what chiefly moved him to undertake the work was that Europe had never produced such a man as Philip son of Amyntas.

Yet immediately afterward, both in the preface and throughout the whole history, he represents him as utterly uncontrolled in his dealings with women, so much so that he says Philip ruined his own household by his passion and favor in this regard,

as profoundly unjust and treacherous in his treatment of friends and allies, as having enslaved many cities and seized them by fraud and violence,

and as so given over to drunkenness that he was repeatedly seen drunk in broad daylight by his friends.

And if anyone cares to read the beginning of his forty-ninth book, he will be utterly astonished at the extravagance of the historian, who among other things has ventured to say the following. I quote his very words:

“If there was among Greeks or barbarians any man who was debauched or shameless in character, all such men flocked to Macedonia and were called the king's companions of Philip.

For Philip in general disapproved of those whose conduct was orderly and who took care of their private lives, but honored and promoted those who lived extravagantly in drunkenness and dice.

Therefore he not only encouraged them in such practices, but made them athletes in every kind of injustice and foulness. For what shameful or dreadful thing did they not possess?

Or what honorable and noble quality did they not lack? Some of them, though men, went about shaved and smoothed; others, though bearded, dared to abuse one another.

They dragged about with them two or three catamites, and themselves in turn rendered the same services to others.

So one would rightly think of them not as companions but as courtesans, and call them not soldiers but common prostitutes.

For though man-slayers by nature, they were male prostitutes in their habits.

In short, to stop my long-windedness, especially when so many matters press upon me, I think that the so-called friends and companions of Philip were such beasts in nature and conduct that not even the Centaurs on Pelion nor the Laestrygonians in the Leontine plain were anything like them.”

Chapter 10 Philip Devastates Messene

Who would not reject such bitterness and such reckless abuse on the part of a historian?

For he deserves censure not only because he says things inconsistent with his own purpose, but also because he has slandered both the king and his friends, and most of all because he has framed the slander in language at once disgraceful and indecent.

If he had been speaking about Sardanapalus or his circle, he would scarcely have dared to use language so foul—and the kind of life and wantonness that man pursued we infer from the inscription on his tomb.

For the inscription says:

These are the things I possess: what I ate, what insolence I indulged in, and the pleasures I enjoyed in love.

But when speaking of Philip and his friends, one should be on guard not against accusing them of softness and cowardice, or even shamelessness, but rather lest, in trying to praise them, one should fail to speak worthily of their courage, hardiness, and, in a word, their excellence.

For it was plainly by their own hard work and daring that they turned the Macedonian kingdom from a very small one into the most renowned and greatest power of its day.

And quite apart from Philip's own achievements, what they accomplished after his death under Alexander has handed down to all men a reputation for excellence that is universally acknowledged.

A large share of the credit must perhaps be assigned to Alexander, who stood at the head of everything, though he was still very young;

yet no less belongs to his helpers and friends, who won many astonishing battles over their enemies, endured many severe labors, dangers, and hardships, and though they came into possession of immense wealth and every opportunity for indulgence, never by that means weakened their bodily strength or gave themselves to any unjust or licentious course.

In a word, all who lived with Philip and then with Alexander proved truly royal in greatness of soul, self-restraint, and daring. There is no need to list them by name.

And after Alexander's death, when they contended over the greater part of the inhabited world, they left their fame recorded in many histories.

Thus the bitterness with which Timaeus attacks Agathocles, ruler of Sicily, though it seems excessive, is still intelligible—for he is accusing an enemy, a wicked man, and a tyrant—but the invective of Theopompus does not even admit of rational defense.

Chapter 11 Criticism Of Theopompus

For after proposing to write about a king exceptionally endowed by nature for virtue, he omits none of the shameful or dreadful charges he can find.

The result is that the historian must necessarily appear either a liar and flatterer in his opening and statement of purpose, or else childish and foolish in his treatment of particulars, if he thought that by irrational and borrowed abuse he would make himself seem more credible and his praises of Philip more acceptable.

Nor indeed would anyone approve even the broad design of this writer, since he set out to write Greek history from the point at which Thucydides ended, and when he had drawn near to the age of Leuctra and to the most brilliant achievements of Greece, he threw Greece and its deeds aside and instead proposed to write the acts of Philip.

Yet it would have been far nobler and fairer to include Philip's actions within a history of Greece than to include the affairs of Greece within a history of Philip.

For no one, once preoccupied with the grandeur of Greek history and having advanced some distance in it, would voluntarily exchange that subject for the role and life of a monarch; whereas someone already occupied with a royal court, if chance and opportunity offered, might perhaps shift to the greater and more illustrious name of Greece.

So what was it that forced Theopompus to overlook contradictions of this scale? Surely only this: that the aim of the first subject was what was honorable, but the aim of the subject centered on Philip was what was advantageous.

About the error itself—his change of subject—he might perhaps have had something to say if one questioned him.

But about the shameful abuse directed against Philip's friends, I do not think he could have given any account at all, except to admit that he had strayed very far from what was fitting.

Chapter 12 Philip, Alexander, And the Diadochi

Philip, though he regarded the Messenians as enemies and set himself to ravage their land, was unable to inflict any damage worth mentioning on them; but against his most intimate friends he displayed the grossest misconduct.

For when the elder Aratus showed displeasure at what Philip had done at Messene, the king not long afterward, through Taurion who managed his affairs in the Peloponnese, had him taken off by poison.

At the time the deed was not recognized by outsiders; for the drug was not one of those that kill on the spot, but one that worked over time and produced a wasting condition.

Aratus himself, however, was not ignorant of the evil done to him. This became clear from what follows.

Concealing it from everyone else, he nevertheless could not keep silence with one of his attendants, Cephalon, because of their familiarity. When this man was carefully attending him in his illness and once noticed some spittle by the wall that was bloody, Aratus said, “So, Cephalon, this is the reward we have received for our friendship with Philip.”

Such a great and noble thing is moderation, that the sufferer was more ashamed of what had happened than the man who committed the crime—ashamed that after sharing in so many and such great deeds for Philip's advantage he had received this return for his goodwill.

And since Aratus had often held the chief office among the Achaeans, and because of the number and greatness of the benefits he had conferred upon the nation, when he died he received fitting honor both from his own city and from the Achaean League as a whole.

For they voted him sacrifices and heroic honors, and in general everything that contributes to eternal remembrance; so that, if there is any awareness among the dead, it is reasonable to suppose that he looks with approval both on the gratitude of the Achaeans and on the hardships and dangers he endured during his life.

Chapter 13 Flawed Structure of Theopompus's History

Philip had long had his mind fixed on Lissus and Acrolissus and was eager to gain possession of those places, so he set out with his army.

After marching for two days and passing through the narrow defiles, he encamped by the river Ardaxanus, not far from the city.

But when he surveyed the circuit of Lissus and saw how strongly it was secured both toward the sea and inland, by nature as well as by construction, and when he also saw nearby Acrolissus, which because of its height and general strength looked like a place no one could even hope to carry by force, he entirely gave up hope of taking the citadel, though he did not wholly despair of the city itself.

Observing that the space between Lissus and the foot of Acrolissus was suitable for an assault on the town, he decided to create a skirmish there and use a stratagem adapted to the situation.

After giving the Macedonians a day of rest and addressing to them during it the words appropriate to the moment, he hid the greater and more useful part of his light troops by night in some wooded ravines on the inland side above the space just mentioned,

while on the following day he himself, taking the peltasts and the rest of the light-armed troops, marched around to the other side of the city by the sea.

When he had gone round the city and reached the appointed place, he made it plain that he meant to begin the ascent and attack there.

Philip's presence had not gone unnoticed, and accordingly a sufficient crowd from all the surrounding parts of Illyria had gathered into Lissus.

For because they trusted in the strength of Acrolissus, they had assigned only a moderate guard to it.

Chapter 14 Aratus Poisoned

So when the Macedonians drew near, the defenders immediately poured out of the city, confident in their numbers and in the strength of the ground.

The king stationed his peltasts on the level ground, and ordered the light troops to advance toward the hills and engage the enemy vigorously. When this order was carried out,

the struggle remained equal for a time; but afterward Philip's men, giving way both to the rough terrain and to the enemy's greater numbers, were driven back.

When these men fled for refuge to the peltasts, those who had come out from the city pushed forward contemptuously, descended to the level ground, and joined battle with the peltasts.

But the men guarding Acrolissus, seeing Philip gradually drawing back his companies in succession and thinking that he was retreating altogether, were lured from their post by their confidence in the natural strength of the place.

Little by little they abandoned Acrolissus and came streaming down by the slopes into the level ground, expecting already some gain and a complete rout of the enemy.

At that very moment the troops hidden in ambush on the inland side rose unseen and charged in earnest; and at the same time the peltasts turned and attacked the enemy afresh.

The men from Lissus were thrown into confusion and, retreating in disorder, made their way back to the city; but those who had left Acrolissus were cut off by the men who sprang from the ambush.

Thus the unexpected happened: Acrolissus was taken at once and without danger, and Lissus on the following day, after severe fighting, when the Macedonians pressed the attack with energy and terror.

Philip, having thus in a wholly unexpected way made himself master of these positions, brought all the neighboring peoples into subjection by this exploit, so that most of the Illyrians voluntarily surrendered their cities to him.

For after such fortresses had been taken by force, no stronghold or security any longer seemed sufficient against Philip's power.

Chapter 14b

The Dassaretae are a people of Illyria.

The city Hyscana is a city of Illyria.

Chapter 15 Philip Takes Lissus in Illyria, B.C. 213

Bolis was a Cretan by birth who had spent a long time at the royal court in a position of command, and he was thought to possess intelligence, reckless courage, and practical experience in warfare inferior to no one.

Sosibius won this man's confidence by many arguments, made him loyal and eager for his cause, and then entrusted the enterprise to him, saying that at the present juncture he could render the king no greater service than by devising some means and method to save Achaeus.

Bolis listened for the moment and said he would consider what had been proposed, then withdrew.

But after reflecting on the matter, he came back to Sosibius two or three days later and undertook the business, saying that he had spent considerable time at Sardis and knew the ground, and that Cambylus, commander of the Cretans serving under Antiochus, was not only a fellow citizen of his but also a kinsman and friend.

It also happened that Cambylus and the Cretans under him had charge of one of the guard-posts on the rear side of the citadel, a place not open to siege-works but held secure by the continuous presence of Cambylus' men.

When Sosibius heard this plan, he concluded that either Achaeus could not possibly be saved from the situation around him, or, if there was any possible way, none would be better than Bolis. Since Bolis too showed such eagerness for the business, the matter at once began to move forward quickly.

Sosibius provided money in advance so that nothing would be lacking for the attempt, and promised much more if all went well.

By enlarging on the gratitude that would come both from the king himself and from Achaeus if he were saved, he raised Bolis to high hopes.

And Bolis, being ready for the task, waited no time but sailed off at once, taking tokens and pledges addressed to Nicomachus at Rhodes, who was believed to feel toward Achaeus with a father's loyalty and goodwill, and likewise to Melancomas at Ephesus.

For these were the men through whom Achaeus had previously managed both his dealings with Ptolemy and all his other outside negotiations.

Chapter 16 Philip V. In Illyria

When Bolis arrived at Rhodes and then afterward at Ephesus, and had shared the matter with the men just mentioned and found them ready for what he asked, he next sent a man named Arianus, one of those under his command, to Cambylus.

The message was that he had been sent out from Alexandria to recruit mercenaries, but wished to meet Cambylus about certain urgent matters; he therefore thought it necessary that they appoint a time and place where they could confer without anyone else knowing.

Arianus quickly met Cambylus and delivered the message. Cambylus readily agreed, appointed a day and a place known to both of them where he would be present by night, and sent Arianus away.

Bolis, being a Cretan and naturally full of cunning, weighed every possibility and examined every idea.

At last, meeting Cambylus according to Arianus' arrangement, he handed over the letter, and when it was laid before them they considered the matter in true Cretan fashion.

For they did not deliberate about the safety of the man in danger, nor about the trust reposed in them by those who had given them the task, but only about their own security and profit.

Thus, being both Cretans, they quickly came to the same decision: first, to divide between themselves the ten talents advanced by Sosibius,

and second, after informing Antiochus of the whole plan and making him their partner, to promise that they would hand Achaeus over to him, provided they received money and future rewards worthy of so great an enterprise.

After this agreement had been settled, Cambylus undertook the dealings with Antiochus, while Bolis arranged that after some days Arianus should be sent to Achaeus carrying ciphered letters from Nicomachus and Melancomas.

Cambylus was to consider how Arianus could safely get into the citadel and back out again.

If Achaeus accepted the plan and sent an answering message to Nicomachus and Melancomas, Bolis said that he himself would then place his services at their disposal and meet Cambylus again.

Once these arrangements had been made, they parted and each carried out what had been assigned.

Chapter 17 Bolis the Cretan Agrees to Rescue Achaeus

At the first opportunity Cambylus brought the proposal before the king.

Antiochus found the offer both agreeable and astonishing. Delighted at first, he promised everything; but then, in some distrust, he examined in detail the several plans and preparations.

Afterward, when he had become convinced and thought that the undertaking seemed to be advancing with divine favor, he urgently begged Cambylus again and again to carry it through.

Bolis acted in a similar way toward Nicomachus and Melancomas. Believing that the attempt rested on the strongest assurances, they at once prepared letters to Achaeus written in cipher, as was their custom,

in such a way that anyone who got hold of the letter would be unable to understand any of what was written in it; and they sent them, urging him to trust Bolis and Cambylus.

Arianus, by means of Cambylus, entered the citadel and delivered what had been written to Achaeus and his circle. Since he had been present from the start, he gave an exact account of every particular, even under repeated and varied questioning about Sosibius and Bolis, about Nicomachus and Melancomas, and most of all about Cambylus.

Yet he endured the examination with natural confidence and resolution, chiefly because he did not know the essential point of the scheme that Bolis and Cambylus had actually agreed upon.

Achaeus, convinced both by Arianus' answers and especially by the ciphers sent from Nicomachus and Melancomas, replied and immediately sent Arianus back again.

After this had happened several times between the two sides, Achaeus and his friends at last entrusted themselves to Nicomachus' group, since absolutely no other hope of safety remained, and told them to send Bolis along with Arianus on a moonless night, as they were prepared to place themselves in their hands.

For Achaeus had formed a plan somewhat like this: first to escape the danger immediately around him, and afterward to make his move, by a circuitous route, toward Syria.

He had great hopes that if he appeared suddenly and unexpectedly among the people of Syria while Antiochus was still occupied around Sardis, he would stir up a great movement and receive a warm welcome from the people of Antioch, Coele-Syria, and Phoenicia.

Chapter 18 Bolis Turns Traitor

So Achaeus, with expectations and calculations of this kind, awaited the arrival of Bolis.

Meanwhile Melancomas and the others, after receiving Arianus and reading the letters, sent Bolis off, encouraging him at length and setting before him great hopes if he should bring the attempt to completion.

Bolis first sent Arianus ahead to notify Cambylus of his arrival, and then himself came by night to the appointed place.

After the two had spent a day together and arranged the details of how each part should be handled, they entered the camp by night.

Their plan had been formed in this way: if Achaeus should come out of the citadel alone, or only with Bolis and Arianus or one other man, he would be easy to despise and still easier for the men in ambush to seize.

But if he came with several companions, the task would be difficult for those in whom he trusted—especially since they were eager to capture him alive, because the greatest part of the favor they expected from Antiochus depended on that.

Therefore Arianus, when leading Achaeus out, was to go in front because he knew the path, having often gone in and out that way.

Bolis was to follow behind the others, so that when they reached the place where, through Cambylus, the ambush was supposed to be ready, he might lay hold of Achaeus and make sure that in the confusion of the night and among wooded ground he neither escaped nor, in desperation, threw himself down a cliff, but instead fell alive into the enemy's hands according to their design.

After these arrangements had been agreed upon, Cambylus, on the very night Bolis arrived, led him by the same route by which he had come, and brought him alone before Antiochus.

The king received him graciously, gave pledges for the promised rewards, and urged both men at length to delay no further over the matter before them. Then they returned to their own camp,

and toward dawn Bolis went up with Arianus and entered the citadel while it was still night.

Chapter 19 Antiochus Approves the Plan

Achaeus received Bolis with marked warmth and friendliness and questioned him at length on every detail.

Judging from both his appearance and his conversation that the man had the steadiness needed for such an undertaking, he was at one moment full of joy because of the hope of safety, and at another terrified and full of anxiety because of the greatness of what hung in the balance.

Yet though he was second to no one in intelligence and quite experienced in practical affairs, he still decided that he ought not to suspend all trust entirely upon Bolis.

So he told him that for the moment it was impossible for him to come out himself, but that he would send three or four of his friends with him, and once these had met Melancomas and his people, he would make himself ready for departure.

Thus Achaeus did what he could; but he did not realize that, as the saying goes, he was trying to out-Cretan a Cretan. For Bolis had left no possible contrivance in this matter unexplored.

When the night came on which Achaeus had said he would send his friends with them, he first sent Arianus and Bolis to wait at the exit of the citadel until those who were to go out with them should arrive.

They obeyed. Achaeus then, at the very moment, communicated the plan to his wife, and Laodice, because of the suddenness of it, was beside herself. So for some time he stayed with her, pleading with her, calming her, and strengthening her with the hopes he expected from the venture.

After this he himself set out as the fifth in the party, having given ordinary clothes to the others while he himself took a plain chance garment and made his appearance as humble as possible.

He instructed one of his friends always to answer whatever Arianus and his companions said, and to keep asking them what was urgent; as for the rest, he was to say they were barbarians.

Chapter 20 The Final Arrangements are Made

When they joined Arianus and his party, Arianus led the way because of his knowledge of the path, while Bolis followed behind in accordance with the original plan, uneasy and perplexed by what was happening.

For though he was a Cretan and ready to suspect anything against his neighbor, the darkness was such that he could not make out Achaeus—not who he was, or even whether he was present at all.

The descent for the most part was steep and difficult, and in some places the path was especially dangerous and treacherous. Whenever they came to one of these places, some took hold of Achaeus while others received him below,

and because they could not entirely suppress the habitual marks of respect they were accustomed to show him, Bolis quickly understood who and which of them Achaeus was.

When they reached the place assigned to Cambylus, Bolis gave the agreed signal by a whistle. Then the men rose from the ambush and seized the others,

while Bolis himself grabbed Achaeus along with his cloak, his hands being inside it, because he feared that once Achaeus understood what was happening he might try to kill himself; for he had provided himself with a dagger.

Quickly surrounded on all sides, he fell under the power of his enemies, and at once he and his friends were led up to Antiochus.

The king, who had long been on edge in expectation of what would happen, had dismissed those who had been with him and remained awake alone in his tent with two or three bodyguards.

When Cambylus and his party entered and set Achaeus on the ground before him in bonds, Antiochus was so overcome by the unexpectedness of it that he remained speechless for a long time, and at last felt pity and burst into tears.

This happened to him, I think, because he saw how hard to guard against and how irrational are the things that come from Fortune.

For Achaeus was the son of Andromachus, brother of Laodice the wife of Seleucus, and he had married Laodice, daughter of King Mithridates, and had become master of all the country on this side of Taurus.

And yet, while he was believed, both because of his own power and because of his enemies' circumstances, to be dwelling in one of the strongest positions in the inhabited world, he was sitting bound on the ground, in the power of his enemies, before absolutely anyone knew what had happened except the men who had done it.

Chapter 21 Achaeus Takes Precautions

At daybreak, when the king's friends gathered at the tent as usual and the matter came before their eyes, the same thing happened to them as to the king: astonished at what they saw, they could hardly believe it.

When the council sat, many proposals were made as to what punishments should be inflicted on Achaeus.

It was resolved first to mutilate the wretched man, then to cut off his head, sew it into an ass's skin, and impale the body.

When this had been done and the army learned what had happened, such excitement and tumult seized the whole camp that Laodice in the citadel—who alone knew of her husband's departure—guessed what had happened from the disturbance and movement among the troops.

Soon a herald came to Laodice, explained what had happened to Achaeus, and ordered her to lay down authority and surrender the citadel.

At first inarticulate cries and dreadful lamentations possessed the people in the acropolis—not so much from affection for Achaeus as because what had happened seemed to every one utterly extraordinary and wholly beyond expectation.

After this came great uncertainty and confusion among those inside.

Antiochus, having disposed of Achaeus, kept constant pressure on the citadel, persuaded that some opening would be handed to him by the men inside, and especially by the soldiers.

And that is what happened in the end. They quarreled among themselves and split into factions, some joining Ariobazus and others Laodice. Once this had happened and the two sides distrusted one another, both quickly surrendered themselves and the citadels.

So Achaeus, after doing everything that reason could suggest, was nevertheless overcome by the faithlessness of those whom he trusted and ended his life, becoming a useful example to posterity in two ways:

first, not to trust anyone lightly; and second, not to grow boastful in prosperity, but, being human, to expect everything.

Chapter 22 Capture of Achaeus

Cauarus, king of the Galatians in Thrace, was by nature a truly royal and high-minded man, and he provided great security for the merchants who sailed into the Black Sea,

and rendered important services to the Byzantines in their wars against the Thracians and the Bithynians.

Yet this Cauarus the Galatian, though otherwise an excellent man, was corrupted by a flatterer named Sostratus, a native of Chalcedon.

Chapter 23 Antiochus In Armenia

When Xerxes was ruling from the city of Armosata, which lies on the so-called Fair Plain between the Euphrates and the Tigris, King Antiochus encamped before the city and set about besieging it.

Xerxes, seeing the king's preparations, first removed himself from danger; but after some time, fearing that if the royal residence were taken by the enemy the rest of his dominion would also be thrown into confusion, he changed his mind and sent to Antiochus saying that he wished to come to terms.

The loyal among Antiochus' friends said that once they had the young man in their hands they ought not to let him go, but advised the king, after taking the city, to hand the principality over to Mithridates, who was his sister's son by birth.

But the king paid no attention to any of this. Instead he summoned the young man, ended the hostility, and remitted most of the money that the father's unpaid tribute still owed him.

Receiving at once from Xerxes three hundred talents, a thousand horses, and a thousand mules with their equipment, he restored everything in the kingdom, gave him in marriage his sister Antiochis, and by acting in so magnanimous and kingly a fashion won over and attracted all the people of that region.

Chapter 24 The Gallic King, Cauarus

The Tarentines, in the arrogance bred by prosperity, invited Pyrrhus the Epirote. For every freedom that has enjoyed unchecked license for a long time naturally grows weary of what lies before it and then looks for a master; yet when it gets one, it quickly hates him again, because the change for the worse appears so great. And this is exactly what happened to the Tarentines then.

Whatever is still in the future always seems better than what is present.

When these troubles fell upon Tarentum and Thurii, the mass of the people grew indignant.

At first the conspirators set out from the city under the pretext of a raid, and when they came near Hannibal's camp by night, the others sat down and waited in a wooded place by the road, while Philemenus and Nicon went on to the camp.

The guards seized them and brought them before Hannibal. They said nothing about who they were or where they came from, only that they wished to meet the general.

Brought quickly to Hannibal, they said they wanted to speak with him privately.

He readily granted the interview, and they explained both their own situation and the state of their country, bringing many and varied charges against the Romans, so as not to seem to be entering into the proposed undertaking without cause.

Hannibal for the moment praised them, received their zeal kindly, and sent them away with instructions to come back and meet him again as soon as possible.

For the present, he ordered that when the first cattle driven out to pasture in the morning had gone a sufficient distance from the camp, they should boldly surround them and make off with both the animals and the herdsmen; he himself would see to their safety.

He did this because he wanted time to investigate the young men's story for himself, and at the same time to provide them with credibility among their fellow citizens, as though their expeditions outside the city really were for plundering.

When Nicon and his companions did as they had been instructed, Hannibal was delighted because he had at last obtained an opening for the enterprise he had in mind,

and Philemenus' party were even more stirred to action because the interview had taken place safely, Hannibal had been found eager, and the richness of the spoil had given them strong credibility among their own people.

For by selling some of the booty and feasting on some of it, they not only won the confidence of the Tarentines but also gained many imitators.

Chapter 25 Antiochus the Great at Armosata

After this they made a second expedition, handled matters in much the same way, and exchanged mutual pledges of good faith with Hannibal.

The agreement was that the Carthaginians would set the Tarentines free and would neither exact tribute from them in any form nor impose any other burden upon them; but once they had taken the city, the houses and lodgings occupied by Romans were to be open to the Carthaginians for plunder.

They also arranged upon a signal so that, whenever they came, the guards would promptly admit them into the camp.

Once this had been done, they were able to meet Hannibal repeatedly, sometimes going out of the city as though on a raid, at other times as though for hunting.

After putting these matters in order for the future, most of the conspirators watched for the proper opportunities, while they assigned Philemenus to manage the hunting expeditions.

For because of his excessive eagerness for the sport, he had the reputation of considering nothing in life more important than hunting.

So they entrusted it to him to win over first Gaius Livius, the officer set over the city, and then the men guarding the tower by the gate called the Temenid Gates, by means of the animals he brought in.

Having undertaken this task, partly by his own hunting and partly with game supplied to him through Hannibal, he continually brought animals in, giving some to Gaius and some to the men at the gate, so that they would open the wicket to him readily.

For he usually made his entrances and exits by night, pretending to fear the enemy, though in fact he was fitting his conduct to the design they had in hand.

When this habit of Philemenus with the gate guards had become so established that they no longer hesitated, but whenever he came near the wall and whistled by night the wicket was immediately opened for him,

they then watched for a day on which the Roman commander in the city was expected to spend the whole day with a large company in the place called the Museum near the marketplace, and fixed that day with Hannibal.

Chapter 26 The Hannibalian War — Tarentum

Hannibal had long since provided himself with the excuse of being ill, so that the Romans would not be surprised to hear that he remained for a considerable time in the same place.

At this moment he pretended illness even more strongly. His camp was three days' march from Tarentum.

When the proper time came, he selected from both cavalry and infantry those most distinguished for mobility and daring, about ten thousand in number, and ordered them to carry provisions for four days.

Then, making his camp break up just before dawn, he marched on at speed. He also chose about eighty Numidian horsemen and ordered them to ride thirty stades ahead of the army and scour the country on both sides of the road,

so that no one would catch sight of the main force, but anyone they encountered would either fall into their hands, or, if he escaped, would report in the city only that there was a raid by Numidians.

After the Numidians had advanced about one hundred and twenty stades, Hannibal took supper by a river that was hard to overlook and ran through ravines.

He assembled his officers and did not fully disclose the enterprise, but in general terms encouraged them, first, to show themselves brave men, since never before had greater prizes been set before them;

second, that each officer should keep the men under him together on the march and sternly rebuke any who left their own ranks;

and finally, that they should pay attention to the orders given and do nothing on their own initiative beyond what was commanded.

After speaking thus and dismissing the officers, he set the advance in motion just as darkness fell, eager to reach the wall around midnight, with Philemenus as guide, and having made ready for him a wild boar for the part he had to play.

Chapter 27 A Bargain Made with Hannibal

Gaius Livius, acting on the expectation fostered by the young men, spent the day with his usual companions in the Museum, and when the drinking was already at its height, toward sunset a report was brought that the Numidians were ravaging the countryside.

He concerned himself only with that, and after summoning some of his officers ordered half the cavalry to ride out before dawn and stop the enemy from plundering the land. This made him even less suspicious of the whole affair.

Nicon, Tragiscus, and the rest gathered together in the city at nightfall and waited for the return of Livius and his party.

Since they rose quickly from the banquet because it had begun early, the main body of the conspirators withdrew to a certain place and stayed there; but some of the young men met Gaius and his companions, in a loose disorderly group, joking among themselves as though they too were returning from a drinking party.

As Livius and his people were made even more unsteady by wine, laughter and playfulness sprang up on both sides the moment they met.

When they had escorted him home, Gaius went to his rest in a drunken state, as is natural for men who begin drinking in daylight, with no uneasy suspicion in his mind but full of cheerfulness and slack ease.

Nicon and Tragiscus then rejoined the young men they had left behind and, dividing themselves into three groups, watched the most favorable approaches to the marketplace, so that nothing happening either outside the walls or in the city itself would escape them.

They also took up position near the house of Gaius, knowing perfectly well that if any suspicion arose of what was coming, the first warning would be carried to Livius and that all countermeasures would begin from him.

When the return from the dinners and, in general, that sort of noise had now passed away, and the mass of the townspeople had fallen asleep, and the night was advancing while their hopes remained unshaken, they gathered together and moved forward to execute the plan.

Chapter 28 Tarentum Betrayed To Hannibal

The agreement between the young men and the Carthaginians was as follows.

Hannibal, approaching the city from the inland side on its eastern face near the so-called Temenid Gates, was to light a fire on the tomb which some called the tomb of Hyacinthus and others the tomb of Apollo Hyacinthus.

Then Tragiscus and his companions, when they saw this, were to answer with a fire from inside.

Once that signal had been completed, Hannibal's men were to extinguish their fire and advance slowly toward the gate.

With this arrangement settled, the young men passed through the inhabited quarter of the city and came to the tombs.

For the eastern side of Tarentum is full of tombs, because the Tarentines even now bury all their dead within the walls in obedience to an ancient oracle.

The god, they say, declared to them that it would be better and more profitable for them to dwell with the greater number.

Thinking that they would best obey the oracle if even their dead remained within the walls, they therefore still bury the departed inside the gates.

So the men already mentioned, after coming to the tomb of Pythionicus, waited to see what would happen.

When Hannibal and his party drew near and did what had been arranged, Nicon and Tragiscus took heart, displayed their own answering beacon, and when they saw the Carthaginians' fire again being put out, rushed at speed toward the gate,

wishing to get there first and kill the men stationed in the gate-tower, since it had been agreed that the Carthaginians should make their advance slowly and at a walk.

Everything went smoothly: the guards were caught before they were ready, some of the young men killed them, and others cut the bars.

The gates were quickly opened, and Hannibal's party arrived at exactly the right moment, having timed their march so well that they never once had to halt on the road to the city.

Chapter 29 Gaius Livius Has a Party

Once the entrance had been safely made as planned and without any disturbance at all, the Carthaginians, thinking that the greater part of the enterprise was already accomplished, now advanced boldly toward the marketplace by the broad street that rises from the district called the Deep Road.

The cavalry, however, numbering not fewer than two thousand, they left outside the walls, wishing to keep this force in reserve against any appearance from outside or against the unexpected turns that commonly arise in such undertakings.

When they came near the marketplace, they halted the force in marching order, while they themselves waited for Philemenus, anxious to see how this part too of their enterprise would succeed.

For when they had lit the fire and were about to move toward the gate, they had also sent off Philemenus, carrying the boar on a litter and accompanied by about a thousand Libyans, toward the neighboring gate, not wishing, as from the beginning, to hang the whole enterprise upon a single hope, but upon several.

Philemenus, when he came to the wall and gave his accustomed whistle, was immediately met by the guard coming down to the wicket.

When he called from outside to open quickly because they were carrying a heavy load, namely a wild boar, the guard gladly and hurriedly opened, hoping that some share of this successful hunt would also come to him, since he had always received a portion of what Philemenus brought in.

Philemenus himself, carrying the front end of the litter, entered first; with him came another man dressed as a Numidian, as though he were one of the country people, and after him came two more carrying the beast from behind.

When all four were inside the wicket, they struck down and killed the man who had opened it, as he harmlessly looked over and felt the boar, and then quietly let in through the little gate the Libyans following close behind them, about thirty in number.

Once this had been done, some were engaged in cutting the bars, others in killing the men on the tower, and others in summoning the Libyans outside by means of agreed signals.

When these too had entered safely, they advanced toward the marketplace according to the arrangement.

And when this force as well joined him, Hannibal, delighted that the business was proceeding exactly as he wished, pressed on with the plan he had set before himself.

Chapter 30 Hannibal Enters Tarentum

He selected about two thousand Celts, divided them into three bodies, and assigned to each body two of the young men who had managed the plot.

He also sent some of his own officers with them, ordering them to occupy the most favorable points along the roads leading into the marketplace.

When they had done this, he ordered the local young men to single out and spare any Tarentine citizens they encountered, crying from a distance that Tarentines should stay where they were, since they were safe.

But to the Carthaginian and Celtic officers he gave orders to kill any Romans they met. With that, they split up and carried out what had been commanded.

As the enemy's entry now became plain to the Tarentines, the city filled with shouting and confusion of every kind.

Gaius, when the enemy's entrance suddenly came upon him, realized that in his drunken state he was incapable of action. He at once rushed out of the house with his servants, came to the gate leading to the harbor, and after the guard had opened the wicket for him, slipped through and, seizing one of the little boats at anchor, was conveyed with his servants to the citadel.

At this same moment Philemenus and his people, having prepared Roman trumpets and some men able to sound them from familiarity with their use, stood in the theater and gave the signal.

The Romans, responding in arms by force of habit to the trumpet-call and hurrying toward the citadel, made the affair turn out exactly as the Carthaginians intended.

For as they came through the streets scattered and without formation, some ran into the Carthaginians and others into the Celts, and by being cut down in this manner in separate groups, a very great number perished.

At daybreak the Tarentines stayed quietly in their houses, still unable to make sense of what was happening.

For because of the trumpet and because no outrage or plundering was taking place in the city, they thought the disturbance had arisen from the Romans themselves.

But the sight of many Romans lying dead in the streets, together with some Gauls visibly stripping the bodies, brought to mind the presence of the Carthaginians.

Chapter 31 Philemenus and his Retinue Get In Too

By now Hannibal had drawn up his forces in the marketplace, and the Romans had withdrawn into the citadel, since they had long since secured it with a garrison. As the daylight became clear, Hannibal proclaimed that all Tarentines were to assemble in the marketplace without arms,

while the young conspirators went around the city crying out for freedom and urging the people to take courage, since the Carthaginians had come on their behalf.

Those Tarentines who had remained attached to the Romans understood the situation and withdrew into the citadel; but the rest obeyed the proclamation and gathered without arms, and to these Hannibal spoke graciously.

Since the Tarentines, in the joy of their unexpected hope, signaled approval of all he said with one voice, Hannibal dismissed the crowd for the moment, ordering every man to return at once to his own house and write on the door, “A Tarentine's.”

Whoever wrote the same words on a Roman dwelling, he declared, would suffer death.

He then selected the most suitable men for action and sent them to plunder the Roman houses, giving as their watchword that every unmarked house should be treated as hostile. The rest he held in reserve in formation behind them.

Chapter 32 Massacre of Romans In Tarentum

After a great and varied mass of goods had been collected from the plundering, and the Carthaginians had gained a booty worthy of their expectations,

they bivouacked under arms for the night. On the following day Hannibal consulted with the Tarentines and decided to wall off the city from the citadel, so that the Tarentines might no longer live in fear of the Romans occupying the acropolis.

First, then, he undertook to set up a palisade parallel to the wall of the citadel and to the trench that already lay before it.

But knowing clearly that the enemy would not allow this quietly and would show their strength at that point, he prepared his best troops, thinking that for the future nothing was more necessary than to strike terror into the Romans and make the Tarentines confident.

Accordingly, when the first palisade was being set up and the Romans made a bold and daring attack on the enemy, Hannibal engaged only briefly and drew out the onset of the Romans, and when most of them had come beyond the trench, he gave the signal to his own men and attacked.

A fierce struggle followed, as was natural in a narrow and enclosed space.

In the end the Romans were forced back and put to flight. Many fell by enemy hands in the fighting itself, but the greater number, pushed and hurled together into the trench, perished there.

Chapter 33 The Tarentines Themselves Spared

For the present, once Hannibal had safely completed the palisade, he remained quiet, since the enterprise had turned out exactly as he wished.

He had shut the enemy in and compelled them to stay inside their wall, afraid not only for themselves but also for the citadel,

while among the civic leaders he inspired such confidence that they believed they would be strong enough against the Romans even without the Carthaginians.

After this, at a short distance from the palisade on the side toward the city, he dug a trench parallel to both the palisade and the wall of the citadel.

Then, by piling up the earth dug from it on the edge of the embankment nearer the city and placing a palisade on top, he made from this structure a security hardly inferior to a wall.

Inside this again, leaving a suitable interval toward the city, he undertook to construct an actual wall, beginning from the place called Soteira and carrying it as far as the district called the Deep Road,

so that, even without men stationed upon them, the fortifications themselves would be enough to provide the Tarentines with safety.

Leaving behind a sufficient force and a body of cavalry suitable for guarding the city and patrolling along the wall, he encamped about forty stades from the city beside the river called by some the Galaesus but by most the Eurotas, which has that name from the Eurotas flowing by Lacedaemon.

The Tarentines have many such names in both country and city because their colony and kinship with the Lacedaemonians are openly acknowledged.

And when the wall was quickly nearing completion, thanks to the zeal and eagerness of the Tarentines and the cooperation of the Carthaginians, Hannibal next conceived the idea of taking the citadel as well.

Chapter 34 Hannibal Secures Tarentum

But just when his preparations for the siege were already complete, relief arrived by sea from Metapontum into the citadel, and the Romans, their spirits somewhat revived,

attacked the works by night and destroyed all the constructions and machines that had been prepared. After this Hannibal gave up hope of besieging the citadel; but since the wall had now already been finished, he gathered the Tarentines and showed them why it was most important in the present circumstances to gain control of the sea.

For since the citadel, as I said before, commanded the points at the entrance to the harbor, the Tarentines could not use their ships at all or sail out from the harbor, while the Romans could safely receive by sea whatever they needed.

So long as that continued, it was impossible for the city ever to be securely free.

Seeing this clearly, Hannibal explained to the Tarentines that if the men holding the citadel were cut off from hope by sea, they themselves would immediately give way, abandon the place, and surrender it.

The Tarentines agreed with what he said, but as to how this could be done under present conditions they could not at all imagine it, unless a Carthaginian fleet should appear—and that was impossible at the time.

Therefore they could not understand toward what end Hannibal was making these remarks.

But when he said that it was obvious they could themselves, without any Carthaginians, gain command of the sea at once, they were even more astonished, unable to see his idea.

Hannibal had noticed that there was a broad and well-laid street within the cross-wall, running beside it from the harbor to the outer sea, and he planned to haul the ships from the harbor across to the southern seaboard.

The moment he revealed this design to the Tarentines, they not only agreed but admired the man exceedingly, deciding that nothing could surpass his quickness of mind and daring.

Wheeled transport was quickly made ready, and the plan passed into execution almost as soon as it was spoken, such was the eagerness and abundance of labor assisting the scheme.

In this way the Tarentines dragged their ships over into the outer sea and safely blockaded the Romans in the citadel, having cut off all outside relief.

Hannibal, after leaving a guard for the city, broke camp with the army, and on the third day returned to his original palisaded camp, where he remained for the rest of the winter.

Chapter 35 Additional Fortifications

The Roman general Tiberius was caught in an ambush and, after meeting the danger bravely together with those about him, lost his life. In cases of this sort, whether one ought to blame the sufferers or excuse them, it is not safe to pronounce absolutely, because many men who have done everything that reason required have nevertheless fallen into the power of those who readily violate the laws of justice recognized among mankind.

Yet one should not on that account lazily refrain from judgment altogether; rather, by looking to the occasion and the circumstances, one should decide which generals deserve blame and which deserve pardon. What I mean will become clear from the following examples.

Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, suspected the ambition of Cleomenes and fled from Sparta; but not long afterward he was persuaded to return and entrusted himself to that same man.

He was therefore deprived at once of both power and life, and left himself no defense before posterity.

For when the situation remained the same, and the ambition and power of Cleomenes had actually increased, how could a man who handed himself over to those very persons from whom he had earlier escaped only with difficulty reasonably expect anything but such an end?

In the same way Pelopidas of Thebes, though he knew Alexander the tyrant's lawlessness and clearly understood that every tyrant regards the champions of liberty as his bitterest enemies, not only persuaded Epaminondas to stand forth as leader of freedom for Thebes and indeed for Greece,

but even when he himself had gone to Thessaly as an enemy bent on overthrowing Alexander's monarchy, he nevertheless consented to serve as ambassador to him a second time.

As a result, after falling into the enemy's hands, he inflicted great harm on the Thebans and ruined the reputation he had formerly won, by rashly and uncritically trusting the very man in whom he least ought to have trusted.

Something similar happened to Gnaeus the Roman commander during the Sicilian war, when he irrationally put himself into the enemy's power; and there are many others as well.

Chapter 36 The Tarantines Blockade the Romans

Therefore men who hand themselves over to the enemy without due caution deserve blame, but those who take every precaution that the case allows do not deserve censure.

For to trust no one at all would in the end make action impossible, whereas to act reasonably after obtaining all the guarantees one can is beyond reproach.

The guarantees available are oaths, children, wives, and, greatest of all, a previous life and character.

Thus, if someone is deceived and trapped through such guarantees as these, the reproach lies not with the sufferer but with the men who committed the act.

One ought therefore above all to seek guarantees of such a kind that the man trusted cannot violate them.

Since that is hard to find, the second-best course is to take every reasonable precaution, so that even if we fail, we do not lose the pardon of outside observers. And this has happened in the case of many before now.

The clearest example, and the one nearest to the times with which the present discussion is concerned, is what happened to Achaeus.

He omitted none of the precautions possible for prudence and safety, but after providing for everything so far as human intelligence could, he nevertheless fell into the enemy's hands.

Yet what happened won pity and pardon from outsiders for the sufferer, and brought only slander and hatred upon those who did the deed.

Chapter 37 Fall of Syracuse, B. C. 212

He counted the courses of stone; for the tower was built of regular blocks, so that it was quite easy to calculate from the ground the height of the battlements.

Some days later a deserter reported that the people in the city had now for three days been holding a public sacrifice to Artemis, and that, though they were using scanty food because of scarcity, they had wine in abundance, a large supply having been provided both by Epicydes and by the Syracusans. Marcus then selected a section of wall where it was lower, and, thinking it likely that the men would be drunk because of the festivity and the lack of solid food, decided to test the hope he had formed.

Two ladders were quickly made, fitted to the height of the wall, and he then proceeded with the remaining arrangements, speaking openly to the men best suited for the climb and for facing the first and most conspicuous danger, and filling them with great hopes for the future.

He also chose the men who were to assist them and carry the ladders, explaining nothing except that they should be ready for what was ordered. When they had obeyed exactly as instructed, he roused the foremost men at the proper hour of night.

Sending ahead the men with the ladders, along with a standard, a military tribune, and the others assigned to the attempt, and reminding them again of the rewards awaiting brave conduct, he then roused the entire army and sent out the leading contingents, one by one, under their standards and at intervals.

When about a thousand had gone, he himself followed after a short delay with the rest of the force.

The men carrying the ladders managed to set them safely against the wall without being noticed, and those appointed to the ascent at once mounted without hesitation.

When these too had escaped notice and had gained a firm position upon the wall, all the rest, no longer preserving the original order but each as he could, came running up by the ladders.

At first, as they advanced along the wall, they found the guard-posts deserted. For the men gathered in the towers because of the sacrifice were either still drinking or had long since fallen asleep in drunkenness.

Therefore the Romans came suddenly upon the first and then the next groups and quietly killed most of them before they knew what was happening.

Then, when they came near the Hexapylae and descended, they broke open the first postern gate built into the wall, through which they admitted the general and the rest of the army. In this way the Romans took Syracuse.

None of the citizens realized what was happening, because of the distance, since the city was large.

And the Romans took courage because they held the high ground around Epipolae.

Chapter 38 Beasts of Burden Used as a Defensive Wall

He ordered the infantry to take the pack-mules from the rear, baggage and all, and place them in front of themselves. Once this was done, the screen proved safer than any palisade.

Chapter 38b

Angara is a city of Italy; its ethnic name is Angarates.

In the end, clinging to uncertain hopes because the punishment before him was obvious, he resolved to endure everything.

Chapter 1 Extract from the Preface

These, then, are the most notable actions included in the Olympiad already mentioned, and in the four-year span which, as we say, must be counted as an Olympiad. I will try to explain them in two books.

I am not unaware that my work has something austere about it, and that because of the uniform character of its plan it is fitted for, and judged by, only one class of readers.

For almost all other historians, or at least most of them, draw many people to their books by making use of every branch of history.

Genealogical writing attracts the lover of such tales; accounts of colonies, city-foundations, and kinships among peoples attract the inquisitive and antiquarian reader, as one may see in Ephorus; political readers are drawn by narratives of the deeds of nations, cities, and dynasts.

I, however, have directed myself solely to this last kind of subject and have arranged the whole of my work around it. So, as I said before, I have made it especially suited to one kind of reader, but have also made the reading less entertaining for the majority.

Why I rejected the other parts of history and chose instead to write only about actions, I have explained more fully elsewhere; still, there is no harm in briefly reminding my readers of it here once again, simply to make the point clear.

Chapter 2 Why Focus on Actions

Since many writers, and in many different ways, have already treated genealogies, myths, colonies,

and also kinships and city-foundations, any man who now takes up those subjects must either present what belongs to others as if it were his own—which is the most disgraceful course of all—or else, if he refuses to do that, plainly waste his labor by working over matters that earlier writers have already explained well enough and handed down to posterity.

For these reasons, and for many others besides, I left such themes aside.

Pragmatic history, on the other hand, deserved approval first because events are always producing something new and therefore require a fresh account; one generation cannot simply report the actions that come after it.

Secondly, this kind of history is the most useful of all—and though it always was so, it is especially so in our own day, now that experience and the arts have advanced so far that eager students can handle whatever circumstances arise almost methodically, as if by rule.

Therefore I aimed not so much at giving pleasure to casual readers as at benefiting those who pay serious attention; and so, leaving the rest aside, I devoted myself to this branch of history.

Those who read my work with care from beginning to end will be the surest witnesses to the truth of what I say here.

Chapter 3 The Hannibalian War

Hannibal surrounded Appius's camp on every side and at first confined himself to skirmishing and testing the Romans, wanting to draw them out into battle.

But since no one responded, what followed came to resemble a siege. The cavalry charged in squadrons and, with loud shouting, hurled their javelins into the camp, while the infantry advanced in companies and tried to tear down the palisade.

Even so, he could not move the Romans from their fixed resolve. Their light-armed troops beat back the men attacking the rampart, while the heavily armed soldiers, sheltering themselves from the storm of missiles with their armor, stayed in formation by their standards.

Hannibal, dissatisfied with the whole situation because he could neither break into the city nor draw the Romans out, began considering what he ought to do next.

And in my opinion these events would have seemed puzzling not only to the Carthaginians, but to anyone else who heard of them.

For who would not have found it hard to believe that the Romans, after being defeated in many battles by the Carthaginians and not daring any longer to meet them in open combat, still could neither be forced to give way nor induced to abandon the open country?

Up to this time they had merely shadowed Hannibal, always keeping to the foothills; but now they had taken their stand on the plains and in the most conspicuous region of Italy were besieging its strongest city, even while the enemy pressed them on every side—an enemy whom they could not even bear to face in pitched battle.

Meanwhile the Carthaginians, though they were winning battles without interruption, at some moments were in difficulties no less than the defeated side.

It seems to me that the cause lay partly in the deliberate policy of both sides, since both had recognized that Hannibal's cavalry formation was the reason why the Carthaginians won and the Romans were beaten.

That is why, after the battles, the defeated Roman camps naturally followed at a distance: they moved through terrain where the enemy cavalry could do them no harm.

And for the same reason, what happened around Capua at that time followed naturally for both sides alike.

Chapter 4 The Siege of Capua

For the Roman army did not dare to come out and fight because it feared the enemy cavalry,

but it remained boldly inside its camp, clearly understanding that the cavalry by which it had been beaten in battle would there be powerless to hurt it.

The Carthaginians, on the other hand, quite naturally could not remain encamped for long with their cavalry, because the Romans had destroyed all the fodder in the neighboring country for this very purpose, and it was impossible for so many horsemen and so many pack animals to bring hay and barley on their backs from a great distance.

Yet they also did not dare, if camped without their cavalry, to assault enemies protected by ditch and palisade, since even apart from the cavalry the danger of an evenly matched engagement seemed uncertain enough.

Besides this, Hannibal was anxious that the incoming consuls might arrive, pitch camp against him, and put him in severe difficulty by cutting off his supplies.

Reasoning from all this, Hannibal concluded that it was impossible to lift the siege by direct force and adopted another plan.

He thought that if he made his march in secret and suddenly appeared in the region around Rome, he might perhaps achieve some useful result against the city itself by frightening the inhabitants with the unexpectedness of his arrival.

And if not that, he would at least force Appius either to raise the siege in haste to help his country, or to divide his forces—making both the relieving troops and those left behind easier to defeat.

Chapter 5 Hannibal Advances Upon Rome

With this in mind, Hannibal sent a letter-carrier into Capua. He persuaded one of the Libyans to desert to the Roman camp and from there make his way into the city, taking precautions to ensure that the letter would be delivered safely.

For he was very anxious that, if the Capuans saw him departing without understanding the plan, they might lose heart as though he had given them up and so surrender to the Romans.

So he wrote to explain the purpose behind his withdrawal and sent the Libyan off, in order that once the Capuans understood his intention and the reason for the separation, they might endure the siege with confidence.

Meanwhile, when news reached Rome from the region of Capua that Hannibal had pitched camp opposite their lines and was besieging their forces, everyone in the city was thrown into alarm and fear, since the crisis seemed likely to affect the whole war.

Accordingly all alike bent their efforts toward this one object, devoting themselves to dispatches, reinforcements, and military preparations.

The Capuans, however, after receiving the letter brought by the Libyan and learning the Carthaginian plan, held firmly to their former resolve, deciding to put this fresh hope to the test.

Then, on the fifth day after his arrival, Hannibal had his men take supper, left the campfires burning, and so conducted the withdrawal that none of the enemy noticed what was happening.

He marched through Samnium at speed and without interruption, constantly sending his advance troops ahead to scout the route and seize key positions.

Thus, while the minds of those in Rome were still fixed on Capua and the operations there, he crossed the Anio unnoticed, came close to the city, and encamped no more than forty stades from Rome.

Chapter 6 Rome Saved by Luck

When this happened and the news reached Rome, the people of the city were thrown into complete confusion and terror.

The whole affair was sudden and wholly unexpected, since Hannibal had never before advanced so near the city; and another thought also crept in among them—that the enemy could never have dared come so close and with such confidence unless the Roman armies around Capua had been destroyed.

So the men occupied the walls and the strong positions in front of the city, while the women went around the temples imploring the gods, brushing the floors of the sanctuaries with their hair.

For this is their custom whenever some overwhelming danger overtakes their country.

But just when Hannibal had encamped and was planning on the following day to test the city itself, an extraordinary and fortunate accident occurred that helped save Rome.

Gnaeus and Publius had already completed the enrollment for one army, and the soldiers had sworn to appear in arms at Rome on that very day; and for the other army the enrollment and examination were then in progress.

As a result, a large number of men happened to be assembled at Rome at exactly the right moment. The commanders boldly led them out, encamped in front of the city, and checked Hannibal's advance.

At first the Carthaginians pushed forward, not altogether despairing of taking Rome itself by storm. But when they saw the opposing force drawn up in battle order and quickly learned from a prisoner what had happened, they abandoned the attack on the city and instead marched through the countryside, ravaging the land and burning the houses.

At the beginning they gathered into their camp an immense quantity of plunder, as though they had come upon a hunting ground of exactly the kind no one had ever expected an enemy to enter.

Chapter 7 Hannibal In Sight of Rome

But afterward, when the consuls boldly ventured to encamp only ten stades away, Hannibal—having now amassed a great quantity of booty, having lost hope of any success against the city, and above all calculating that by this time Appius ought, according to the original plan, to have learned of Rome's danger and either to have raised the siege altogether and come to help, or at least to have left part of his force behind and hurried off with the greater part—broke camp at dawn.

He believed that whichever of these things happened would serve his purpose well, and so set his army in motion before daybreak.

Publius and his men, however, broke down the bridges over the river just mentioned and forced Hannibal to take his army across the stream itself.

As the Carthaginians were making the crossing they pressed hard upon them and caused them great trouble.

They could not accomplish anything decisive because of the number of Hannibal's cavalry and the readiness of the Numidians on every kind of ground; but after stripping away a fair part of the booty and killing about three hundred of the enemy, they then withdrew to their camp.

After that, thinking that the Carthaginians were retreating in haste out of fear, they followed in their rear along the foothills.

Hannibal at first kept up his speed, eager to carry out the plan before him; but on the fifth day, when word was brought that Appius and his army were still remaining at the siege, he halted, waited for the pursuers to come up, and while it was still night attacked their camp.

He killed many of them and drove the rest out of the camp.

When day came and he saw that the Romans had withdrawn to a strong hill, he gave up any thought of continuing the attack against them.

Instead he marched through Daunia and Bruttium and suddenly appeared in the region of Rhegium, coming so unexpectedly that he came within a little of taking the city itself, cut off all those who had gone out into the countryside, and in that visit made himself master of a large number of Rhegines.

Chapter 8 Epaminondas and Hannibal Compared

At this point, I think, one may fairly pause to note the courage and ambition both of the Carthaginians and of the Romans in war.

For just as everyone admires the Theban Epaminondas because, after coming to Tegea with the allies and observing that the Lacedaemonians themselves had all assembled at Mantinea, together with their allies, in order to fight the Thebans,

he ordered his own men to take supper early and led out the army as night was just coming on, pretending that he was hurrying to seize certain advantageous positions for the coming battle,

but after creating that impression among the rank and file actually marched straight toward Sparta itself,

and, arriving unexpectedly at about the third hour, found Sparta empty of defenders, forced his way as far as the marketplace, and occupied the parts of the city that slope toward the river,

yet then suffered a reversal because some deserter got through during the night to Mantinea and informed King Agesilaus what was happening, and help arrived just at the critical moment when the city was on the point of being taken,

so that he failed in that hope; but afterward, having had breakfast by the Eurotas and allowed his troops to recover from their exertions, he again set out by the same road in the opposite direction,

calculating that since the Lacedaemonians and their allies had gone off to help Sparta, Mantinea would in turn be left undefended—which is exactly what happened.

So he encouraged the Thebans, pushed on with a vigorous night march, and came up to Mantinea about midday, when it was completely abandoned by those who might have defended it.

But at this very moment the Athenians, eager under their alliance to take part with the Lacedaemonians in the struggle against the Thebans, arrived.

And just as the Theban vanguard was reaching the sanctuary of Poseidon, which lies seven stades in front of the city, it so happened that the Athenians appeared on the hill above Mantinea.

At the sight of them, the Mantineans who had been left behind only then found courage enough to mount the walls and block the Theban assault.

For this reason historians are justified in their criticism of those events, when they say that the commander did everything that a good general could do, and that Epaminondas was superior to his enemies but inferior to Fortune.

Chapter 9 When Audacity is the Truest Safety

The same remark may be made about Hannibal as well.

First, he attacked the enemy and tried by a series of partial engagements to raise the siege.

Then, after failing in that attempt, he rushed straight at Rome itself; and when that purpose also was frustrated by accidents beyond calculation, he turned back again, crushed the troops pursuing him, and held himself ready in case any movement should occur among those besieging Capua.

And finally, without abandoning his design, he flung himself against the enemy to injure them, and all but wiped out the people of Rhegium.

Who would not mark such a commander out for admiration?

And yet at this moment one might judge the Romans superior to the Lacedaemonians.

For the Lacedaemonians, thrown into confusion at the first message, saved Sparta indeed, but so far as they were concerned they lost Mantinea.

The Romans, however, both preserved their own country and did not raise the siege. Instead, they remained steadfast and immovable in their original resolve, and from then on pressed the Capuans with still greater confidence.

I do not say this so much for the sake of praising either Romans or Carthaginians—for I have already noted their qualities more than once—as for the sake of those who hold command among either people, and of all who in later times will have charge of public affairs.

By remembering such actions, or by having them set before their eyes, they may become eager to imitate them. For what seems rash and dangerous often turns out, on the contrary, to be real safety; and boldness of conception, if only it is guided by reason, remains admirable, noble, and worthy of remembrance whether it succeeds or fails.

Atella is a city of the Opici in Italy, lying between Capua and Neapolis. The ethnic name is Atellanus, as Polybius says in the ninth book: "The Atellani surrendered themselves."

When the Romans were besieging Tarentum, Bomilcar the Carthaginian admiral came to help with a very large force. But since he could do nothing to assist those inside, because the Romans had secured their camp and blockade so well, he consumed his supplies without accomplishing anything. Though he had first been compelled to come by urgent appeals and great promises, he was later forced by the entreaties of the people within the city to sail away.

Chapter 10 The Spoils of Syracuse: Works of Art Taken To Rome

A city is not adorned by things brought in from outside, but by the virtue of its inhabitants.

For this reason the Romans decided to transfer the objects just mentioned to their own country and leave nothing behind.

Whether they acted rightly and to their own advantage, or the reverse, would require a long discussion. But the stronger argument, I think, is that they did not act properly then, and are not acting properly now when they do such things.

If it had been by means of such objects that they had first advanced their own country, then it would plainly have made sense to bring home the things through which they had grown great.

But if, while living in the utmost simplicity and keeping themselves far removed from the extravagance and luxury connected with such things, they nevertheless conquered people who possessed them in greatest abundance and of finest quality, how are we not to regard what they did as a mistake?

For to abandon the customs of the conquerors and take up admiration for those of the conquered, while at the same time taking on the jealousy that always follows such things—and that is the most dangerous thing for those in positions of superiority—must surely be acknowledged to be an error.

A spectator never praises those who possess what belongs to others so purely that pity for the original losers does not at once mingle with envy.

And when power continues to grow, and one people gathers everything belonging to others into its own hands, and in a sense invites the dispossessed to come and look at it all, the evil becomes double.

For then the spectators no longer pity their neighbors, but themselves, as the sight recalls their own disasters.

From this there springs not only envy, but a kind of anger against the prosperous, because the memory of their private misfortunes acts like a spur driving men to hatred of those who caused them.

There may perhaps be some reasonable argument for bringing gold and silver together into one's own possession; for no one can aspire to universal power without at once weakening the resources of others and preparing that kind of strength for himself.

But the things that lie outside this kind of power ought to have been left in their original places. In that way they would both have avoided stirring up envy and would have made their own country more glorious, adorning it not with paintings and statues, but with dignity and greatness of soul.

Let me say this for the sake of those who continually inherit positions of power, so that when they plunder cities they may not suppose that other people's disasters are an ornament to their own fatherlands. The Romans, however, after transferring these objects, used them to decorate private life in individual households and to embellish the public spaces of the city.

Chapter 11 Spain

The Carthaginian commanders, though they had mastered their enemies, could not master themselves.

Thinking that they had already brought the war with Rome to an end, they fell into internal quarrels, continually led into conflict by the Phoenicians' inborn greed and love of power.

Among them Hasdrubal son of Gesco, abusing the authority he possessed, went so far in wickedness that he demanded a large sum of money from Andobales, the most loyal of their Iberian friends—a man who had once lost his rule because of the Carthaginians and had only recently recovered it because of his goodwill toward them.

And when Andobales refused, confident because of his long-standing loyalty to Carthage, Hasdrubal brought a false accusation against him and forced him to hand over his daughters as hostages.

Chapter 11a

The Romans sent envoys to Ptolemy because they wanted grain supplies, since there was a severe shortage among them.

All the countryside in Italy had been devastated by the armies as far as the very gates of Rome, and no help had come from outside, because wars were in progress and armies were encamped in every part of the inhabited world except the regions of Egypt.

So extreme had the scarcity at Rome become that a Sicilian medimnus was selling for fifteen drachmas.

And yet, though their situation was like this, they did not neglect the war.

Chapter 12 On the Art of Commanding Armies

Military enterprises are attended by many circumstances that require careful thought; yet in each case it is possible to hit upon the right course, if a man carries out his plan with intelligence.

That operations in war openly and forcibly executed are fewer than those accomplished by stratagem and by the timely use of opportunity is easy for anyone to learn from past events.

And that even among those operations that do depend on seizing the right moment, failures are more numerous than successes is also not hard to see from experience.

Nor would anyone doubt that most such failures come about through the ignorance or carelessness of commanders.

So we may now examine what method governs this sort of undertaking.

Events in war that occur unexpectedly ought not really to be called operations at all, but rather accidents and chance occurrences.

For that reason we may leave aside anything that cannot be treated methodically or reduced to a fixed principle. What should be explained is what is done according to deliberate design; and it is of this that the present discussion speaks.

Every action has its definite opportunity, duration, and place, and requires secrecy, fixed signals, and also clear knowledge of through whom, with whom, and in what manner it is to be carried out.

It is therefore plain that the man who gets each of these points right will not fail in his enterprise, whereas one who neglects even a single point will ruin the whole design.

So much has nature made even one small detail enough to bring an intended plan to failure...

Chapter 13 Scientific Strategy

Success demands that everything be adequately provided for; for that reason commanders must neglect nothing in undertakings of this kind.

The first principle of all is silence: a man must not, whether from delight at some unexpected hope, or from fear, or from familiarity, or from affection, share the plan with anyone outside the circle,

but only with those without whom the design cannot be brought to completion—and not even with them before the moment when the need for each person's part compels disclosure.

And one must keep silence not only with the tongue, but even more with the mind.

For many men, though they concealed their words, have betrayed their designs by their very expression, or even by the actions they took.

The second requirement is to know the capacities of marches by day and by night, and the distances that can be covered in each, not only on land but also at sea.

Third, and most important, one must understand the opportunities provided by the seasons and be able to adapt the plan rightly to them.

Nor should the place of action be treated as a small matter, since it often happens that because of the ground what seems impossible becomes possible, while what seemed possible turns out impossible.

Finally, one must not neglect signals and counter-signals, or the choice of the persons through whom and with whom the decided action is to be carried out.

Chapter 14 Generals Also Need to Know Science

Of the matters just mentioned, some are learned through practice, some from history, and some by systematic experience.

Best of all is for the commander himself to know the roads, the place to which he must come, the nature of the ground, and in addition the men through whom and with whom he is going to act.

Second best is to make careful inquiry and not trust random people; indeed, the reliability of guides in such matters should always be secured in some definite way.

These things, and others like them, perhaps can be acquired by commanders through military practice itself, some by direct experience and some by history.

But what comes from scientific knowledge requires instruction and principles, especially from astronomy and geometry. The actual labor of these sciences is not great for the purpose in view, yet their value is great and they can contribute greatly to the operations I have described.

Their most necessary use lies in reckoning night and day. If those periods were always equal, the matter would require no study and the knowledge would be common to all.

But since they differ not only from each other, but also vary in themselves, it is clearly necessary to know the increase and decrease of each.

For how can anyone correctly estimate a march and the distance possible by day or by night unless he has understood those differences?

And indeed it is impossible to arrive at the proper moment without such knowledge; one must otherwise either be late or arrive too early.

In these operations, arriving too early is an even greater mistake than being late.

For the man who passes beyond the appointed moment merely misses his opportunity, since he can learn from a distance what has happened and withdraw again safely.

But the man who comes too early, by approaching before the time and being noticed, not only fails in the enterprise but risks everything.

Chapter 15 Mode of Calculating Time

In all human actions the critical moment has power, but most of all in war.

Therefore a general ought to have ready at hand the summer and winter solstices, the equinoxes, and the intervals between them in which days and nights increase and diminish.

Only in this way can he properly measure the distances that can be covered, whether by land or by sea.

He must also know the divisions of time both by day and by night, so as to understand when reveille should be sounded and when a march should begin.

For no one can attain the end if he has failed to get the beginning right.

The times of day can be observed without difficulty from the shadow, from the sun's course, and from the distances it traverses across the sky.

Those of night are harder to judge unless one can follow, from what is visible, the arrangement and order of the twelve signs of the zodiac; yet even this is easy for those who have carefully studied the heavens.

For although nights are unequal in length, it nevertheless happens that in every night six of the twelve signs rise above the horizon. It is therefore clear that in corresponding parts of every night equal portions of the zodiac must rise.

And since the sun's position is known each day, it is clear that the sign lying opposite it must be the one rising.

What remains is that whatever part of the zodiac appears to have risen after that point indicates how much of the night has elapsed.

And once the signs of the zodiac are known both in number and in size, the particular divisions of the night also become known accordingly.

On cloudy nights one must pay attention to the moon, because by reason of its size its light is almost always visible wherever in the sky it may be.

Sometimes one must estimate from the times and places of its rising,

and sometimes again from those of its setting, provided one has enough understanding in this matter to keep pace with the daily changes in those risings.

There is an easy way to observe this as well, for one month marks out a single evident cycle, perceptible to the senses...

Chapter 16 Example: Ulysses

For this reason one may praise the poet for representing Odysseus, that most capable of leaders, as drawing inferences from the stars not only for navigation, but also for operations on land.

For unexpected events, which cannot be fully anticipated by exact foresight, are enough by themselves to produce great and repeated difficulties,

such as heavy rains, floods of rivers, severe frosts and snowfalls, thick and cloudy air, and all other things of that sort.

So if we also neglect matters that can in fact be foreseen, how can it fail to be our own fault when we miss success in most cases?

Therefore none of the things just mentioned should be neglected, if we do not want to fall into the kind of blunders into which many others are said to have fallen, as well as those men whom I am now about to mention by way of example.

Chapter 17 Failures Arising From Ignorance

When Aratus, the Achaean general, planned to seize the city of Cynaetha by treachery, he agreed with his collaborators inside the city on a day when Aratus was to come by night to the river flowing from Cynaetha and wait there quietly with his force.

The men inside, about midday when they got the chance, were to send one of their number out through the gate quietly, wrapped in a cloak, and tell him to stand before the city on the tomb that had been agreed upon as the signal.

The rest were to lay hands on the officials who, around midday, when they were asleep, were accustomed to guard the gate.